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ABSTRACT
AESTHETICS, AUTHORITY AND JUSTICE IN A POST-METAPHYSICAL
AGE: NIETZSCHE AND ARENDT
SEPTEMBER 1991
KIMBERLEY F. CURTIS, B.A., SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain
The aim of my dissertation is to explore the
aesthetic approaches to questions of authority and justice
in a post-metaphysical age in the works of Friedrich
Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt. Both turn from a rationalist
foundation for political order, and suggest that our
aesthetic response to the world is central in forming our
sense of legitimacy and allegiance as well as in orienting
us ethically. Central to this response is a celebration
of the plurality and relativity of human affairs in the
form of a sense of tragic pleasure which I argue is of
great ethical relevance to our post-metaphysical condi-
tion. This "aestheticization" places both Nietzsche and
Arendt 's work in great tension with conceptions of
politics based primarily on concerns about social and eco-
nomic justice. I explore these tensions, and argue that
the line of thinking begun by Nietzsche is brought to real
fruition in Arendt's work. As such, she offers an
v
important alternative to the nihilistic and anti-political
tendencies in Nietzsche's work, tendencies which haunt
post-structuralist thinkers indebted to Nietzsche. Hence,
this dissertation is situated between modernist
rationalism and post-structuralist relativism.
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INTRODUCTION
In this study I explore what I take to be the aestheti-
cally grounded approaches to the problems of authority and
justice in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah
Arendt. Both thinkers lodged their reflections in the gap
with which they thought their and our times were con-
fronted as the efficacy of the modern rationalist
metaphysical foundations for political and ethical order
waned. Both Nietzsche and Arendt were driven by the sense
that the remnants of modernity must be critigued in the
effort to usher in, as Arendt put it, a novus ordo
saeclorum
. And both carried out their critigues of
modernity through a persistent rejection of Western
metaphysics in favor of aesthetic explorations. Yet both
would have stood critically to the philosophical-political
body of thought that has arisen in what many now call our
condition of postmodernity : post-structuralism, a set of
works informed by an explicitly aesthetic orientation.
Furthermore, their critical distance I believe would have
been of an ethical nature, involving shared concerns about
both authority and justice in this condition of post-
modernity.
This dissertation is situated within the on-going
contemporary debates over the relation between modernity
and postmodernity; that is, squarely within our preoccupa-
1
tion
- perhaps itself prototypical ly modern - with our
place and identity. More specifically, I am concerned
here to explore and make a case for the ethical relevance
to our present condition of the works of both Nietzsche
and Arendt - not only insofar as they reveal the ethical
corrosion of modernity, but insofar as they help us to
reconceive ethics in a post-metaphysical condition. The
aesthetic dimension of both of their works has been sound-
ly criticized as amoral and lacking in ethical force, 1 and
it is central to this work to suggest the shortcomings of
such critiques, while at the same time distancing their
work from much of post-structuralist thought which, on the
whole, I find ethically limited. It is to an elaboration
of these debates that I now turn in the effort to more
closely situate this work.
Our times - it is too much to call ours an "age" -
are increasingly beset by the sense that Western culture
is moving beyond "the modern." The goals and aspirations,
the founding principles, assumptions and beliefs which in-
augurated a clear sense of the new in the 17th century,
and which, variously, retained effective force in forming
a relatively coherent sense of a cultural identity, no
longer possess the same kind of potency. The conglomerate
of claims and dreams with which moderns distinguished
themselves from both the medievals and the ancients: in-
creased rationality, freedom, scientific knowledge and
2
mastery of nature, self
-consciousness
, individuality,
progress, material abundance - to name but an important
few, have one by one been challenged and problematic by
events of the late 19th and 2 0th centuries, and by the in-
tellectual and artistic efforts to come to grips with the
age within which these events occurred. Most dramatically
significant in this regard are imperialism, the
totalitarian orders of Nazi Germany and Stalin's reign in
the Soviet Union, the invention and use of nuclear
weaponry, and, more recently, the possibly irreversible
alteration of the earth's climate due to ozone depletion,
as well as an industrial system of production and way of
life which daily destroy the biological and genetic diver-
sity of life on earth.
Philosophically this sense of moving beyond "the mod-
ern" (and I call it a sense to underline the idea that
this is not just another argument but a felt condition
f
something we are not altogether simply able to choose ) has
been registered in the claim that Western metaphysics has
come to an end, a claim first heralded by Nietzsche,
spread afar by Heidegger, and most persistently and posi-
tively pursued as the beginning for all thought by post-
structuralists such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Der-
rida. At the heart of this sense lies the idea that we
must relinquish the notion that there is a true reality
which underlies the world of appearances, a true reality
3
with which we have affinity and whose purported sub-
stantiality should and can frame and inspire our philo-
sophic, scientific and ethical lives. Truth is not some-
thing out there, underlying, essential, waiting to be dis-
covered, it is, rather, a human product, something his-
torically contextual rather than transcendental and uni-
versal. Thus the end of metaphysics is synonymous with a
crisis in epistemology
.
At its most general, but also its most fundamental
level then, this sense of being beyond the modern consists
philosophically in an inability to sustain faith or trust
in the founding philosophical idea of Western culture - of
a reality which is perfect, harmonious, universally con-
sistent, final and eternal, and which, furthermore, can
provide the guiding ethical principles by which our pri-
vate and collective lives can be ordered, given meaning
and purpose. Under these conditions the problems which
loom for political theorists (as well, obviously, though
in different ways for everyone) are those having to do
with how to ground or legitimate political order, on what
foundations to build conceptions and practices of
authority and justice in a world increasingly unable to
sustain any claims to truth or universality towards such
ends.
In the modern age such foundations have taken various
forms: in the early modern period in such thinkers as
Hobbes and Locke it was the laws of nature which were
thought to be hidden in the breast of every human, that
is, rational being; the 18th century followed, proclaiming
the inalienable rights of all men; and the 19th with the
dialectical laws of history in the form of Geist or class
consciousness whose full realization it was thought would
put an end to history as such. Jean-Francois Lyotard has
characterized recourse to such foundations for legiti-
mation in the modern age as recourse to "meta-narratives .
»
With the term modern itself he designates, "any science
that legitimizes itself with reference to a metadiscourse
of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand nar-
rative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics
of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working
subject, or the creation of wealth." 2 This dealing in
meta-narratives has also been called foundational ism or
totalizing theory. All three terms, as efforts to grasp
the essence of the modern conceptually, imply the guality
of the modern age which I would like to highlight here -
namely a will to master, a drive to order, tame and take
charge of the world.
More pointedly, I think we must understand the modern
as driven by a will and a conviction that the human condi-
tion of suffering in both its material, but also substan-
tially in its spiritual dimensions can and should be ex-
purgated from the world. To master and to heal become in-
5
terwoven in the secular humanism of the modern age. As
such, modern progress is implacably pitted against both
the finitude of nature as well as its mysterious infinity
or wildness. To become essentially human is understood as
a developmental and historical process of increasing im-
provement in the rational faculty which can ever more
thoroughly assert itself over and against a nature - both
within the self and without - which otherwise leads us
astray into chaos, moral degeneracy, unknowing, darkness
and helplessness. Modern "man" is guintessentially homo
faber who will make the tools and create the wealth
through which the harshness of a capricious nature will be
terminated and the alienation which comes from finding
oneself subject to such forces will be annulled. Whole-
ness, and healing occur through mastery and domination,
the end goal being not to redeem suffering by finding
something to suffer for, but to believe it possible to
eradicate the phenomenon altogether.
Objection to this reading of modernity will un-
doubtedly be made that this age does indeed tolerate a
great deal of suffering - in its liberal moment wherein
those who cannot achieve the level of mastery and rational
autonomy demanded of them are marginalized, stigmatized
and disciplined; and in its marxist moment wherein those
insufficiently socialized and humanized must be re-
programmed and re-educated. Thus, it will be objected,
6
both liberalism and marxism require perpetual sacrifices,
forms of asceticism and suffering to gain their ends.
Such points are obviously well taken. The amount of
human suffering which occurred in the early capitalist
period in the West was tremendous, and the expansion of
disciplinary and social control interventions which have
come to constitute the nature of the relationship between
the state and citizen/client in liberal welfare state dem-
ocracies has brought a rather new kind of suffering to
liberal polities. Alternatively, the extraordinary
curtailment of individual and public freedom under state
socialist regimes has brought arguably even greater suf-
fering.
Yet this should not obscure what, in my view, is a
deeper driving current of modernity, namely that in both
its liberal and marxists dimensions modernity's fundamen-
tal ethical self
-understanding of what it is doing is
framed by a persistent humanism which, in hubristic fash-
ion, takes pity upon the human condition and is motivated
by the effort to mitigate and ameliorate, if not eliminate
the pains which it supposes are not necessary for the ra-
tional, self-creating beings it takes humans to be (or be
on the way to becoming)
. And this drive rests, once
again, in faith in and access to true knowledge of the na-
ture of humans and the world; on unconditional claims to
the truth that ground their ends and thus too the meaning
7
an
that infuses their lives. There is no need here for
interrogatory posture, though this drive has always been
accompanied by great anxiety and doubts about the ends it
seeks to realize.
These are very large claims and I would like to
specify them somewhat by briefly looking at two
preeminently modern political theorists: Locke and Marx
who will serve as the emblems for the two most important
intellectual forces in modernity - liberalism and marxism.
In the state of nature of Locke's political and ethi-
cal imagination we find that we are naturally rational
(though "the guarrelsome and contentious" do fall short of
their nature), and that it is this nature, the rational
and industrious, which God commands to subdue the earth.
All earthly nature must be subdued which means be trans-
formed out of its "worthless" state and made productive,
wealth-producing; it must be possessed by the rational,
and this is as true for the natural world as it is for the
human "waste" which was the target of Locke's proposed
Poor Law Reform. 3 Both are pitiable and in need of dis-
ciplined subjugation by the industrious hand of the ra-
tional man. Both are in need of rectification, and the
relation the rational man takes to them is fundamentally
structured by the conviction that such rectification is
both necessary and possible, and that the rationality
which legitimizes such relations is pre-social, God-given.
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If we turn to the theorist who fundamentally shaped
the other pole of modern political thought - Marx - we can
see reason again pre-established, though this time being
developed through the movement of history understood as
the dialectical exchange between humans and nature. And
again, the final aim, the driving impetus is the allevia-
tion of suffering in the human condition, this time in a
twofold sense of material misery but also of that
elementary alienation which the human subject experiences
as a consequence both of private property where the fruits
of her labor stand over and against her as something
alien, and as a consequence of an alien, unhumanized na-
ture itself. in this context marxism is an extension and
further intensification of the modern drive to alleviate
suffering. In both senses the human condition is piti-
able, in need of rectification. Hence Marx's ideal of a
fully naturalized man and humanized nature, and the prom-
ise of a phenomenal transparency in human affairs.
In both Locke and Marx the drive to rectify a piti-
able condition is underwritten by a meta-narrative about
reason: for Locke it is a reason given us by God prior to
society; for Marx it is a metaphysically grounded concep-
tion of reason in history. And in both cases this ground
fuels an impulse basic and central to each - to bring
abundance that will alleviate suffering on earth. Though
certainly not the only ethical impulse in liberalism and
9
marxism, this is, I would suggest, one of its strongest
and most durable ones, but also one without which neither
of these modern forms of thought could sustain their
identity as such.
While the crisis of nihilism to which this sense of
being now beyond the modern corresponds is a complex
tangle of events I do not here presume to thoroughly elab-
orate, what I do want to suggest is the central ity of this
will to master and rectify to the collapse of the modern
rationalist metaphysical foundation for ethical and
political order ./Most poignantly in its imperialist stage
capitalism and state socialism, through different means,
rather quickly exposed the raw lust for power and ac-
cumulation which drove the practices of political and cul-
tural life, steadily undermining the ethical foundations
of both political forms: the freedom of the rational
autonomous subject, on the one hand, and the freedom of
socialized man, on the other. This revelation of naked
power as well as the tremendous human-powered interven-
tions each shook, in their own ways, trust and faith in a
transcendent reason as the foundation for political order,
authority and justice. In the 19th and first half of the
2 0th century modernity reached its darkest hour, and with
the tumbling of a rationalist metaphysical foundation so
too teetered notions of a free willing subject, the equa-
tion of self-consciousness with freedom, historical prog-
10
ress... what was left of the order was a ceaseless, rest-
less accumulation process and pursuit of power and mastery
through it, a process to which all "uncongenial" cultural
formations and traditions are sacrificed: either destroyed
or assimilated so as to lose their distinctive form.
The curious aspect of this modernity which culminates
in so much nihilistic despair in the 20th century is that
the very will to master both the material and spiritual
suffering with which the human condition presents itself
actually begins a pursuit of total control and stability
of life experience in which all forms of life, all senti-
ments, impulses and beliefs which threaten that control
must ruthlessly be rooted out, subjugated, destroyed. The
very will to master and control itself produces the
greatest instability of life forms and cultural formation.
Hence, paradoxically, the essence of modernity is its pro-
cess character, as Arendt put it; an inertia towards form-
lessness which in this century has reached its peak in
such a way that we now, in our despair over modernity's
hopes and dreams, have come to the sense that we are
moving and must move beyond the modern.
It is with the term postmodernism that we grope to
express this sensibility which now intuitively grips much
of the Western world and which self-consciously grips many
Western intellectuals. Those who write from out of this
sensibility (to whom I shall refer as post-structuralists
11
for brevity's sake) all do so as self-consciously post-
metaphysical thinkers, thus striving to pull out of this
"ending" in Western culture what is possible in a positive
sense. For most this generally consists in a celebration
of difference, multiplicity, plurality and discontinuity;
a rejection of the search for immutable forms, of the
"consoling play of recognitions," of meta-narratives sue
as historical progress, of the autonomous subject, and a
concommitant embrace of contingency.
The most persistent and loudest concern that has
emerged regarding post-structuralism has to do with the
ethical relativism that critics charge makes this kind of
thought dangerous; that is, that there is no basis firm
enough upon which some form of authority and practices of
justice would guide and limit human action and human com-
munal life. The nightmare that haunts critics of post-
structuralism is an abandonment of all limiting, shaping
possibilities in favor of raw power and will alone.
At a theoretical, as at a practical level these con-
cerns must be addressed. The task, which appears to the
modern mind as the gigantic paradox of constructing a non-
foundational theory of authority and justice clearly must
be confronted. This confrontation is yet in its infancy
at this point, and it is here, within these youthful ef-
forts, that this dissertation is wedged insofar as, on the
one hand, it participates in critique of modernist concep-
12
tions of authority and justice with a postmodern
sensibility, yet, on the other, retains a critical dis-
tance from what often appears to be post-structuralist
thinkers' own embrace of this sort of hypermodern form-
lessness. Let me turn briefly to the work of three post-
structuralists by way of illustration.
Michel Foucault's work is an interesting and compli-
cated example in this regard. Foucault's most important
contribution is his conception of the specific form of
power modernity has produced: bio-power. Emerging with
the modern nation-state and its overarching concern for
its own existence, the target of bio-power is twofold:
species life and individual life. This form of power op-
erates by creating a subjectivity, an identity through
which the body can be objectified and subjugated. On the
basis of this deep subjectivity, this deep truth, (e.g.
the hysterical female body, the psychiatrization of the
perverse adult, etc.) that which does not fit is ruthless-
ly pursued in a ceaseless show of force which is never
complete because of what Foucault calls the plebs, or, "a
certain plebian quality" 4 irreducible to this true sub-
jectivity upon which the state relies. Indeed Foucault
argues that modernity's specific mode of operation, its
ceaseless effort to conquer the irreducible in the name of
the contained or complete, constantly causes the very
being of "man" to change and hence continuously objec-
13
tifies all values it established, making any morality or
ethical life impossible.
Foucault himself, in his own move beyond the modern,
distances his thought not only from subject-oriented
thought which privileges the self
-understanding of the
signifier, but also from thinking which takes seriously
the signified
- the sedimented background unavailable to
the signifier. Foucault thus rejects deep meaning in ei-
ther sense in favor of an analysis of human relations as
"fields of force," and of history as the perpetual dis-
continuous, discordant movement of "endlessly repeated
plays of domination." 5 what we essentially are are ef-
fects of this power, nothing more nor less.
Thought itself, then, becomes with Foucault, action -
both a play of power and an effect of power. It is no
longer theoretical. Hence, ironically, Foucault 's own
thought is a rarefied product of modern thought as he him-
self critically conceived it - as a "mode of action." And
this hperactive, disruptive, elusive offensive, hyperbolic
quality of Foucault 's thought was the strategy least open,
in his view, to peril in an age of bio-power. So Foucault
offends our desire for value by rejecting notions of
humanity and human dignity through which we seek to unify
human selves, and urges us to comprehend that what is is
discordant, that it exists in and as discord, and this he
does both by meticulous mapping of history's restless
14
plays of domination, but also by a constant self-conscious
refusal to affirm more than the irreducible "plebs" which
modern bio-power ceaselessly seeks to subjugate. it is,
then, through a hyper-movement, through his own form of
strategic thought-as-action that Foucault thinks it pos-
sible to battle modern formlessness and inability to
sustain an ethical life insofar as this strategy destroys
the anchors (namely the forms of subjectivity or deep
truth about selves) upon which modern bio-power depends
for its own reproduction.
This is very important work. Yet the thoroughly
deconstructive dimension is, finally, terribly insuffi-
cient when it comes to notions of what positivities we
might indeed ethically form ourselves around as we move
out of modernity. Foucault remains too silent on ques-
tions of authority and justice.
Jean-Francois Lyotard, by contrast, indeed tries to
address these questions in both The Post-Modern Condition
and in Just Gaming . 6 Lyotard ends The Post-Modern Condi -
tion with the following,
"Let us wage war on totality, let us be wit-
nesses to the unpresentable, let us activate
the differences and save the honor of the
name
.
1,7
The condition of postmodernity is characterized by Lyotard
as being "dispersed in clouds of narrative elements," each
element with its own "pragmatic valence," each of us
15
living at the "intersection" of many of these dispersed
clouds. 8 Thus we live in a heterogeneity of such elements
which are neither necessarily stable nor commensurable.
"They only," he says, "give rise to institutions in
patches
- local determinism," 9 despite the efforts of de-
cision makers to coordinate and systematize them.
Lyotard, like Foucault, embraces as a positive step
this condition of heterogeneity and dispersal, and sug-
gests that it is this being witnesses to the unpresentable
which will reenchant the world. Indeed that which legiti-
mates or has authority in the postmodern condition is the
generation of new ideas and new statements, is bringing
forth the new through paralogy which Lyotard distinguishes
from innovation. Legitimacy resides in paralogy, in those
moves which disturb the order of reason, destabilize the
capacity for explanation and certainty, thereby giving us
a thrilling brush with the incommensurable and the sub-
lime. The postmodern attitude is jubilation in a disrup-
tion which inaugurates new rules of the game, and not a
nostalgic disappointment in which the unpresentable is put
forth as "missing contents," 10 a sentiment which charac-
terize, in Lyotard ' s view, the modern. The very con-
sistency of form in modernist works continues to offer a
solace denied to the witness or spectator by postmodernist
works. Yet postmodernists take great pleasure in the dis-
16
ruptions and multiplicities that our condition engenders.
They embody an altogether different aesthetic.
The question then becomes for Lyotard what bearing
such reflections on paralogy and witnessing the unpresent-
able have outside the realms of knowledge and aesthetics?
If authority and legitimation lie in paralogy and the un-
presentable or sublime, how are we to re-think justice in
the condition of postmodernity?
He suggests that we must replace the modern regula-
tive idea of justice - totality, with that of plurality.
Here justice would be placed under a rule of divergence
not convergence. 11 The first step would be the recogni-
tion of the heterogeneity and purity of each language game
and a rejection of "terror" which assumes the isomorphism
of language games. 12 The second step recognizes that con-
sensus on the rules of any game must be local so that
there are a multiplicity of finite arguments about
metaprescriptives, limited in time and space. 13
Justice then, for Lyotard, gets reduced, on the one
hand, to maintaining the purity of incommensurable lan-
guage games, and, on the other, to a restless innovation
at the limits of given rules which have no other value
than joy in the new and intimations of the unpresentable.
The problem, as Sam Weber, using Nietzsche, points out in
the Afterword to Just Gaming is that what is interesting
about language games is not their absolute singularity and
17
incommensurability, as Lyotard suggests, but rather the
tension between unity and disunity. " it is this kind of
agonism and not one of complete rupture and distance which
more closely captures relations between language games,
and which is most fascinating when it comes to question
concerning freedom, authority and justice. Furthermore,
to build out from Weber's point, it is this very tension
within which the constitution of a "we" is possible, a
non-totalizing we in which change and the new occurs not
alone through the monotonous radical disruptions which
characterize Lyotard 's paralogies. Purposefulness, that
which justifies in this Lyotardian game-world, is disrup-
tion for disruption's sake; change of rules for the sake
of delight in the change. And the question, why? presses
itself forth constantly upon this text. Lyotard
celebrates the restlessness and the formlessness which
characterizes life in this postmodern condition. "[The]
most significant effect of language games," he writes, "is
precisely what validates the adoption of rules - the quest
for paralogy." 15 Here we have it outright: what justifies
are instabilities, disruptions in the order of reason, and
the incommensurability of our games as well as legiti-
mation by paralogy itself keep us from being able to
evaluate such moves save for the very largest of princi-
ples - heteromorphism which must prevail against the ter-
ror of isomorphism.
18
This kind of formless heteromorphism clearly fright-
ens Richard Rorty, though he too writes conscientiously
with a postmodern sensibility. Rorty's "liberal ironist"
cultivates the constitution of a public we through a
solidarity which comes of pity for pain and remorse for
cruelty. 16 The human solidarity he wishes to cultivate
depends not on a human essence or core sense of the self,
but on "the ability to think of people wildly different
from ourselves as included in the range of "us"..." 17 and
this through a recognition of our common susceptibility to
humiliation and pain. This is the extent to which we can
define a moral subject. For Rorty, this and not agreement
about a final vocabulary that establishes our ends and
purposes is "the only social bond needed." 18 This bond
then is the solitary basis for public, collective life.
It is private life which the liberal ironist reserves
for ultimate questions about life's meaning and purposes.
The minimal social bond should make it maximally possible
for individuals to pursue such questions as an ironist
would, that is, not with the hope of arriving at any final
truth but with the effort to constantly re-describe them-
selves and their ends in their experiments with self-
creation and private salvation. This is done through en-
counters with others - in books and with living persons.
The ironist creatively pursues the doubts and ambiguities
19
inevitably lodged in her settled views and beliefs, seek-
ing to forever re-define them in light of the new.
What we may appear to have found in Rorty 's liberal
ironist culture is an answer to modernity's and post-
modernity's formlessness - the former the result of a will
to master, the latter the result of a celebration of dis-
ruptions, discontinuities, and paralogy. For the liberal
ironist has rejected the modernist metaphysician's project
of a final vocabulary, but has also found a minimal basis
for a social bond which gives a general principle-based
form to cultural-public life. There is in a liberal
ironist culture the possibility of a great degree of so-
cial cohesion yet a tremendous space for self-
experimentation or "private salvation" as Rorty sometimes
characterizes it. 19 The formlessness and the wildly
deconstructive impulses of much post-structuralist thought
appear to be absent in liberal ironist culture with its
ethically rooted citizen and its rootless ironist.
I think this judgment too precipitous, for neither
can Rorty address the Nietzschean contention that some
forms of suffering may be creative and ethically fruitful,
nor the Arendtian contention that a pity-based politics
itself leads, if not inevitably to the Terror, then to a
pursuit of comfort which itself knows no limits. Nor can
Rorty answer Foucault's charge that such a politics has
led and will lead to the constitution of a public culture
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which perpetually seeks to expurgate pain and cruelty in
the name of some identity (the pederast? the mad? the
hysterical female body?) while it is clear Rorty would
not embrace this disciplinary bio-power, his formulations
of public life and the basis for solidarity leave his lib-
eral ironist culture no resources with which to combat it.
For even the private ironist which Rorty very undemocrati-
cally (and probably naively) sees as being but a minority
of the population - the vast majority living from common
sense, is busy describing new forms of cruelty and
humiliation and pain, and thus is fundamentally bound up
in the very modern project of expurgating pain and suffer-
ing.
I turn, then, to both Nietzsche and Arendt for help
in groping towards a post-metaphysical or non-foundational
approach to the problems of authority and justice in the
wake of the end of modernism and the still dissatisfactory
nature of most postmodern work, three examples of which I
have commented on above. The pairing of Nietzsche and
Arendt for such a task is not at all self-evident. In
some sense Arendt is the heroine of this work for, on the
one hand, she is critical of modernity's effort to al-
leviate suffering through a hyper focus on mastery - in-
cluding here the project of the autonomous or sovereign
subject as well as the collective self, but also the im-
pulse to master the earth. Furthermore, she was highly
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suspicious of the emotion of pity and the passion of com-
passion with regard to political life, fearing the uncon-
ditional and limitless character of their force was
destructive of cultural formation. On the other hand,
Arendt would not have taken much solace in post-
structuralist thought either; she would have been particu-
larly impatient with its deconstructive tendencies, unbal-
anced as they usually are by constructive ones, and thus,
as I argue above, doing little to combat the formlessness
of life in late modernity. Arendt seems to occupy an im-
portant position: neither nostalgically (or despairingly)
modernist, nor blithely postmodernist.
In this regard Nietzsche seems perhaps ill-chosen as
someone from whom help also might be sought for sue a pro-
ject, particularly as post-structuralist theorists with
their deconstructive tendencies are probably more in-
fluenced by Nietzsche than by any other single philoso-
pher. Even Arendt herself said of Nietzsche's formula-
tions of our condition that they were sometimes "overly
loud and pathetic," as if, in her view, Nietzsche ex-
aggerated not so much the end of the old world, but
resources for constructing a new one. 20 So why the pair
Nietzsche and Arendt for a project that sets out to think
about the possibility of authority and justice, of limits
in a post-metaphysical age?
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Nietzsche and Arendt share an exploration that in
both thinkers becomes an exemplification of an alternative
to the aesthetic impulse which underlay modern rationalist
metaphysics with its roots in Platonism. Convinced that
the effective force of Western metaphysics for political
life was at an end, both Nietzsche and Arendt turn with
anxiety to the problems of form, of authority and of the
possibility of cultural greatness or excellence. Reject-
ing the older aesthetic of pleasure in harmony, perfection
and oneness, the aesthetic sensibility Arendt and
Nietzsche both exhibit and consciously attempt to
cultivate is pleasure in the tension between harmony and
discord
- what Arendt called "tragic pleasure." 21 it is
their conviction that experimentation with this aesthetic
was critical to the reconceptualization and re-
establishment of a kind of authority suited to a post-
metaphysical age. And even more strongly, that this
aesthetic sensibility must be the difficult ground of
ethical life in such an age. The works of both Arendt and
Nietzsche suggest that we must cultivate the ability to
find beautiful the tensions, ambiguities, the
heterogeneity and plurality - painful though this may be -
at the heart of the human condition.
Such a sensibility embraces pain, embraces suffering
at minimum as it arises out of the uncertainty as to basic
questions of meaning. And insofar as this is true its
basic pulse beats against the unconditional hopes, the
totalizing projects of mastery which so mark the modern
age. We find in both Arendt and Nietzsche an embrace of a
kind of wild alteritas, an irreducible and beautiful
strangerliness that plagues and pleasures the human condi-
tion and which, furthermore, both believe a culture cannot
do without if it is to endure as a living form. By
"living" I mean a form of life in which the spirit to
which a culture owes its being is continuously renewed and
reaffirmed through acts which perpetually reunite and
retie a group to shared goals, reshaping its integrity
anew. It is the failure to have such an aesthetic
sensibility which I think for both Nietzsche and Arendt is
the reason modernity lacks what Nietzsche called
gestaltende Kraefte, form-giving forces. Hence its lapse,
its decay.
It may justly be objected that while this may be a
plausible interpretation of Arendt, it is a strange
Nietzsche indeed. And in fact the past World War II
scholarship on Nietzsche, diverse though it be, largely
supports such an objection. There are few Nietzsche
scholars who argue Nietzsche is relevant or interesting
when it comes to political thinking, let alone who find
him insightful with regard to questions of authority and
the ethical limits to action - with the very obvious and
disturbing exception of German fascist thought. On the
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one hand, we find scholars such as Walter Kaufmann and
more recently Alexander Nehamas who, for different reasons
suggest Nietzsche was either not concerned with political
life or is not relevant to political questions. 22 On the
other, we find that those who decidedly do think Nietzsche
was concerned with things political and thus must be taken
seriously by political theorists do so almost exclusively
out of a sense of danger. Here we can mention J. P. stern,
Stanley Rosen, and the latter works of Martin Heidegger. 23
Finally, a third hand deals to Nietzsche the role of
deconstructor, of one who sees life as a play of forces,
nomadic and utterly decentered. For this line of inter-
pretation we must think primarily of Jacques Derrida,
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. 24 While this latter
group finds Nietzsche intimately relevant for political
problems they, once again, sorely under-investigate the
problem of authority and order from a constructive angle
in Nietzsche's work and hence Nietzsche tends to become in
some sense the paternal apotheosis of postmodern formless-
ness on their reading.
Central to my own line of interpretation in this work
is the claim that a fundamental political concern informs
Nietzsche's work from his earliest to his final writings:
the concern with a culture's ability to produce formative
agents and to artistically form itself into a living
whole. It is true that in his early writings Nietzsche
was directly engaged in the effort to create cultural
regeneration in Germany by articulating potentialities in
Wagnerian festivals, but that after breaking with Wagner
he ceased successfully to link his intellectual work with
any existing political, social or cultural movements. 25
Yet even and perhaps especially in his rich post-Wagner
works Nietzsche continues to be propelled by the essen-
tially political questions: what forms of life and what
kinds of authority and culture are possible within the
context of a post-metaphysical condition whose meaning and
consequences Nietzsche labored both to discern and to
shape
.
This interpretation of Nietzsche as constructivist
is, obviously, not the only plausible one, but it is a
neglected one and, more importantly, one of which we are
in great need currently. Nietzsche has become a site of
tremendous interpretive struggle I believe because in the
multiplicity of his voices we experience, we grasp the
numerous directions possible for ethical life in post-
modernity. To read Nietzsche is the be made to feel the
horror of some alternatives (the focus of readers such as
Heidegger and J. P. Stern) but also the seduction of others
(the focus of readers such as Foucault and Derrida) . To
reject either path is to domesticate Nietzsche's thought
(the problem with readers such as Kaufmann and Nehamas)
.
What I have tried to do is to feel the horror, resist the
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seduction and still allow the wildness of Nietzsche's
thought to breathe. This is a wildness mixed with great
anxiety over the problems of order, greatness and freedom
in a post-metaphysical condition. And in the tension of
these forces Nietzsche glimpses a kind of non-foundational
form of authority and approach to justice to which I think
Arendt is the heir. it is this voice of Nietzsche's we
need so much to hear today.
Yet it is only an incipient voice in Nietzsche, and
one still posed out of the dilemmas presented a philoso-
pher in a post-metaphysical age. Arendt is an original
student of Nietzsche's and simultaneously a necessary
antidote to him, for Nietzsche's frame of reference for
his reflections on authority and justice, and on politics
more generally, remains largely that of a solitary philos-
opher: human perfection (works), singularity and truth,
while Arendt's frame of reference wells fundamentally and
even relentlessly out of concerns of a political philoso-
pher: human events, plurality, and meaning. Nietzsche's
elaboration of political problems are still formulated
from the point of view of the life of the mind, while
Arendt thinks in the tension between the visible and the
invisible worlds, as she sometimes characterizes the dis-
tinction between the life of the mind and that of the
world.
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What I think is so important about thinking Nietzsche
and Arendt together is not only that Arendt highlights the
dangers of the one-dimensionality of the Nietzsche of
post-structuralist works, but also that, on the one hand,
she helps us pay attention to another moment in Nietzsche,
and, on the other, Nietzsche highlights for readers of
Arendt how seriously she took the philosophical dilemmas
of postmodernity which Nietzsche was the first to articu-
late, albeit in overly loud tones. Scholars of Arendt
have underestimated this dimension of her work and thus
missed what I think will become an increasingly crucial
encounter between Arendt 's work and post-structuralism. 26
This work consists of six chapters, and a conclusion.
The first three chapters are devoted to Nietzsche, the
second three to Arendt, the two parts separated by an In-
terlude. In chapter one I lay forth Nietzsche's critique
of modernity, arguing that what drives his critical stance
towards his age is the sense that modernity lacks the
ability to give itself a distinctive form, a powerful cul-
tural identity to which people can feel allegiance and
through which their lives can be justified. And that fur-
thermore this is due to the failure to develop a particu-
lar aesthetic sensibility. This critique moves through
Nietzsche's analysis of Wagner, the experimental ism of the
age, the ascetic ideal and modern political forms of which
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I treat as exemplary the women's movement for emancipa-
tion.
Chapter two is devoted to developing the aesthetic
foundations of Nietzsche's reflections on suffering with
the aim of honing in more precisely on his conception of
the kind of suffering we must not attempt to master. I
argue that it is a philosophical sense that has to do with
embracing the suffering which necessarily accompanies the
loss of Truth, certainty and meaning which characterizes
late modernity.
In chapter three my aim is first, to develop the gen-
eral outline for the new basis for authority, aesthetic in
nature, with which Nietzsche wrestled and which he hoped
could replace the rationalist metaphysical grounding of
authority in modernity; and second, to develop the shared
ethical horizon towards which this new aesthetic founda-
tion points - what I have called the ethos of the ex-
emplar. It is on the basis of this ethos that a
Nietzschean aesthetic approach to justice emerges.
In chapter four which forms an interlude I am con-
cerned to consider the insufficiencies of Nietzsche's work
and to allow his other more objectionable voices into the
text, voices which I had purposefully held at bay in the
interest of illuminating his more ethically constructive
voice. This then sets the stage for Arendt as both heir
to this voice and antidote to Nietzsche's other voices.
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In chapter five I develop Arendt's critique of the
modern age. (I use her term rather than Nietzsche's but
they refer substantially to the same period.) i argue
that what forms her critical posture is what she calls the
"process character- of the modern age, a condition in
which human life appears to be a function of natural pro-
cesses which strip individual and public acts of their
dignity, power and place, and thus the ability of a cul-
ture to actively form and shape itself. I also argue that
Nietzsche and Arendt share the sense that what the modern
age lacks is a particular aesthetic sensibility without
which a culture cannot sustain itself as a living whole.
I trace these themes through Arendt's analysis of
totalitarianism, her effort to elaborate the major histor-
ical and philosophical events of this age which most sig-
nificantly contributed to its process character, and
finally examine her analysis of modern revolutions which
so interested her precisely as those political attempts to
thwart this process character of the modern age.
In chapter six I develop the aesthetic sensibility
which lies at the center of Arendt's thought and without
which, I argue, we cannot discern the ethical relevance of
her thought. I do this through an elaboration of the
ontological foundations of her work which are fundamental-
ly aesthetic in nature, calling hers an "ontology of dis-
play." Here we begin to see how deeply bound both to the
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ontological condition of plurality and to an aesthetic ap-
preciation for the contingent, multiplicitous texture of
human reality her ethical reflections are. Arendt calls
this aesthetic appreciation "tragic pleasure" and it is
the central sensibility which she herself exemplifies in
her work and which I believe she wishes to cultivate as
necessary for ethical orientation in a post-metaphysical
world.
The ontological-aesthetic reflections of chapter six
lay the groundwork for the conception of authority and the
approach to the question of justice towards which Arendt's
work points and which form the subject matter of chapter
seven. I develop this conception of authority by analyz-
ing not only Arendt's explicit reflections upon the con-
cept itself, but also through her conceptual work on judg-
ing as well as the kind of authority exemplified in her
own judgments themselves. As examples, I take up both her
judgments of the kibbutzim movement in Israel and her
judgments of the Judenraete during the Nazi period. I
argue that when we examine both Arendt's conceptual work
and the kind of authority exemplified in her own judgments
what we find is that what can be authoritative in a post-
metaphysical age is not Truth or God or any such finality,
but rather that authority obtains in the figure of the
judge who perpetually poses the question, who are we?
thereby taking responsibility in the process of judging
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for the plurality inherent in the human condition insofar
as this question takes as its central task that of mediat-
ing between the world as it is and the world as it might
be; between those who have gone before and those who are
in the process of becoming. m this tension of responsi-
bility, I argue, is the life of a culture renewed. And,
finally, it is this primary concern for the conditions for
such a living "we" which shapes Arendt's approach to the
question of justice.
In the conclusion I summarize my work, and then take
up one issue - the contemporary debate over "the Western
canon" in the curricula of higher education - through
which to argue for the importance of these aesthetically
oriented reflections on authority and justice.
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CHAPTER I
NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY
A. Introduction
But there are opposite ages, really demo-
cratic.
.
.where the individual becomes con-
vinced that he can do just about everything
and can manage almost anv ro1g
r
and every-body experiments with himself, improves,
makes new experiments, enjoys his experi-
ments, and all nature ceases and becomes
art... With this always comes the most inter-
esting and maddest of all ages, when the
"actors," all kinds of actors, become the
real masters."
"How things will become ever more
"artistic" in Europe.-"
The Gay Sciencs 1
It seems beyond dispute that Nietzsche had nothing
but contempt for democracy and democratic culture. And
yet at first glance Nietzsche's work itself seems to em-
body the experimentalism, artistic play, theatrical pre-
dominance and even madness which to him characterize demo-
cratic cultures: Periclean Athens, the United States, and
increasingly the Europe of his day. He himself called his
work "thought experiments," was a master of disguise and
masking, and, as the self-conscious "bad conscience" of
his age, 2 unleashed voices of disquietude into the souls
of his contemporaries in the hopes of de-naturalizing much
of what made their world solid, comprehensible and secure.
It appears that Nietzsche too wanted all nature to cease
and become art.
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Yet Nietzsche was troubled by the concept of the ac-
tor and the theatrical atmosphere which increasingly en-
veloped and defined his age. m aphorism #36! in. The Gay
Science, entitled "On the Problem of the Actor" it is the
similarity between the actor and the artist which dis-
quiets him. Haunted, he asks, "...the inner craving for a
role and mask; for appearance; an excess of the capacity
for all kinds of adaptations that can no longer be
satisfied in the service of the most immediate and nar-
rowest utility
- all this is perhaps not only peculiar to
the actor?"
There is a distinction between the actor and the art-
ist which is being eclipsed in the democratic culture of
modernity which Nietzsche strives to uphold. It is this
distinction which will constitute the path upon which I
will explore the critical distance which defines
Nietzsche's relation to modernity. in this chapter I
shall argue, contrary to the emphasis of most contemporary
interpreters of Nietzsche - sympathetic post-modernists as
well as unsettled critics - that the most disturbing
aspect of modernity, in Nietzsche's view, is its lack of
form: its inability to produce the kinds of forces neces-
sary to endow life with a particular shape. It is the ab-
sence of what Nietzsche called "gestaltende Kraefte,"
form-giving forces, 3 which is the cutting piece he uses in
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constructing the distance between himself and the theatri-
cal, experimental tenor of modernity.
This distance, however, is continuously precarious.
Nietzsche perpetually haunts himself with the question as
to whether he himself has not lost the necessary
gestaltende Kraefte; as to whether his own work has not
succumbed to modernity's endless theatricality. This is
all the more a fear since Nietzsche's concern with form is
defined and bounded by his analysis of the metaphysical
condition of our times: nihilism. Hence the defense of
forms of life in which form-giving forces flourish - be
they the style of an individual or the shape of a culture
- cannot be substantiated by recourse to faith in trans-
cendental concepts of any kind - neither god nor reason
nor nature. Nietzsche will have to make other defenses
for such forms. And defenses there will be. One should
not be beguiled by Nietzsche's rhetorical styles - the
multiple and conflicting voices, the complete lack of sys-
tem, the variegated styles of writing themselves. As
Alexander Nehamas puts it, "Though Nietzsche's writing as
a whole supports his perspectivism, it does not do so by
being itself beyond interpretation, by failing to have a
determinate structure, form or meaning." 4 Nietzsche's
styles are designed to unhinge us from our faith in trans-
cendentals, and in this, Nietzsche's aim is deconstruction
to be sure. But his primary interest lies in construc-
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tion, in formation, that is, it lias in inspiring into
baing our "gastaltanda Kraafta." "There are yet many
houses to be built!" 5
In Nietzsche's view this task is essentially
aesthetic. Modernity lacks the particular aesthetic
sensibility which forms the basis of any true culture,
that is, of any culture capable of bringing into being a
form of life worthy of existence, of a culture which is
thus self-justifying. Modernity's aesthetic is theatri-
cal; it lacks a specifically artistic sensibility.
Nietzsche refers to this sensibility at times as honesty,
at other times as nobility, and in "On the Poets" in
Zarathustra
,
most interestingly, as "Inbrunst der Toene."
Difficult to translate, I will render it, "the inner pas-
sion/suffering brought about by musical tones." in inter-
preting this we should recall that Nietzsche himself was a
composer, that he never entirely broke free of the
Schopenhauerian view that music, unlike any other art
form, is the voice of the will or life force itself, and
that he unabashedly proclaimed his distaste for some other
art forms, particularly the theatre. Musical metaphors
recur throughout Nietzsche's work. Here, I believe, the
musical metaphor stands for any cultural achievement or
any life form worthy of being, so that with "Inbrunst der
Toene" he refers to that particular sensibility which al-
lows us to experience both the freedom and suffering which
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inevitably accompany any cultural achievement or any life
form. it is a particular taste for living, a tone of
life, a sensation of the body, a pulse without which we
cannot "stand before things in awe,»6 nor revere the com.
Plicated beauty in everything given. Nietzsche uses
Physiological metaphors to refer to this sensibility, this
pulse, this sensation of the body. There are strengths,
forces which modernity has failed to develop, and it is
Nietzsche's aim to make manifest this fundamental failure,
for they are forces without which no form of life can ade-
quately justify itself thereby making it difficult for a
sustainable notion of justice to be had.
In the initial section of this chapter I will turn
first to some of Nietzsche's final works in which Wagner,
the modern actor par excellence, is criticized in order
to begin to elaborate the distinction between the actor
and the artist. Next I will turn to some of Nietzsche's
earliest works to explore the critical distance he estab-
lishes from the experimental science of what he called
contemporary historical culture. By spanning the whole of
his productive years I hope to establish the centrality
and continuity of Nietzsche's concern with form and its
absence in modernity. In the second section I will brief-
ly trace the genealogical path to our failure to possess
form-giving forces. And in the third section I will ana-
lyze the way in which Nietzsche thought modern political
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phenomena fail to manifest form-giving forces. m each
section effort will be made to examine that specific self-
deceit peculiar to modernity's culture of actors, a self-
deceit born of a subterranean religion of pity for this-
worldly life. It is this deceit which keeps us from even
experiencing the absence of the aesthetic sensibility and
particular strengths without which Nietzsche believes hu-
man beings cannot appreciate the terrible beauty that per-
vades the human condition and hence bring into being a
form of life worthy of being.
B. Contra Wagner
"Others may be able to get along without
Wagner; but the philosopher is not free todo without (him)
. He has to be the bad con-
science of his time: for that he needs to
understand it best. But confronted with thelabyrinth of the modern soul, where would hefind a guide more initiated, a more eloquent
prophet of the modern soul, than Wagner?
Through Wagner modernity speaks most in -
timately (emphasis mine)
,
concealing neither
its good nor its evil - having forgotten all
sense of shame. And conversely: one has al-
most completed an account of the value of
what is modern once one_has gained clarity
about what is good and evil in Wagner."
The Case of Wagner. Preface 7
Somewhere amidst the profusion of Nietzsche's writ-
ings he calls himself "the most modern of moderns." What
intimacies then do we hear when we listen to modernity
speak through Wagner? They can hardly be whisperings
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about Nietzsche, for we know from biography that Nietzsche
broke publicly and privately with Wagner. Or can they?
In his final year of lucidity, Nietzsche wrote two short
books on Wagner. One, Nietzsche M^n^r was a CQm_
pilation of earlier aphorisms. The other. The Case of
Wagner, was a sustained, voraciously critical attack on
Wagner's aesthetics and their effect, a work whose main
body is followed by two postscripts and an epilogue. Two
books on Wagner in one year, one of which Nietzsche clear-
ly had trouble bringing to a close, as if he had not and
could not satisfactorily complete his break with Wagner.
In the Preface to this same work, Nietzsche writes of him-
self, "Perhaps nobody was more dangerously attached to -
grown together with - Wagnerizing.
.
.
,
"
8 that his detach-
ment was nothing less than an act of self
-overcoming, and
that he feels, for this reason, nothing but the gratitude
of a philosopher towards Wagner. Yet it is precisely
sustaining this feeling of gratitude which troubles him,
as if what he gives thanks for keeps slipping out of
sight, as if what his "Zarathustra eye" sees from its dis-
tance "above things" blurs in and out of focus. There is
uncertainty and difficulty here. Nietzsche uses Wagner to
define a distance between himself and his times, but it is
a precarious one. In what sense does Nietzsche mean that
he is "the most modern of moderns?" What is the good and
the evil in modernity? Let us begin to approach these
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questions by listening as Nietzsche has modernity speak
through Wagner.
Brutality, artificiality and innocence. These are
the stimulants upon which the modern soul thrives. They
form the culture ripest for its growth: the culture of
modernity. it is Wagner's genius that in his music he has
mastered a mixture of these three fundamental stimulants
of the modern soul. Let us look at each in turn as they
pertain to Wagner and hence, in Nietzsche's view, to
modernity.
Wagner is brutal because he is only after effect.
His art is "expressivo at any cost," 9 an "art of display
windows. "10 There is no substance, no thought, no melody
in his work, only passion, only convulsive affects
designed to drug the senses and the understanding. Wagner
hates knowledge, and through an "uncanny access to every-
thing that seduces, lures, forces, overthrows," he shocks
the nerves of his audience with the appearance of sub-
limity, profundity, and the overwhelming. Nietzsche
likens the effect of this music to the experience of walk-
ing into the sea. "(One) gradually loses one's secure
footing, and finally surrenders oneself to the elements
without reservation: one must swim." 11 By contrast, the
music Nietzsche praises requires that one dance . It re-
quires measure and attention to balanced units of time and
force; a sense of rhythm. It demands "continual wariness"
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on the part of the listener, and its magic rests on the
interplay between this cautious wariness and a certain
"warm enthusiasm." m short, it demands taste, judgment,
cultivation. Wagner's genius and his brutality lay in
destroying any space for such wariness, such attentive-
ness, such thought. Wagner was, in short, a tyrant. His
art produced a herd. "Never," Nietzsche remarks, "has
obedience been better, never commanding." 12
Wagner is an actor. His is not so much art as
histrionics, a talent to lie. His music is artificial.
("Kuenstlich" is sometimes rendered as "artistic," sug-
gesting a false artistry.) it exhibits an "excessive
liveliness in the smallest parts," 13 but there is no
style. Wagner had, Nietzsche writes, an "incapacity for
giving organic form." 14 He was "unable to create from a
totality." 15 His was a "declining power to organize" 16 so
that he engaged in a "counterfeiting in the imitation of
great forms." 17 what he called "dramatic style" was,
Nietzsche argues, no style at all, for there is no life in
his music which inhabits the whole, but only "instability
dressed up as principles," 18 a restlessness of convulsive
passion. This pushing of life's exuberance into even the
smallest of forms, which Nietzsche says has its corollary
in political terms in "freedom of the individual" and
"equal rights for all," is only the semblance of a living
whole; it is composite, calculated, artifact. It con-
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ceals, Nietzsche seems to suggest, the diversity and dis-
tinction required for any living thing.
Finally, Wagner's music is innocent, innocent of its
own "moral mendaciousness." Nietzsche identifies two
kinds of creative forces. There are those through which
hunger exhibits its power, and those through which
abundance and fullness of life exhibit theirs. The former
are born of weakness, of resentment towards everything
given. Their aim is to negate the life force. Nietzsche
calls them decadent creative forces, and they correspond
in the related sphere of morals to slave morality. Those
forces of abundance by contrast, embrace life, are part of
ascending life. Their aim is to give form and shape to
the life force. Nietzsche calls them classical, and they
correspond to noble morality. Wagner's music (and more
broadly, modernity) consists in a simultaneous embrace and
negation of life. It is, Nietzsche says, a "physiological
contradiction," for it lies, but with a good conscience;
that is, innocently. Its mendaciousness lies in its fail-
ure, which Nietzsche at times polemically refers to as its
refusal, to experience these two distinctive creative
forces as distinct, as opposites. It conflates, and
refuses to distinguish in a paroxysm of good-heartedness
and bright-eyed virtue, for modernity's mendaciousness is,
paradoxically, instinctual. Hence its "innocence." Thus
Wagner "(made) eyes at master morality, at noble
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morality... while mouthing the counterdoctrine, that of the
"gospel of the lowly," of the need for redemption! "19 it
is the "innocent" conflation of these opposite values
which defines fully the passively nihilistic character of
Wagner's art and of modernity. "Passive nihilism, a sign
of weakness,... and whatever refreshes, heals, calms, numbs
emerges into the foreground in various disguises, reli-
gious or moral, or political, or aesthetic. .. "20
Modernity deceives itself (and Wagner is a first class
agent of this deceit) into believing all creative forces
are of a piece morally, so theatrically talented has it
become. What it is really doing is instinctively covering
a void
- the inability to create out of a yes! to life - a
void it is not even aware of. Implicit in Nietzsche's
discussion is that this distinction between types of crea-
tive forces must, at the very least, survive as a distinc-
tion in order that a human life worthy of being be created
and sustained.
Let us focus in more carefully on this state. It is
not simply, on this reading of modernity via Wagner, that
we are creative out of resentment, out of a no! to life.
This, as we shall see, has, in Nietzsche's view, been the
predominant aesthetic form since Christianity. Modernity
is different, different in the sense that it acts as if it
were creative out of a strong yes! to life, as if it were
beyond the life-eschewing impulses that governed Chris-
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tianity, when in fact what underlies its creations is,
like those of Christianity, pity for those of this world.
And thus, what it really offers is redemption in the form
of the destruction of all felt differences between us. it
thinks it embraces life (which Nietzsche understands as
essential heterogeneity, difference, order of rank)
, but
instead suffocates and reduces. Modernity's problem is
that it is self
-deceptive. it is passive nihilism's full
development. Thus Wagner's music produces effects by
overwhelming so that the audience is neither required nor
able to place any distance between the music-drama and it-
self, it is made to swim in a sea with no bearings by a
tyranny which appeals to the cheapest, lowest common
denominator
- overweening passion, passion without wari-
ness. The spectators become a mass, "the neighbor
reigns." 21 Wagner's music panders to and creates the
herd, the herd which, because of Wagner's theatrical
genius and its own weakness, believes it has discovered a
life affirming aesthetic, an aesthetic for the strong; an
aesthetic for this world. In its innocent and cheerful
self-deception the herd too, unwittingly, becomes a sea of
actors, adapting itself nimbly to every latest stimulant,
dependent upon a continuous dosage to maintain its self-
deception. Hence the popular reception of Wagner, the
genius of deception, the consummate actor.
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Wagner's "herdification effect" rests on having the
capacity to create the sense of the profound, the over-
whelming, the sublime. One need only listen to his music
but a very short time to partake of this sense, and, under
Nietzsche's tutelage, to see that it is in fact achieved
by a certain formlessness, or what Nietzsche calls "un-
endliche Melodie,
» unending melody - a term which actually
refers to the willful refusal in so much of Wagner's work
to resolve, make closure, to limit and form, to make
whole. Webster's Third New International Dictionary
defines melody as: a rhythmically organized and meaning-
ful succession of single musical notes or tones having a
definite relationship one with the other and forming an
aesthetic whole. Thus, "unendliche Melodie," as a con-
tradiction in terms, is actually the entire lack of
melody; the failure to make melodic, whole. It borders on
the ugly. Nietzsche's critigue of Wagner's aesthetic as
relying on an invocation of the sublime and producing
nothing of beauty can be traced to Kant's distinction be-
tween the sublime and the beautiful in the Critique of
Judgment
.
The sublime is that which we experience but
have no concept for; it throws us into speechlessness and
borders on the fearful and the ugly. Its very essence is
formlessness. By contrast, the beautiful (and here I turn
explicitly to Nietzsche, though there are important echoes
of Kant) is, it appears, that which evokes a warm
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enthusiasm which is traversed by wariness. it is a sensa-
tion that does not collapse the distance between us, a
distance without which we become equals in a swooning,
drugged awe; that is, we become herd. it allows that dis-
tance to appear in its tragic and even terrible hue; the
beautiful even requires such distance for its very being.
It seems to be the specific distinction of an art-
ist's power that it can evoke this state of tension in
spectators, demanding of them an exercise of judgment.
And it seems to be the specific distinction of an actor's
power that it suspends this tension, herding all spec-
tators into the unanimity of a convergence; tyrannizing by
destroying those things which create and preserve a
certain distance, a certain space between us. The dif-
ference is that Wagner (and by extension, modernity) lacks
form-giving powers, or, as Nietzsche alternatively calls
them, melody, a dominant thought. Wagner creates in the
absence of form, in the absence of a conceptual whole, and
relies instead on dramatic effects to conceal this want.
In this, his is an inventive genius. He, like modernity,
becomes a consummate actor, finally deceiving himself and
his audience, and thus enjoying this "falseness with a
good conscience; the delight in simulation exploding as a
power that pushes aside one's so-called "character,"
flooding it and at times extinguishing it." 22 Such
delight in simulation and adaptation, such inventive
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genius is modern in the first degree. it forms the core
of modernity's taste and circumscribes its virtues.
And yet Nietzsche feels kinship with this delight; he
revels in the inventiveness, agility and dissimulation of
the actor, of Wagner, and of his age. These are not un-
mitigated evils to be dismissed simply. Nietzsche's very
style, (more accurately, styles)
, is born of the embrace
of these virtues. m this sense we can indeed understand
Nietzsche as "the most modern of moderns." But his is a
careful and tremendously self-conscious embrace of these
modern virtues. We must remind ourselves that Nietzsche
is writing as the first self-consciously post-metaphysical
thinker. His understanding of the beautiful and of form
does not rest, as does Kant's, on faith in a "deeply hid-
den basis, common to all human beings, underlying their
agreement in judging the forms under which objects are
given to them." 23 He does not and cannot counter the
moral mendaciousness of modernity by relying on the puta-
tive existence of a "subjective universal ism. " For this
reason Nietzsche feels a tremendous sense of distress, in
rare moments of panic, in the face of the irrevocable loss
of faith, in the face of that murderous act of a heedless
modernity of which he himself is the first herald. 24 And
it is this sense of distress which restrains his embrace.
Nietzsche fears the loss of all authority as he fears the
loss of all excellence which enlivens rather than weakens
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and herdifies. Wagner's tyrannical and despotic ex-
cellence is, for Nietzsche, exemplary of the dangers of
the simulative talents of the modern self. His delight in
them takes a different path.
C. Experimental
i
sm
Before turning to the distinction found in
Nietzsche's earlier writings between his thought experi-
ments and the scientific experimentalism of our con-
temporary culture, I would like to say a word about these
writings. Nietzsche's early writings (with which I am
designating those works written prior to his break with
Wagner in 1876) were written in the throes of an
enthusiasm. He had hopes, with the aid of Wagnerian
opera, of regenerating a distinctively German culture. It
was during this period that Nietzsche was concerned overt-
ly with what was required to effect the rejuvenated forma-
tion of a people in the cultural sense. Peter Bergmann
calls this effort one of "cultural politics," 25 arguing
that the political quietism which Bismark's unification
efforts produced had created the opportunity for cultural
blossoming, and that Nietzsche's cultural politics were
explicitly antipolitical ; that they were aesthetic. The
distinction Bergmann seeks to make is an important one,
but the semantics are messy. That is, what is "cultural
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politics" if not political? Nietzsche's writings, as
Berg-ann argues, were explicitly in opposition to both the
international politics of Bismark and to the national
party politics in Germany. However, his concern with the
cultural regeneration of a people was a political concern
of the first order, namely, what organic forms are neces-
sary for a political-cultural unit to exist as a living
and hence legitimate entity instead of as the cold idol
Nietzsche came to understand the modern nation-state to
be? Bergmann unfortunately recognizes only the
restricted definition of "political" and thereby contrib-
utes to that view, most disseminated in the United States
by Walter Kaufmann, that Nietzsche was unconcerned with
things political and is therefore of no interest to those
of us concerned with the "res publica."
The importance of my argument with Bergmann is the
following. I believe Nietzsche's concern with the living
essence of a political-cultural unit remained a constant
preoccupation. Many Nietzsche scholars argue that
Nietzsche ceased to have political concerns after his
break with Wagner. There was, after the 1876 break with
Wagner, a change in Nietzsche's thought to be sure. it
came upon witnessing Wagner's capitulation and assimila-
tion to Christianity and the Prussian state - the later
being a marriage Nietzsche considered disastrous for a
flourishing cultural life in Germany because it had to
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rely on dramatic and tyrannical effects to sustain the il-
lusion of a living whole. (The kinship with Nietzsche's
analysis of Wagner's aesthetic should be clear.) This
capitulation of Wagner's became for Nietzsche emblematic
of the decadence of his age, dominated as it was by the
actor's virtue: adaptation, and by the actor's inability
to be a strong formative agent. it became emblematic of
the tremendous difficulty of regenerating the life of a
people under modern conditions and under the reign of mod-
ern taste. Nietzsche did, then, chart a new course, but I
will argue and attempt to show in the next two chapters
that it was one designed explicitly to tame precisely that
"virtue" which ruined Wagner and made cultural regenera-
tion impossible: the madness of our "really democratic"
age
- adaptability. it was the readiness of moderns to
submit to tyranny and become a herd, and our incapacity to
endow our common lives with a distinctive form at which
Nietzsche took aim, and this, without allowing himself a
nostalgic glance in the direction of metaphysical
authority.
Interpreters such as Bergmann who ignore this con-
tinuity in Nietzsche's fundamental political concern: the
concern with a culture's ability to produce formative
agents and to artistically form itself into a living
whole, often see instead a thinker whose intellectual
problems lie in two distinct pieces: the public-political
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writings of his early period, and the private-
philosophical writings of his mature years. m this way
such interpreters allow themselves the comfort of evading
the force and depth of Nietzsche's critique of his and
their age. This has been a common problem for inter-
preters of Nietzsche. Hence, for example, Walter Kauf-
mann, who entirely de-politicizes Nietzsche, wonders if,
"the tenor of (Nietzsche's) remarks about democracy and
parliaments" are not of a piece with his "second hand wis-
dom about women," suggesting that both are "time-bounded"
and "dated. "27 In so wondering he entirely misses ^
depth of Nietzsche's critique of the herdifying forces of
modern democratic culture. it would seem that this too is
emblematic of the modern genius for adaptation. Kaufmann
himself may indeed be guilty of engaging in modern self-
deceit under the guise of a rather paternalistic and
cheery self-assurance in assimilating one of the most in-
sightful and disturbing critics of modernity to his own
view regarding the superiority of modern democracy.
It seems to me that when we allow ourselves to be
haunted by our modern genius for adaptation and assimila-
tion, we discover terribly good reasons for reading these
early works both as the initial formulation of and as the
foundation for Nietzsche's developed critique of
modernity. His concern with culture and with form-giving
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forces, on this reading, is fundamental and constant. And
Where
'
in The Gay ScWq, he writes,
"(We) are no longer material for society;" 2 8
he does not only mean (and perhaps not at all) that we are
too brave, too experimental, too liberated as individuals
(which, though this probably frightens us is how most of
us would like to read it)
. Perhaps he is more strongly
saying that we no longer have the power to create anything
definite enough to distinguish itself individually - be it
person or society; that modern subjectivity is too feeble
and too disorganized to produce an outward effect and
endow itself with a form distinctive enough to be a cul-
ture. 29 This I think is one of Nietzsche's most constant
laments, one which clearly places a chasm between himself
and his age. with this, to the earlier writings directly.
"Compare for once the heights of your capac-ity for knowledge with the depths of yourincapacity for action.
.. Your manner of
moving, that of climbing upon knowledge, isyour fatality: the ground sinks away fromyou into the unknown; there is no longer anv
support for your life..." 30
The aim of Nietzsche's attack is what he calls our
"historical culture" whose domain can be demarcated by the
reign of an unquenchable thirst for knowledge and truth
that turns all it touches into a desert, sucking dry the
life-giving juices. This culture relates to the past as a
"science of universal becoming" in which all ages, includ-
ing the present, are understood in the context of the
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progressive development and maturity of truth, or, once
this Hegelian philosophy of history collapses, in terms of
change pure and simple. The aim becomes discerning his-
tory's true mechanism, each individual act or event con-
sidered only in terms of its position within the whole
process. Driven by this will to truth and disciplined by
the professional ethic of "objectivity" (which Nietzsche
equates with indifference)
, modern scholars dig ceaseless-
ly in the panoply of the past attempting to trace this un-
folding procession of truth in history; dissecting, cate-
gorizing, infatuated by the allure and promise of a "net
of pure insight woven impenetrably tight." 3 ! And thus are
unearthed a stream of new things, an amazing procession of
diverse forms of life and ways of being which press
relentlessly on the modern soul as so many "indigestible
stones.
"
The defense against this kaleidoscope of forms,
colors, tastes, possibilities is to cavort as lightly as
possible with them. Hence we become a composite of causal
developing factors, taking refuge in this determinism and
failing thereby to form anything stable enough by which to
confront and mold our investigations or ourselves. The
defense, in short, is to develop the habit of not taking
things seriously, of having no stake in things. One pro-
tects oneself from the event quality of the world, from
experiencing the new, by subsuming all occurrences under
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the consuming hunger of the hi^oy^.iy ^ ui. n n storical process. one be-
comes insensible 32 , ... _,i . (m Nietzsche's later writings he ap-
plies the same critique to non-Hegelian objectivity, m
"On the Land of Education- in Zarathustra, for examplei he
writes, "With the characters of the past written all over
you, and these characters in turn painted over with new
characters: thus have you concealed yourselves perfectly
from all interpreters of characters. And even if one
could try the reins, who would be fool enough to believe
that you have reins. You seem baked out of cclors and
pasted notes .
"
)
3 3
Nietzsche's thought experiments are driven by a dif-
ferent impulse. He argues that our relationship to the
past should be fundamentally artistic, aesthetic. it
should be "evoked by hunger, regulated by the extent of
its need, held in bounds by its inherent plastic
powers.
"
3 4 it must, in short, be driven by the con-
straints of a particular form of life.
But it is the essence of historical culture's experi-
mental science that it destroys any particular horizon or
form of life as it subjects all ideals, all values, all
actions to the blinding exposure of the examining lamp of
the experimental scientist of the process. So blinded,
unable to nourish a stable horizon by which to orient
oneself in a common world, or in a stable world for the
self, the modern soul retreats into the refuge of "the
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smallest egoistic enclosure." This reduction to an ego
what Nietzsche calls our "Innerlichkeit" (literally
-in-
wardness," usually translated
"subjectivity") is
celebrated as our virtue. Modern nan, Nietzsche argues,
is all content and no form, s/he rejects and even fears
the "sense of form" and derisively views it as convention,
disguise, an undesirable externality which masks our true
inner selves. 35
The result of this retreat is that the self becomes
unsure, fearful, and loses the ability to believe in it-
self, with no form, no horizon to organize and hence
strengthen it, the self becomes characterized by "weari-
ness, tattered memory, incoherent personal experiences."
Its greatest danger is that its very content itself ac-
tually disappear under the lack of organizing vision; that
what the self is become a mere abstractly a shadow of
events
- even to itself
. Out of this loss of form grows
the modern need for masks; the need to cover its own void.
Out of such conditions, the singular virtues of the modern
soul are born - adaptability, assimilation,
verisimilitude, experimental ism - the virtues of the ac-
tor. It is this self which sits so vulnerably in Wagner's
audience, prey to the brutal, artificial, but innocent
stimulus of his genius.
Paradoxically, the culture of the modern actor, demo-
cratic culture, experiences a strong contentment, cheer-
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fulness and optimise about what it sees as its unique
achievement: the continual process of the liberation of
the
-free personality," of the individual under conditions
of equality. But Nietzsche argues that this optimism is
the effect of self-deceit, that what is actually occurring
is that each is being reduced to a common denominator,
made the same, herdified. Modernity, he argues, consists
in precisely the lack of individuals, in
-muffled up
identical neoDlp "36 Tn ^ , .p p e. m one of his more overtly ideologi-
cal attacks, Nietzsche argues that the rush of forms, the
unstable horizon lets in too much light blinding and
stunting the growth of the modern self. This, he sug-
gests, is done by "the present age" so as to control those
it stunts; so as to prepare everyone to "labor in the fac-
tories of the general good. "37 constantly shifting
horizons function to compel external conformity, conformi-
ty masked as individuality, in which no one succeeds in
being truthful towards themselves. They are too immature;
their growth has been effectively stunted. Deceit reigns.
What kinds of strength and abilities have been lost
as a consequence of too much exposure? What is the nature
of the maturity Nietzsche finds nowhere around him? These
questions are critical, for they lead directly to the
heart of that which distinguishes the experimental ism of
Nietzsche's thought experiments from that of his
scientific contemporaries.
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Truthfulness, honesty, a kind of relation to the self
and the world without which the very "distress, the inner
misery of modern man" will not come to light;38 tnese
abilities are what the modern soul lacks. Elsewhere
Nietzsche writes that modernity has lost its instinct, its
nature; with its instinct it will recover its honesty.
Truthfulness, he seems to suggest, requires we have a na-
ture. Actors have none. Neither has the herd. But how
to acquire a nature? How to become honest? How to art-
istically craft a new nature in an age of actors who so
adeptly shield their misery in a culture of comfort and
self-contentedness? And what kind of stability could such
a nature acquire in a post-metaphysical world? Nietzsche
is not exactly the bard of convention and eternal
stability, yet he objects to the ceaseless process of
adaptation and chanqe in modernity which does not allow
individuals to mature. But what does this mean? What is
the content of that distance Nietzsche places between him-
self and modernity?
These questions are questions for the rest of this
work. However I will begin to build a foundation for my
reading of Nietzsche's answers through a discussion of his
early attempts to define culture.
In his essay, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of His-
tory For Life," Nietzsche offers a general law regarding
the conditions for the sustenance of any kind of human
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cultural life, conditions „hich are artioulated and regain
the sa,e from the beginning to the end of his work
. The
law he offers is,
"...a living thing can be healthv c=i->-o™and fruitful only when bounled^y'a'SSJon-
around'it^??^1" °f drawin^ a horizon
self r^r J ; at the Same time to°-centred to enclose its own view withinthat of another, it will pine away slowly orhasten to its timely end." 39 Y
Humans need shelter from the onslaught of the eternal
return of history; they need the "unhistorical , " that mood
of "pious illusion" which forms a misty atmosphere without
which life, and in particular, the future cannot be.
Without the "envelope of the unhistorical (humans) would
never have begun or dared to begin. "40 m a very early
formulation, Nietzsche writes that what culture indeed is,
is "illusion spread over things;"41it is art. Culture,
born of love, is the artistically achieved form, which
further seduces us to love, and hence to dare to begin
anew. It is that answer to the question, "wozu?" "to what
end?" This is true both for the life of a people as well
as for the cultivation of an individual. Such love forms
the horizon without which our being would be a ceaseless
fal-ling away into nothingness. it gives us a nature, in-
stincts, and the capacity to renew our being.
In 1874, Nietzsche writes that, "Anything that con-
strains a man to love less than unconditionally has
severed the roots of his strength: he will wither away,
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that is to say become dishonest . "42 The nature of QUr
dishonesty lies in not looking into the depths of life,
and hence not facing the essential condition of all deeds
-
injustice. This is the knowledge to which our love, the
for. of life to which we are bound, makes it possible' for
us to be privy. This is its tragic fruit. The unhistori-
cal is "the condition in which one is the least capable of
being just; narrow-minded, ungrateful to the past, blind
to dangers, deaf to warnings, one is a little vortex of
life in a dead sea of darkness and oblivion: and yet this
condition
- unhistorical, and anti-historical through and
through
- is the womb not only of the unjust but of every
just deed too... "43 This . g the insight Qf ^ ^ ^
culture who takes up the challenge to live in the face of
this knowledge, acquired only once gripped by a fierce
love. Modern self-deceit is the shield used in our time
to protect us from this knowledge and from the enormity of
this challenge. Knowledge for us, by contrast, is what
comes of becoming a mirror, of developing what Nietzsche
calls in Thus Spoke Zarathustr*
, "immaculate perception"
whose curse he says in a parody of Christianity, is that
it "shall never give birth," 44 or, as in the quote above,
that it shall be "incapable of action."
It is important to note that with The Gav Science ,
which I see as marking a distinct development in
Nietzsche's thought, the moralistic language of "in-
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justice" is usually replaced, except for purposes of
parody, by the neutral "suffering," and rather than
"knowledge," it is a "tone of life," an aesthetic
sensibility, a specific "taste" which modernity lacks. As
significant as this is for Nietzsche's challenge to tradi-
tional metaphysics, the nature of the modern dishonesty
with which we are concerned here remains unchanged in
Nietzsche's later works. The aesthetic sensibility
Nietzsche extols, which I earlier called "Inbrunst der
Toene," is understanding that anything of beauty, anything
of glory
- deed or thing - is achieved only with great
suffering; that it is the fruit of stupidity, slavery. To
possess this taste means to be able to be awed and humbled
before life, yet still to act. in a very important pas-
sa9e in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes,
"Every artist knows (that) .. .what is essen-tial "in heaven and on earth" seems to be,to say it once more, that there should be'
obedience over a long period of time and in
a single direction: given that something al-
ways develops and has developed, for whose
sake it is worthwhile to live on earth; for
example, virtue, art, music, dance, reason,
spirituality
- something transfiguring, sub-
tle, mad and divine." 45
This insight, which Nietzsche calls a physiological
relationship to life, is the honesty of man which we, as
cheerful moderns, must recover to feel our own inner
misery and poverty. Without this recovery the "instrument
produces no strong sound," we will not be able to "stand
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before thinqs in awe-»46 .9 , the terrible beauty of the world
will escape us and life win be impoverished> parched flry
_
Only in the unity of an artistically achieved form or
style are we granted the opportunity to revere and renew
through action this life.
The greatest temptation which this tone of life
Nietzsche calls honesty holds for us is that we will come
to pity the human condition. Being a steadfast witness to
the fact that suffering is a necessary precondition for
bringing anything worthy of being into appearance is a
dreadful responsibility. The modern age has borne it
poorly. m fact Nietzsche argues that we have continued,
as heirs of Christian morality, to make a religion of this
pity; that we have deeply succumbed to the essence of our
pity: flight from this world. We are, in this, part of
that long tradition in the West which has made a "religion
of pity" the basis of our morality, a morality in which
revenge on life predominates.
Wagner's decadent aesthetics demands nothing of its
spectators but unmediated passion; it reduces. Likewise
historical culture continuously destroys all horizons
through which something beautiful might be hard-won, an
individual forged, and rather attempts to reduce all to
the same under the horizon-destroying principle of
"scientific fairness." Both of these modern phenomena
have pity for the hardship of the human condition as their
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core. Both seek to alleviate suffering and master life
through denial and flight. Both create homogeneity of the
herd through a kind of commitment to formlessness.
Nietzsche writes that the herd-like uniformity of
modernity constitutes the "exclusion and negation of every
artistically productive form and the demand of a true
style... "47 The dissection characteristic of modernity,
the ceaseless rush after forms, this disrupting unrest,
produces only deserts in which withered identical beings,
like tiny grains of sand (Sandkoernchen) burn blindly, but
blithely under the glare of a horizon-less sky. Gazing
upon such a society one encounters only the monotony of a
flat uniformity; the antithesis of a culture; the im-
possibilities of cultural creations whose beauty
justifies. Nausea haunts. Yet most remain unaware, so
practiced is this age in the mastering crafts of the ac-
tor.
This then is the predicament of modernity from which
Nietzsche seeks a distance not a mere reaction. If the
modern predicament is fear and deceit in the face of the
suffering which is exposed if one attempts to bear the
burden of action in the world; if the modern response to
human life is pity, the question presses: why are we so
constitutionally or, as Nietzsche put it, physiologically
unable to bear up under the demands of action in a world
inherently unjust? Why can we not obey the universal law?
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What happened to our form-giving forces? what in-
heritances mar our present being? I turn now, with these
questions, to a brief examination of Nietzsche's
genealogical efforts to construct the historical con-
stituents of our current malaise.
D. The Ascetic Tribal
"All honor to the ascetic ideal insofar asit is honest ! so long as it believes in it-
self and does not play tricks on us!" 48
Nietzsche refers to the ascetic ideal as the "awe-
inspiring catastrophe of 2000 years of training in truth-
fulness." 49 it is a great Ungeheuer, something
tremendous, monstrous. As the foundational ideal of west-
ern culture beginning with Socrates, and as the origin of
the predominant moral code for post-platonic Western civi-
lization, it is the ideal through which human suffering
was endowed with dignity, made profound, interesting. As
such, Nietzsche must honor it and feel gratitude. In its
sheer awesomeness it is so deserving. This is, for him, a
terrible task, for this ideal embodies a taste for life he
finds repugnant. The story he tells of this ideal is
filled with deep ambivalences and ironies. Yet in the
telling, his ambivalences are overcome enough to carefully
distinguish between the pre-modern period when the ascetic
ideal was honest with itself, and our own modern period,
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when the ascetic ideal beco.es dishonest; when not only
deceit but self-deceit reign.
We stand, Nietzsche thought, at the threshold of a
great event: when Christianity a^norality destroys itself
in a great act of self-overcoming. with modern science
and its unconditional belief in truth, the last stage of
this great Ungeheuer has been reached and, as the heirs of
2000 years of intellectual cleanliness and as "good Euro-
peans," we must finally question the one unconditional of
science and ask, "What is the meaning of the will to
truth?" 50
With the mere hint of this question, the tarantula
stings itself and the ascetic ideal lies dying. The con-
vulsive aftershocks from the self-destruction of this
foundational ideal constitute the acute illness of con-
temporary society. Suffering and travail seem for naught.
Nihilism appears in its full suit, for the horizon is
being erased and the beings left in the dark have no art-
istic powers, no form-giving forces with which to con-
struct anew.
Although our inheritances gave us the capacity to
destroy the horizon by which life was given meaning, they
also have, over the course of two thousand years, weakened
us, reduced our very concept of man until what we have be-
come is essentially domesticated animals, essentially
identical, one to another, essentially herd. So ex-
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traordinarily long and thoroughly has this ideal held sway
that we no longer are able to hold a Gegenmacht or
counterforce to it. 51 So embedded in the fabric of our
being is the ascetic ideal that we are, in truth, unable
to imagine or experience otherwise, though we pride our-
selves in being beyond it, in being modern. Hardly do we
hear the death thrashings of the ascetic ideal, for we
deny that it is our own. Only a vague nausea, a sense of
the "involuntary" nature of our own contentment begins
surreptitiously to undermine life's hold on us, and we
weak loveless creatures burrow into the calm seas of
science or the anesthetized euphoria of romanticism, seek-
ing, in effect, our own oblivion, though we claim other-
wise.
The problem of the absence of Gegenmacht amidst this
crisis is at the heart of Nietzsche's genealogical
strategy in constructing the history of the ascetic ideal
in the West. His aim is to recreate in his readers the
pain and ferocity of the battles from which this great Un-
geheuer emerged historically triumphant. its truth, this
genealogy proclaims, is not eternal. As all bases of cul-
ture, the will to truth, the kernel of the ascetic ideal,
is illusion. For millennia it constituted that "misty at-
mosphere" which allowed human beings to "dare to begin,"
to renew their lives. It was the heart of those "heavy
and pregnant errors contained in the conceptions of
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morality, religion and metaphysics . "52 The wm tQ
was a pregnant error, pregnant with "a new possibility of
willing, some delight in willing" at a time when there was
a great collapse and disease of the will. 53 The ascetic
ideal "(sprang) from the protective instinct of a
degenerating life. "54 But it did ^ spring ^
without blood. it was born in blood. Nietzsche's aim is
that it die in blood, for "there is no such thing as a
morality (Sittlichkeit) with an exclusive monopoly of the
moral, and every morality that affirms itself alone
destroys too much valuable strength and is bought too
dear. "55 He hopeSf with his genealogy/ nQt Qnly ^
the (ugly) origins of the ascetic ideal and thus to un-
dermine its omnipotence, but also to provoke in his
readers a surging turmoil strong enough that might itself
become a Gegenmacht; that might eventually become a dif-
ferent experiment in being.
Appropriately, Nietzsche both finds and mytho-
poetizes a great battle at the outset of the history of
the ascetic ideal, a battle which remains known throughout
human history, though modernity, to its detriment, is on
the verge of amnesia. Nietzsche would rekindle modern
memory.
"The watchwords of the battle, written in
characters which have remained legible
throughout human history read, "Rome vs. Is-
rael, Israel vs. Rome." No battle has been
more momentous than this one. .. Perhaps there
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is today not a single intellectual worth hissalt who is not divided on that issue abattleground for those opposites .
»
5 6
The two opposing forces - Rome and Israel - cor-
respond to the two primary physiological responses or
tastes for life. The first, which when using moral lan-
guage Nietzsche calls noble morality, is a healthy
response. it is the response of the strong who have an
excess power to form, mold, recuperate from their own er-
rors and from the wrongs done them. They revel in the
challenge of a violent and heedless world, and in enemies
with whom their strength can be tested. Out of exuberance
and gratitude they anoint themselves good, and, as an
after thought, those who do not measure up to themselves,
bad. They create value out of love of, and honor for
their life. it is their art, Nietzsche says, their "realm
of invention" that they know how to honor. 57 Politically,
such honor translates into laws. The noble are the law-
givers, those who attempt out of a positive love for life,
to contain the resentful, the weak, the reactive, those in
whom life is reviled. The society of the noble rests on a
double reverence - for tradition, and for age. And in
this double reverence lies the source of its capacity to
organize, to build, "to make plans that encompass the dis-
tant future." 58 Rome is here paradigmatic.
With the establishment of laws and the foundation of
a state, bad conscience, the active, positive desire not
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to be rid of something (to be distinguished from the in-
ability "to have done with anything" which Niet 2sche says
results from a damaged apparatus of repression) is creat-
ed. under these new conditions and through cruel and ter-
rible mnemotechnics, the human being is tamed, made more
uniform, calculable; s/he becomes a promising being. The
community within city walls maintains order through this
hard-won new ability. Towards transgressors and outside
enemies however, the noble retain a wild celebration of a
violent and mutually preying world. They retain a healthy
beastliness.
Nietzsche calls this noble morality "die Sittlichkeit
der Sitte," "the morality of customs." it forms, he
argues, the "prehistoric labor" whose fruit is historical
man, or, the sovereign individual - a new and interesting
phenomenon capable of the proud and new privilege of re-
sponsibility, conscience.
The other primary physiological response is that of
the weak - what Nietzsche calls "slave morality." it is
the response of the impotent, that is, of those unable to
bear the bitter indifference towards suffering which the
life force seems to possess and on which the noble
thrives. The strongest of the sick is the ascetic priest,
that "incarnate desire to be different, to be in a dif-
ferent place." 59 The ascetic priests invent a religion of
pity which reduces each human being to a common
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denominator: sinner. They create a human herd led, in
early Christianity (which historically marks the first
"slave revolt in morals") by the priestly caste itself.
But the weak always produce enormous tension within any
society, Their resentment of the human condition and of
those who thrive in it is the impetus for great
creativity. As the basis of a culture however, the crea-
tive force which constitutes the ascetic ideal in morals
forms a horizon which demarcates an "other world" of the
"beyond." The unconditional love which this ideal spawns
is not love for this world. Life in this world deserves
only our pity. They anoint both this world and the strong
"evil." Themselves they call "good," and their other-
worldly vision, "true world." The ascetic ideal is the
creative product of the weak, and its driving force is
redemption from and revenge upon this life. Their crea-
tive act appears to be a no! to this world.
Yet Nietzsche says that the triumph of the ascetic
ideal opened up "a new possibility of willing, some
delight in willing." The no!
, Nietzsche says, magically
brought to life an abundance of tender yeses! 60 How then
did the ascetic ideal keep the weak and poor in spirit on
this life? Nietzsche's painful answer is that it did so
through the development of delight in a certain kind of
cruelty. Joy in life was found to reside in the cruelty
of finding oneself eternally guilty before God, guilty for
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the "ineluctable animal instincts . "61 Joy in l ife was
found in "the will of man to find himself guilty and
reprehensible to a degree that can never be atoned for."
It is the priest who creates such "orgies of feeling"
which keep the weak on this life. The priest, "that art-
ist in guilt feelings"" who answers y^ ^ sufferers
can find someone to blame for your pitiful condition.
There is meaning in your suffering. it is your own sin,
you yourself are the cause of your suffering. with this,
"the invalid has been transformed into a sinner. »« The
eternal sinner. Life, Nietzsche says, was made once again
interesting, for pain and suffering became again meaning-
ful; one even longed for it; one broke oneself over the
"cruel wheel of a restless, morbidly lascivious con-
science." 64 so is one, through his own wounds, kept in-
terested in this life under the horizon of the ascetic
ideal.
With this interpretation Nietzsche sings a kind of ode
to impotence. Paradoxically, with this cruelty a certain
kind of beauty was born - God on the Cross; a new affirma-
tion of this-worldly suffering. A strange new love
sustained by the mystery of the pudenda oriao of the being
of man strapped the will to this life. The ascetic priest
made of man a perpetual mystery to himself, carving out a
painful cleft between self and self-knowledge which could
be redeemed only through a war of expurgation against
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one's mortal being, a war led by the high priest, sick
himself, still the high priest retained the degree of
health necessary to be both trusted and_feared by his
flock. He was, Nietzsche interestingly says, his flock's
"support, resistance, prop, compulsion, taskmaster,
tyrant, and^od. » (emphasis mine) « Alone thrQugh ^
powers of the ascetic priest did the divine appear to the
flock. Alone with the aid of the ascetic priest could the
lowly
-stand before things in awe," in this case, before
the beauty, the divinity of their own self-inflicted suf-
fering.
Embodied in the pitiful spectacle of this ascetic
life in the Christian community was something Nietzsche
could not fail to admire, for in a certain sense he recog-
nizes in the ascetic priest of early Christianity the
strength to give life a distinctive shape and hence the
aesthetic sensibility he thinks modernity has lost. The
sensibility with which the ascetic priest renews the will
is based on an honest look into the depths of life. it
faces, in a certain way, the fact that injustice is the
essential condition of all deeds, that perfection in this
life and in the community of believers is impossible. The
ascetic priest faces this, yet still acts, carving out a
distinctive form of life, renewing the will through find-
ing a terrible beauty in suffering. The ascetic ideal ap-
preciates that suffering is an ineliminable part of beau-
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ty, of a life worth living. Through the ascetic ideal a
love for life is achieved, not by expurgating suffering,
but through it.
However, there is a counter sensibility by which
Nietzsche is repulsed. The new beauty and the new affir-
mation of the ascetic ideal "wants to become master not
over something in life but over life itself, over its most
profound, powerful and basic conditions."^ m seeking to
affirm itself alone, in its unconditional will to truth,
the ascetic ideal seeks to destroy the conditions of the
life force. Not only does it seek to expurgate its own
bloody origins but it continues to disguise the ceaseless
battle it wages against the strong. The creative act of
the weak is reactive. What is reacted to is the harsh
law of life; to anything which has the strength to love
this world in the face of it. It conducts not simply a
war, but a war of expurgation against the strong. Rome
must be utterly destroyed in favor of the human herd.
Thus the ascetic ideal contained form-giving forces
for an exhausted world thereby saving the will itself.
Yet the misty atmosphere of unconditional love was for
things not of this world. One loved what one was not;
eternally punishing and wounding one's mortal self. Life
in this world was worthy only of our pity. A certain
denial stood at the portal of this horizon, an honest
denial, one which still believes in itself, for this is
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not yet modern self-deceit. The mist is yet strong and
thick, still capable of inspiring deep love and faith.
Luther and the Protestant Reformation form a key
juncture in the consolidation of Israel's triumph, for
what was effectively Luther's attack on the Church (though
he himself meant only to attack its corruption) was an at-
tack on "the last construction of the Romans. "67 It . g
Luther as the innocent simpleton who receives Nietzsche's
wrath as bearer of the responsibility for almost wholly
eclipsing from the world the knowledge and experience par-
ticular to "Rome." i shall examine Nietzsche's analysis
of this stage of the battle with care, for with this al-
most mortal wound to Rome, a certain kind of impetus to
mastery is, for the first time, both fully unleashed and
combined with the already strong Christian pity for the
human condition. in this, the nihilism latent in the
morality of the weak comes nearer to actual fruition.
With Rome's ruin, the mist is about to be dispersed, man's
form-giving forces dealt a near mortal blow.
The triumph of Israel in the Christian ascetic ideal,
is also the triumph of the impulse to the unconditional.
This impulse, the essence of the weak, is for Nietzsche a
sign of the extreme immoderation of a being who cannot
bear the kind of complexity and Vieldeutigkeit (literally,
the many meaning-like character of the world; usually
translated as multiplicity which loses the notion of
75
"deuten": to point, interpret, give meaning, illumine)
which a person of good taste not only experiences in the
world but embraces. This impulse is embodied at the most
general and fundamental level in the unconditional faith
in another world which offers salvation and redemption,
and in an all-knowing, all-seeing God. it is also
manifest in the tactics the Christian ideal uses to keep
the weak on this life, namely, in the orgy of guilt feel-
ings that locates responsibility for suffering un-
ambiguously in the self. And it is manifest in the famil-
iarity with which the Christian relates to his God.
Nietzsche refers here to the "pawing" and "nuzzling," to
presuming to involve God in the pettiness of even one's
smallest worries. 68 Christianity presumes an access, a
proximity to the deity, or what Nietzsche calls "das An-
sich-der-Dinge" (the in-itself of things) where other re-
ligions dare not even create a word to name theirs.
The trajectory of this impulse from early Chris-
tianity to the Lutheran Reformation is upwards. Luther is
the apotheosis of the immoderation of the Christian as-
cetic ideal. When Luther declares that works give us no
special promise of salvation, that faith alone matters,
his rejection of this-worldly action is even more uncondi-
tional than that of early Christianity. Likewise, when he
defrocks the priest both by declaring "everyone a priest"
and by removing the injunction of abstinence, his effort
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xs to eliminate all worldly constructions that might con-
ation and mediate the individual's relationship to God.
A similar logic governs his dismissal of the inspirational
base of the Church councils. The unconditional rejection
of all this-worldly life save the wholly inner life of the
spirit, assured each believer alike the possibility of a
kind of access to God hitherto unheard of in Christian
faith.
While Nietzsche acknowledges that the Lutheran
Reformation unleashed a certain restlessness of the
spirit, a yearning for independence, and a belief in a
right to liberty
- all of which Nietzsche embraces, though
skeptically
- he is most concerned to argue that it coar-
sened the spirit, made it shallow, plebeian, simple. For
in making access to God an immediate and private affair,
Luther undermined the very things that both sustained and
brought into appearance the awesome power of "das An-sich-
der-Dinge," of the holy. Luther destroyed those forms of
life through which a distance from the holy was
maintained, a distance without which the awesome quality
of its presence could not be experienced. Through the
humility of appearing alone before one's almighty God,
Nietzsche smells the scent of a stronger unconditional
urge to master this relationship through simplification,
purification. The Protestant spirit lost, in Nietzsche's
view, the depth of early Christianity's insight.
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What stood between early Christianity and Luther, be-
tween, as Nietzsche put it, multiplicity and simplicity,
was the Roman Church. it was a Roman insight based on
Roman experiences which kept the impulse to the uncondi-
tional in bounds. Enshrined in the Roman Church was a
certain skepticism and hence moderation which enlivens the
spirit of the strong. Nietzsche refers to this spirit as
southern, recalling the long debates in the classical
world in matters of faith, and contrasting it with the
simplistic, unconditional spirit of the north. The last
mark left on the world by this southern Roman spirit which
Nietzsche so admires was the creation of the Christian
Church as a "structure for ruling. "69 As such/ what ^
here understood but lost on Luther was how to sustain
faith and awe before the superhuman, the divine. The
Roman Church was no innocent regarding power. it instinc-
tively knew how to assure a thick, deep mist.
Paradoxically, Nietzsche appears, in this attack on
Luther, as a defender of the need for faith, for he at-
tacks the peasant simplicity responsible for Luther's
failure to question whether the holy would retain its
power in human life once its worldly institutional embodi-
ments were destroyed; whether unconditional faith alone
was sufficient to sustain the awe; whether the faithful
might not need a specific form of life and structure of
power in which the magnificence and light of the holy
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could be manifest. Nietzsche's wrath is directed against
Luther's innocence about the means to sustain faith. Yet
his interest in mounting this attack is not in saving
Christian faith. In fact, he rails against Luther's
simplistic intervention for failing to see that it was not
corruption that sat on the Papal throne, but life itself,
so that in attempting to save the Church, he not only
crushed the Renaissance and detained the Enlightenment,
but lastingly impoverished the spirit itself. Herein_lies
Nietzsche's interest in this critique. He wants to point
to the fact that both the experience of rule and more im-
portantly the knowledge born of it were, with Luther,
lost: how to create a form of life in which the beauty and
awesomeness of das An-sich-der-Dinge could appear.
Nietzsche's aim is recovery of this knowledge.
What the Roman Church understood and Luther did not
was that it was not enough to have a moral ideal which
gave suffering a meaning. The import and awesomeness of
any meaning given to earthly suffering needed to be
manifest in sensuous human struggle, to be endowed with
human form, culture; it needed to be institutionalized and
ritualized. This alone would provide a space for those
who excelled in the human struggle with suffering. Only
in the drama of the excellent - the saint, the monk, the
priest - could humans behold with awe the beauty to be
found in this "veil of tears" and receive an inspired spur
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to live. This is ^ kernel Qf Nietzsche , s raggs
Luther.
But Luther's spirit was too violently unconditional
to tolerate the wisdom of this southern skepticism. To
allow sensuous human struggle a space for display risked
honoring the evil life of the flesh. And so Luther struck
a death blow to the power of the ascetic ideal by im-
poverishing the spirit. Both Luther and this enfeebled
spirit to which the modern age is the direct heir, were
innocent of the requirements for sustaining a love of
life, for neither could tolerate the necessary ambiguity
of any form of life. Neither had a "taste" for it. This
innocence regarding one's lack of knowledge becomes the
origin of modernity's deceit and the dishonesty of the as-
cetic ideal, releasing its nihilism. Freed from Chris-
tianity as dogma and bolstered by the modern faith in the
"free personality," the secular modern is compelled to
ask, why then do we suffer? In what sense can it be
necessary? Silence alone responds, and the modern cry
resounds in turn, "Let us then do away with it in the name
of reason, truth, freedom and equality!" With this begins
the ascetic ideal's dishonesty; with this, modernity. No
longer can Nietzsche give it "all honor!"
In Nietzsche's view, it is precisely the will to
thoroughly transform this veil of tears which defies
modernity's claim to being this-worldly . Born into the
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world in this moment is the most unconditional will to
master the human condition heretofore found in the West,
fed by the most thorough outbreak of pity yet seen.
Nietzsche calls modern science (by which I encapsulate
these outbreaks)
-the most spiritualized form of the as-
cetic ideal, "70 fQr its s . ngle unconditiQnal . s . n_
tellectual cleanliness, faith in truth as objectivity, an
objectivity which Nietzsche says "refuses not only to af-
firm but also to deny. "71 with this, nothing will
prosper. Israel's nihilism blossoms, for such a spirit
can bring forth literally nothing which men might find
worthy of their honor. Life is utterly degraded. Lost to
modernity is the knowledge and experience necessary to
engender a form of life worthy of existence. Rome has
been vanquished.
Let me now turn to Nietzsche's critique of modem
political phenomena to show the way in which these specif-
ically modern forms embody this inability to engender a
form of life worthy of being.
E. Modern Political Phenomena
In this final section I would like to further deepen
and clarify Nietzsche's relation to modernity by exploring
his critique of modern political forms. Nietzsche never
did a sustained and individual critique of major political
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phenomena. He did however att^vtack them continuously
throughout most of his texts, with the exception of na-
tionalism, he tended to treat democracy, anarchism,
socialism, the movement to emancipate women, and what he
simply called industrial society as phenomena which
cohered together around the two sustaining impulses which
in his view constituted the specifically modern moral
ideal: the desire to do away with suffering, and the
desire for equal rights. Modern political forms, in
Nietzsche's view, were embodiments of that specifically
modern morality: the morality of pity, we will recognize
the two major impulses of this morality of course as the
critical ones in any movement - liberal or socialist -
agitating for social and economic justice today. Rather
than address each of these political forms in turn, I win
examine and draw out Nietzsche's analysis of one alone:
the women's emancipation movement.
My choice is not random, for Nietzsche identifies
both of the sustaining impulses of modern morality with
the feminine. The characteristic which, according to
Nietzsche, defines our age - the democratic desire for
equality
- is an effeminate one. Likewise the "inability
to remain spectators, to let someone suffer" is a feminine
failure. Moreover, modern morality, as the morality of
pity, is itself "old woman's morality." 73 By invoking the
necessary sterility incumbent upon old women, Nietzsche
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suggests that modern morality's impulse to help everyone
is infertile; it yields nothing. where everyone is a
nurse and everyone an invalid, there we find no self-
reliance, no selves.™ There, there is no child and hence
no future. it appears then that "the feminine" is em-
blematic of modernity in Nietzsche's writings.
But what is the essence of "the feminine?" it is a
complex figure. As Derrida put it, "Nietzsche dealt with
so many women.^ As we look more clQsely at ^ f±^
we see that in Nietzsche's view the feminine has undergone
a de-feminization(Ent-weiblichung) in modernity; modernity
has experienced the "deprivation of" the weiblich, the
feminine. Hence, paradoxically, the modern age, though
emblematically feminine, is less Weib, less woman. The
movement to emancipate women embodies this de-
feminization. An analysis of this process of Ent-
weiblichung will help further reveal Nietzsche's relation
to modern political forms and to the shallow formlessness
of modernity as a whole. We should remind ourselves that
one of the women in Nietzsche's life was life itself; that
"woman" is a metaphor for life. Hence, if in modernity a
process of de-feminization has occurred, if there is less
Weib, close attention to this process should illuminate in
what ways modernity is an impoverished and nihilistic age,
an age unable to endow itself with the contours of a form
by which it itself could be justified.
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Before examining directly what Nietzsche actually
said about the movement for women's emancipation, I brief-
ly want to lay out the historical terrain of the movement
as it pertains to Nietzsche's period. The late 19th
century was a period of tremendous agitation in Europe and
the United States for women's rights. There were three
general approaches to the question which were solidifying
during this period in Germany, with real solidification
and even open breaches occurring in the early 1890's. The
most prominent part of the movement was the moderate wing
of the middle class. Heavily influenced by German
idealism, this wing argued for sexual difference rooted in
a glorification of motherhood and the demand that woman's
distinctiveness should be developed as a complement to
man's. The radical wing of the middle class was less
prominent though important, and stood for uncompromising
equality between the sexes, and the demand for participa-
tion in political life. Finally, there was the
proletariat wing of the movement for women's emancipation
which argued that the question of women was only a part of
a larger social problem which could not be addressed
without class conflict that included both men and women
together. 76
What was Nietzsche's view of this explosive agita-
tion?
"...to dream perhaps of equal rights, equal
education, equal claims and obligations -
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Nietzsche repeatedly takes aim at the dream of equal
rights when raging against the emancipation of women.
Ostensibly aiming at progress, this dream is the "aspira-
tion to the economic and legal self-reliance of a
clerk. "78 Nietzsche identifies this dream as part of the
same economic optimism which pervades industrial society,
part of that "ungeheuere Prozess," that monstrous process
which presumes that the "increasing expenditure of every-
body must necessarily involve the increasing welfare of
everybody. "79 The real product of industrial society how-
ever is "a certain actually rendering similar," the clerk.
The demand for equal rights is perhaps the instance
of the morality of pity in that it is the demand for all
to suffer equally, to suffer alike. Nietzsche writes,
"The man of "modern ideas," this proud ape, is im-
measurably dissatisfied with himself: that is certain. He
suffers
- and his vanity wants him to suffer only along
side others, to feel pity (mit-leid) .
"
80 The modern im-
pulse to equality is the impulse to sameness. As such it
is the process of the borification and uglification of
woman. It diminishes her.
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It is in this sense that we should understand
Nietzsche's attack on the very concept of rights which un-
derpins the movement to emancipate women, a right he
argues is acquired through treaties, it is something
earned through struggle and strength. it is not something
that can be demanded, for it is not a right but the "fa-
tality of life itself" that one attack or defend
oneself. 81 Behind this accusation of semantic confusion
lies something serious. Modern demands for equal rights
belie a loss of the instinct for the fatality of life;
they belie the lack of a critical understanding of life
itself. once lost, the human being is diminished, made
ugly. Her impulses are no longer for radiance and dis-
tinction, but for sameness, equality in suffering. The
loss of this instinct for battle, Nietzsche is suggesting,
entails the loss of an aesthetic sensibility for beauty.
This gets to the essence of Nietzsche's animus
towards the emancipators. They are abortive women, women
who have met with an accident (verunglueckten)
, who have
turned out badly (misgeratenen)
.
82 And what is it they
abort? That singular power bestowed upon women alone: the
power of birth, of bringing something new into being.
Along with this power they abort the child which is "a new
beginning.
. .a first movement." 83 Emancipatory women, in
their demand for equal rights, have suffered the loss of
the power of their distinctive feminine instincts. "They
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lack the stuff for children. "84 They
, like the M
woman's morality by which they are borne, are sterile.
It is critical to wend our way past the impatient ir-
ritation which surrounds our initial reading of these
Physiological and naturalistic arguments against the eman-
cipators. Nietzsche's critique appears to be merely an-
other form of that uninteresting defense of keeping women
in their place so common among philosophers in the Western
tradition. More generously, we are tempted to assimilate
it to the position, sketched above, of the conservative
wing of the middle class movement for emancipation. Yet
this form of emancipation too has lost its specifically
feminine power. m Bevond r,nnH »„h Evil, aphorism #232
Nietzsche ridicules the attempt to define "das Weib an
sich" (woman in itself) as a clumsy attempt at scientific
self
-exposure. His prose is filled with sarcastic meta-
phors from the Enlightenment - exposure, bringing to
light, venturing forth, "being medically explicit." This
effort to address the question of women also diminishes
and erodes the distinctively feminine power, commandeered
as it is by the will to proximity.
Too close .- If we live together with another
person too closely, what happens is similar
to when we repeatedly handle a good engrav-ing with our bare hands: one day all we haveleft is a piece of dirty paper. The soul of
a human being too can finally become tat-
tered by being handled continually; and that
is how it finally appears to us - we never
see the beauty of its original design again.
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tion w^hT 10^3 bY to° Miliar associa-ith friends and women; and sometimeswhat one loses is the pearl of one's l52!«
Both the idealist attempt to define "das Weib an
sich" and the attempt to attain equal rights for all are
exemplary of too much handling. Driven by the impulse of
the unconditional, the impulse to master, they draw too
near to that they wish to strengthen - the power and free-
dom of women, impoverishing, dirtying instead, losing the
beauty of the original design; that is, losing the fertil-
ity Nietzsche attributes to the feminine instincts.
"To lose the sense for the ground on whichone is most certain of victory... to workwith virtuous audacity against men's faithin a basically different ideal that he~takesto be concealed in woman, something
Eternally-and-Necessarily-Feminine whatis the meaning of all this if not a crum-
tion?»86
feminine instincts, a defeminiza-
What then is the ground upon which women are most
certain of victory? what is the feminine instinct which
makes women tall enough for "all fundamental problems of
life," which makes women "deep?" What is the specifically
feminine form of power, the secret of her fertility lost
on modernity? For this we go, with Nietzsche, to the
"world of the eternally feminine" where lives "the perfect
woman," "the real woman," the truly feminine.
The most tremendous metaphor for this woman and her
power Nietzsche concocts is "the beautiful cat." Woman is
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brilliantly shrewd, cunning. Her power and her victory
lie in mastering the art of pleasing and hence the art of
simulation. She is a master in the arts of the actor.
She adores and adorns herself with masks. As such, her
true power is the power of a^n_distans ; 87 of keeping
herself hidden through a dance of simulation, while
mimicking the desires man has for her. She masters the
art of appearing in his image. These desires, as
Nietzsche sees them, cluster around the need for repose,
lightness, beauty. Woman is that subtle creature who "as-
sists (man's) efforts at idealization by adorning herself,
walking beautifully, dancing, expressing delicate
thoughts: in the same way, she practices modesty, reserve,
distance
- realizing instinctively that in this way the
idealizing capacity of the man will grow." 88 it is criti-
cal here to note that this practice of modesty, simula-
tion, distance is not the hypocritical "I shall pretend to
be modest." The essence and power of "the feminine" is "a
deliberate closing of one's eves to oneself ," 89 the
"(pushing) aside of one's so-called "character," flooding
it and at times extinguishing it." 90 m this art, which
Derrida calls "the feminine operation," 91 the actio in
distans becomes naive, utterly instinctual. The essence
of the art of the beautiful cat is her allure, is animal,
wild.
"What inspires respect for women, and often
enough even fear is her nature , which is
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more "natural" than man's. The genuinecunning suppleness of a beast of prey
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The essence of the perfect woman's power, which at
least twice in his published works Nietzsche calls the
preponderant power, 93 i ies in the allure q£ ^
comprehensible, the awesome, the distant, the ever-
retreating; in what Derrida calls "the untruth of truth."
Her wild beauty enthralls, drawing man towards her as
towards some great incomprehensible. At the same time
however it draws his idealizing powers forth, and woman,
the simulatress par excellence, shrewdly and deftly forms
herself to his image, so that what he approaches
originates only in his idealizing powers themselves. in
Twilight of the Idols
, Nietzsche writes, "Man created
woman
- but what out of? Out of a rib of his God, his
* ideal '..."94 woman's artistry is in appearing to be
something, in appearing to possess something necessarily
and eternally feminine, while in fact she is evoking his
dreaming capacity, his idealizing capacity. Her power
lies here, in the capacity to keep, through a never con-
summated approach, man's interest, his passion, his
enthrallment alive. "...her art is the lie, her highest
concern is mere appearance and beauty." 95 Woman is the
play of mere appearance. Hers is the "power of the
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dream." „oM„ always renins alluringly out of his reach
prompting his creative formative forces. The essence of
her power is in creating in hi* a desire for and a belief
in the possibility of proximity which, because of her
shrewd cunning, can never be consulted. The child to
which woman gives birth is the idealizing capacity, the
capacity, in Nietzsche's view, which sustains human
entailment with life itself. Thus Nietzsche could say
that although man wills woman, creates her, hers is the
preponderant power, for without it humans do not
--dare to
begin. 1,96
With this reading, the question remains regarding the
status of this world in Nietzsche view. Can he really
mean this defense of the eternally feminine to be read as
woman's essential identity? as an argument for keeping
women in their traditional place? He is, after all, argu-
ing explicitly against the women's emancipation movement.
With these questions we must turn to a discussion of
Nietzsche's forms of parody and irony regarding this
"world of the eternally feminine," for while he extols it,
it is by no means a simple bow he makes in its direction.
To begin with, Nietzsche's very use of the term
"eternally feminine" is facetious and ironic, as is his
reference to woman's "nature" in any sense other than as a
reference to her historical being. Nietzsche's entire
work, born as it was out of the anxiety and joy created by
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the end of the dominant moral-metaphysical ideal in the
West, bears unrelenting witness to this claim.
The most powerful argument for this reading can be
made through an analysis of aphorisms #231-239 in the
chapter "Our Virtues" in Bevondj^^^ This chap.
ter begins with the very foreboding sigh
, "Ah if you knew,
how soon, how very soon - it will be different!..."
Nietzsche is foreseeing the consummation of nihilism, the
end of "believing in one's virtues," of therefore, having
a good conscience. What will life be worth when we can no
longer believe in anything good about ourselves? We will
leave this question dangling, as Nietzsche himself does,
to move on to the task Nietzsche sets himself in the face
of this coming event. That is the task, referred to
above, of the "good European," heir of 2000 years of
training in truthfulness. it is the task of intellectual
cleanliness, for this, or as he calls it, honesty, is the
single virtue left us. But Nietzsche warns, let us not
become bores or saints in our task of perfecting our
virtue. Let us approach our task with love and with
malice, that is, with art, parodic art.
Sections 231-239, the last nine aphorisms of this
chapter, are a case study in this task of perfecting our
last virtue with love and with malice. His target - any
essentializing, and hence dishonest, view of woman. His
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means - parody. In the opening ^
honesty begins. Nietzsche declares that the particular
solutions to problems which initially effect great belief
in us, we later come to see as steps to our own self-
knowledge; steps which reveal in fact our particular
stupidity, what he calls that unteachable
"granite of
spiritual fate.-" steps^ ^ ^ ^
are. He then goes on to say he is about to reveal a few
truths about "das Weib an sich," his truths, that is, his
stupidities.
Nietzsche's honesty about his views of women - that
they are a granite part, that is, a stupid but relentless
part of him
- parodies the mendacious idealism of the
"emancipated women," both those whose aim is equal rights
and those who speak out about "das Weib an sich." The
revelation of his "Granit von geistigem Fatum" is also an
example of the malice of parodic honesty he turns upon
himself, for this giving up of one's convictions is pain-
ful, cruel, though necessary. Nietzsche also maliciously
parodies his readers' desires for truth about woman, and
for a settled Nietzschean position. if the repeated view
that woman
- wild and fragile - must be, like a bird from
on high, locked in a cage like property and kept from
singing about herself, is self-parody, we don't know what
Nietzsche thinks. He makes of his readers, fools.
Nietzsche maliciously dodges himself and us.
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Yet Nietzsche dodges not because he is at a loss
here.
„is neW sel f-knowledge is precisely^ ^ ^_
truth of truth," about what kinds of artifices are re-
quired to sustain iove of this life, to be fertile, and to
develop the requisite form-giving forces for creating
seething beautiful and thus worthy of being. Through the
traditional relationship of men and women, of
-will and
willingness" Nietzsche finds valuable insights into the
fertility of life itself. Bis writings on women^ ^
and out of being direct arguments against the women's
emancipation movement, and treating women and women's
power as emblematic of life's fertility. The two of
course are intertwined. The arguments against the former
are made in defense of the later.
Nietzsche's insight into the eternally feminine is
not, however, static. if he had wanted to retain the
power of the "feminine operation" as is, and as the sole
preserve of women, would he so carefully and enchantingly
have displayed its workings and have called it the prepon-
derant power? if this had been his intention, why would
he have made conscious, through his work, this "in-
stinctual knowledge?" He is clear to say elsewhere that
once instinctual knowledge becomes conscious, it loses its
power. Nietzsche is out to bring something before the
mind's eye and to transform it. His strategy is
genealogical
.
94
ss
in elucidating the form of power critical to woman'
"victory," an instinctual knowledge without which woman i
••defeminized,.. what I have done is outlined the Kernel of
Nietzsche's inchoate genealogy of "the eternally femi-
nine." inchoate because Nietzsche never specifically
wrote such a genealogy
- his writings about women are
sprinkled throughout his texts with little apparent
coherence. Nevertheless Nietzsche approaches the question
of woman genealogically and constructs thereby a powerful
if not univocal critique of understanding the history of
women as the progressive freedom of a heretofore oppressed
and victimized group. Nietzsche again, as elsewhere,
reconstructs battles, this time in the area of woman.
However he is also out to redraw the lines of these
battles.
"Reflect on the whole history of women: dothey not have to be first of all and above
all else actresses?" 98
The histrionic instinct and the power of the
histrion, Nietzsche suggests, were developed out of the
necessity of struggle of all "somehow dependent social
strata." 99 in this, Nietzsche singles out the lower
class, Jews, and women. All of these groups became only
what they were considered to be worth by those upon whom
they were dependent. Out of this void in self-valuation,
out of this suffering, grew the "slave's craftiness," the
specific art of appearance of the histrion. Hence a
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definite counterforce, and Nietzsche argues, with ween
hegemonic force, was born. The weak were fructiferous. A
child was born. Herein lies Nietzsche's interest in the
eternally feminine. (Reflection upon why Nietzsche
singles out women alone as having a hegemonic power is
further persuasive evidence that Nietzsche's treatment of
women should also be read emblematically, that something
besides a mere reactionary critique of the women's eman-
cipation movement is taking place. I am not suggesting
that there is not an element of reaction in Nietzsche's
writings. He as much as admits this is so in identifying
his "Granit von geistegem Fatum." Rather, I want to elab-
orate the deeper, more important critique I think
Nietzsche is making of the assumption* underlying the
women's emancipation movement and, by extension, most
other modern political phenomena.)
We are not then to take Nietzsche's work on the
eternally feminine as any kind of essentialist discourse
on women or as an argument to keep women in a powerless
position. But is there perhaps not some irony here which
Nietzsche himself is unable to see in this argument that
this power specific to women is the preponderant one?
Hasn't his "granite of spiritual fate" in fact got a
faster grip on him than he knows? How can willessness be
more powerful than willfulness? And how can the theorist
of the will to power make such an argument? Lizzie Bor-
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den, director and producer of the film, "Working Girls"
about women prostitutes offers an interesting contemporary
comment on this question. m an interview she says,
"Men's bodies are exposed and therefore vulnerable,
whereas women have this ability to conceal. On some
level, women have always dealt with theater. And their
theatricality is often constructed to make men believe
there's true passion there. Young girls know the power
that comes from making men excited, that ability to spin
them out of control. That's what working girls use in the
bedroom, what keeps them from victimization." 100 This I
think is an example of how Nietzsche's work might in fact
illuminate a kind of power, even if I think it is dif-
ficult to argue that it is a preponderant one through this
example. This is one level on which Nietzsche is operat-
ing and through which his work is illuminating, at least,
in part.
But he, like the filmmaker herself, is far from ex-
tolling this power, this child, unequivocally. The kernel
of the genealogy, the slave's craftiness, is a treasure
Nietzsche has "found" but does not covet. His ode to im-
potence is no simple song. The purpose of his genealogy
of women, like his genealogy of morals, is to resurrect
battles and transform them.
"Women are considered deep - why? because
one can never discover any bottom to them.
Women are not even shallow." 101
97
This art of pleasing, the art of the histrion, is
also the power of the weak and impotent; it is reactive,
that is, entirely dependent upon others for its being.
Woman as histrion is wholly actress, simulating a sub-
stance, a self. The essence of Nietzsche's anxiety about
the art of the histrion is this lack of self. Numerous
times he intones that women have no depth, no clarity
about themselves, no psychological understanding. m
fact, her art depends upon her "closing her eyes to her-
self." she has no bottom; she is not even shallow. she
renunciates herself; her devotion (to simulation) is un-
conditional. She is a slave to opinions.
The eternally feminine is for Nietzsche an ambiguous
power. Modernity is overturning it. 102 Nietzsche WQuld
give it a kick too, though off to a slightly different
direction than the voices of the equal rights eman-
cipators, for there is, in his view, a trajectory from the
self-less woman in the world of the eternally feminine, to
both the heaving breasts of the Wagneriennes and the in-
fertility of the abortive women of the emancipation move-
ment. None possess the requisite powers to endow them-
selves with a distinctive form. Nietzsche's work on the
eternally feminine performs a warning function. As a form
of power the eternally feminine stimulates anew our awe
and love of life. Like the ascetic priest, the eternally
feminine creates the fear of the distant and the desire to
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approach; it creates belief in divinity which inspires
love. it preserves a vital experience and form of knowl-
edge which Nietzsche thinks women have unconsciously pos-
sessed. He would make it conscious, for the emancipation
movement wants, as Luther wanted, and as the other modern
political phenomena want, in the name of equality, same-
ness in suffering, to expurgate this kind of power and
knowledge from the world. The essence of such attempts is
abortiveness, shallowness, nihilism. They result in a
herd whose virtue is adaptation. Nietzsche warns against
such attempts without simply extolling this other form of
power (the problematic position I think Derrida's work
helps to suggest)
.
Just as he does not extol the ascetic
ideal's unconditional impulse, yet finds a treasure of
knowledge and experience from which the modern will to
proximity should learn, so too is his aim in analyzing the
eternally and necessarily feminine. in both cases
Nietzsche aims, in the face of the shallow will to
proximity of modernity, to resurrect the battles and ten-
sions which pervade our settled truths, not in order to
resurrect those same tensions, but to destroy the hegemony
of our contented adaptive and theatrical sensibility, and
to thereby call into being the artistic sensibility
without which humans cannot create a life worthy of their
honor. Central to this sensibility is the importance of
tension itself, of battle. it is to an elaboration of
99
this tension-ridden sensibility that T u{11 «-j-j-uy n I will turn in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER II
CREATING AND THE TRAGI
-COMEDY OF THE GREAT TRAGEDIAN
A. Intrnrfnrtinn
In chapter one I have argued that what most disturbs
Nietzsche about modernity is the inability to manifest the
form-giving forces needed to bring into being a specific
form of life whose distinctiveness and beauty could be
self-justifying. There is a curious paradox to this argu-
ment however because, at the same time, Nietzsche identi-
fies modernity with a ferocious will to master, a will to
form the world. Most contemporary thinkers indebted to
Nietzsche for their critical understanding of modernity
adopt this latter line of thinking, more or less eclipsing
the former, and argue that getting the shape of modernity
"right" consists in understanding that its distinction
lies in constant efforts to organize, order, tame and dom-
inate human selves and the natural world, what dis-
tinguishes modernity is the effort to stamp out the world
with a form of man's own making alone. Modernity, so goes
this analysis, is the continuous effort to impose form.
Hence, as critics, our aim should be to inhibit or
diminish such projects of mastery, an aim variously char-
acterized as "putting slack in the order," developing a
will "not-to-will, " or "suspending the relation with
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castration," aU forms of
-letting up' in some manner or
another. The broad outlines Qf ^ debate^^ ^
oscillation between imposing form an(J nQt .^.^^
or, imposing it less. 1
While I agree that modernity is characterized by a
will to master, it sees to me that if we, following
Nietzsche, see that the essential characteristic of this
will is an unconditional desire to expurgate all suffering
from the world, what 1 called in chapter one a will to
proximity, then we come to see that it is precisely this
drive which destroys the very possibility of form and
formation in any enduring or relatively enduring sense.
On this reading, as I have argued in chapter one, suffer-
ing is an ineliminable and necessary part of any creative
form-giving, and it is this sensibility, this aesthetic
understanding of being which is inimical to the modern
mind.
Of importance in this reading of the will to master
is the shift it effects both in the focus of our defini-
tion of modernity's problems, and in our critical
response. From the problem of mastery and the strategy of
"letting up" or "relieving, » we move to a focus on
modernity's process character, its lack of stability and
inability to create forms of legitimate authority - what
Nietzsche more polemically referred to as the inability to
command or obey, and to the strategy of understanding the
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demands of the creative act itself r uZ . m brief, Nietzsche
urges us to bear witness to the sufferingcn any imposition
of for. demands of us. He urges us to testify to this
tension, this limit, for aione in its presence, as j will
argue in great detail in this chant.,Pter, can we create forms
of life which draw our artistic being forth both in crea-
tive renewal and in creative guestionina.
Hence, in modernity what we find is a kind of power
which^ at a once and for all tyrannical imposition of
form, but whose s£tssSk ls precisely ^ ^
effect is an endless process of attempting to impose form
and shape selves and the world. m this light Michel
Foucault's work on disciplinary power is instructive, for
while he argues, I think persuasively, that modern power
is positive, productive and formative, its mode of pene-
trating and stamping the body with souls is utterly un-
stable. The very essence of bio-power lies in its nomadic
versatility, its chameleonic brilliance, its adaptability.
Furthermore, in the critique of humanism, found for exam-
Ple in Madness and civilization
, and in Disci nlin. „nH
Punish, (most masterfully exemplified in this later work
in the opening passages, though haunting the entire work)
,
Foucault even broaches, albeit obliquely, the possibility
that this problem of nomadism might be related to this
very desire to eradicate all suffering. 2 still, Foucault,
to my mind does not explore or articulate this aspect of
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Modern attempts to „aster fuiiy ^^^
fore, return to some of the most disturbing thoughts of
Nietzsche in order to better understand the inability in
modernity, despite a for* of power whose aim is to tyran-
nically stamp and for™ the world, to actually bring into
being the forces necessary for self-and-cultural forma-
tions whose distinctiveness and excellence gives them a
»odicum of stability and duration, without these forces
there can be no legitimate authority and no real justice
nor can there be a taming of this ordering-mastering im-
pulse itself.
in the foregoing chapter I have argued that it is to
Nietzsche's critique of the modern religion of pity and
his reflections on suffering that we must turn in our ef-
fort to think through the shape or shapelessness of
modernity. More specifically, I have argued that modern
attempts to master eschew the very kernel of understanding
necessary for cultural and self-formation - the necessity
of embracing suffering. Yet this formulation obviously
remains far from satisfactory in its lack of specificity.
Thus far, in this work, Nietzsche has escaped interroga-
tion aimed at ascertaining whether in any of his discus-
sions of suffering he distinguishes between those forms of
suffering in our time which themselves contribute to her-
dification and lack of distinction, and hence unnecessari-
ly preclude self-and-cultural formation, on the one hand,
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the very heart of our modern condition ^ ^ ^
who we are," on the other. t„ short
, thus ^ ^
the general historical specificity within which
Nietzsche's thought occurs, his reflections on suffering
remain at a fairly abstract, mostly formal level. Hence
the questions press, does Nietzsche distinguish between
kinds and contents of suffering? Does he give us any gen-
eral parameters for doing so? These questions are criti-
cal if „e are to assess the importance of a Nietzschean
inspired critique for conceptions of justice which aim
primarily at social and economic amelioration, and to de-
velop and assess Nietzsche's own approach to the question
of justice.
In attempting to answer the question of the
specificity of Nietzsche's reflections on suffering we are
confronted, as we are in all of his work, with a style
full of polemical reversals and juxtapositions. m
modernity, he says, pity for all suffering on earth and
the totalizing attempt to eradicate it prevails. And
Nietzsche seems to counter this with the simple reverse
image
- we must suffer. This is our basic condition.
Similarly, he seems to employ an operation of reversal
with respect to the relationship between suffering and
knowing. in Christianity suffering was the most
gerneralizable commonly shared and known condition. The
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co^on origin of all knowledge was original sin, meta-
Phorically represented by the story of the Garden.
Through this c«o„ condition of suffering from one's
sins, Ban knew »a„. once again, to counter this Nietzsche
seems to suggest that it is precisely suffering which is
the most individualizing of experiences, and one which
Must therefore be preserved and guarded if creative self-
and-cultural formation is to be achieved. Here too he
seens to retain the totalizing quality of the thought
against which he thinks.
Does Nietzsche simply reproduce this kind of think-
ing? Are his reversals only reversals? it is my aim in
this chapter to argue that Nietzsche is not simply
reproducing and reversing by filling out more precisely
the kinds of suffering he thought it was our historical
lot to have to creatively transfigure.
I will begin by developing the aesthetic foundations
of Nietzsche's reflections on suffering since it is with
these foundations that he formulates the content of our
particular suffering. I will then attempt more explicitly
to articulate this content by developing what Nietzsche
sees as "our challenge." Finally, I will explore the fig-
ure of the artist-philosopher who, as the great tragedian,
represents in figurative form the kind of thinking ac-
tivity which succeeds in "[making] beautiful what is
necessary" 3 in our time. Here we find a fundamentally
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aesthetic move»ent of thought which is affirmative which
transfigures and gives for* to our particular historical
form of suffering.
B. Aesthetic Frmnr^f-j ons
^Jjngth (of an individual or of a people)
^ether^and where the judgment
"beautiful"
'
in IL ?r I deal With if Lt confronted usthe flesh
- as danger, as problem temp-tation
- this determines alsoeven our ?
S£2SoZ!?l (
"That iS b-tif
- * an
What I have begun to suggest in chapter' one is that
any reflection on justice we might undertake with
Nietzsche's aid must be aesthetic in nature. Not only is
his critique of the ascetic ideal levied from the stand-
point of the question of the beautiful, but likewise his
admiration for it wells out of this question. similarly
his vituperations against modernity are aesthetic in
origin. Modernity is not only ugly, it is unable to ap-
preciate the beautiful; it has no aesthetic sensibility
whatsoever. Without an ability to aesthetically ap-
propriate or evaluate, Nietzsche suggests, there can be no
justice.
To elaborate these thoughts we must explore the mean-
ing of the beautiful, hence of affirmation in Nietzsche's
view
-
In Twilight of the Tdn1 S
f he writes,
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"Nothing is so conditional 1^4-
cumscribed as our ffo 'r""Anyone who tried to divorce it t™*™^"1 -Pleasure in man would at once find tS" "ground give way beneathe him "5
The beautiful is a judgment about the world in which the
feeling of pleasure in ourselves predominates. But
Nietzsche specifies this further. It is pleasure in our
Strength, °ur strength to affirm that which we can barely
endure. At the most fundamental level Nietzsche conceives
°f the barely endurable as the condition of suffering from
lack of meaning or purpose, and from a life force appar-
ently indifferent to this, our suffering. Such, in his
view, is our basic state. In this sense, it is the taking
Pleasure in our strength to affirm "the terrifying and
guestionable character of existence"* which moves us to
make the judgment,
-that is beautiful." Hence any judg-
ment of the beautiful carries within it this affirmation
of the basic ontological condition of existence.
What is most important about this formulation to my
reading of Nietzsche's aesthetic approach to questions of
justice is that the aesthetic judgment and feeling for the
beautiful is, at its most essential level, an affirmation
and hence at least an implicit recognition of an un-
masterable mystery at the heart of being, a condition
which he finds to be the fount of human pain, yet also the
source of our pleasure in ourselves as we attempt to fash-
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ion a relationship to this condition. Hence the pleasure
we take in our strength is pleasure in a certain cruelty
towards ourselves; we learn to feel a certain delight in
the suffering this condition causes us. The judgment
"that is beautiful," in Nietzsche's view, expresses a love
of tragedy which he calls "the art of the terrifying and
questionable.-
.7 Thus, in the aesthetic judgment we are
called forth to a challenge, the challenge of comporting
affirmatively towards the mystery at the heart of our
being.
Yet Nietzsche has said that the beautiful is the most
conditional of all things, hence this affirmation is not
the affirmation of mystery and suffering in grand gener-
ality. The specific judgment "that is beautiful" artisti-
cally transfigures this ontological condition, raising it
up into historical specificity, calling a people or an in-
dividual to their historical or personal task of affirming
the barely endurable in their time. in so doing they give
form, make public, their relationship to being. The
strength to give form and historical garb to this
ontological condition, the strength to bring a particular
figure into being through which life can be affirmed and
re-affirmed is what we call beautiful. And it is the
tragic sensibility this strength radiates, a strength
which is "hard enough to experience suffering as a
pleasure," 8 that quickens and supports life and hence
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gives a certain historically authoritative power to the
beautiful.
What so interests Nietzsche about aesthetic judgment
-
precisely this authoritative power of the beautiful
for in his effort to overcome nihilism, he searches for
something which could command, in Arendt<s words, » an
obedience in which men retain their freedom...9 Nietzsche
finds in the historical judgment "that is beautiful" a
goal or horizon which, in the power of its tragic-
historical challenge as it transfigures the ontological
condition of suffering, displays a strength whose radiance
calls us forth to affirm and bring forth our historical
originality. Forms of life which do not take up this
tragic historical challenge eschew, through varying ef-
forts to master being, the very relationship to the world
which alone has binding force. Such a relationship
Nietzsche conceives as essentially artistic.
in The will to Power
, Nietzsche experiments with an
important distinction between a love of beauty and the
ability to see and create the beautiful which can aid in
clarifying the distinction between this artistic rela-
tionship and the effort at mastery. In a fragment found
in The Will to Power
,
we find that those who try to master
are those who,
"...have a nihilistic attitude toward lifetake refuge in the beauty of fnn, - in thosethings in which nature has become perfect
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beauUful
3
-
6
,"?
indi»erently great and
the beautiful,
^LS^beffiSf
-VSt,be ^expression of the very inabuiti^ao
Here Nietzsche entertains the idea that we can con-
ceive of perfect things in nature - ideas or things. But
he contrasts this possibility with another mode by „hich
the beautiful can make its appearance, namely our active
ability to make, to see, to create the beautiful, that is,
the way in which we participate in the appearance of the
beautiful. The warning issued in this thought seems to be
that a love of perfect form as the beautiful can actually
be or become the very inability to have form. Let me un-
pack this. A form is a structure in tension. The simple
structure of a geometric box retains its for, only by
virtue of a set of conditions we might call content or
context conditions
- gravity, air pressure, etc. without
such content conditions, the form cannot sustain itself;
it is a structure only as sustained by a field of force,
by tension. So too, by analogy, a form of life. If „e
take the indifferently perfect things in nature and at-
tempt to establish a form of life within their horizon -
all moral thought in the Christian-Platonic tradition is
here paradigmatic
- we deprive that form of the very con-
tent necessary to create its sustaining tension, a content
ineliminably bound up in Nietzsche's view with an embrace
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of hu,a„ suffering.
„oral thinking
„an
elevation of man above the world" wh ich paradoxically
results in "Baking man gloomy, small and inpoverlshed„ ^
cause it deprives man of the task which most demands his
strength. 11 ;t hence deprives us of the relationship
through which we can participate in the creation and dis-
covery in ourselves of southing, some content, which we
can admire and be transported by. Alone in this activity,
Nietzsche suggests, can the being of man bind itself to a
form of life, and renew that life through the questioning
brought on by the constant proximity to suffering. Trage-
dy, he writes, is a tonic; it renews and refreshes, by
filing forth our strength, our commitment to life.
With these reflections on the beautiful and justice
in mind, it might be useful to glance back once again upon
Nietzsche's genealogical work on morals and the ascetic
ideal for historical examples of a form of life „hich both
did and did not embody the tragic sensibility Nietzsche
finds so critical to the sustenance of a form of life.
Before doing so, however, I would like to make a few brief
comments about the relationship between Nietzsche's per-
spectivism, the aesthetic foundations I have adumbrated
above, and genealogy. m the discussion above I have ap-
proached these foundations as if they had metaphysical
status for Nietzsche. Much of Nietzsche's own discussion
in fact suggests they do. However Nietzsche subjects even
117
his reflections on art and aesthetics to his perspec-
tivis»; even they, he sporadically suggests, are mere
hypotheses. yet they are hypotheses which emerge in
response to the specific historical circumstances of
nihilism, and furthermore, from a way of living which
Nietzsche himself has learned to Uys in the effort to
combat just those circumstances. Hence they have become
conditions for Nietzsche's own life and their status
therefore reaches beyond that of
..mere- hypotheses. They
have become the lenses through which Nietzsche sees and
experiences the world. m "The Uses and Disadvantages of
History for Life," we see that this is true both for his
relationship to the present and to the past. Nietzsche
writes
"...man should above all learn to live, andshould employ history only in the service oftne life he has learned to live ." 1 ^
In short, genealogy, the method by which Nietzsche
reads the past, derives its relationship to the past from
the life it has created for itself in the present. The
constraints of this life form, guide, and sculpt its un-
derstanding of the past - and it is aware of itself as
such. In short, genealogy is an aesthetic methodology.
Let me now turn once again to Nietzsche's genealogy
of the ascetic ideal with these thoughts in mind. In the
ascetic ideal Nietzsche initially finds both artistic im-
pulses which take up the historical task of creating the
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beautiful th^
. relationship tQ ^
mysterious indifference of the life force on the one nana
ana in.rti^ impulses to master those myster . es through
'
a love of the beauty of form on the other. m the figure
of the sinner the "veil of tears- is artistically trans-
figured into a form of life held together through the
awesome and beautiful spectacle of a human drama in which
on earth man remains a perpetual mystery to himself.
Forever responsible for the cleft between self and self-
knowledge, yet ever unable to bridge it, to master this
discord, the sinner's eternal self-flagellation and
punishment testifies to the presence of this mystery. The
specific "space" in which the strength required for such a
life was displayed and the particular judgment - "per-
petual self-punishment and the ever-guilty is beautiful" -
was preserved and renewed in the public drama of the
saint, in the priestly faith, and in the discipline of the
monk, all held together by ecclesiastical authority, m
these dramas the tragic, mysterious character of this-
worldly existence was affirmed and re-affirmed through the
ever new initiatives of the sinner, through human striving
to give it form, made because this particular transfigura-
tion of suffering in the figure of the sinner struck the
Christian with awe. At a time when the will was flagging,
a new and authoritative judgment about what was beautiful
was born. And with it, what was most elemental in the hu-
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man condition, in Nietzsche's view, was channeled into a
for, of l ife
„hose barely endurable quality called nutans
forth to take up its challenge. The ascetic ideal offered
a tragic beauty which drew the will forth to exhibit and
display its own strength. m this, once again, human life
became worthy of our honor i„ t-h= w.n . m the beauty of this human
striving, life could be justified once again.
This reading of the ascetic ideal of course remains
silent about the drive which forms its center, namely the
will to truth, to true Being and perfection held to be
possible only in the world of the Beyond. This "other-
realm constitutes the realm of the Real in the form of
what Nietzsche, in the quote above, referred to as a
refuge-taking in the beauty of form, of perfection. it is
of course crucial to maintaining the transfiguration of
suffering peculiar to the ascetic ideal in that its in-
accessibility is the fundamental element in the tragic and
beautiful strength of the sinner. Vet Nietzsche condemns
the nature of this particular transfiguration of suffer-
ing, this particular kind of inaccessibility, for, in the
name of the realm of true Being, (which gives historical
form to the impulse to master) earthly life is degraded
and humans are reduced to the common denominator of sin-
ner. So long, however, on Nietzsche's reading, as these
realms were strictly kept apart, the ascetic ideal
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remained able to give presenoe tQ ^ „terrifying ^
questionable" in existence.
As I have argued, it is Nietzsche's view that Luther
struck a death blow to the legitimacy and hence sustaining
Power of this particuiar historicai transfiguration of
suffering. This he achieved by attacking those ec-
clesiastics practices which most sustained the appearance
iD-ihS-Sorld of that tragedy in the human condition which
moves us to excellence and forms the emotional heart of
any judgment "that is beautiful." But further, and most
importantly, this blow was dealt ngt amidst the effort at
a different transfiguration of suffering that would be
capable of inspiring a new and beautiful strength in the
being of man
- Luther was no artistic revolutionary in
this sense
- but rather in the effort to gain more immedi-
ate access to the realm of true Being. The unintended ef-
fect was to unleash the unconditional urge of the ascetic
ideal more thoroughly into the world and to deprive this
interpretation of suffering of the very authority its
tragic beauty commanded. Access to true Being becomes a
private matter, and the pathos and beauty of the human
struggle with guilt could find no place for public dis-
play. The transfiguring beauty of this struggle lost the
specific place in the world which could guarantee its
renewal. Consequently its authority ebbed.
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Again, it is not the fact that an ebb tide carries
this particular transfiguration which is of concern to
Nietzsche here, but rather that as the place for the
heroic struggle moves
.ore thoroughly inward, the very ex-
istential reality of this basic ontological condition of
suffering is threatened. The impulse to the uncondition-
al, fixed in the ascetic ideal in the for* of the realm of
true Being, comes to predominate. m spiritual matters it
taxes the form of a promise of heightened access to this
realm freed now from ecclesiastical hindrance; and in
practical matters, now increasingly freed from the tragedy
°f sin, it takes the form of a hope, fed by a still very
active religious pity for the suffering endemic to life,
of humanly rectifying such conditions themselves in the'
name of truth, justice or reason. Rather than affirming,
through a new interpretation, the terrifying and prob-
lematic character of existence and thus bringing into
being a new figuration of beauty which could justify the
new age, modernity tries to master suffering of all forms
through an essentially inartistic impulse. Modernity ab-
dicates the fundamental, but always historical task of
life as Nietzsche sees it - to transfigure the human con-
dition into a form we can call beautiful while not negat-
ing its basic qualities. It rejects the basic challenge
which, he suggests, stands before the being of all men and
all times
- that of finding a certain pleasure in suffer-
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ing, in cruelty. Alone by taking uf>^
Nietzsche suggests, can we bring our creative strength
into appearance.
It is through the lenses of this abdication that
Nietzsche sees the main modern 19th century phenomena I
have thus far examined
- historical culture, the tyranni-
cal excellence of Wagner, and the movement to emancipate
women. All, in the most 3ansrai of senses
_
^
to face the utter newness of our condition; namely, that
"God" and the shadows of God no longer are "wirklich,"
they no longer are effective, real. They no longer quick-
en our lives in such a way that southing justifying and
beautiful tragically calls forth our creative being. in-
stead moderns move forward with a project of mastery which
aims to gain immediate proximity on earth to a condition
free from suffering, to the realm of true Being. But such
a project at this time, perhaps at any time, lacks by its
very definition the kind of challenge which can draw forth
our awe and honor, and thereby bind us to it. The result
will be and is, Nietzsche suggests to us, an inability to
create forms of life whose beauty calls forth our con-
tinuous creative renewal of them. Life is reduced to an
empty but continuous "rush after forms."
The thread by which these modern phenomena are held
together is that of pretending that this will to
proximity, to master is sufficiently powerful to justify
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our lives. For thls
, Nietzsche ^^
ourselves, beco, actors. Refusing to facg ^
newness of our own metaphysical situation< we^ ^
ther dry
, infertile conform . ng an . mais ^ tyrant^ ^ ^
the religion of pity that sustains our pretense, for it is
the driving force behind the mastery specific to the ac-
tor, it is our faith in this religion which keeps us from
Knowing ^ we , as historical beings ^ ^ ±> ^ ^
sad shadow of God.
in his essay,
"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Michel
Foucault, one of the raost exemplary and influential stu-
dents of Nietzsche, agrees that our problem is this lack
cf historical individuality, distinctiveness. Following
Nietzsche, he writes that,
"The decadence of (19th) Europe presents animmense spectacle, and (he nature of ?hescene ls to represent a theater lackinamonuments of our own making, which propLly
But
US
'
WS liVe amon
* crowded scenes?there is more. Europeans no longer knowthemselves; they ignore their mixed an-cestries and seek a proper role. They lack
"individuality." 13 Y CK
What Europeans ignore is the fact that the state of having
"mixed ancestries" itself constitutes the historically
original in our time, and that without engagement head-on
with this state there can be no "who" distinctively our
own. By mixed ancestries Nietzsche refers both to the
practical state of the breakdown of nationalities in con-
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temporary Europe as well as t-o w n±i o the philosophical state of
a heterogeneity of values.
It is genealogy, Foucault argues, which offers a
"transformation of history into a totally different form
of time" through the construction of a "counter-memory,"
and hence creates the possibility of »a realm where
originality is once again possible."" Yet Foucault
argues that Nietzsche's genealogical approach to history,
rather than aesthetic in the way I have suggested above,
is essentially strategic. There are three distinct
strategies Foucault argues Nietzsche offers which together
might build this counter-memory and thus form the con-
ceptual and practical basis for an individuality distinc-
tively our own. We must become, through constantly reap-
pearing masks and an excessive choice of identities
"parodists of history;" we must commit ourselves to the
dissociation of identity; and we must sacrifice the notion
of the subject of knowledge.
Not without a certain irony Foucault is suggesting
that these strategies, which constitute the realm for dis-
tinctiveness out upon which pur historical field opens,
consist in the systematic dissipation of anything con-
tinuous and constant enough to serve as an identity. The
condition for the emergence of our "who," for our
"identity" is laughter in the face of the very idea of an
identity. Rather than ignoring our mixed ancestry by
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pretending such an identity (resting in Truth, is pos-
sible, rather than becoming mere actors> ^
Nietzsche, suggests that we celebrate our diffusion, our
association, and that „e make or ourseXves a carnival
The »emory Poucault is out to
..construct" is a memory of
the utter discontinuity and
.multiplicity of forces amidst
which the modern came to he. „e writes, "Nothing in ma„ .
not even the body
- is sufficiently stable to serve as the
basis for self-recognition or for understanding other
»en...!5 To claim Qur distinctively histor . cal . s ^
recognize the possibility of foxing a ..who- alone in ^
concerted commitment to dissolution of identity-as-self-
recognition.
This is the paradox Poucault argues Nietzsche offers
us when "as parodists of history and buffoons of God" he
beckons us to strategically claim the historically
original in our times. And indeed Nietzsche did write
that only by becoming "comedians of the ascetic ideal"
could we wrestle free of this great Ungeheuer and come
into our own tasks. Vet Foucault's failure to understand
Nietzsche's genealogy in any but strategic terms results
in the failure to unearth the real constructive power and
scope of Nietzsche's work. For if we ask a series of
questions which arise from out of the basic aesthetic
foundations of Nietzsche's thought which I have adumbrated
above, we find Nietzsche engaged with questions of justice
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and authority crucial to the very possibility of having a
distinctively individual identity in_p^r_ti^, questions
which in his own work Foucault entirely skirts. what
today is the challenge which can stir our will or form-
giving powers? What takes us to the edge of our
capacities, and what, thus, do we most admire M ^
most beautiful? m what do we. find (meant here in the
sense of judge) a commanding beauty so that "that is beau-
tiful" is a command of our own we will obey? what can
serve as the principle of our being? what is the good in
our time? what cruelty can or must we find pleasurable?
What shape does tragedy take for us?
in light of these questions it is not sufficient to
conceptualize Nietzsche's genealogy merely as a strategy
of dissociation in which the past is unearthed as a series
of rifts and fissures opposed to the past as the pro-
cession of Truth; nor identity as a parody of the pos-
sibility of identity itself. Rather than merely a parodic
strategy of dissociation and dispersal, genealogy should
be understood aesthetically in that it both embodies and
aims to help bring about that artistic transfiguration of
suffering which identifies "the barely endurable in our
time," giving public form to and hence calling us to the
task which marks our own unique historical location. It
itself is understood as integral to the possibility of the
artistic birth of a new figure, a new form of life, a new
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horizon whose tragic beauty issues forth a challenge, it
is the strength we exhibit in responding to this challenge
which freely commands our obedience, or, put another way,
persuades us to find in the challenge our own originality.
It is the aim of the rest of this chapter to articulate
the precise character of this challenge.
C. Our Challenge
"But to stand in the midst of this whole
rerum concordia discors and of this whole
marvelous uncertainty and rich ambiguity of
existence without questioning
,
without trem-bling with the craving and rapture of such
questioning.
.
.
"
16
Nietzsche situates his own thinking squarely within
the tradition of the will to truth as the heir to "2000
years of training in intellectual cleanliness," and it is
paramount to situate his characterization of *the barely
endurable in our time' within this philosophical-moral
tradition as well. As he gazes back from his modern
vantage point over the form of thinking which sustained
this tradition, the kind of knowledge it bore appears, not
as truth, but as error. That there are enduring things,
things that are equal, that there are substances, that the
will is free — all of these appear now as errors of the
intellect, errors which have however become almost the
basic facts of existence, not because they in any way ex-
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press true Being, but because they have proven helpful to
our species preservation. They are, Nietzsche suggests,
"aesthetic anthropomorphisms," articles of faith which
have made existence bearable.
It was not until late in human history, Nietzsche
argues, by contrast, that truth emerged. And by truth he
refers to the feeling of mistrust, skepticism, scrutiny,
honesty. with this new understanding of truth, Nietzsche
seems to be consciously offering up a polemical rein-
habitation of that understanding of truth which comes to
us by way of the ascetic ideal. Both of these truths,
Nietzsche continues, have become powers, that is, they
have helped to sustain life. Having proven their useful-
ness, it is our lot to find them contending in their first
direct fight in the modern thinker. That is, this fight
is the stuff of any one who today attempts to think
profoundly. Nietzsche puts this situation in slightly
different terms elsewhere: because of the life preserving
errors which have emerged from centuries of reign of the
ascetic ideal, we have developed a new need which remains
with us - a need to find in the world purpose, a need for
reverences, for divinity in things. But at the same time,
the growth of our mistrust and skepticism bred by the very
will to truth itself, has become such that we have come so
to doubt the possibility of truth in this divine sense
that it no longer has the power to win our unconditional
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allegiance, perhaps not even our conditional allegiance.
Hence we are faced with a raging discordance between our
need and desire for the old reverences which made life
endurable on the one hand, and the beings we have become,
on the other, namely beings who, as part of the nature of
this world, have no intrinsic purpose, godliness, or
value. Nietzsche wonders if we are not confronted with a
terrifying either/or: "Either abolish your reverences or
yourselves !
"
and then ponders, "The later would be
nihilism; but would not the former also be - nihilism?"
Put still differently the question confronts us, "To what
extent can truth [in his sense] endure incorporation?"^
It seems important to me to take note of this verb,
incorporation, for Nietzsche's view of these "errors of
knowledge," including the existence of eternal things, is
that they are necessary errors - at least to some extent.
Hence he does not reject the structure of mind that posit
true Being, but rather transforms the status of this con-
ception of truth. And it is this he attempts to do by
positing the will to power. Life's fertility, he sug-
gests, is advanced through a wily, deceiving, adept ver-
satility which seeks always those conditions in which a
particular historical form of life can best preserve and
enhance itself. This will is an essentially creative
force and hence the fundamental mode of this will to
power, this life force, is art. From this point of view,
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the ability to think the thought, true Being or Truth in
the classical sense, is not evidence of some
.metaphysical
order lying the WQrld which ^ ^ ^_
tially gl lmpse. It is not evidence of a metaphysical ca-
pability residing in thought. It is, rather, evidence of
the fundamentally creative and, as I shall argue,
aesthetic nature of thouaht- ™« ,n ugnt. The very concept of true
Being is itself a creative act of thought.
in a late note found in Th^jmi_to_Ppwer
, Nietzsche
gives ironic twist to the central claim of his earliest
work, The Birth of Tr^
,
both affirming the fundamental
continuity in his thought and marking a departure from his
early, still metaphysical work, inspired by Schopenhauer.
In 1888, he writes, quoting verbatim from The Birth gf
Tragedy,
"art as the real task of life, art as life'smetaphysial activity-" 18
There is irony here because it is clear from Nietzsche's
late work (post-dating his break with Wagner) that he no
longer believes in "the metaphysical," but what remains is
a need to give a different interpretation to this struc-
ture of mind, to transform its status.
The challenge in our times therefore becomes, in
Nietzsche's view, the honest reckoning with the fact that
that understanding of truth which grounds the ascetic
ideal and which forms the basis of our reverences was it-
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self born of the polytropic will to power( ^ ^
some realm of perfection which reigns in life
, ^^
an historically varying set of^^ ^ ^
our capacity to preserve and enhance ourselves. The^
meztisn^ to which Nietzsche alludes in numerous
aphorisms- the real challenge> is no iQnger^ ^
true Being and the question of man's ability to atone for
his guilt. But rather, truth as polytropic error ana the
question of man's §tI§mth to face the fact that all our
efforts to know are indeed errors, yet still to be enrap-
tured, thoroughly taken up by the questioning through
which knowledge emerges. The cruelty which we must prac-
tice against ourselves is to find beauty in the tragic
fact that we now must learn to revere, be enraptured by
the question of knowledge at a time when the very pos-
sibility of truly revering, having faith in something, it-
self is in question. it is the cruelty of this terrible
honesty which we must inflict upon ourselves; which we, as
heirs to 2000 years of training in intellectual cleanli-
ness must suffer, and in suffering, learn to love and
transform.
Can we learn to revere skepticism, the question mark
itself, Nietzsche asks? Can such reverence form the new
horizon within which a form or forms of life might
flourish? With this, the very structural sturdiness that
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the notion of truth connotes has been altered
ly. it wouia see, Does it remain
^
become such that it can^ its nome such ^
substantial ropes and possibilities?-^" with tnis
Nietzsche says
,
.. the real question ^ pQsed ^ ^
first time... the de^i-in^ «^n sti y of the soul changes, the hand
moves forward, the tragedy begins..-21
Nietzsche welcomes the beginning of this new tragedy
Even though the pain of our contemporary condition is such
that our trust in life is gone, even though life as "un-
scrupulous polytropoi" has become a problem, we must still
be capable of loving it, of learning to see as beautiful
what is necessary in things, and hence making things beau-
tiful. 22 it is to this end that Nietzsche's work is
dedicated. He writes,
"Love of life is stin possible, only oneloves differently. it is the love for
T
woman who causes doubts in us. "23
It is now for the first time within the grasp of this
doubting, insecure, jealous love that our delight must
blossom. We must find "delight in an x.»
"?S
thinkin9 ^ogs, nor objectifyingand registering mechanisms with their in-nards removed: constantly, we have to givebirth to oUr thoughts out of our pain and,like mothers, endow them with all we have ofblood, heart, fire, pleasure, passion,
agony, conscience, fate, and catastrophe.Life
- that means for us constantly trans-forming all that we are into light and flame
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most spiritual fo^ V^rytlme into the
of traL^urat^^?^:..^^ «*
This challenge of finding delight and beauty an
"x,
»
the trebling craving for the questioning of this
"whole marvelous uncertainty and ambiguity of existence-
is the 'fSB^Msims&„ to which Niet2sche , s d . stress
at nlioil.. gave birth. « is then
, the daughter Qf
own pain. Vet this is a figure through which Nietzsche
identifies not only the contours of his own personal con-
dition, but also that of his ti.es. The pain of Nietzsche
the philosopher is the pain of Nietzsche the individual
and of Nietzsche the citizen of his age. For this reason
Nietzsche attests to persuade us to feel his pain as our
own, to embrace what he sees as the form of suffering
specific to our historical moment.
It is towards this end that we can see why the
thought of eternal return was of such importance to
Nietzsche. There are three primary dimensions to this im-
portance, two of which I will discuss here. The thought
of eternal return was for Nietzsche the focussing and the
cultivating thought. As such it asks of its thinkers two
basic questions. First, if humans are to accept that
there can be no true world behind this one, we must in
some way come to grips with all that is weak, ugly,
limited, that is, with the "small man." We must come to
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grips with all the ways in which we as , ^
which have heretofore provoked pity and the desire to es-
cape our condition. The thought of eternal return asks,
can you accept the worst, the small<-/ Ln man as integral to
being? can you face this part of existence with strength
and honesty instead of being dwarfed by pity? ^ ^ ^
portant to note that this acceptance does not entail, as
might be inferred, passivity for Nietzsche. Why this is
so will be clear in the following chapter., Can you bear
that, as he put it in Beyond_GoM_and^yil, man is part
Geshoepf, part creature, that is, something made, some-
thing not entirely in our control?" m this sense the
thought of eternal return asks us to confront the fact
that there is something about our condition which should
and must suffer.
Second, the thought of eternal return asks, if not
only this Geshoepf but everything were to eternally
return, could you bear it? That is, have you done some-
thing which could make you embrace such a possibility?
Have you the strength to be what man also is, Schoepfer,
creator? This is the cultivating thought in the thought
of eternal return.
Together these two questions which the thought of
eternal return presses upon us hone in upon the tension,
the mystery man is in Nietzsche's view, turning us towards
an understanding of ourselves Nietzsche wishes to bring
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into focus. As creature and creato^ ^ ^
txon, this pain. And it is the pain^
which is instructive, for it cultivates us by asking if in
our focus on ourselves as such a pain-filled tension, we
cannot expand and heighten the soul through the increase
« strength we must demand of ourselves precisely to ac-
cept and honor ourselves as this state of tension, this
"Spannung der Seele in Unqiuck » Tnu g K. i the passage in Beyond
Good and Evil
,
to which I referred above, he writes,
ferLa
iSC
^
line
° f Suffering, of great suf-ring
- do you not know that onlTthTs hascreated all enhancements of man so fir?That tension of the soul in unhappinesswhich cultivates its strength was it nnfgranted to it through suffering,* throughgreat suffering? m man creature and 9
Sp^sffion?»2g
ited:
--- do you understand this
Nietzsche intends the thought of eternal return to
focus the thinker on the pain that we are in hopes that it
will be a spur to the cultivation of strength in the mod-
ern soul, a strength whose power will strike us with awe,
bringing into being a form of life which we can find beau-
tiful. (I read Zarathustra as the story of precisely this
effort to cultivate the strength of the soul.) The
thought of eternal return is an effort to persuade us to
see that, as Nietzsche put it with epigrammatic power,
"There is no feast without cruelty." 27
If the thought of eternal return attempts to persuade
the reader to take an artistic relationship to things, if
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it is a call to display the strength tQ fcransfigure suf_
fering and thereby bulla a home for ourselves, still a
building that demands We develop a feel ing of pleasure in
the uncertainty and insubstantiality of our current condi-
tion is a difficult task. And Nietzsche often see»s to
falter. Frequently he conceptualizes our task as having
to develop a strength which can affirm the nothing, si-
lence, Muteness. In a passage exemplary of this he calls
the change in the destiny of the soul which we face the
latest rung on the ladder of religious cruelty. History
is here conceived as a huge ladder with many rungs, ours,
he says, is one of the three most important. The first
demanded sacrifice of human beings to their God; the sec-
ond to their strongest instincts. About our rung,
Nietzsche writes,
"Finally
- what remained to be sacrificed?At long last, did one not have to sacrificefor once whatever is comforting, holy heal-
In^ulurJ
1
^' faith in hi^en ^rmony!in fut e blisses and justices? didn't one
^n!^° Sacrifice G°d himself, and fromcruelty against oneself, worship the stone,stupidity, gravity, fate, the nothing? Tosacrifice God for the nothing- this paradox-ical mystery of the ultimate cruelty was
reserved for the generation that is now com-
this?-»28
a11 ° f US already know something of
It is a paradox indeed to take pleasure in worshipping
nothing, to find heroism in nihilism. Nietzsche's fre-
guent characterizations of our challenge in such terms as
facing the nothing, muteness, silence seem to capture a
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condition so tragic tnat no _^^ ^ ^
art of tragedy under^ condltions: experiencing suf_fermg as a pleasure.
in yet another despairing moment over this r^i^_
****** Nietzsche wonders if the impossibility of true
up the question mark itself. Now that in ^u
'
m the great si-
lence, nature - sea, sky cliff ™ n
, ^y, , no longer speak to us of
truth, should we too not fall silent?
"The tremendous muteness which suddenly
sneak Ir, , trutn, it too cannotJPeajt, it too mocks when the mouth callsomething out into this beauty it too Ljoys lts sweet silent malice?7
'
i
"begin to"hate speech, to hate even thinking for do t
error
ea
of
bf T** WOrd the laSghSr o?
*
nff • I ^agination, of the spirit ofdelusion? Must I not mock at my pity? Morkat my mockery?
- o sea, o evening? You IrT
^Ln^l^V Y°U teaCh *™ ^ ^se tooe ma ! Shall he surrender to you? shallhe become as you now are, pale, glittering
Exalted
re
r
nd
°i;
S
'
reP°Si^ ^e^sllf?*'e above himself?" 29
One response to the evil spirit of the great silence
is indeed muteness, repose above the self, the end to
questioning about the being of man and things, about
Being. But this, as I have suggested above, is not the
tragedy to which Nietzsche thinks the destiny of the soul
of man has been called in our time. For in fact, though
there is a great and new silence in the universe, it is a
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silence suth^s^^ the existence of true Being and
knowledge, a is nc absolute silence! There are new
sounds in the land and new spirits in the sea, and
Nietzsche's writings are dotted with recurrent questions
about whether we "have ears enough to hear." Southing
calls. Nietzsche endows it with the divine name of
Dionysus, die Versucher-Gott
- the experimenter-tempter
god. it is the music of this god and his followers
Nietzsche hears and would have us hear, a music which
cruelly mocks our efforts to know and tempts us to si-
lence, yet enraptures us by the allure of the question
mark just the same. Although it is only mockery which
emerges when we attempt speech, this music inspires forth
our form-giving forces just the same, our naming voices.
Nietzsche thus only appears here to falter, to succumb
to the muteness the indifferent universe seems to offer.
Unable to bear the indifference to which the will to truth
has led Western civilization, he insists on thinking, and
this means he insists on fictioning, fashioning, giving
voice to and even deifying what is new.
In this last section I would like to develop in
greater detail this thinking qua deification of the new,
this transfiguration of our particular form of suffering.
Nietzsche's understanding of the nature of the thinking
process itself is explicitly aesthetic, and it is this we
must pursue in our effort to discern whether and in what
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Philosophical level, with those ,. insubstantial^
possibilities.. which appear to be the SQle ^^^^ Qf
our current condition as Nietzsche defines it. Let me
turn now to a discussion of the artist-philosopher the
great tragedian, for in Nietzsche's conception of this
figure „e better glimpse what thinking ^ deif
entails.
"In the Great Silence," the aphorism quoted above, is
about what becomes of the substantiality of thought in our
times when it is no longer tied to God's string. It is an
attempt to conceptualize thinking-as-an-activity from a
this-worldly point of view. it tells the paradoxical
story, in the answering voices, swelling heart, seduc-
tions, deception, faith, of a mysterious artistry at work
in thought. Now, it suggests, that there is a great si-
lence with respect to Truth, it is not necessary for us to
fall silent
- at least not for long. Thought is something
essentially creative. As such, it needs at least one
other voice in order to be, even if this voice is the
voice of mockery at the very possibility of thought that
is "true" itself. Thought, Nietzsche suggests with the
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example oC his own, attempts to be .peopie ^
tion in the effort to giye ^ ^^
even a situation which itself seems to be i ie the pos-
-ibility of real substantiality. As oreatures unf ^
bear this new abyssal silence, we »ust transfigure it in
so- way, making beautiful what is necessary. „e raust
dance, but we must dance "near" this abyss. To this end
Nietzsche insists on thinking, and that means in creating
structure near, perhaps even a bridge oyer this abyss -
all the while keeping it in view.
But, paradoxically, Nietzsche be-peoples with a god.
He deifies the voices he hears. His aim in this deifica-
tion is to evoke mystery, the mystery in the dialogue or
novement of thought which he wishes both to illuminate and
to give substantiality to. And he gives the name Dionysus
to this mystery. „hy Dionysus? Dionysus is both the god
of creation and of destruction, the two moments prerequi-
site for the fertility of life. if thought is to give
form and make beautiful the new trembling excitement at
the question mark, it must be intoxicated, and one of the
central powers of Dionysus, the god of the vine, is in-
toxication. But Dionysus is also the god of chaos, of the
abyss, one who mocks at eternity, at Truth in the tradi-
tion of the ascetic ideal, a god without shame. Together
these two Dionysian powers are the artistic powers which
the dance of thought demands in our time. They represent
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the powers which we, as arj^-philosophers. must possess.
Let me turn first to the powers of creation in the
aesthetic state through which humans beautify and give
form to the world.
"Oh my friends, that your self be in vourdeed as the mother is in her chUd!»3X°
U
With this resonating metaphorical image Zarathustra
exhorts his friends to their virtue. Through this image I
think we can draw out the two primary aspects of creating,
of form-giving in terms of the act of thinking which recur
in Nietzsche's work. First, a mother brings forth her
child and thus lives in her through the exclusive blind
love akin to that an artist must have to fully inhabit her
own creation. Both we could say are intoxicated with
their goal. Nietzsche refers to this as Rausch
,
variously
translated as intoxication or rapture, and, with Heideg-
ger, we should understand it as the primary aesthetic
state in Nietzsche's view. 31 But a mother alsQ Uves ^
her child through a quite different force - that of long,
meticulous training, what Nietzsche calls Zucht or
Zuchtung
,
variously translated as discipline, cultivation,
breeding, meanings which all resonate strongly in both
German words. Let me now turn to a brief discussion of
some of the more disturbing, but representative of
Nietzsche's writings on Rausch and Zuchtung.
With the exception of The Birth of Tragedy
,
Nietzsche
published nothing about Rausch until his later works, be-
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ginning with The_Genealp^ The most extensive
discussion in his published works appears in Twilight^f
the_Idols. m #8 of "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," he
says that intoxication, or, as he alternatively refers to
it, idealizing, is the indispensable
"physiological
precondition" for art, for any aesthetic Tun or Shauen,
any aesthetic doing or seeing. For the artist,
^
cert*in Physiological precondition isindispensable: intoxication.
. .The essence ofintoxication is the feeling of plenitude andincreased energy. From out of this feelingone gives to things, one compels them totake, one violates them.
.
.
"
yz
In this condition, man enriches everything, he gives to
things. But Nietzsche says this transformation is an ac-
tual "mirroring" of man's power, a transformation of
things until they are reflections of man's perfection.
"This compulsion to transform into the per-fect is - art. Even all that which he is
not becomes for him nonetheless part of his
Doy in himself, in art man takes delight inhimself as perfection." 33
Elsewhere Nietzsche says that this delight in oneself as
perfection is delight in distinct things , definitenes* of
tone, nuances, forms upon which the eye feasts, measure.
And that it is these things which awaken one's energy,
one's rapturous state.
Finally, Nietzsche refers to the highest feeling of
this power of intoxication as "the grand style." This is
power which,
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slow ?o 9
requires proving; which ist answer; which is conscious of nowitnesses about it; which lives obliviSSs ofthe existence of any opposition; whichreposes^in itself, fatalistic, a Taw'among
interestingly, this exposition of intoxication does
not in the least reflect opposition to tyranny or mastery
of any kind, nor does it seem to have anything to do with
sustaining a love of questioning. m fact, in the name of
a raping-taking possession of things through making them
reflect our own perfection qua form-making, they seem to
express a most totalizing form of mastery. Here seems to
reside a vision of human creativity in which man is the
absolutely sole measure of all things. Yet this state of
intoxication is the precondition, the sine qua non of any
aesthetic act, qua thinking. what of the other aspect of
creative form-giving, Zuchtung?
Much of Nietzsche's advocacy of Zuchtung is an as-
sault on an understanding of freedom as laissez-aller, in
favor too, it would seem, of a kind of tyranny. in the
form of an appeal to the knowledge possessed by the art-
ist, Nietzsche discusses the place of Zuchtung.
"Every artist knows how far from any feeling
of letting himself go his "most natural"
state is - the free ordering, placing, dis-
posing, giving form in the moment of "in-
spiration" - and how strictly and how subtly
he obeys thousandfold laws ... Slavery is, as
it seems both the indispensable means of
spiritual discipline (Zucht) and cultivation
(Zuchtung)
.
35
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These two aspects of the creative act - the aesthetic
state of intoxication and the power of discipline - must
it seems to me. be discussed together. Although a quick
reading of Nietzsche could easily suggest otherwisej ^ ^
crxtical in his view that the latter tether the former
That is, the state of intoxication is hounded and informed
bY long and great spiritual discipline; it is a being-
possessed, a bei„g-taken-up-by a strong and deep, and
therefore guiding passion, still, the tyrannical rela-
tionship of the intoxicated artist to her material and the
terrible compulsion of long obedience and discipline con-
stitute the axes upon which Nietzsche's aesthetic reflec-
tions are most disturbing, most anti-democratic in tone,
and most susceptible to the kinds of uses made of his work
by the National Socialists. Many have argued that
Nietzsche's styles lend themselves to such appropriation
and that he must, therefore, be held, at least to some ex-
tent, accountable for history's paths.
I find it important to reflect on this claim for it
seems to me there is a subversive aspect to Nietzsche's
styles, subversive in the favor, precisely, of question-
ing. Yet this aspect comes to view only through a con-
certed effort to make sense of the enigmatic qualities of
these styles, particularly his dodging, masking, eluding
antics. Preliminarily let me suggest that it is through
these antics that Nietzsche creates for the reader pre-
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cisely the conditions of uncertainty and insubstantial ity
within which we in our ti.es m^think. Hence he at-
tempts to demand, through the means of style, that in our
thinking we engage directly with our condition. if how-
ever, we fail to see the subversive aspect o, Nietzsche's
styles, his is clearly a very dangerous set of thoughts.
Vet I think he would respond, this is a risk that must be
taken, for failure to "think what we are doing" as Hannah
Arendt put this dilemma is at least as disastrous. Nazi
totalitarianism attests, it seems to me, to both these
dangers
.
36
I would like to turn now to the "counter-thoughts"
which I think must press upon the careful reader of
Nietzsche regarding this apparent celebration of mastery
in his discussion of Rausch and Zuchtung. Failure to at-
tend to them leaves the other dimension of Dionysian
powers
- the destructive, abyss-creating ones - un-
examined, and hence the terrible tension which pervades
Nietzsche's thought remains unnoticed and buried, obscur-
ing what I think Nietzsche would have us face about the
challenge of thought in our time.
These counter-thoughts are the mocking, doubting
voice of the bad conscience of the philosopher. As the
other voice of thought, they arrest, disrupt, tear apart
the ground of our intoxication itself; they create abysses
and thereby cultivate the guestion mark. In Nietzsche's
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work they present themselves in Multiple forms - direct
assertions, subtle riddles whioh cry for interpreters, and
the conscious deployment by Nietzsche of stylistic textual
artifices. I will briefly examine Qnly ^
Most prominently, and constituting one of the most
difficult challenges facing readers of Nietzsche, is his
constant self-contradiction
- particularly when deployed
amidst his aphoristic style. In this tiring fluctuation
Nietzsche mocks our desire for respite from uncertainty,
our desire to be followers. Nietzsche himself plays the
nocking music of the Versucher-Gott. He himself seduces
us so thoroughly to his "truths- that, intoxicated, we are
tempted to find in them reality itself, yet constantly
through this self-contradiction he warns against such
seduction, reminding us of the tentative, experimental,
insubstantial nature of his thoughts, even calling them
"regulative fictions," "thought experiments." We receive,
for example, outright encouragement by Nietzsche for con-
sidering something so central to his thinking as the will
to power as a mere supposition, mere interpretation. 37
Such mockery leaves the reader with a frightening
feeling of insubstantial ity and groundlessness. As if in
explanation of this constant mockery, Nietzsche counsels
us that if we wish to protect the profound and "delicate
things" of thought, we must learn to withdraw, evade com-
ication, love masks. 38 We must not directly defend ourmun
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thoughts, but mock others attempts to directly contest
them. Further confounding the reader, We must mock even
S^Eselvss in the attempt to remain free of our own moral
seriousness.
air*nH
m
°£aliSt? 1 Wh° command ™an first of
Si.and above ^ to gain control of himself
ease- h^V^ With a Pecu^ar dis-
Qestu;;'?hJ ^ ln ^ fixed P°s ition with a
lelf SiS «h^rdS 2"' armed against him-s , with s arp and mistrustful eyes - theeternal guardian of his castle, s?nce he hasturned himself into a castle. of course he
certain^ ^is way. Bu? he has
dSficSft ^
CTe lnsufferable for others,
cit of? rn
°r
,h
linSel
f'
and imP°verished and
°f ° f f °m tne most beautiful fortuities
?Ln
1S A1S
° fr°m 311 further instruc-tio . For one must be able to lose oneselfoccasionally if one wants to learn somethingfrom things different from oneself . »39
l
irony is still another constant artifice of mockery
and distancing Nietzsche deploys to throw himself and his
readers off a totalizing, mastering form of thought. in
chapter one I have already discussed one good example -
the ironic honesty, which he calls his Granit von
Geistigem Fatum, his granite of spiritual fatum with which
he prefaces his "true" remarks about women.
Amongst such textual artifices I would also include
Nietzsche's hyperbolic reversals in which, as I have men-
tioned above with regard to the question of suffering, he
seems simply to take the exact opposite position from the
one he apparently wants to reject. This pattern becomes
quite apparent to the attentive reader and is, like those
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discussed above, designed not to stake out a true posi-
tion, but to open chasms for the question mark.
Hence if we read both moments of Dionysian fertility,
the artist and the philosopher, Nietzsche's deification of
the new voices he hears, that is, of the new condition of
thought in our time emerges as a rather insistent counter-
force to a form of thought whose aim is a totalizing
mastery. m fact these two moments of Dionysian fertility
should be read as attempts by Nietzsche to directly
counter the nihilistic will to master whose curse, as I
argued in chapter one, is precisely the inability to
manifest form-giving forces, is infertility. Hence, on
the one hand, Nietzsche's demand that we see that thought
is and mustjDe_intoxicated is a response to the formless-
ness of scientific culture, sustained as it is by claims
to passionless objectivity. And on the other, the power
of mockery is developed by Nietzsche precisely to counter
the tyranny of Wagnerian-type excellence in that it con-
stitutes a constant questioning, disrupting effect which
protects the individual from the tyrannical effects of
Wagnerian excellence. Nietzsche attempted to make his
readers capable of both of these Dionysian powers, for to-
gether they combat the nihilism of his age.
Together they compose the creative tension which the
thinker as an artist-philosopher possesses. On the one
hand, as heirs to 2 000 years of training in intellectual
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cleanliness, we must admit that our love of honesty is
nothing more than a passion, an artist's passion born of
intoxication, yet one by which we are nevertheless
thoroughly enraptured. As artists, we possess the power
of intoxication. Yet on the other hand, despite our in-
toxication, we mock our honesty for we know it rests on
error. As philosophers, we are critical.
Yet at another, more subtle level Nietzsche generates
still another paradox, a sort of meta-reflection we must
confront which is the true endpoint for his reflections on
truth in our times. This is the fact that the truth of
this mockery itself rests on and gains substantiality from
the truth of a god - from our god, honesty. That is to
say, it itself is an integral part of the complicated ten-
sion of our passion and faith in honesty, and as such is
the product also of our intoxication, our erring. it can-
not have for Nietzsche, as nothing can have, an indepen-
dent status. one of the more fascinating expressions of
this meta-reflection emerges out of an interpretation of
aphorism #230 in "Our Virtues" in Beyond Good ,nH gyi]
Nietzsche begins the aphorism by saying he wishes to
explain what he has, in the foregoing aphorism called "the
basic will of the spirit." In that aphorism he had
claimed that the seeker after knowledge, in his insistence
on profundity and thoroughness (honesty) acts out a volup-
tuous tragedy because he attempts to transfigure the
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cruelty involved in this insistence. such thoroughness is
cruel because it goes against "the basic will of the
spirit" which Nietzsche says is a will which "increasingly
strives for the superficial and the apparent." m this
self-inflicted cruelty Nietzsche finds a desire to hurt,
an actual taking pleasure in the suffering. it is pre-'
cisely this capacity to find pleasure in suffering which
is artistic. m this the seeker of knowledge acts as a
transfigurer of cruelty, as a tragic artist.
in #230, Nietzsche expands on this opposition between
the seeker after knowledge and the basic will of the
spirit. The basic will of the spirit, he says, is a will
to simplicity, a desire for masks, the surface. it "wants
to be master in and around its own house and wants to feel
that it is master. "40 He identifies several divergent
forms of this will to simplicity which desires to be
master
- the spirit's power to appropriate the foreign,
sudden decisions in favor of ignorance, readiness to be
deceived and to deceive. This, he contrasts with the will
to multiplicity which he finds in the seeker after knowl-
edge, a will which is a cruelty of the intellectual con-
science. In light of this opposition Nietzsche's own
"task" appears cruel. He reneges on flattering it with
names such as honesty, love of truth, etc., saying we must
eschew such festive words as belonging to "the gold dust
of unconscious human vanity." Instead, he says we must
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retUrn to the Grundtext
- we must translate
-n back into nature and become "master over ^ many
OV6rly an<J ~^ic interpretations and connota.
tfons that nave so far been scrawled ana painted over that
eternal basic test of homo Mh,» ..41
The close reader of Nietzsche will Mediately
suspect the language in this last statement - to translate
»n back into m3w^ l and finally, the tip-off, to become
With the use of such language and concepts so in
contradiction with his basic thoughts, the reader must
think carefully. Nietzsche's tone has become heavily
ironic; he uses this irony to point to a paradox about
thought and the taste for intellectual cleanliness pecu-
liar to the seeker after knowledge: it too seeks to become
"master in and around its own house," the house of the
being of man. For Nietzsche, this house in his time is in
the building, and the irony he points to is that in
replacing the old house of "metaphysical piping,.. he too
,
we too, must simplify. In our efforts tQ fce ^
too must err. The effort to grasp and transfigure the
world, Nietzsche suggests, to build the house of being, is
a creative state in which thought is comEelled to
simplifications.
If I may draw together Nietzsche's multiple terminol-
ogy, the problem we face is that of giving form to the
will to multiplicity, to the trembling questioning of this
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"hole rSIum_canca£di^is£2Is . But this itself requires
rapture, intoxication, f^ith. It requires intoxication
with the
..x» itself, with doubting itself. Henoe, to
avoid dogmatism, to protect the question mark, we develop
a mocking voice. Vet even the attempt to mock at our in-
toxication with the question mark is done in-service
91 our intoxication. in the attempt to give voice to what
is new, Nietzsche's very fictioning of voices, even com-
plex Dionysian intoxicated/mocking voices, is a making
beautiful, a deification and hence, a simplification of
our condition. As in the beauty by which Zarathustra,
convalescing from his confrontation with his "most abysmal
thought- is struck upon hearing the words and sounds of
his chattering animals, so the very act of conceptualiz-
ing, language itself, creates bridges over clefts and
abysses, over things eternally apart; that is, it requires
intoxication, and therefore simplifies.
"0 my animals," replied Zarathustra, "chat-ter on like this and let me listen. It isso refreshing for me to hear you chatterinq:
where there is chattering, there the worldlies before me like a garden. How lovely itis that there are words and sounds! Are not
words and sounds rainbows and illusivebridges between things which are eternally
apart?"^ '
In a difficult but highly suggestive aphorism in The
Gay Science
,
Nietzsche hints about this common structure
of all knowledge.
"Appearance is for me that which lives andis effective and goes so far in its self-
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mockery that it makes me feel that th<.appearance and will-o'-th= Zt ls is
of spirits and notning more - lhT * danCethese dreamers T £ at among all
ing my danST'th^t t^^nower^sVm*™
oelongfro tne *™1 ™«^u xongs t h masters of cerpmnnv «^
(-!,„ .
e tne highest means to preservethe universality of dreaming and thf^SSalcomprehension of all dreamers and thus aliothe continuation nf <-v,»
^rrim .."3
cn s
The sublime consistency and interrelatedness of all know-
ledge to which Nietzsche refers is the condition in which
knowledge must emerge
- the aesthetic state of intoxica-
tion. It is this state which is indeed the means for
prolonging the earthly dream and dance. And in this
Nietzsche suggests his thought is no different from any
that has gone on before. However, though Nietzsche must
go on dreaming, his form of intoxication is new in that he
is conscious of it as such. He knows and lets us know his
passion for the question mark is just that, a passion and
not the truth about the being or the "should" of man.
With this in mind, Nietzsche makes an admission he
would like "those who have ears" to hear, namely, that he
cannot place his appeal for the question mark on any
firmer ground than appeal, through exemplification to our
sense of awe. He hopes, in witnessing the strength he ex-
hibits in his effort to truly be the heir to 2000 years of
training in honesty, that we will find in it a tragi-
comedy that is beautiful; that we will be moved by the
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age-old tragedy of striving for true knowledge, and
delighted by a new-found ability to find this age-old
struggle in whioh now even the attest to revere the ques-
tion mark itself lapses into intoxication. We are always
falling into error, wanting to oarry a goddess across the
"ver" In the mystery of th . s perpetuai ^^^^^
great striving Nietzsche would have our tears and our
laughter
- and our awe. It is the strength to embrace
both the hero and the fool which Nietzsche wishes to ex-
emplify; the strength of the thinker who, as an artist-
philosopher is a great tragedian who wantonly parodies the
tragic in his own strivings. In a passage in ^^^^
23^£-M2rals where he expresses a wish that Wagner's
final work, Parsifal (which was for Nietzsche Wagner's
ultimate submission to Christianity)
, had actually been
intended as a joke, an epilogue and satyr play, he says
what true greatness is.
r^/? rePeat, would have been worthy ofa great tragedian, who, like every artist
onlv
V
tL"\ the Pinnacle of his greatness
'
ari
Yh^ ^e K°meS t0 See hi*self and hist beneath him - when he knows how tolaugh at himself." 45
It is the strength of this artist
-philosopher with
which Nietzsche tries to overawe us, to intoxicate us. He
would cultivate in his readers a passion for it and wrest
from them the judgment
, "that is beautiful," and in this,
call us to our historical originality insofar as we become
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revelers in the mystery of intoxication which constitutes
the thinking activity itself. it is in the service of
this aim that the third dimension of the thought of
eternal return, mentioned above, achieves its importance
in Nietzsche's thought, for we cannot bear the eternal
return of things without re-awakening what Nietzsche
refers to as that "higher art," the "art of the festi-
val. "46 Manf Nietzsche argueSf needs himself as a spec_
tacle. Not only are we "creature" and "creator" but we
are "spectator divinity and seventh day, "47 and it - s the
cruelty towards ourselves, spiritualized and made beauti-
ful, which draws us to ourselves as spectacles. The
thought of eternal return cultivates in us a love of the
spectacle, a love for that which we can barely endure, a
love of the pleasure we feel at our own pain which, in our
time, is the ability to take pleasure in both the hero and
the fool in our passion for knowledge. The tragi-comedy
of thought in our time, Nietzsche suggests, is a spectacle
in the oldest and richest of senses.
The great tragedian then, in addition to knowing her-
self as Geshoepf and Schoepfer, is a Zuschauer, a spec-
tator, one who Nietzsche calls the "genuine spectator" 48
in sharp contrast to the "herumwandelnde Zuschauer" 49 of
our age whose objectivity and disinterestedness keep him
from affirming anything, keep him in aimless wanderings.
The "genuine spectator" by contrast is stirred by the ten-
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sion of the challenge of our ti-e. She is stirred by the
beauty, the tragic beauty of the strength necessary for
taking herself as an aesthetic phenomenon - for affirming
the mystery of herself as at once Geschoepf, schoepfer and
zuschauer; she is stirred to affirm and give form te this
spectacle, to create a form of life on the basis of the
cruelty she must suffer in forming herself around
questioning. yet she is also stirred to the Olympian vice
of laughter, laughter at her own strivings, and in this
she keeps an artistic distance above things. 50 In her
laughter she delights in the play of surfaces, in the
mysterious fertility of the world which her own tragic
strivings stimulate, she has a child's fascination with
and absorption in this new pain. In Beyond Go^j ^ „.M
Nietzsche writes,
"Perhaps everything on which the spirit'seye has exercised its acuteness and thought-fulness was nothing but an occasion for thisexercise, a playful matter ... Perhaps the daywill come when the most solemn concepts
which haye caused the most fights and suf-fering, the concepts "god" and "sin," willseem no more important to us than a child'stoy and a child's pain seem to an old man -and perhaps "the old man" will be in need ofanother toy and another pain - still child
enough, an eternal child.
"
51
As master in the "art of the festival," the figure of
the "genuine spectator" completes the aesthetic movement
of thought I have been describing, a movement Nietzsche
wishes to stir with his own. In the movement of thought
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from the artist's intoxication tQ ^ phUosopher , s^
-y to the spectator's awe at the beauty Qf ^ ^to revere the question mark at a time when reverenoe no
ionger see»s sustainable, Nietzsche would have us experi.
ence the mystery of the artistry in our own thought ana todevelop in his readers the aesthetic sensibility „hich
, as
I argued in chapter one, is absent in modernity. This is
a sense for the fact that oniy in the creative q£
great suffering can we bring into being a form of life
whose beauty enraptures and hence holds us to it. It is
the beauty of the strength we are cailed forth to manifest
amxdst this tension which binds us to this for, of life.
This aesthetic sensibility is thus critical for any pos-
sibility of legitimate authority and for conceptions of
justice in our time, for it .rises out of the challenge of
thought facing us; out of the this-worldly tragi-comic
spectacle of ourselves as we attempt honestly to revere
the question mark. This spectacle alone has the power to
»ove us to manifest form-giving forces. It is within the
parameters of this understanding alone that a form of life
which could be self-justifying could be formed.
In this chapter I have tried to formulate the general
parameters for specifying Nietzsche's understanding of our
historical form of suffering. Yet I have done so with
respect to an articulation of the situation of thought in
our time in terms of an individual's thinking activity in
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-elation from the world
. In chapter^ z ^^
out from this elahoration to Cevelop the social-ethical
-Plications in Nietzsche's wort of facing up tQ ^ task
of transfiguring our historical for» of suffering as he
defines it. Through the developroent of "the exemplary
ethos" I will more fully articulate an*lcl ± d assess Nietzsche's
conception of justice.
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CHAPTER III
THE EXEMPLARY ETHOS
A. Introduction
n^i US S?l0r °Ur °Wn examPle ever more
^ook alrt
Y
'No
Le
? Tr brilliance »ake Lentl da k. , let us not become darkerourselves on their account, like all thosewho punish others and feel dissatisfied
away?»l
S°°ner ^ aSide " Let Us look "
The fundamentally political nature of Nietzsche's con-
cerns can be seen in his efforts to gesture towards a new
basis for authority in Western society. This basis,
aesthetic in nature, he hoped could replace the rationalist
metaphysical grounding of authority in modernity, a ground-
ing which had lost its capacity, in Nietzsche's view, to
inform human life. My aim in this chapter is to articulate
the general outlines of this new basis for authority and to
flesh out the ethos or shared ethical horizon towards which
it points
- what I have called the ethos of the exemplar.
On the basis of this ethos a Nietzschean aesthetic approach
to justice begins to emerge.
Thus far I have argued that Nietzsche's critigue of
modern nihilism hinges on the argument that modern forms of
thought and practice lack form-giving forces. I have been
concerned with probing what Nietzsche could have meant when
he referred to the will to power as gestaltende Kraefte,
what he thought form-giving entailed , and even what a form
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of life as a living thing is or requires. , naye argued
that to do this probing we must focus on ^ essentiai ^
tent of the modern will to Master as Nietzsche sees it -
namely, the unconditional desire to expurgate suffering
from the world
- a desire which was, in Nietzsche's view
the final nihilistic blossoming of this-worldly denial of
the ascetic ideal. „e referred to his desire ^ ^
gion of pity, and his claim is that the aim of this reli-
gion itself undermines the conditions for form and forma-
tion in any enduring or relatively enduring sense. That
is, it undermines the possibility of commitment to shared
ends and values
- even eventually to those of mastery it-
self.
This claim rests on Nietzsche's understanding of the
demands placed upon us if we are to take a creative rela-
tionship to ourselves and the world around us. By this I
mean a relationship which retains the ability to perpetual-
ly breathe new life into old perspectives and established
forms, and to create new ones. To this end we must be
capable of sustaining within our culture a wrestling ten-
sion between commitment to a form of life, and questioning
-
a tension which, as a perpetual potential threat to es-
tablished forms and meaning, involves some kind of suffer-
ing, chasms, distance, disjuncture. in this sense suffer-
ing from what Nietzsche called "the terrifying and
questionable nature of existence" is an ineliminable part
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of any creative form-giving and form-sustaining. it is an
appreciation for this fundamentally aesthetic understanding
of the conditions for human meaning and community which is
inimical to the specifically modern mind. it is this I
think Nietzsche claims we must understand if „e are to be
capable of reestablishing some form of authority through
which the threads of a common life can be held together in
our times
in chapter two I have argued that this basic problem
of suffering from the problem of meaning always comes to
any people qua problem in historically specific form and
must necessarily be addressed in an historically original
way. That is, in order that a form of life be established
or renewed it must be able to house, give particular cul-
tural space and form to this questioning after meaning. We
cannot live in this questioning in its raw, abstract form,
but we must have the strength to approach it in some form.
Our horizons must not expel it. Twice in the history of
the West has this questioning been so housed in Nietzsche's
view. Greek culture did so throuqh its tragedies; Chris-
tianity through the figure of the sinner who perpetually
asks, "Who am I, oh my God?" In both cases the pain of the
basic problem of human meaning was not extinguished, but
rather perpetually posed and transfigured, given meaning.
In both cases a certain kind of beauty was embodied in cul-
tural figures (the tragic hero and the sinner respectively)
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whose efforts to excel amidst . ^ ^
continuous sultuEaii^a^ exposure to the ,.terrifying
an, questionable character of existence" spoke to and reaf-firm the identity of a whole people. By posing the prob-
lem of waning a^ugstisn, a culture exposed its people
to a certain painful unknowing and indeterminacy
, and hence
at least theoretically opened up the possibility for an
answer other than the one customarily given. The retention
of this possibility, the ability to take such a risk,
sustain such a tension within a cultural for™ is the key to
a culture's capacity to speak to a whole people, for a
people's ability to find themselves in their culture. Put
another way, it is key to the ability of a culture to have
and to sustain authority.
It is precisely the inability to take such a risk
which characterizes modernity in Nietzsche's view, and
which also is at the heart of the problem of authority in
modernity. m the figure of the self-interested rational
bourgeois, the problem of meaning is never posed. Modern
theorists attempt to secure it so thoroughly beforehand
that it is entirely removed from human experience. This is
as true for the social contract theorists as it is for Kant
or for Marx. In Nietzsche's view then modernity has lost
the aesthetic sensibility without which a culture cannot
establish authority. Modern nihilism is a crisis of
authority, and hence to combat it and to regenerate culture
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« the west, on my reading of Nietzsche; wg^^bexng a figure and a cultural space which gives voice ana
home to this questioning after waning as it must be for-
mulated in our time. It is towards these ends that my
elaboration of the exemplar and the exemplary ethos aims.
In Nietzsche's view then, the efforts to establish
authority at the outset of the modern age were indeed fail-
ures, yet the aspirations which were expressed and the
problems posed remain in some fundamental ways unchanged,
in much contemporary thought the problem of cultural
regeneration and renewal is construed as the need for our
culture to encompass the capacity for self-reflection.
2
What Nietzsche suggests to us is that while every culture
needs to possess resources for some form of reflection,
reflexivity itself, or rational self-reflection cannot ob-
tain the kind of authoritative power necessary to create
and sustain a culture. The tragic-aesthetic dimension of
such an achievement must receive our acute attention if we
are to capture the challenge of Nietzsche's thought to mod-
ern rationalism and its inability to create cultural forces
sufficient to establish authority, to gain our allegiance.
I shall try to show how Nietzsche makes the case that what
gives life force to a form of life and hence critical
authoritative powers is its ability to cultivate a distinc-
tive relationship to "the terrifying and questionable
character of existence" in which a certain beauty and ex-
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cellence are called forth and affirmed because they^
to a people of their own situation but within the contexfc
of the broader human condition. This distinctive beauty
then obtains authority by facing the age-old questioning
after the waning of existence but as historically framed
in this distinctive, unique form, a culture both defines
Itself, i.e. receives definition and authority on the basis
of which the just and the unjust is determined, and is
called to itself as a participant in the greater human ef-
fort to discern and give form to the nature of the human
condition.
in my effort to outline the most interesting ethical
direction Nietzsche's thought takes it is the figure of the
exemplar who exhibits the strength to display the peculiar-
ly tragic beauty which our time demands of us. The ex-
emplar embodies an unswerving commitment to keep before the
mind's eye the irrevocable gulf which has come to stand be-
tween us as metaphysically grounded understandings have
lost their power. The exemplary ethos, I shall argue, is
the historically original ethical form in which we could
house the basic questioning after meaning. in the figure
of the exemplar a culturally established beauty is embodied
which, for our times, could become authoritative.
Before turning directly to the main body of this chap-
ter I would like to distinguish my approach from that of
Alexander Nehamas in his very beautiful, very seductive
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recent work on Nietzsche, MetzschJ^_Mfe_J^ in
which Nietzsche's aestheticism and exemplification figure
centrally. As insightful as this work is, Nehamas succeeds
in almost entirely ignoring the political-cultural concerns
which fundamentally propelled Nietzsche's thought. The
result is a de-radicalized, individualized and ahistorical
Nietzsche who has little to say with regard to the pos-
sibility of a shared ethical horizon which might bind a
people together in our times, that is, little other than
each must find his/her own best horizon. This interpreta-
tion fails to draw forth the stunning challenges a post-
metaphysical condition presents for political community -
by a philosopher who is actually convinced by Nietzsche's
reading of our metaphysical condition. in defending
Nietzsche's perspectivism from charges of relativism,
Nehamas succeeds in emptying Nietzsche's thought of most of
its political and social relevance and vitality.
The central and very original argument of this book is
that, through his writings Nietzsche the author fashions a
literary product Nietzsche the character thereby creating a
figure which he hopes will be, like all great literary fig-
ures, literally unforgettable. Nietzsche, argues Nehamas,
strives to be the Plato of his own Socrates. And, as in
the case of Socrates, Nietzsche hopes that what this
character exemplifies will also be unforgettable, that it
will plague us for centuries in the same way the Socratic
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gadfly has plagued us. Now what *-hi<= w" n t s character exemplifies
is an alternative to the view that if ^-lc n t, in a post-
~t.phy.icl age
, we can find ^ singie standard . s^
for everyone and for all time
, then no standard is good for
anyone anytime
,
or, the flip-side, any standard is good for
anyone anyti»e. Through our acquaintance with Nietzsche
the character, we experience an unforgettable instance of a
*rnd of affixation of standards which in not nihilis*.
NehamaS characterizes this possibility as Nietzsche's per-
spectivis. - „hich he is careful tQ argue . s ^ ^
as relativism.
"Perspectivism does not result in the rela-
as
V
anv SEE
hol
?\that ™Y view is as go^d
are the SS'V* h°ldS that °ne ' s own views
fJI*.TS °r oneself without implyingthat they need be food for anyone else!"?
At the center of this interpretation is what Nehamas calls
Nietzsche's aestheticism, his reliance on artistic models
for understanding and evaluating the world. 4 If the world
is like a text, it is susceptible to multiple interpreta-
tions, though as Nehamas argues, not infinite ones. As we
see through the history of texts, some leave more of an
impress. Hence, through the creation of the fascinating
character "Nietzsche," Nietzsche at once admits his is
only one of many interpretations, yet simultaneously
demands in this impress to be believed. 5 The central way
Nietzsche does this is by bringing style to the center of
his thought. it is critical to understanding Nietzsche's
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Project, Nehamas argues, that „e see that Nietzsche does
this by using a plethora of styles (and he insightfully
identifies them arguing persuasively against the predomi-
nant preoccupation with Nietzsche's use of the aphorisitc
genre,
.
Nietzsche does this to make himself stand out, to
remind us that should we find him persuasive, it is the
particular person, Nietzsche, who has particular values,
goals, and idiosyncrasies that are bound up with a partic-
ular form of living which persuades us, not Truth. In so
bringing style to the center of his thought Nietzsche
seeks to repeat the Greek and Roman achievement of the
"grand style" in „hich the distinction between ^ ^
content is undermined. Hence Nietzsche does not describe
or argue; his means of persuasion is exemplification. The
authority of his voice rests on his success in creating of
himself something so singular yet so excellent that we
cannot keep him from our thoughts. Hence, Nehamas argues,
Nietzsche's aestheticism is the flip side of his perspec-
tivisn.6 and is central to his effort to escape "the dog-
matic tradition" of philosophy.
Nehamas identifies three important consequences hav-
ing to do with ethical life which follow from this reading
of Nietzsche. I would like to call attention to them.
First, Nehamas says that Nietzsche is a radical formalist.
By this he means that he is more concerned with the
(aesthetic) organization of the self, with the "formal
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factor" than with the intrinsic content of actions.
Nietzsche's ideal is the unity and coherency of each self
as an artwork, achieved by a perpetual process of Master-
ing the chaos one is." Hence actions can be evaluated
only in terms of the contribution they make to the self as
a complete artwork. Central to Nehamas' argument is his
interpretation of the thought of eternal recurrence which
he argues is an essentially aesthetic view of the self by
which, through alterations in one's present narrative, the
past too can be integrated - even the worst of it - and
the coherency of the self perpetually re-won.
Second, on this reading, Nietzsche offers no positive
code of conduct. if we look for one, Nehamas says, we
will find only banalities and inconsistencies. Rather,
Nietzsche exemplifies what he wishes to teach about
morality. He commends a specific ideal to us, but in so
doing says it is best alone for him, and that, true to his
rejection of unconditional morality, he cannot argue it is
best for everyone. He even must entertain the possibility
that an unconditional morality itself might be best for
some
.
This brings us to the third and final consequence.
Although Nietzsche's aim was to destroy the tyranny of un-
conditional morality and to influence ethical life by en-
couraging others to find what was best for them by means
of exemplifying what was best for him, Nehamas argues that
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Nietzsche's work is ained at ^ few
_ ^ is phiiQso_
Phers to whom Nietzsche addresses his demand to leave thefusion of moral judgment beneathe them.? „ost
, he sug.
.ests, Bill need an unconditional morality.
„ence Nehamas
concludes that the ethical consequences of Nietzsche's
work are not nearly so apocalyptic as many students of
Nietzsche have claimed. „ost people , s WQrlds^ ^
change much. Nietzsche, according to Nehamas, was no so-
cial reformer or revolutionary. 8
The central flaw of this fascinating book is a phi-
losopher's flaw par excellance. That is, Nehamas fails to
adequately bring forth the social-historical dimensions of
Nietzsche's work. The most dramatic example of this is
Section I of the book which, despite the promising title
"The world," is occupied exclusively with elaborating
Nietzsche's literary understanding of the world, since
"the world" receives very little further social-historical
specification, the historical texture of Nietzsche's
thought is lost and we can grasp only dimly what, for ex-
ample, Nietzsche might have meant substantively when he
claimed he was "the bad conscience of his age." without
seriously integrating this dimension of Nietzsche's work
Nehamas underplays the urgency with which Nietzsche
thought nihilism had to be countered and the depth of his
anxiety about his social world.
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The critical historical-social dimension I nave in
-no here is the finance in Nietzsche's view of the "re-gion o, pity" in modern ethico-institutional life a re.
ligion which in his view, as x have argued ^
was the primary foundation of modern nihilism. Hence
Nietzsche's perspectivism was not only, and ! would argue
not even primarily, individualistic, but historical or
epochal. The charge of radical fetalis* - that Nietzsche
is concerned with the organization.! coherency of a per-
son's experiences and actions rather than their "intrinsic
or moral character, is formulated in such a way that the
historical dimension to Nietzsche's perspectivism is cut
from view. Nietzsche did not, it is true, believe one
could talk about the
..intrinsic" character of things, yet
he was terribly concerned about the content and effect of
action resting in particular on pity. Only by integrating
Nietzsche's historical perspectivism can this contradic-
tion be resolved. That is, while there is nothing in-
trinsically immoral or objectionable to actions based on
pity in Nietzsche's view, there are critical reasons,
rooted in the particularities of our historical condi-
tions, for rejecting them, reasons having to be do pre-
cisely with their content or, to put it another way, with
the meaning they accrue in our time. In this context we
should recall Nietzsche's enigmatic ending to The Geneal -
ogy of Morals
,
the import of which is that though
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Nietzsche's primary target
, as he ^
txve forces suited to our age, is the world-rejecting
sentiment of pity, he acknowledges and at times even
Praises, affirm and admires the rescue of the win the
Christian ascetic ideal makes precisely through pity
Thus while Nietzsche finds that actions based on pity per-
petuate nihilism in our »<.. «.».time, they are not inherently ob-
jectionable. Nehamas sets up a false equation between re-
jection of the possibility of actions which are intrinsi-
cally moral in content and the rejection of concern with
any content whatsoever. Nietzsche rejected the former,
but not the latter.
If this is the case, and we, following Nehamas, un-
derstand Nietzsche's work itself as exemplification, that
is, as speaking to us of its content through its form, can
we find no moral or ethical content in his act of writing
beyond mere coherency of self
-presentation? (Which,
though Nehamas is right to point out is not relativism in
the radical sense, is still relativistic with regard to
the problem of social norms.) Surely Nehamas is right to
argue that Nietzsche offers "no positive code of conduct,"
yet he fails to draw out the ethical content in
Nietzsche's own actions which, when situated historically,
I think must be understood as the beginning of that forma-
tion of an ethical goal which Nietzsche contended our his-
torical period needed. In this light their meaning is not
175
reducible or relevant to the person of Nietzsche alone
What Nietzsche exemplifies is not literally unforgettable
primarily because he makes of himself a literary figure Gf
the first order, but because what he exemplifies to
us; we find ourselves (if not wholly
, at^ ^ ^
profound respects) in him. He has authority.
Nehamas' mistake is again to set up a false equation
-
this time between a positive code of conduct and a gen-
erally applicable ethical content or direction. He fails
to distinguish between ethical thinking that offers a pos-
itive (read universal) code of conduct and one which indi-
cates a general ethical direction. This direction emerges
only if we attempt to discern the meaning of the form
which Nietzsche's effort to persuade takes - exemplifica-
tion
- within a series of reflections which pay strict at-
tention to his concern and even anxiety regarding the
problem of cultural regeneration in a post-metaphysical
age. Because Nehamas is inattentive to this concern, he
loses the tension and hence the importance and richness of
Nietzsche's reflections on ethical life. Nietzsche speaks
to his age by way of exemplification, by way of aesthetic
provocation not because the only alternatives he sees are
philosophic dogmatism or ethical solipsism, (which is how
I read Nehamas' reading of Nietzsche), but because he did
not think that straight-forward argumentation resting upon
self-reflective rationality contained the resources neces-
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sary for the kind of cultural regeneration needed in the
West.
This brings me to the third consequence for ethical
life Nehamas draws from Nietzsche's aestheticism. He
argues that, consistent with his rejection of uncondition-
al codes of morality, Nietzsche does not reject such codes
unconditionally. Moreover, Nehamas argues, Nietzsche not
only does not reject them but thinks most people will
still have to be ruled by them. On this reading, it is
only to philosophers that Nietzsche speaks of an ethical
life beyond good and evil. To be true to his rejection of
universalis*,, Nietzsche could not presume to create an
ethics suited for all. while this reading makes good
sense of Nietzsche's overt claims regarding the supe-
riority of the few - of which there are many - it stifles
another voice of Nietzsche's which is more open and in-
determinate with respect to the effect of his writings and
with regard to the contingency of history. Nehamas er-
roneously concludes that because Nietzsche rejects a
metaphysical ground for morality which could legitimately
compel compliance, it therefore follows that Nietzsche did
not aim for a morality which was generalizable. But the
force of Nietzsche's critique of universal morality, on my
reading, is that it claims to be good for all humans at
all times and consequently does not admit of the pos-
sibility that what is good might be historically con-
177
tingent and thus only generally but not universally valid
I think Nietzsche did ain for a Borality that was gener-
alizable. That is, he sought an ethical horizon which
could orient and bind Western culture into a whole, but
which did not dai*, in doing so, the ground of univer-
sality. Though he was certainly skeptical and cautious
about such a possibility, still „e should take account of
this other voice in Nietzsche, for it is this voice which
nest Urinates the problem, of authority and culture in a
post-metaphysical age.
The most obvious and prominent instance of this voice
is the subtitle to Zarathustra:
"A Book For All and For
None." with these strange words Nietzsche is saying, my
thoughts are potentially for all, potentially for none,
depending, as Derrida put it, on "the ear of the other."*
This is not to say that Nietzsche was a radical democrat,
but rather to remind ourselves that the grounds Nietzsche
offered for his claims were not Truth, but persuasion of a
certain kind. The difference between the character Plato
created and the one Nietzsche created, to follow Nehamas'
artful interpretation, is that the former, as an exemplar
of the moral life he sought to establish, made universal
claims about the good as the true, while the latter ex-
emplifies a moral life which makes claims about the good
as the beautiful. The difference is compulsion over per-
suasion; absolute certainty over contingency and dif-
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ference; universality over potential generalizability
NehaMS
°
nCe agai
"
the
"—usly concludes that because
Nxetzsche rejects a metaphysical„ which^
universai compliance, it therefore foliows that he did not
— for a moral life that was generali2able ^ ^
Nehamas eclipses the breadth and urgency of Nietzsche's
analysis of nihilismxn i . He defuses and domesticates
Nietzsche.
There is . signifioant voice in Nietzsone ^.^ ^ x
shall argue in what follows, aims at a generali zab ie ethi-
cal horizon capable cf
-creating" beings with
-sharp
edges- rather than the
-round grains of sand" modernity
produces. 10
„ere Nietzsche's ethical goal aims at ena-
bling individuality, difference - the true building blocks
°f anything culturally great in our tine, when Nietzsche
^ote in the_Gav^cience,
"we are no longer material for
society," the hope he expressed was that since, with the
end of metaphysical Truth, we are no longer material for
society in the sense of being "stones in a wall," since
our culture can no longer build anything in this way, our
cultural building, cultural excellence must take another
form. 11 Hence Nietzsche does not give up this aim of
building something excellent together as a people, and it
is my aim to flesh out the authority and ethical vision
which one of Nietzsche's voices adumbrates towards such an
end.
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in the following section z wUl discuss ^
of the term authority with which x an herg ^
further articulate the way Nietzsche characterizes the
problem of authority with respect to the modern
"religion
of pity."
B. Authority and the Mod(arn Reliqjion of Pi+y
in her essay, "What is Authority," Hannah Arendt of-
fered a conception of authority which Nietzsche would have
mediately acknowledged as his own though he rarely ever
used the word itself. Authority, Arendt wrote, is "an
obedience in which men retain their freedom. "12 Thought
politically, this meant, in Arendt's view, that a society
in which authority was legitimate was one which could es-
tablish institutions in which its founding principles were
enshrined. Hence, through participation in the common
life, one's memory of the founding principles - principles
which bind a people together giving them their distinctive
identity
- could be renewed and revitalized. in this
renewal of shared identity one could feel freely commanded
anew.
In a particularly poignant passage in The Genealogy
of_Mora!s, Nietzsche has an observer peer into the factory
that produces modern ideals. One among many of the things
heard is that obedience is subjection to those one
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hates. This produces nausea ^ ^ Qbserver ^
Nietzsche seems to be reaching for some other un<Jerstand_
xng of obedience. „e get a hint of this in Hafflan
_MI_Ss2SME
'
"here NietZSChe «°"ies about the loss of belief in
unconditional authority, a belief which had been the foun-
dation for obedience in the past. Today, in mercantile
society, he says, we lack the "proud obedience-- which is
the heir of the nobility." clearly Nietzsche does not
wish to resurrect the £smastiSm for this proud obedience
once again, even were it possible. m fact the uncondi-
tionally of the obedience exhibited by the
--herd-- in
modernity is one of the things about modern obedience
which disgusts and distresses him. Nietzsche is after, at
least in his best moments I suggests, a
-proud obedience-
understood as an ability to
-obey- excellence - in oneself
and in others. He is after the creation of selves capable
both of commanding excellence in themselves and others,
and of responding to it in others, that is, capable of
-obeying" the inspiration or spur of others. m
"Nietzsche's Political Aesthetic," Tracy strong, borrowing
both from Kant and from Emerson, has characterized this
capacity as "the capacity to find the judgments of another
in ourselves and the find ourselves in another"^ and, as
the ability to be "provoked" by another which means the
ability "to find myself with you. "16 Authority then, to
draw these understandings together, is an obedience in
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which we retain our freedom because we submit to, find
ourselves in, the excellence of another, and in the "sub-
mission" renew our common lives.
Understood as the possibility of renewal of shared
identity, Western civilization faces a crisis of
authority, with the growing extinction of Christian mean-
ing, and the grave challenges to reason as something we
all possess as a consequence of being human, we face a
situation of chaos with regard to the basic question of
who we are, and what is good, what is wortny Qf Qur ^
legiance. Characteristic of this crisis is that we have
no basis for judging between competing claims. A silent
abyss responds to our questioning. Hence, we are faced,
on the one hand, with a destructive permissiveness in
which we can give no grounds for choosing one thing over
another, or with an equally destructive fleeing of this
dilemma into the relative safety of an increasingly un-
sustainable reliance upon reason, on the other.
Modernity's nihilism is defined most prominently by
this fleeing. it hence refuses to face that, in the wake
of God's death, a dark and silent distance has come to in-
habit the space between man and man, between man and na-
ture. This is a distance and a silence in which the radi-
cal and hence terrifying questioning after our meaning
reigns with formless power. Modern man refuses to hear
the new silence, and in this refusal refuses to lay claim
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com-
to the one pri„oiple which> in Niet2sche , s^^
still serve as the basis for a revitalization o, our
-on life, which could transfigure the pain of our condi-
tion by housing this questioning within a fen, of life
Nietzsche calls this principle
"intellectual honesty," a
principle which "2000 years of tr-a^i* • .ain ng in intellectual
oleanliness" has wrought. 17 By this Nietzsche meant to
evoke not some capacity for total transparency towards
ourselves and the world, but the critical capacity to be
struck or awed by the new, or struck anew by the old.
(Nietzsche's genealogy of morals was designed to awaken
this kind of honesty so that we would be terrifyingly
struck anew by the problem of meaning in the world as we,
with his help, place the ascetic ideal in the context of'
the form of life it enabled, thereby feeling the enormous
distance which now separates us from it.) Nietzsche
clearly does not wish then to attack reason understood as
our capacity to reflect, to question, to wonder. But he
does wish to sever our understanding of reason as the
ability to know true Being from the capacity to reason
which he understood as an essentially creative activity in
which the ability both to look at things anew and to look
at the new, figure centrally.
Hence Nietzsche's efforts to re-establish authority
begin with an appeal to the deepest principle of our
shared identity. As a claim to the founding impulse of
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Western civilization
, such . kinsh . p^^ ^
authority we could freely Qbey because ^^ ^^
of our common ends at this most fundamental of levels
Alone through such a renewal, Nietzsche suggests, can we
begin to establish authority understood as "an obedience
in which we retain our freedom." In such a beginning
,
freedom is retained in two ways. First, in that we are
called to ourselves in being called to renew the tradition
of intellectual honesty
- understood as the wonder that
sparKs reflection. And second, in so being called, we are
called to see what is new in our time, and hence to
prepare the way for an original relationship to being.
Thus this claim to be heirs ties us back to the founding
impulse of western civilization and, in so doing, situates
us to our present, a present in which our freedom must be
conceptualized anew.
^ Twilight of the_ldois, Nietzsche asks,
"For what is freedom? That one has the will
^
S
H
lf/eSP0nSibility ' that one Preservesthe distance that divides us." 18
The authority Nietzsche relies upon to call us to renewal
of ourselves via "honesty" brings us face to face with the
fact that our continuing freedom hinges upon embracing the
new distance left in the wake of God's death, a distance
in which the terrifying and open-ended questioning of
meaning is relentlessly heard yet receives no answer. Our
continuing freedom rests on embracing as our fate the
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challenge of forging a comfflon ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
new necessity.
Vet obedience to honesty which consists in an
obedience in „hich men retain the distance that divides
the™ could hardly be a sufficient ground to create the
Kind of authority necessary to form a coMo„ life. It is
simply too painful and cannot be sustained. Is this the
extent to which Nietzsche succeeds in this project? I
think not. Rather p»c * •K , as the first step, Nietzsche's appeal
to ..honesty gathers us together in a largely deconstruc-ts moment; it aims to create "active nihilists," those
strong enough to hear the new silence, to peer into the
dark distance. And in this very act of gathering,
Nietzsche promises a more constructive foundation for
authority, one arising precisely out of this embrace of
distance
- an aesthetic foundation I win elaborate
momentarily. For now, of importance is Nietzsche's claim
that at least part of the authority on the basis of which
we could be "compelled" to re-est-ahH.h „° ablis a common life must
reside in the claim to being heirs to "2000 years of
training in intellectual cleanliness." This claim alone
can bring us face to face with the new and painful dis-
tance which the death of God has brought into being.
It is this deconstructive moment, towards which our
efforts to become rightful heirs compel us, that the mod-
ern will to master refuses. Defined centrally by its sub-
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Mission to the "religion of pity„ in which ^ ^.^ ^
eradicate suffering governs, the win to master targets
preciseiy this distance, making creative renewal of the
founding principle of Western civili 2ation impossible.
Before turning to the constructive moment of Nietzsche's
aesthetic foundation for authority I „ould like tQ explore
what I have called "the operation of pity."
!• The Operation of pity
As the heir to Christianity's rejection of life on
earth (found most dramatically in the promise of heaven)
the modern "religion of pity" contains an even more uncon-
ditional impulse
- it promises heaven on earth. The dis-
cord, the painful wrestling with one's own meaning heard
in the haunting questioning of St. Augustine: "who am I,
oh my God?", a discord relieved only after death, now
largely ceases to find place in the world. In modernity,
Christian pity for this-worldly suffering is retained.
But to the questions such suffering provokes, an answer
which promises rectification is given, an answer, more-
over, which ceases properly to take the form of an answer
since it eclipses the interrogative mode altogether in fa-
vor of "self-evidence." What Nietzsche means most funda-
mentally then by a "religion of pity" is a fervor to
entirely relieve humankind of a kind of tragic suffering
from the most basic questioning after human meaning, pur-
pose and identity. Philosophically this takes many forms
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- fro* the assumption of the Kantian ^.^ ^
nature nan who should conduct
^ ^
right rule of reason,., to sooialist »an
, to Smith , s
visible nana. It is this which is responsive for pittingNietzsche in an interesting way against such diverse
Political forms and movements as liberal democracy
socialism, the movement to emancipate women and capi-
talism, interesting that is, insofar as they seek to es-
tablish an unmoving basis for social-political life; to
unconditionally remove from the forms of lives they wish
to establish the basic questioning after human meaning.
It is this
.-removal,., possible because of faith in the ra-
tional subject, which is at the center of the illegitimacy
experienced in modern culture and politics, for it reduces
life to a kind of organized effort to ameliorate and rec-
tify our condition, stifling a kind of terrible existen-
tial wonder and questioning.
But Nietzsche spends little effort in showing the
specific ways in which modern political movements and
political philosophy are rooted in this extreme form of
pity and hence extinguish such questioning, what he does
do is to elaborate the bad effects of what has, in
modernity, become an ethos of pity, if you will, an ethos
which has grown out of the cultural legacy of Christianity
as expressed in these philosophical positions. It
receives so much attention by Nietzsche because he consid-
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ers it to be critical to keeping us from the wonder that
sparks reflection and hence fro, the deconstructive moment
he would "provoke." It is to this elaboration I now turn.
Nietzsche argues that pity has become the constituent
element in the tissue of modern social relations and even
in relations within the self since the French Revolution.
It is this affect which disrupts the capacity of selves
and societies from coming to terms with the historical
form of suffering with which they are confronted. Pity is
central in keeping us from "making beautiful what is
necessary" by which Nietzsche referred to the cultural
transfiguration of the new and painful distance which has
arisen, as fact, in the wake of God's death; a trans-
figuration through which the basic questioning after human
meaning could be renewed.
Pity is essentially a world-rejecting affect. In
"The Voluntary Beggar" in Thus Spoke 7^h,1c+^ we find
Zarathustra has come upon a man Nietzsche would have us
take for Jesus. Or rather, Nietzsche would have us take
him for the man Jesus has become after long years of
giving to others out of pity. Exhausted by these efforts,
he has rejected the human world and is now reduced to
talking with cows, trying to learn their happiness. Hav-
ing given everything to the poorest, only to be rejected,
he now believes his only hope is to learn to "chew the
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cud," to become a part of nature. About JeSus' rejection
Zarathustra says,
ultL^eSe^S Wel1 is an art aAd the
t0
Nietzsche's critiques of pity which occupy him from
his break with Wagner to his last works revolve around his
claim that pity is no means by which one can render others
aid, it is not "right giving." Importantly, this is not
at all a rejection by Nietzsche of compassion or concern
with the welfare of others. (Through my development of
the exemplary ethos I shall articulate the contours of
what Nietzsche might have meant by "right giving.") if
one wishes to be a physician to mankind "in any way what-
soever," Nietzsche writes, it is pity against which one
must guard, for "[it] will paralyze him at every decisive
moment and apply a ligature to his knowledge and his sub-
tle helpful hand.-.20 It is in^ sense^^^
stitutes one of the greatest injustices, for it denies
both to the one who pities and to the pitied that "spa-
ciousness of perspective," 2 ! the precondition for the
questioning wonder through which knowledge emerges.
Greatest injustice is done, Nietzsche says,
"...where life has developed at its smal-lest, narrowest, neediest, most incipient
and yet cannot avoid taking itself as the
goal and measure of things.
.
. "•"
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Pity is an emotion which binds perspective making
life and knowledge small, mean, needy. it is a ligature
on self-knowledge and on knowledge of others both for the
one who pities and for the pitied. In taking on another's
burden as her own, the one who pities is, Nietzsche
argues, distracted from her own struggles and goals, and
hence is kept from those things which could yield a deep
under-standing of the world. Pity is a form of escape.
The act of pity also deprives the pitied of self-
knowledge, for in assuming that suffering must be al-
leviated, the one who pities presumes to know the meaning
of another's suffering. m this presumption he strips the
pitied of what is and must be, in Nietzsche's view, dis-
tinctly personal, distinctly unique. There is an economy
of the soul, a "personal necessity of distress" whose
meaning alone the sufferer must come to know. Suffering
is an essential part of the growth of the soul - of its
letting go of "whole periods of the past" and its breaking
open of "new springs and needs." 23 Hence to pity is to
show contempt for the deeply personal nature of distress.
The intrusion of the one who pities into this economy
causes shame, the response to which, Nietzsche suggests,
is either submission to the understanding of the pitier,
or revenge. Both are means of evading the personal strug-
gle all must constantly engage in in the effort to con-
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tinuously bring their distinotive selves intQ beingj
to renew them.
Pity also places a ligature upon our knowledge of the
other. Both the intrusive acoess the one who pities as-
sumes with regard to the waning of another's suffering
and the yielding up by the pitied self ta this interpreta-
tion creates a sooial in-between whose very existence is
made possible by the efforts of both parties to flee from
those forms of wrestling with the self and other which
could yield distinctive beings. This is the source of
Nietzsche's virulent anti-egalitarianism. Thus pity
deprives both the one who pities and the pitied of the
"spaciousness of perspective- which provides the very
resources with which real "help- might be fashioned;
resources for "right giving," that is, for a giving which
feeds our own and others' capacities for self-formation.
On this analysis something important about the dis-
tance now fundamental and irremedial which divides us
emerges, it is Janus-faced. It is at once something most
difficult to bridge, something which thus wraps us in our
solitary selves, keeping us fundamentally mysteriously and
finally unknown to ourselves, and something without which
we remain absolutely solitary, absolutely unknown as self-
revealing, distinct beings, without this distance, a dis-
tance which pity destroys, we are lacking in the capacity
whatsoever to feel the other as other, to feel the edge
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that dearcates seething different, to have, as Nietzsche
puts it,
-organizing power" by which he „eans the capacity
to ma*e distinctions between things by separating, rank-
ing, opening chasms. 24
The results relevant for the problem of establishing
authority are twofold. First is what I will call the
problem of excellence in our time. "industrial culture,"
Nietzsche writes, (and we can assume inclusion of all mod-
ern political forms) " is submission to unknown and
uninteresting persons. "25 obedience in modernity is the
same as submission because dominant modern culture pro-
duces nothing which we will freely obey, nothing with the
power to call us to renew our shared identity and therein
re-establish authority. For this, "honesty" is required.
For this, we would have to face the fatal blows our expe-
riences have dealt "God," a task the will to master es-
chews. (And, Nietzsche would add, the state also eschews
this task in its attempt to become our new God. 26 )
This is one side of the problem of authority in
modernity. The other, as important, is the inability to
respond to the kind of excellence upon which Nietzsche
hopes to re-establish authority. Thoroughly under the
sway of the "religion of pity," clinging to the faith that
all suffering can be abolished, moderns seek revenge
against those who teach and live differently. Moderns
possess alone the capacity to respond to that type of ex-
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cellence its culture produces: that which unconditionally
and tyrannically commands, that which aims to destroy "the
distance that divides us." Both Wagner and the only ap-
parently anti-modern phenomenon of Napoleon are exemplary
of such excellence in Nietzsche's view. What he calls
"the art of command" eludes them, and they create and
pander to the "herd" impulse for unconditional obedience,
for an equality qua conformity made possible, once again,
by obliterating that distance between persons without
which their otherness cannot confront us with the
guestioning of our own lives.
Thus the "proud obedience" Nietzsche sought, an
obedience in which men retain their freedom, is thwarted
by the modern will to master's aim to eradicate suffering.
On the one hand, because the dominant ethos of pity does
not produce those who exhibit the kind of excellence which
could command our esteem by renewing our sense of our
shared identity in the face of the event of God's death.
And on the other, because we are able to respond alone to
those whose excellence is the kind which commands uncondi-
tionally. Pity keeps us from experiencing the radical way
in which the distance which divides us is now present; it
keeps us from the deconstructive moment mentioned above,
from a questioning wonder in which we could take stock of
our condition.
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All of this now begs the question, what is, in
Nietzsche's view worthy of our esteem? so much so that our
obedience to its command would not compromise but in fact
constitute our freedom? what could have the power to
freely compel our obedience, and how could we practice
commanding as an "art?" To approach these questions we
must review the historical form in which the problem of
meaning confronts us as Nietzsche sees it.
As I have suggested in chapter two, we are confronted
with the paradox of affirming that the fundamental princi-
ple which rendered our lives intelligible and gave them
meaning
- unchanging metaphysical Truth to which we, as
rational beings have access in some form - was in fact
only our own erring. But how could affirming error
engender rapture, be authoritative? How could we find
ourselves in this task? How could we be drawn to such a
task even had we the strength for it? We cannot, nor is
this the impossible deconstructive task Nietzsche sets be-
fore us, for it is only from a vantage point still caught
within the frame of true Being that knowledge could appear
as error. In "How the *Real World' at Last Became a Fa-
ble," Nietzsche puts it this way,
"But no! with the real world we have also
abolished the apparent world ! " z
1
Knowledge then is not error. Rather, it is always par-
tial, perspectival, the means for preserving and enhancing
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particular beings and forms of l ife
. As such
, it reveals
the artistic foundations of our being.
As heirs to the tradition of "honesty" our challenge,
as I have argued, becomes that of taking ourselves as
aesthetic phenomena and now, as "genuine" spectators,
learning to take delight in the tragi-comic spectacle of
the mysterious artistry at work in our thinking activity
itself. m so doing we must, like great tragedians,
parody the tragic in our own strivings by admitting that
our intoxication with creative bringing forth via
questioning is just that - intoxication with a being of a
particular kind, that is, a Western being. No further
foundation, we must admit, is possible. with such parody
we celebrate the fertility of the world our own tragic
strivings to know engender. m remaining true to our task
of intellectual "honesty," we become that "artistic
Socrates" Nietzsche longed to encounter.
But still, why affirm such a task? Beyond the claim
to be heirs, there is a new promise, a new hope embedded
in this Nietzschean honesty. From the promise of true
Being which transfigured the suffering of the sinner,
making it beautiful, Nietzsche offers the promise of
"Vieldeutigkeit," multiplicity, fertility, of a creative
unfolding of the world heretofore impossible. it is this
promise which he thought could transfigure the painful
distance that divides us. And here we approach the con-
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structive Moment Nietzsche at least often, though certain-
ly not always, graSps. NaMely, the pain of the distance
is seething „e suffer not Merely so „e face our condi-
tion, but rather it is southing we must suffer and whose
reality we must constantly re-affirm because it allows us
to participate in unfolding the mysterious fertility of
the world and of ourselves. That is, just as much as in-
toxication, this new distance is a condition of our own
artistic powers, our form-giving powers, with this, the
pain of "the distance that divides us" can be trans-
figured, redeemed, and the full essence of our freedom can
come into view. This distance, we now see, is the origin
of a new and promised pleasure since it is necessary to us
as self- and world-revealing beings.
What becomes authoritative on this reading of
Nietzsche's effort to combat nihilism, in sum, is a
renewed commitment to intellectual "honesty," to a
questioning wonder in which we position ourselves in the
new silence such that we affirm ourselves as artistic
beings. As such, our capacity to give form to things and
to renew this form rests on an essentially tragic and
aesthetic sensibility; a sensibility which finds beauty in
that wrestling tension between intoxication and skepticism
which constitutes our efforts to know. It is a
sensibility which revels in the fact that to sustain crea-
tive forces in any form of life, that form of life must be
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sustained by a certain tension by ^
questioning after waning. Hence in the tension between
being heirs and being newborns, Nietzsche lodges his own
claim to speak authoritatively, and hence too his hopes to
renew the foundations of Western civilization in an
obedience which is renewal yet not repetition. m such a
renewal we are called to ourselves anew and thus celebrate
the creative fertility of our own being.
Vet this new basis for authority Nietzsche claimed
was beyond good and evil, though not beyond good and bad.
That is to say, there are indeed many things of which the
creative unfolding powers of humans are capable and thus
which, it appears, Nietzsche had no basis for rejecting.
Does Nietzsche not affirm all forms of diversity for
diversity's sake? Does he not trade the formlessness he
found in modernity for a postmodern nightmare of endless
forms? such a prospect hardly has compelling power.
Through the development of the exemplary ethos in
this final section I will argue on the basis of
Nietzsche's own understanding of "gestaltende Kraefte"
that there are ethically limiting principles embedded in
this aesthetic foundation of authority, ethically con-
structive principles which are suggested in much of
Nietzsche's work.
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C. The Exemplary T?+- nn ~
"Above all, one should not wish to divestexistence of its rj^h^mbj^uitv: that i**dictate of good taste, gentiemln, the tas?e
The exemplary ethos is one which celebrates and
engenders the essential plurality or, as Nietzsche put it,
Vieldeutigkeit of things, a plurality we would be unable
'
to know without the "pathos of distance," without the
ability to suffer the painful cleft that now haunts our
lives in such a way that we are struck by a new sense for
the beautiful in human life. m the exemplary ethos this
different sensibility, this different aesthetic is given
form. Most interpreters who have wrestled with the
political and ethical implications of_Jlietzsche; S reflec-
tions on the beautiful have argued some variant on the
theme that his is an aesthetics of coherency and/or domi-
nation. Thus, for example, Alexander Nehamas argues that
Nietzsche has an aesthetics of coherency which aims only
for a unity of self, and that therefore it cannot be ex-
tended to broader social relations. Alternatively, Martin
Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's aesthetics do have so-
cial relevance but must be rejected since they reproduce
what he sees as the dominating impulse in Western
metaphysics. Tracy Strong, by contrast, attempts not to
read Nietzsche as a theorist of domination as he inter-
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Prets Nietzsche's aesthetic understanding o f authority
Vet Strong approaches the latter through the Emersonian
"instance of transparency" „hich he defines as a mome„t of
"lived perfection... when our intentions and abilities are
unified in perfected praxis." This approach to
Nietzsche's reflections on authority however collapses the
interesting tension Nietzsche attests to sustain in his
aesthetic reflections. 29
in my view, Nietzsche's efforts - in their best mo-
ments
- are aimed precisely at turning us away from an
aesthetics resting on pleasure in order, coherency,
harmony, and perfection, to pleasure in the tension be-
tween harmony and chaos. 30 Hence the kind of ethical
defense of individuality as artistic self-formation funda-
mentally presupposes a form of ethico-social relations
which aim at preserving "the distance that divides us" and
the questioning tension its presence requires.
Through the figure of the exemplar I will explore the
ethical horizon on the basis of which this Nietzschean in-
spired case for an aesthetic understanding of authority in
our post-metaphysical age is most compelling. The ex-
emplar "provokes- us, she calls us forth to find in her a
new beauty in the pain of the "distance" which now divides
us. In the exemplary ethos the form in which the "ter-
rifying and questionable character of existence" confronts
us as a question is housed. It is an artistic ethos in
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which we for, ourselves in the face of the new distance
that surrounds us such that we are seething beautiful to
behold, but also capable of beholding. the metaphor with
which Nietzsche best captures this ethos is a garden with
high walls yet a hospitable gate.
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meantime, the question itself remains un-answered whether one is of more_jase to an-other by immediately leapin^To~nTi side andpiping him - which help can in any case beonly superficial where it does not becometyrannical seizing and transforming - orcreating something out of oneself that theother can behold with pleasure: a beautifulrestful self-enclosed garden perhaps, with'high walls but also a hospitable gate?" 3 !
This image recurs in Nietzsche's work. it evokes an
artistic way of being whose driving commitment is to the
idea that "right giving" consists in making of oneself an
example so that ones effort to influence makes it possible
for others to receive and in so receiving form themselves.
The central question it poses is, can you form yourself
such that you remain able to receive different others and
inspire their distinctiveness? so that central to your
self
-formation is this twofold capability?
1. Solitude
It should not be surprising given that Nietzsche ties
our freedom to an embrace of the new "distance that di-
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vides us," that solitude should be centra! to the ethos of
the exemplar. But Nietzsche's praise of solitude must not
be mistaken for a song to solipsism as many interpreters
have suggested.32 Let us ^ ^
"Thus speaks the fool: association withother people corrupts one's chararl-^pecially if one has none »3 3
C cter
" 6S *
The truth of the fool - the one who speaks foolishly
but honestly about things most refuse to acknowledge or
examine
-
sets the context within which we should place
Nietzsche's sometimes bitter, most often extreme ut-
terances about association with others. The truth the
fool tells is that while association per_^e is not cor-
rupting, in our times most people possess little character
and less knowledge of how it is formed, and thus use asso-
ciation with others either to find the selves they lack,
or to hide from themselves what in themselves they
despise. Association becomes conformism.
Nietzsche's praise of solitude then is part of an ef-
fort to turn our attention to a different way of being
with others. But how does he conceive it, what are its
effects, and just why, in the moral interregnum which con-
stitutes our day, does he argue that one of the four
"sciences" from which the laws of life and action will
come is solitude? 34
The fulcrum around which the value of solitude turns
is Nietzsche's claim that thinking and acting without wit-
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nesses yields a different kind Qf ^ ^
reveals the world differently. To develop this point it
-
critical to note that the primary context against^
Nietzsche reacts in his multifarious reflections on
solitude is Christ- i^n mu„cn istia . The ever-present Christian God
practiced a surveillance of the sinful so complete that
they were unable, finally, to bear it. Never left alone,
the pious become so respni-fni +u^4-ent ul that murder and overthrow
alone offer relief. This is
, in any case
, one Qf ^ ^
ratives Nietzsche spins to explain the death of God, and
it is a story from which Nietzsche wishes us to learn, for
it manifests its general form in modern culture as well
where politically the state wishes to take over the sur-
veillance God once practiced, 35 and socially a resentful,
ever-vigilant conformist egalitarianism drives relations
with others.
It is our new solitude in the universe then which
Nietzsche thinks offers up a possibility of acting out of
something other than resentment and revenge. Yet we fear
this new condition and most refuse to acknowledge it. We
fear it because when, alone in this way, we look into our-
selves, we see, Nietzsche says in a parable, that we are
not galaxies with regular, cyclically orbiting stars. In
this new solitude we are led, rather, into the chaos and
labyrinth of ourselves and existence. 36 Life appears dif-
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ferently to us in solitude a niff6
'
dl ference for Nietzsche of
great import. He writes,
^K^oud 2°rStrtl ^Y^V0 "0tfear the hollow echo - th= ' f°r they
nymph Echo. And all Co?
orltl1"e of the
in solitude. 37 1CeS Sound different
This solitude saves us from a Kind of superficiality. It
brings us face to face with "critique,., with uncertainty
skepticism and questioning. We dare not speak too loudly
lest the folly of our emphatic sound return to us as echo.
Such a need to speak softly, unemphatically and with a
questioning voice, a voice in touch with chaos, builds
strength. m the Prologue to Zarathustra, the saintly
hermit says to Zarathustra who does not disagree, that
solitude is as the (salten) sea where the body is carried
along, kept from being a drag on us. There is almost an
otherworldly status Nietzsche accords to solitude; it is a
locus for divine powers. Though a thing rooted in earth,
solitude brings us nearest to the infinite, an infinite
which, though an infinity of chaos, Nietzsche sees as a
bulwark of
-security-, and "slowness- against the pressing
hour of the marketplace. Solitude's pace is slow, making
us capable of distinguishing "persuasion- from "frenzy-
and "proving" from "overthrow. "38 it combats the uncondi-
tional. It is one of the preconditions for deliberation
as it opens us out onto the (frightening) infinity of in-
terpretations and hence opens up the world to pos-
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sibilities otherwise ungrasped. it is a precondition for
that "spaciousness of perspective" pity extinguishes.
Hence in terms of social relations one of the primary
reasons Nietzsche defends solitude is directed at "pro-
tecting our fine neutrality of conscience" by which he
means nothing l ike objectivity, but rather a questioning
critical capability. Hence retreating into solitude is
the protection Nietzsche counsels from the obtrusive and
revengeful. To be drawn into defensive engagement with
others who may fear our questioning is to be forced to be-
come dogmatic, "unneutral," martyrish ourselves. m this
state we forfeit the chance of making our own self some-
thing distinct and thus of contributing to the diversity
of the world. we also forfeit the chance of experiencing
this diversity through others.
Thus our new state, thought socially, is the rich
state without which we cannot, through our own self-
fashioning, affirm the plurality of the world. Nietzsche
therefore, in his reflections on solitude, presents us
with the challenge of forming ourselves in the face of our
"new infinite," and of developing an aesthetic sensibility
for the tragic beauty of so doing.
Yet all of this requires qualification, for the
solitude Nietzsche instructs is a qualified solitude -
what he calls "the good solitude." it is not that of the
hermit, the man of absolute solitude. As metaphor for the
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life of a mind in conversation with itself alone, in
hermetic solitude the mind falls into its own depths,
Pulled by too terrible a gravity. Thus, Nietzsche writes,
this hermit always longs for the friend, for the third
person and his height. 39 The fr-ior^ync m iend saves us from our own
depths, from the bearingless infinity of our own
labyrinthine selves, not through an ever-present surveil-
lance armed with God, Truth or Reason, but through the
height of her beauty, by her example. m this exemplary
bearing of the friend we are provoked to wrestle with our
own possibilities of self-formation; we are brought back
to our own worldly possibilities and hence reaffirm our
common essence as form-giving, world revealing beings.
The solitude Nietzsche affirms then is a certain
solitude among friends, a solitude in which "right" giving
is possible. This is the central point of all
Zarathustra's ethical teachings. He says,
heart
a
"4°
YOU ^ friend and his overflowing
In the effort to explore this teaching and to
demonstrate the textual support for my reading of the
ethos of the exemplar, I will turn now to an analysis of
the Prologue and the narrative structure of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra
.
The primary dramatic structure of this test
is, it seems to me, the story of one who, in the effort to
aid mankind, learns the art of "right giving," learns to
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-a friend in this exemplary sense. Zarathustra both
teaches this and comes to exemplify it himself in the
course of the book.
2 • Zarathustra
be
0
haI
r
you y
°Ur haPPiness
-VZT* i whom y°u shine?"First words spoken by Zarathustra.
At the outset of the Prologue we find Zarathustra
high in mountainous solitude, outside the door of his
cave. He has come up to this solitary height ten years
before carrying his own charred remains. As„en and empty,
having burnt himself out in the valleys of the world,
Zarathustra rekindles his fire through his solitude. How
so? By receiving the sun's overflowing rays, so wise has
this extended solitude made him that now he too, like the
great star, is overfull and longs to return to the valleys
to give them the light of his wisdom. Hence the first
words we hear Zarathustra speak, addressed to the sun, are
words which ask if we do not need others for our own hap-
piness; if our happiness does not indeed depend upon a
certain kind of virtue Zarathustra later calls "the gift-
giving virtue." That is, if it does not depend upon
certain relations with others such that in giving to them,
they in turn are able to bless us, to receive our gift,
and we theirs.
I read Zarathustra as a narrative centrally about the
problem of "right giving." That is, how can we persuade
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others to « wisdom
, how can „e . nfiuenoe them w . thout
shading the,., making then envioug and ^ ^
one hand, or tyrannizing over the., on the other? „o„ can
we, in this act of giving, help constitute others so that
they are abls to receive and in receiving bless our gift
with a gift of their own? It is this Zarathustra teaches
and in so doing himself learns something: how to relate to
the other as other. Both teachings fundamentally depend
upon a capacity for solitude.
I should like to look carefully at the nature of
Zarathustra's first solitude, the state in which the
reader first encounters him. The thing we should notice
first is that Zarathustra is not alone in his solitude.
His animals, courage and wisdom, are with him, suggesting
that both virtues are at home here. But there is another
overwhelming body
- the sun. Everyday the sun climbs to
Zarathustra's cave and shines upon him, and Zarathustra in
turn receives its light and blesses the sun in gratitude.
It is this exchange
- in solitude - which has brought
about the change of which the old saint takes note when
Zarathustra descends: Zarathustra has no longer any dis-
gust around his mouth; he is awakened, a dancer in
gratitude to life, what has transpired? what is this sun
in which Zarathustra has bathed and which he has blessed
ten years long?
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First, it is the earth's sun, the sun which brings
light to the earth as it ascends and descends around it.
It lives and shines for and with the earth. Hence it
represents the kind of l ight and power available to humans
in our new solitude. it is the light of the ^arth, not of
God or heaven or Truth. m this sense it must also be un-
derstood as a symbol for the sun Zarathustra (and indeed
all of us) now must create/receive for himself. still, we
must plumb this metaphor further with Zarathustra
' s ques-
tion in mind, for it is not nearly so solipsistic as ap-
pears at first glance. We must listen to the social es-
sence of Zarathustra's question. That is, without "those
for whom (it) shines," and therefore those who bless it,
could the sun continue to shine, or to be at all? i'm
suggesting that even when we, in the most materialist of
terms, read this sun as the law Zarathustra gives to him-
self as lawgiver and avenger of that law, even when we see
it as the god Zarathustra has created for himself, as the
star he has thrown out into icy solitude, Zarathustra's
Grundfrage
,
asked both at the very beginning and at the
very end of the book, suggests that a profoundly social
web of exchange is the condition for anything to radiate -
be it the sociality of the self or of man with man. With
the metaphor of a celestial body, Nietzsche captures the
astonishing, miraculous and mysterious quality to this
radiance. Between humans something godly can come to be.
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in Plato's imagery the cave is the place of the many
where there is no radiance, only deceptive reflection. By
contrast, Nietzsche's cave is the place for solitude, the
Place from whence one receives radiance and grows
courageous and wise. Here one develops a pressing need
oneself to radiate, to give to others, and the need to be
received, the urge to sociality of a certain kind. For
Nietzsche, the cave and sun imagery do not represent ir-
reconcilable images of the illusion-filled world of the
many and the radiating world of Truth of the few. Rather,
they are images for a kind of strengthening solitude (the
cave) and a continuous circular movement down towards and
back away from others (the movement of the sun) without
which this strength can neither sustain itself nor
radiate, have worldly significance.
Thus in the ten years of Zarathustra
' s solitude he
has filled himself with a brilliance, a rich goal which,
if it is to shine, needs others who can receive it - lest
it perish on high. But the problem is, how to communicate
it to others? How to give? it is commonly argued that
the lesson Zarathustra learns in the Prologue which he
later refers to as "the hermit's folly" 41 is that it is
not indiscriminantly to everyone he should speak, moreover
it is only the philosophers to whom Zarathustra can and
wishes to speak. And at the end of the Prologue
Zarathustra indeed says,
209
foHLT 1? tha11 1 Speak to people:
dead?»?2
laSt tlme hav* I spoken tothS
While I do not wish to argue entirely against such a
view, it needs careful elaboration and qualification. The
lesson Zarathustra learns, it seems to xne, has little to
do with the question of who can and cannot receive, for
some mysterious writ large in the order of things,
Zarathustra's wisdom. That is, it has little to do with
the distinction between philosophers and the rabble.
Rather, it concerns the problem of how Zarathustra can
give so that in giving he honors "the distance that di-
vides us" and hence helps constitute others as able to
receive his ethical teachings, a reception which itself
must honor that selfsame "pathos of distance." What
Zarathustra learns in the Prologue is that it is a
hermit's folly to think that by merely telling the world
one's wisdom, one can expect to mold and shape it; that
only a hermit could imagine the world so malleable.
In distinct contrast to Socrates and Jesus, the other
two great exemplars and teachers in Western civilization
whose stories Nietzsche keeps close to this text,
Zarathustra leaves the marketplace, the public space to
which all have most equal access. Unlike Socrates and
Jesus who do not learn from the world and hence remain
hermits of the marketplace, Zarathustra joins the world
and seeks to learn how to be a prophet of it. Hence he
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leaves the marketplace and his hermitage simultaneously
for, as the jester „arns
, if he stays he risks death ^
what would for Zarathustra constitute death? ciearly ex-
tinguishing that which makes him happy
, that iS( cutt . ng
off the life of his sun which I have argued now needs
others to continue to radiate, to have life. And how, if
Zarathustra stayed and continued to seek reception by the
people could this occur?
The most obvious way of course would be actual death
by collective hands on the order of both Socrates and
Jesus. Why, as the "Plato of his own Socrates," why in
this literary construction of a prophet, does Nietzsche
have Ms prophet, who, like Socrates and Jesus, leaves no
written, worldly trace of his teachings, not punctuate his
teachings by such a collective drama? To avoid the reac-
tive, world-negating relations such guilt induces of which
the chroniclers of both other prophets made use. As the
chronicler of this prophet's life and teachings Nietzsche
wishes to offer a corrective to the dogmatic shrillness of
the chroniclers Plato and Paul. Zarathustra's life should
remain able to teach by example, by provocation, not by a
coercive Reason or Truth.
On a more subtle level Zarathustra risks death by the
temptation of becoming shrill, dogmatic. Zarathustra ex-
presses such temptation when he says of the people,
"Must one smash their ears before they learn
to listen with their eyes?... Must one clat-
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ter like kettledrums and preachers of
repentance?" 43
Death, in this sense, for Zarathustra would entail not
remaining "loyal to the earth," true to what alone his
eyes thus far have witnessed - the death of God, and a
new-found ability to bless and have gratitude for this
world.
For the sake of being able to be true to his teach-
ings then Zarathustra leaves the marketplace. And where
does he go? These are not exclusively private places and
private audiences, nor are they as public as the market,
in Part I where he is most intent upon gathering those who
would and can listen he is in the (democratic) town of the
Motley Cow at an ostensibly public gathering around a
sage, he is with youth high on a mountainside, alone with
ascetics who despise the body, with brothers in war...
But he is also travelling in many lands and many places,
talking, observing. Zarathustra is in multiple sites,
theoretically available "to all." There is then, an open-
ness regarding potential followers that most do not empha-
size. 44
But there is additional reason to question the elite
interpretation of the book. In "On the Higher Men,"
Zarathustra interprets for us the folly of his initial ef-
fort to give his gift to men. His hermit's folly was a
folly apparently of not knowing the rabble. He character-
ized it thusly:
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"And as I spoke to all, I spoke to none. "45
The logical inference here, and one which is ostensibly
bolstered by the change in Zarathustra
' s attempts at
"gift-giving," is that Zarathustra learned only to give to
a selected few. Yet surely Nietzsche is playing with us
in some way for we are reading a book whose subtitle, once
again, ironically reads, ABooK_Fo^l^n0^one. Does
Nietzsche, at lea^t not pose a question to us regarding
this elite interpretation as he, in giving this subtitle
to his book, commits the very folly he was supposed to
have overcome in the Prologue, the pre-logic to his book?
I think that this is one important way this must be
read. Yet we might also read this as a proclamation by
Nietzsche of the tragedy of his own efforts to instruct.
That is, as long as he is unable to find those who have
ears for his instruction, he must commit the folly of the
hermit and write indiscriminately to all, he must address
his work as only hermits, who know nothing of the world,
must address theirs. Yet this is only partially true. As
I have suggested in chapter two, through the subversive
aspect of his styles, Nietzsche aims strategically to con-
stitute others, to provoke others so they are able to hear
him. He is aware that simple proclamation, simple appeals
to rational self-reflection will fail. in the overwhelm-
ing contradictory verbosity of his voice he makes us expe-
rience, he exemplifies the insubstantial ity of our present
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im in
age. m this way he calls us forth to engage with h
thought about what is to be done, with this form of
aesthetic provocation he attempts to make others able to
hear, to receive, to be equal to the task of facing our
condition.
It seems to me that what Zarathustra learns in the
Prologue is something similar. That is, that it is a
hermit's folly to think that merely by telling the world
one's wisdom, one can expect to mold and shape it; that
the world is so malleable. m the Prologue Zarathustra
begins to learn what he later will tell Jesus - that
"right giving" is an art, and that he must live with
others, must learn about the world, and through that
living teach through exemplification. As part of this
lesson, Zarathustra ceases to proclaim and instead at-
tempts to befriend. To do this however he must withstand
the trial of pity (the main topic of Book IV) and gain the
"good solitude," the solitude among friends.
Hence the fundamental movement in the solitude narra-
tive in Zarathustra is from Zarathustra as hermit in
solitude to Zarathustra as friend in solitude; that is, it
is the development of the capacity to maintain the wisdom
and strength of gratitude towards the earth, won in
solitude, among men. It is this capacity I shall argue
which is central to "right giving;" to a being with others
which neither tyrannizes nor assimilates.
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in the course of the book, Zarathustra returns three
times to his solitude on high. There he receives the
sun's riches and blesses her in return. There he becomes
wise like the serpent and courageous like the eagle. Upon
the third return Zarathustra learns something so fundamen-
tal that the relationship of his solitude to the social
world has perhaps been utterly altered - if not his
solitude itself. Upon his third return he is visited by
the soothsayer who is there to try Zarathustra. The trial
is nothing less than to see whether he is strong enough to
maintain his own form, his own goal of love and gratitude
for the earth, to exemplify in his own life the import of
his basic teaching of eternal return. In this trial
Zarathustra is tempted to pity the most saddening, dis-
gusting, needy humans - namely all that is left of his
"higher men." They are suffering terribly - in part from
pains Zarathustra himself has inflicted. with momentary
slipping, Zarathustra withstands his trial and therewith
receives the sign promised earlier in the book: the sign
of his going under. With this sign, Zarathustra emerges
from his cave "glowing and strong as a morning sun that
comes out of dark mountains." 46
In not pitying, in withstanding the temptation to
succor in such a way that he debilitates and debases,
Zarathustra has learned how to shine, to give as a friend,
to be an exemplar. No longer need he hide in his cave
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away from the hands of the vengeful for, much to his sur-
prise, such giving has had tne effect Qf strengthening ^
afflicted, of giving them the strength for gratitude. m
"The Ass Festival," after Zarathustra has withstood this
trial of pity, he is surprised by a new roguish inventive-
ness, a new independence in the higher men. He addresses
them thusly,
"0 my new friends,
.. .you strange higher menhow well I like you now since you hive be-come gay again."47 *
Hence Zarathustra has learned how to give so that
others can receive, and in receiving give in return. Al-
though these men are not yet his "proper companions," the
gratitude he has received in the form of a new strange-
ness, a new gayness, a new strength for friendship in the
higher men has made him radiate most brilliantly.
Zarathustra has learned to give out of gratitude and to
reap the fruits of this giving.
The art of right giving then we learn from
Zarathustra is an art in which Herrschsucht
, the lust to
rule, finds particular expression. it is a way of
responding to others that is not a tyrannical commanding
nor a spineless adaptation to them - both of which ex-
tinguish the possibility of diversity (Vieldeutigkeit)
.
Yet it is a giving gua ruling of something, a giving
which, as an effort to constitute others as capable of
friendship, has a distinctive ethical content. Nietzsche
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purposefully assimilates gift-giving and ruling - concepts
which we tend to oppositionally juxtapose to one another.
I should like now to return directly to Zarathustra
'
s
teaching of the "friend and his overflowing heart" to show
the contours of the very particular ethical life Nietzsche
gestures towards in this gift-giving gua ruling which I
have called the exemplary ethos.
3. The Friend
The obvious contrast Nietzsche wishes to draw is with
Christian-based ethics - to love thy neighbor as thyself -
which he sees as an assimilative, pitying, leveling kind
of love. in so contrasting, Nietzsche emphasizes the
"strangerliness" of friends. As the first intimate rela-
tionship outside the family, friends are drawn to one an-
other by an admiring fascination with this strangerliness
amidst similarity. Bound by a different authority or bond
than that found in the family or in the neighborly rela-
tion, both of which have strong dimensions of coercion be-
cause they are not freely chosen relationships, the
friendship is held together by mutual admiration in which
a kind of mutual aesthetic provocation constantly occurs.
This is a provocation in which each attempts to provoke
the other to find himself in the excellence of the other,
but a provocation whose end cannot be assimilation lest
the very strangerliness upon which the relationship is
premised be destroyed. As a model for ethical life,
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Nietzsche finds in friendship that relationship which re-
quires and thrives upon the distance that divides us, a
relationship in which each is quickened by the difference
of the other, in which the strange quality of this dif-
ference constitutes the authoritative bond. The overflow-
ing love of the friend is a love this strangerliness.
In contrast to neighborly love, the love of the
friend is a creating love in Nietzsche's view. All great
love, he says, wants to create the beloved."8 But how oan
we create the friend as someone whose beauty recalls us
from the labyrinth of ourselves? what can creating the
friend as the beloved mean? What can this ruling qua
giving be? It is a paradoxical ruling whose aim is to in-
fluence the other to gather the strength necessary for
creative self-formation, for giving herself her own ap-
propriate style, "yet for a self-formation which remains
"ruled by- the painful "distance that divides us." That
is, which remains within the ethical horizon of the ex-
emplary ethos, a horizon constituted by love for this
strangerliness, this distance.
To that end we must continuously engender this
strangerliness in our efforts at self-formation. The
friend accomplishes this through exhibiting a kind of pas-
sionate restraint. Nietzsche says we must have a hot
heart and a cold spirit. We must be intoxicated with the
possibility each being possesses of making of themselves a
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beautiful garden. This must be . blinding ^
we must retain a cold spirit for the ability to carry out
this passion for others' self-formation. We must be
capable of withstanding, as Zarathustra withstood, the
trial of pity for the suffering others must undergo in
their efforts at self
-format ion. Thus the "good solitude-
is a being-with-others in which we retain the strength to
honor the abyss which yawns between friend and friend as a
beautiful agony. m "On the Friend" in Zarathustra,
Nietzsche warns earnestly against going naked before the
friend. "You cannot groom yourself too beautifully for
the friend. "50 To this end we must retain a sweet and
delicate, but almost hidden compassion, hidden, as
Zarathustra counsels, under a hard shell. 51 We must go
close to the friend, but not oyer to him, 52 that is# we
must respond, but with hardness. m a powerful few words
Nietzsche captures the essence of this overflowing love
whose spirit is hard.
"But if you have a suffering friend, be a
resting place for his suffering, but a hardbed at the same time, a field cot. Thus
will you profit him best. "53
The delicate compassion of the overflowing love of
the friend is a compassion for the creative potential in
each of us. in learning to be guided by a creating love
which attentively exhibits the self, we learn to shine for
others, even for those we may despise. We learn,
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Nietzsche says, to feel better joys ,54 for we foregQ
directly trying to influence which always
, to some
relies on shaming, shaming is a response to another's
difference or perceived weakness which dwells upon it - in
Pity or in moral admonition. it is a "love- or "concern"
which actually disables the other by constituting them
through their apparent inadequacy. Thus, as a form of
ruling which aims at influence by example, the exemplary
ethos embodies the awareness that our particular vision
must be partial, perspectival
, and hence we comport
towards others so that they are not swallowed by revenge
against our active shaming of them. Because it is not a
preaching or a boring stare into another's strength of
soul born of Truth or Reason, it "creates" the possibility
for the other to behold the beauty and excellence of the
exemplar with pleasure, to be constructively inspired.
The central aspect of this beauty and hence the essence of
what proves authoritative about it for ethical life is the
strength precisely to form around the awareness of this
perspectival nature of ones own vision. It is the ex-
emplification of this strength which makes it possible for
others to receive or, as Nietzsche polemically put it, to
"obey" the new distance that divides us," and in so doing,
to receive from our example inspiration for their own
self-formation, their own self-shining.
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em-
Thus as the art if commanding, right giving as
bodied in the exemplary friend is a giving which^ ^
possible for the receiver to receive, and it is a creating
love in that it helps enable the other to for- herself.
Vet there is a further sense in which this love is creat-
ing, for it makes possible a life that "cuts into itself
with its own agony [and thereby] increases knowledge. -55
The social-ethical relations the exemplar constitutes
through this creating love increase knowledge. Recall
that the metaphor for the exemplar is a garden with high
walls, but_also with a hospitable gate, a portal to the
world the exemplar must retain not only so that others may
pass through to behold the beauty of the garden, but also
that the exemplar may behold different others, other gar-
dens. The creating love of the exemplar depends upon en-
counters with different others whose distinctiveness,
whose strangerliness places our own selves in question in
such a way that they "cut into the self." without this
ability to encounter the
-sharp edges" of another, knowl-
edge itself, as the capacity to creatively reveal and
renew ourselves and the world by attaining different per-
spectives, is not possible. In this final sense then, the
ethos of the exemplar is an ethos in which the questioning
wonder which is the foundation of our civilization is
renewed, for in the effort to transfigure "the distance
that divides us," we come to see that it is precisely this
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wonder which is the source o f our ability to establish
selves as creative, world revealing beings.
The exemplary ethos is an ethos which celebrates and
even aims to engender the cleft between man and man be-
cause it is the si^^^ of our abil . ty tQ encounfcer
different others and to take genuine pleasure in ourselves
as creative beings. m being so engendere(J an<J displayed
in the tissue of human relations the agony of the cleft is
transfigured, made beautiful, for we are, in the exemplary
friend struck with awe at the strength required for
sustaining the tension of this creating love in which the
"creation" of difference is essential to ones own
identity, what binds us together under the horizon of the
exemplar is admiration for the beauty displayed in the
strength to give life, to give life space to this
strangerliness, to this wonder at the "rich ambiguity of
existence. It is this beauty which is authoritative,
which has form-giving force. Hence in Zarathustra
,
when
life reveals that her secret is that "alles lebendiges 1st
ein Gehorchendes," "all that lives is an obeying, -56 the
obedience we must come to love is the commanding authority
of this beauty. It is this Nietzsche thought must con-
stitute our amor fati .
But does this ethos contain any limiting principles?
Does it affirm all differences as instances of the crea-
222
tive forgiving powers of man? Are there ethically cQn.
structing prinoiples which could further give shape to a
life shared in common?
The central constructive principle embedded in the
ethos of the exemplar which could form the basis for dis-
criminating between kinds, of differences allowable is that
everyone has the right to creative self-unfolding so long
as it does not only not transgress other's ability to the
same, but that it enable it. That is, the ethos of the
exemplar is guided by the principle that in our imposition
of form, in our "lust to rule," we impose in such a way
that we inspire others to their own creative self-
formation, and in so doing help give form to the plurality
of things which keep our own creative questioning alive.
Those ways of revealing the world which attempt to herd
others into a mass (in which category Nietzsche included
Wagner's music and Napoleon's commanding, among others,
and we would certainly include Hitler's totalitarian rule,
but also modern normalizing disciplinary power which, on
Foucault's persuasive reading, sustains the productive ap-
paratus in the West, among others), collapse the tension
which the form-giving forces of human beings must sustain
if we are to creatively renew, through questioning after
our own meaning, our forms of life and hence endow them
with legitimacy and enduring life.
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on this reading of Niet 2sche< s ethical thinking a
conception of justice emerges which would ground rights
not in reason, transcendental order, or God, hut in the
creative self-forming world revealing capacities of human
beings. The questions who are we and what is good we
would fundamentally answer with the following: we are
questioning, creating beings whose excellence, whose
"good" is manifest in our world revealing capacities.
Vet is this really Nietzsche? isn't this a sanitized
version? There is so often, at the very least, a fierce-
ness to Nietzsche's characterization of this wonder, and
in talking about the friend it is critical that the friend
also be capable of being our enemy, what are we to make
of this? I would like to anticipate these objections with
the help of an essay by the naturalist-philosopher Barry
Lopez, and argue that in Nietzsche's best moments, where
he is most illuminating, this fierceness must be un-
derstood in terms of sustaining tension, not conquering
collapse.
In "The Passing Wisdom of Birds," Lopez reflects on
the deliberate incineration by Cortez and his men, on June
16, 1520, of the beautiful aviaries of the Aztecs in Mexi-
co City. 57 He recounts the wonder at the gardens and
aviaries the Spaniards expressed in entries in their
diaries carefully made in the months prior to the con-
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flagration of the r-i-t-w u~n c ty. He suggests that the nature of
this wonder is the one we too share.
abL'patrerns^huMan^6"06 fr°" predict"
to them Tn%hf desl9n that draws us
universe we are abie to bUt related
farlrv-we^
91^ ^ ol t^ST
pattern »5?
eC°3"^- With astonishment, a new
He goes on to suggest we must ouitivate this sense of
nystery as a counter to incineration and conquest, "to see
that the possibilities for expression of life in any en-
vironment.
. .are larger than we can predict, and that this
is all right... to encounter a wild animal is to know the
defeat of thought, to feel reason overpowered. -59 We must
learn, he says, that a return to a state of awe with na-
ture does not threaten our intellectual capacity to ana-
lyze complex events.
It is something like this cultivation of the wild, of
mystery, a self-conscious effort to live in such a way
that we are able to experience the wild in ourselves and
in each other that Nietzsche in his best moments attempts
both to exemplify and articulate; to have his readers ex-
perience in his voice and to hear in the form of reason.
Through his efforts to discern in what ways the mystery of
our new metaphysical solitude could be celebrated,
Nietzsche was led at his best, to appreciate that to em-
brace our originality we must paradoxically cultivate this
wildness within a life shared in common.
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The metaphors he uses to express i-hi«this sense of wild-
ness and mystery are evi-r^^^Y xtraordinary and extreme, and often
appear more to form a seamless continuity with the in-
cendiary congesting character of modernity than to con-
Dure a different ethos. In interpreting an instance of
such extremity
- an expanded version of the passage from
whence I drew Nietzsche's definition of freedom - I would
like to explore and situate this fierceness within the ex-
emplary ethos in terms of the aesthetic
^conceptualiza-
tions of freedom equality and justice which, on this read-
ing, Nietzsche's work suggests. These are conceptions
which, though they rely fundamentally on reason, also
"know the defeat of thought, feel reason overpowered."
That is to say, they rest on a cultivation of the wild.
"For what is freedom? That one has the will
^
S
H
lf
;
reSP°nSibility- That preservesthe distance that divides.
. .The free mantis
^JfiF*?*" " H°W is freedom ^asured, in in-
whlch'h^ t
S
H
n nations? By the resistanceich has o be overcome, by the efforts itcosts tp^Jay_alpft. One would have to seekthe highest type of free man where thegreatest resistance is constantly beina
overcome: five steps from tyranny, near thethreshold of danger of servitude." 60
In this passage on freedom Nietzsche suggests we must
preserve the distance that divides so that we can contend
with others in such a way that we make something of our-
selves
- a possibility he suggests only arises under con-
ditions of danger of some sort. This danger is that pre-
sented by strong others in whose presence we are "five
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steps fro* tyranny, very near the threshold of servitude »
If we thin, these two thoughts together: to maintain the
distance that divides, and to place ourselves on the
threshold of tyranny and servitude - it beccnes evident
that in order that „e ma intain our freedom i„ NietZsche's
vre„, we ourselves mUst not become tyrants or ma.ce ser-
vants of others, for in so doing we would "incinerate" the
distance that divides. But what to raake of the language
of Uebe^indung, of overling? if we eltamine the
Nietzsche uses to illustrate this state <=cm of freedom I think
it becomes clear that overcoming also must not be un-
derstood as tyrannical destruction or domination. The ex-
ample he gives is from psychology, where he says the high-
est type exercises maximum authority and discipline when
contending with tyrannical instincts. Finest type -
Julius Caesar. what is critical about this example is
that in order to be this "finest type," the very force
tyrannical instincts present us with must not be ex-
tinguished, but used, channeled. Our freedom requires
that we not only not neutralize them, but that we
cultivate these "unruly tyrants."
To extrapolate from the psychological realm then, it
is in the tension produced by strong others, strong indi-
viduals that our freedom flourishes. The strength to
maintain this sense for the wild, this distance that di-
vides, constitutes what is noble in human beings, for it
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^ants a *ind of difficulfc ^^^^ ^the basis o£ an appreciation bofch
nnitude
ones own perspectivally confined existence, but also for
the fact that it is the very existence of the „i ld itself
which generates what has Uf. force in our experience A
just society, on this reading, is one which organi.es it-
self around this aesthetic cultivation o, the wild, this
questioning wonder without which individual freed™ cannot
flourish. Its social and political principles would be
ordered around this excellence, within this aesthetic un-
derstanding of justice material well-being, adoration
politics would have thpir rvi u. 4 . ,n e place, but they would be bounded
and defined by this socially recognized value of cultiva-
ting the wild, of "trembling with the craving and rapture
of such questioning," and not by some kind of promise of
rectification for human existence.
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CHAPTER IV
INTERLUDE
Siqh
.
-I caught this insiaht «™quickly seized the ra^hefpoor WordHh^
flv%w
10SeSt
-
t0 hand to ifc down les? it
tlL
aWay
."gain
'
And now ^ has died ofhese arid words and shakes and flaps inthem
- and I hardly know anymore when I i onvat it how I could ever have felt sowhen I caught this bird. 1 3PPY
Melancholy aspiration. Sorry backward glance that
tells us Nietzsche knows that no seizing effort at
identity, no effort to "pin it down" will keep the bird's
heart on beat. Yet Nietzsche knows too that we, as creat-
ing beings, must make effort with words to give positive
shape to our momentary insights, that we must form some
kind of particular relationship to the bird on wing. The
Aztecs built aviaries. Cortez incinerated. I have sug-
gested that in his best moments Nietzsche urges us, like
Barry Lopez, to "cultivate the wild," to develop an
aesthetic sensibility. That is, he urges us to develop an
appreciation for the fact that for a thing to endure as a
living entity
- be it a thought, person, or a cultural-
political form of life - our relationship to it must be
infused with a certain tension, a certain space for its
wild alteritas. Insofar as this tension is sustained,
that which gives a form its endurance, its vitality can be
sustained.
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done. And amidst the effort- • -i -.ort to illuminate the construc-
tive dimensions of Nietzsrhp'cx c e s thought, we must admit he
does this damage aqain and ana iny y<n again. m speaking of the
overman, to aive hnf nf10g but one of many, many possible examples,
he writes,
cne leveled," a feeling of distance from£2 mSS Sta"- S °n the™' he l^es off teem
ture.»2
g r arlstocracy is that of the fu-
What are We to make of these two discrepant voices
and this backward sighing insight? I think we approach an
answer if we become clear about the essential standpoint
from which Nietzsche's reflections on culture and politics
flowed, namely, the standpoint of the solitary philoso-
pher. By this I mean that his fundamental concern was
with preserving the questioning life of the mind, a life
which in Nietzsche's thinking is almost entirely devoid of
the need for the presence of others for its quality and
its sustenance. In this sense his concern was not unlike
Plato's. And his concern, again not unlike Plato's, was
with the predicament of the life of the mind at a time
when the very ground of thought, that which gathers,
directs and gives solidity to the thinking activity, was
being lost, it is then from within the dilemmas posed in
a post-metaphysical condition for thinking
, traditionally
understood, that Nietzsche approached and demarcated and
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illuminated the problems posed by "the death of God" for
action and practice, for politics and culture.
The consequences are both enormously illuminating as
well as enormously limited. Illuminating because, since
there is some Kind o, interdependent relationship between
the world of thought and that o, practice, Nietzsche's ef-
fort to situate the life of the mind in the world of
chacs, flux, and finitude - in distinct reaction to the
tradition in which the life of the mind is severed from
this confusion, freed for the contemplation of eternal es-
sences
- opened up space for critique so extraordinary
that it further threw all settled opinions into doubt.
But Nietzsche's thought was limited by the fact that the
central drama remained for him that of the solitary phi-
losopher who, in a post-metaphysical age must learn to em-
brace with parodic honesty and with gratitude the in-
evitably imperfect nature of his thought-products. As a
consequence when he turned to reflect on political-
cultural life and in particular on authority and on jus-
tice, he encountered the following dilemma. It is quite
possible for those concerned with thinking and artistic
creation to take a parodic and ironic relationship to
their own creations, to suffer this pain of finitude like
a "great tragedian," reveling even in the spectacle of
their own struggles; to take enormous pleasure and derive
substantial form-giving force from the insubstantiality
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and unending quality of this drama. Vet it is quite an-
other order of difficulty to found a society, a political-
cultural order on the celebration of irony and parody.
There are two possible alternatives Nietzsche predom-
inately sees in response to this dilemma. One can retain
a nihilistic continuation of the present in which the ex-
perimental democratic spirit is bound, and in which though
there be no horizon, one pretends to a distanced objec-
tivity from which vantage point real engagement with the
world is not possible. The result is susceptibility to
fakirs and tyrants such as Wagner in whose drama the self
can be reunited in a seamless comforting whole. The
result then is an infinitely adaptable self and tyranny
which together pass for freedom and community.
This is the insidious form of tyranny. The other
alternative Nietzsche sees is the incendiary voice - a
tyranny whose virtue is that it is at least forthright,
and which therefore Nietzsche seems to prefer out of a
commitment to honesty, m this alternative, in order that
the few strong enough to take aesthetic pleasure in great
tra-gedy can do so, it is necessary that they "stand upon"
the herd who are too weak for this draught of pleasure.
And here Nietzsche makes a nitch for himself in that long-
standing philosophical tradition which sees a strict
dichotomy between freedom and necessity to which Nietzsche
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added his own justification in the form of the strong and
the weak.
This is the division of the world of possibility un-
der post-metaphysical conditions which usually occurred
when Nietzsche turned his thoughts from the predicament of
the solitary activity of thinking and artistic creation to
the world of politics and culture. it is the standpoint
of the solitary philosopher as artistic maker then which I
think accounts for the persistent disjuncture between, on
the one hand, Nietzsche's philosophical radicalism - by
which I mean his effort to think without the ground of
Truth and enduring essences and his concomitant philosoph-
ical embrace of multiplicity and difference, and on the
other, his overt political and cultural reflections which
are fundamentally and frighteningly tyrannical.
However, as I have argued through my development of
the exemplary ethos, there are moments when Nietzsche
grasps a conception of authority that is neither insidious
nor overt tyranny. in moments he has insights into a
cultivation of the wild within the context of interrela-
tions between persons, insights which could and I think
should inform our thinking on cultural and political life
under post-metaphysical conditions since they encompass
the condition of contingency and plurality at the heart of
the human world yet do not usher in relativity and lack of
standards. That is to say Nietzsche gestures towards the
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IIS
im-
possibility of an ethical horizon which could sustain a
thinking between persons (dialogue)
, not a thinking alone
possible in solitude. And it is this voice that is Most
insightful and of most interest to us, as X have argued,
in searching for a conception of authority and justice in
a post-metaphysical age.
Still, there are serious limitations to even thi
constructive voice of Nietzsche's. Perhaps the most
portant one has to do with his lack of an appreciation for
the tremendous aesthetic pleasure of being side-by-side
with our fellow humans in the sense that you are with me;
that we stand together, moved by the same cultural or nat-
ural thing; pleasure in finding ourselves similarly
provoked. There is a sweet anticipation of concord as we
think to share the world that moves us with others; we
take tremendous pleasure in this desire and in its ful-
fillment. Yet such harmonious concord must not, and here
is Nietzsche's insight, be the only way we take aesthetic
pleasure in each other. Nietzsche would have us dis-
cover/cultivate the pleasure of the excitement and fear
that our anticipation of disaccord and difference genera-
tes. It is this pleasure of aesthetic provocation
Nietzsche almost exclusively explores - in contrast and
perhaps in reaction to the philosophical tradition.
It may be that the reactive quality of Nietzsche's
thinking in this regard, that is, his failure to positive-
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ly explore identity or a beinn-^jn,y o g with aua concord, is acute-
ly bound up with the increasing and eventually ex-
traordinary solitary and lonely l ife he himself came ^
lead. And this Must be thought in terms of a personal
life in which friends were precious few and never ade-
quate; in which "home" or "place" was a perpetual parade
of inns and boarding houses; in terms of political exile;
and in terms of a simultaneous distancing of his reflec-
tions from any specific cultural and political institu-
tions and practices. Insofar- p. c -i-k«i orar as the equivocal dialogue of
the solitary is arrested by the "third person" as
Nietzsche himself suqqests in t-h^ d>-~i «yy he Prologue to Zarathusl-.T-*
,
others restore a certain wholeness and identity to the
self and a certain necessary confidence in a world shared
in common, however incomplete and subject to change this
may in fact be. And it may be that though Nietzsche knew
this enough to articulate it, his own life had so at-
tenuated his confidence in such a world that it entered
only episodically into his philosophical and political
reflections
.
However that may be, Nietzsche's neglect of the
aesthetic pleasure we take in concord, and of a world
shared in common cannot of course be understood outside
the context of his analysis of nihilism and his sense of
talking into a void. Any bases upon which a common form
of life might be established under these conditions must
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be utterly different, new For fhic
,
. t t s reason we find in
^thustra, the work in which in my view Nietzsche is
most consistently constructive with respect to the pos-
sibility of a coMon ethos under post-metaphysical condi-
tions, that the figure embodying this ethos is a prophet.
Zarathustra is no normal person; these no normal times.
He is a person who comes and goes, who lives high on a
mountain in a cave with semi-wild animals for companions.
He is a solitary, not a political being. He is fundamen-
tally outside the city. still, he goes into the city and
there tries, through his example, to constitute a "we" of
a certain kind; to constitute, by example, a particular
kind of power or capability in others such that they are
able to bear up to their times. Politically this means
that they have the strength to speak to a we that is al-
ways not yet a we; that is never entirely constituted
since under post-metaphysical conditions there can be no
ground for so being. Politically this means not treating
"the settled" as True, not seeking to ground it in this
way. Politically this means searching to ground order not
in Truth but in a different kind of authority.
Zarathustra is a prophet who tries to teach with truth,
yet the truth he teaches is that there can be no Truth.
He is a different kind of prophet; one whose truth allows
him to learn, to be surprised by the world, to be filled,
despite his wisdom, with wonder. And this precisely is
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the source of Zarathustra
' s authority, that, having with-
stood the trial of pity, he can treat his fellow humans as
equals, suffering the pathos of distance that allows him
to let them cut into him with the sharp edge of their dif-
ference, their otherness. And it is this ability to
celebrate the difference of others and the diversity of
being which forms the radiating quality of life and which
Nietzsche gestures towards as the new foundation for
authority and authoritative action in a post-metaphysical
condition. Politically Nietzsche suggests to us that we
must have, under these new conditions, a prophetic, in-
spirational dimension to political discourse and action in
order that the norms, standards, traditions we develop
endure as living things; in order that they maintain the
ability to speak to a we that is in perpetual potential
re-constitution
.
What we find in Nietzsche then in the way of positive
limitations and commitments is not only the imposition the
artist must experience as s/he limits and shapes, through
long discipline, the multiplicity of her being. Not only
do we explore with Nietzsche the necessity of such imposi-
tion on the individual as artist in order to create some-
thing worthy. We also find in the exemplar a form of
power that imposes, not through tyranny but through
provocation and display of excellence, provocation pos-
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sible only through resolute refusal to pity and to assimi -
late others to ourselves.
Still, we must consider whether this kind of tragedy
lived by the exemplar exhausts the nature of imposition
necessary for political community. The most persistent
and problematic omission in all of Nietzsche's thought as
it pertains to political-cultural life is a failure to
turn his thought directly to what positive institutional
affirmations
- broadly understood to include laws, con-
stitutional arrangements, practices and beliefs - might
bind a culture together forming shared horizons and con-
stituting traditions. m this sense too Nietzsche's
thought is "reactive" for, though he proclaimed the death
of God, he also foresaw this death taking place for some
200 years, and he was preoccupied with hastening it. in
his view this meant bringing nihilism to its full conclu-
sion, a preoccupation which must engage active nihilists
for decades to come. This meant that while, as I have
claimed in chapter one, his primary and ultimate aims were
formative and constructive, there was yet a lot of un-
dermining to be done. To paraphrase Arendt, Nietzsche, in
choosing this strategy, is enormously illuminating, but
insufficiently constructive; capable of great radicaliza-
tion but not a new beginning; still bound to though (or
perhaps because) rebelling against the conceptual categor-
ies of the philosophical tradition. 3
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I think it is evident that this is So if we consider
that Mm-m^, Nietzsche's most interesting and politi-
cally insightful writing offers us nothing faintly aKin to
a meditation on political institutions. Egually to the
Point are Nietzsche's critiques of modern political in-
stitutions which, as I have argued, cohere around the con-
tention that they all desire to eradicate suffering and
that they all demand equal rights which Nietzsche equates
with a leveling demand for sameness. As such, they all
embody the quintessential^ modern spirit: the morality of
Pity, a morality whose basic impulse runs directly
counter, once again, to the aesthetic sensibility
Nietzsche sought to cultivate. In my discussion of
Nietzsche's critique of the women's movement for emancipa-
tion, emblematic in his view of modern political forms, we
see Nietzsche display an enormous capacity for ironic play
which cleverly deconstructs the notion of the eternally
feminine while simultaneously deriding as clerks and
borifiers those who argue strictly for equal rights - in
both their bourgeois and socialist forms. Certainly it is
clear that Nietzsche is suggesting an end to the bourgeois
state, yet, though through his constant dodging he chal-
lenges the comfortable and usual contours of the debate
and in so doing is not un-illuminating, the extent to
which he both caricatures and hence simplifies the aspira-
tions behind the movement for emancipation, and fails to
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wrestle with the question what should we struggle for,
leads to a certain sterility amidst much parodic and
'
ironic fun. why didn't, one is pressed to ask of this
serious thinker, he actively engage in sustained debate
with the women's movement over the notion of equality they
were arguing for? Likewise for democrats and socialists.
Why did he not more carefully study the philosophical
dimensions of these movements? Why did he not bring his
thought about the friend, equality and the importance of
the "distance that divides" to bear explicitly and in
terms of political philosophy and political action on
these contemporary political movements?
We have reached in Nietzsche's thought an impasse.
It haunts his work, particularly if one wishes to read him
as a political philosopher and claim him as part of that
tradition. One can try to explain this impasse by point-
ing out, as Bergman has, that Nietzsche was an aristocrat
who feared the Paris Commune, who hardly seriously read a
socialist in his life, etc. so that his radicalism was
caught within the confines of an aristocratic sensibility
making him an aristocratic radical. And one can argue, as
I have, that Nietzsche's singular failure in his sole ef-
fort to really practice politics in any sense - Wagnerian
culture-politics
- turned his concerns away from direct
practice to epistemological
,
metaphysical, and ontological
problems that made most contemporary political practice in
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Nietzsche's view futile
. And^^ ^ ^forts to parodio irony and deconstructive evas . ons ^
shake up further-er, as an active nihilist, the already crum-
bling roots of modern society Or ono
' ° e can argue as I did
above, following in part Arendt's lead that th. Iu
'
-na e impasse
also has »re fundamental roots. That is, that it is
rooted in a preoocupation with the life of the mind, tra-
ditionally understood, and that this central concern
defines and structures the options Nietzsche perceives in
the world of political practice. m this sense we would
see Nietzsche as a transitiona! figure with regard to the
tradition of political philosophy - on the one hand re-
jecting the world of eternal truth as the home of the life
of the mind, on the other, viewing the world of politics
and action solely from the vantage point of the contempla-
tive life
I believe all three efforts at explanation are in
different ways illuminating. More important with regard
to my concerns however than developing a convincing expla-
nation for this impasse is to point to the fact that while
we must reject the perhaps dominant voice in Nietzsche
with regard to an aesthetic conception of justice, there
is another conception still firmly within the critique of
the morality of pity. The first conception goes something
like
- since the herd are not strong enough to live in a
world with no Truth in any way worthy of life, the strong
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who are able to thrive ana have, even in this tragic
state, gratitude for life, should stand on the backs of
the weak, enslave them that at least so»e may answer well
the
-hammer blows of necessity." This would be just.
This is clearly a strong voice in Nietzsche. Yet the
other conception of justice to which I have alluded in
chapter three is, it seems to me, by far the more inter-
esting and fertile ground for thought about authority and
justice in our times.
It is with the aim of further developing this other
conception of justice which also is aesthetic in nature
that I will turn momentarily to the work of Hannah Arendt,
for Arendt must be understood, on my reading, as the heir
to this voice of Nietzsche's. Arendt takes Nietzsche's
tragic aesthetic insight that in order for things to
endure as living things they need to be infused with ten-
sion born of questioning, and tries to situate it in terms
of institutions, practices, and worldliness more persis-
tently than Nietzsche was able. Arendt asked the ques-
tions Nietzsche failed to and thus avoided his impasse.
This I believe leads her to confront more interestingly
than Nietzsche the problems for an essentially aesthetic
approach to politics, to the problem of authority and to
justice. And she does so as a preeminently and self-
consciously political philosopher by which I mean, follow-
ing her formulations, one concerned about the world in its
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plurality and relativity and „„t alr , no alone as it concerns the
solitary philosopher.
If Nietzsche's efforts to elaborate an ethical
horizon and an understanding of authority on the basis of
which political life in a post-metaphysical age could be
ordered lapse either into tyranny, on the one hand, or a
very interesting elaboration of the nature of such rela-
tions as they might exist between two persons, but an
elaboration which nevertheless fails to rigorously address
itself to sustained political concerns, on the other,
Arendt both articulates this aesthetic sensibility and
subjects it in a sustained manner to political concerns.
The second half of this dissertation, assuming a vast ter-
rain of shared sensibilities between Arendt and Nietzsche,
seeks to explore how Arendt fares in the effort to
"cultivate the wild," to sustain this bird in flight which
Nietzsche, with such melancholy, in his most luminous mo-
ments knows he largely fails.
In chapter four I will be concerned with elaborating
Arendt 's critique of modernity which centers around its
process character and the lament, similar to Nietzsche's,
that it is distinguished by its inability to give specific
form and stability to cultural-political life. in chapter
five I will be concerned with articulating the aesthetic
foundations of Arendt 's thought which I will tie closely
to her ontology, and in chapter six with developing the
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conceptions of authoritv =.«^ * jy and of justice which emerge from
her work.
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CHAPTER V
ARENDT'S CRITIQUE OF THE MODERN
A. Introdunt j r>n
in C^volution, Arendt conjectured that to the
backward glance of those in the future it may become ap-
parent that "what we call revolution is precisely the
^msitpj^^ which brings abQut the Qf a ^
secular real,. »1 (emphasis mine) And in B^twe^st^nd
Future, she writes, "it could be that only now will the
past open up to us with unexpected freshness and tell us
things no one has yet had ears to hear.»2 The WQrldly
reference points for both thoughts were the events and ex-
periences of totalitarianism and the first atomic explo-
sions which in her view marked the real and absolute break
with tradition and the advent politically of the modern
world. This Arendt distinguishes from the onset of the
modern age beginning in the 17th century and lasting up
until that absolute break - a time in which the thread of
tradition was no longer able to provide a reliable guide
to the past and hence signposts for the present or for the
future. This age was consequently marked by instability
and political experimentation in the effort to find a new
foundation for political order, for political authority.
The absolute break with tradition which marks the ad-
vent of the modern world, forces upon us ever more urgent-
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ly in Arendt's view the task of listenlng to the past^
new ears for clues ana hints about the foundations for a
new political order. Arendt's critics of the modern age
coalesce around her efforts to he a midwife to the^
aE^aecloruM she thought could, with effort, appear.
The fundamental concern which guides Arendt in her
critique is the process character of the modern age in
which human life appears to be a function of natural in-
exorable processes which strip all individual acts and
considerations of their dignity, power and place. 3 Tnis
notion of process is conceptually coterminous with what I
have referred to in my discussion of Nietzsche as the lack
of form, the inability to form, despite a driving win to
mastery and imposition in modernity. indeed Nietzsche's
lament that modernity lacks "gestaltende Kraefte" - forces
which shape, form, and give structure - finds direct echo
in Arendt <s metaphorical characterization of the type of
pemanence the modern age has developed: that of process
rather than that of stable structure." Moreover, as in
Nietzsche, in Arendt too I think we find a particularly
post-metaphysical aesthetic sensibility at play as she
works on this task of building the conceptual foundations
for a stable structure, for a different kind of permanence
and for a novus ordo saeclorum. In particular they share
an impulse basic to this sensibility - that to achieve
something of beauty whose excellence gives it "the right"
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ce
nie.
to be saved from the obscurity „*of time requires sustaining
some kinds of creative tensions, tensions which inevitably
involve suffering i,^^. They share^ g i
"ill argue, an aesthetic approach to questions of justi
in a noyu^a^^^. And they^ ^^ ^
see this capacity to sustain tensions as central to the
durability of a for, of life as something with lifa. They
both suggest that the durability and permanence (which in
political terms means the authority) of a political struc-
ture in our post-metaphysical condition depends in criti-
cal ways upon the space within that form of life for, in
Nietzsche's case questioning wonder, and in Arendt's! for
the capacity for initiative and the capacity to think from
the standpoint of others. They share, as I will argue
, an
aesthetic approach to the problem of authority in a noyus
ordo saeclornm.
In Arendt's work however, this sensibility is largely
implicit. What I wish to do in these chapters on Arendt
is to draw out the aesthetic sensibility which I think is
both the ever present implicit comportment she takes
towards the world in her reflections, and which also ex-
plicitly informs much of her reflection on the bios
politikos
,
particularly with respect to justice and
authority.
There are however, important qualitative differences
in their aesthetic understandings which I want now briefly
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to adumbrate, and which win fae further eiabQrated ^CO"in9 ChaPterS
- ~ «*• * —ition and the Mod.m A96
'"
that ^ V°iCeS
-
«- three modern thinkers who
-re the first to dare to think ^ ^
any tradition . Marx
, ^
_ ^ ^
overly loud and pathetic in c1-„i =P n u style, making it difficult for
us to listen to them. If this is „Qt altogether true z
think Arendt wrote these words to coax our hearing to hear
them so
-
and in some important sense she was right to do
so. With respect to my concern - the differences in the
aesthetic dimensions of Nietzsche and Arendt 's thought
she is on target for, as I have suggested in the Inter-
lude, Nietzsche's thought was still to a great extent a
reaction to traditional metaphysics' rejection of the
mundane, sensuous, disordered world and its embrace of the
eternal quietude of Truth. This reactive quality holds
Nietzsche's critique within the framework of the terms of
that against which he reacts. m his aesthetics this
manifests itself in his placing the self as an artist who
is intoxicated with perfection of his own making at the
center of his conceptualization of the tragic beauty of
human life. what Nietzsche's artist must develop the
trength or courage for is the cruel disappointment that
"is perfection is an elusive dream, never attainable, yet
e which must be pursued. And it is this cruelty he must
ffirm as tragically beautiful. The terms he uses in this
s
th
on
a
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light are most significant. This ia a s£ml^ ^^
suffer and bear if we are to embrace life. To do so, to
be sure, Nietzsche argues we must become "genuine spec-
tators," those who can delight in such cruelty; but
cruelty
-
a cruel fate - it remains. mdeed, it is barely
endurable.
I think we find a qualitative movement in Arendt's
aesthetic reflections with respect to suffering and
cruelty. Although, in Arendt's view, there is much in
life that must be born or suffered by being artistically
transfigured, Nietzsche's understanding of this trans-
figuration as "spiritualized cruelty" remains foreign to
her way of thinking. And this is not I think because she
is a "softer" more "romantic" thinker. it is as if
Nietzsche's, at the time, solitary and heroic effort to
accept the end to the dream of the metaphysical world of
true Being remains a sort of endless Sysphean task in
which he is condemned forever to push the boulder to the
top of the hill, only to give out at the last moment.
Hence we see the figure of the artist striving for perfec-
tion, ever disappointed, developing a laughing but cruelly
tragic perspective on the situation to which he has been
condemned in order to compensate.
It is this dimension of compensation rustling
eternally in the shadows of Nietzsche's thinking which is
finally I think stilled in Arendt's work. The figure at
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the center of Arenas aesthetics is the
..Man- of action
who, as a subject with its twofold meaning of actor ^
sufferer is first and foremost a subject t^^^, a
political being in the broadest of senses who experiences
as perhaps the basic nature of his art the unpredictable
quality of all action, and hence the futility of efforts
to be its sovereign. Off only a little from center stage
there are other figures
- the spectators, those who alone
can complete the action begun by the actor by telling the
story, giving it meaning, fitting it into a coherent
whole. It is only with this completion Arendt argues that
there is reconciliation in a world fundamentally inhabited
by many distinct and unique but essentially related
beings. Arendt <s frame of reference is from beginning to
end human events, plurality and meaning, as Nietzsche's is
human perfection (works)
, singularity and truth. And in
this light it is important to note that it is the metaphor
of the theatre which rules Arendt <s political theory, for
it is only in the theatre as she says that that art "whose
sole subject is man in his relationship to others" is
practiced. 5
The aesthetic sensibility Arendt develops and wishes
to cultivate in her readers is a pleasure in man in the
plural, what she refers to in her essay on Lessing as
"tragic pleasure." 6 What is pleasing, what is beautiful,
and therefore reconciles is to bear witness to the courage
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of those „ho "take upon themselves the naked fact of our
givenness,- acting into a world of distinct others in the
effort to hoth establish relations and tear apart others
under conditions of extraordinary uncertainty and open-
ness, in so bearing witness, in so seeing, we undergo a
process of recognition of what has occurred, o, knowing,
and hence we come to see a waning available only where
there are actors and spectators who share a c«o„ stage.
There is no question here of mastering the past, mastering
events or creations. About events she writes, "The best
that can be achieved is to know precisely what it was, and
to endure this knowledge, and then to wait and see what
comes of knowing and enduring." 7
The promise, along with coherency and understanding
in the form of a story through which we experience a
tragic pleasure, is an "intensified awareness of
reality. "8 There is a constant concern in Arendt's work
with what is dead while alive, with the contrast between
life and mere life. To give but one of many possible ex-
amplSS
'
in
-
The Origins of TotaUtarianlsm, she writes that
the logical consequence of "unlimited expansion," the cen-
tral principle of the imperialist body politic, "is the
destruction of all living communities. .. "9 By this Arendt
points to a loss of a particular kind and is not to be
read literally. What she points to is the fact that ex-
pansion, as a limitless process which subordinates all
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specific and individual considerations to its own logic
destroys the conditions within which individual deeds nit
only can he d^, but understood and countenanced fay^
who witness and are affected by them, where life, be it
the life of the mind or of human reality writ large, ap-
pears as a product of forces, where it appears to be com-
pelled by processes beyond individual or even collective
control, the human capacity, not for sovereignty but for
participating in the forming and shaping of a specifically
human life, is eclipsed. When this occurs reality is
deadened, for the armpayann« . .ppe r ce of a specifically human sense
of reality depends upon the presence of distinct others -
precisely what the process character of the modern age
makes superfluous. m this sense Eichmann was the final
product of the modern age for he was distinguished in
Arendt's view by an inability to think which she writes is
the same as being able "to think from the standpoint of
somebody else. "10 Eicnmann was shielded against
as such which is to say against the words and presence of
others, the fundamental human condition of plurality. The
source of his "death" was precisely this shield. Hence
the heart of Arendt's critique of the process character of
the modern age is that it destroys the conditions for in-
dividual freedom and for collective, cultural reflection
which together constitute the sine qua non both for our
capacity to give specific form to human reality, as well
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as for our very ability to experience reality, to be
alive .
in this first chapter my aim is to argue that it is
the process character of the modern age, its inability to
provide a stable structure within which a distinctive cul-
ture could flourish, which lies at the heart of Arendt's
critique of the modern age. By this I mean not simply to
have a coherent form but to be capable of sustaining it-
self through the initiatives of its free citizens, initia-
tives sparked by questioning, by wonder and by thought.
It is this concern which forms the thread which holds
Arendt's opus together in a coherency noteworthy for its
single-mindedness.ll i begin with a discussion of The
Origins of Totalitarianism
, a work which remained for
Arendt the experiential touchstone for all of her sub-
sequent theorizing; then proceed to a discussion of The
Human Condition
,
where she analyzes historical and philo-
sophical events and developments in order to explain the
predominance of modernity's permanence-as-process; and,
finally, turn to a discussion of On Revolution
,
where she
identifies historical moments when this process character
might have been withstood, yet was not. In this work we
find Arendt resurrecting possibilities in the effort to
give credence to her alternative vision for a novus ordo
saeclorum
.
This is first and foremost a vision designed
to address the difficulties of political order in the 20th
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century where we are, in her view, absolutely
„ ithout
guide from tradition, relig ion or authority, the old Roman
trinity which has bounded and stabilized and given
specific shape to human affairs in the West heretofore.
B. Total ii-^rianism
If there is a single utterance of Arendt's which ex-
presses the origin and organizing pathos of her political
theorizing it is the following.
"The mass manufacture of corrises i = j
*V the historically and politically 1%°°**tellxgible preparation of living corpses.""
Arendt's fundamental effort in The Origins ^
Totalitarianism
,
is to make intelligible that preparation
by showing the events and developments which culminated in
an unprecedented homelessness and rootlessness that char-
acterized in her view the later part of the modern age.
The extremity of modern conditions has deprived human
beings of some of the most fundamental preconditions for
spontaneity, reaching a terrifying finale in a government
of terror in which humans are "stabilized" so that the
laws of nature or history (race or class) can be
liberated. 13 Once liberated, the movement of history or
nature becomes like a relentless, logically compelling
process in which individuals resemble cogs, remarkable for
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their adaptability, docilitv •y, a nty, and incapacity for experi-
ence
Within the context of the "creation., of this kind ofbeing Are„dt argues that the widespread support for Hitler
was a function neither of brainwashing nor of lack of
knowledge. it was rather a function of -Mss oonsent ,.
The very paradox of such a concept, a paradox of which
Arendt was very much aware, can be resolved only by the
notion that those
..consenting" were not in fact in see
fundamental sense "alive," but were in fact "living
corpses." The degree to which totalitarian government ex-
tinguished individual spontaneity, the ground of freedom,
has brought into being a new and nearly unbearable pain
which now forms the horizon of radical evil, with
totalitarianism we witness the beginning of the destruc-
tion of the "essence of man." 14
Central to the effectiveness of this new form of
government is its ability to extinguish space within which
individuals are both related and within which they can
move. "Totalitarianism," she writes, "is like a band of
iron squeezing people tightly together," so that no move-
ment is possible. 15 The e i i]nination of space fQr related.
ness and movement is historically rooted in the precarious
modern grounding of law in the nature of Man gua Man begun
with the proclamation of the Rights of Man in revolution-
ary France and the birth of the modern nation-state. I
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would like to focus on Arendt's analysis of the in-
sufficiency of such a grounding for law and authority, for
as we shall see, under the onslaught of imperialism, law
changed from an apparently eternally stable thing rooted
in man's "nature" to an ever moving process which followed
the logic, first, of capital expansion, then of race. m
this chapter of European history the naivete of the idea
that from man's "natural" being certain rights automati-
cally flow is revealed, and it forms the foundation for
Arendt's insistence that political order must not be con-
ceived as natural but precisely in contradistinction to
the natural
- another essential reason for her use of
theatrical metaphors in conceptualizing the "nature" of
political life.
The legitimacy of law in the modern nation-state
rests on the consent of the governed and is held to ex-
press the rights that Man, as a natural being, should be
granted. its revolutionary quality was rooted in its
emancipation of man from the specific status and
privileges accorded individuals by virtue of their place
in the social-political order from time immemorial. The
power and legitimacy of the nation-state was thus rooted
in the natural law of "Man." The paradox however, Arendt
argues, is that the Rights of Man qua Man are really
rights conceived by and suited to a particular historical-
ly defined people who share a national heritage, tradi-
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tions, language, etc. The power of the nation_state real _
lY in fact, she argues, rested on the nation. The fallacy
of natural rights theory, she suggests, was to think there
was one human nature, to identify it with history, and
then to think total domination was impossible. The fal-
lacy we might say lay in "naturalizing" man. This she
argues became dreadfully clear in the 20th century. To
trace the central dynamic of this fallacy as it was worked
out in history, we must follow Arendt's analysis of im-
perialism, "the first stage in the political rule of the
bourgeoisie," and of bourgeois political philosophy which
consequently became dominant.
Following Luxembourg, Arendt argues that by the late
19th century, domestic expansion was exhausted and capital
moved abroad to such an extent that the bourgeoisie turned
to the state to insure and secure their overseas invest-
ments. Though the bourgeoisie had dominated economically,
Arendt argues that until this direct rule there existed a
true "national element" consisting of statesmen, parlia-
ment, an independent press, and civil servants who
authentically represented the nation writ large. This na-
tional element took as its primary concern the life of na-
tional political institutions resting on the consent, and
hence on the limiting, shaping capacities of the governed.
With the political domination of the bourgeoisie a new
political concept was born - imperialism, the central
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principles of which were competition and expansion. m
the effort to protect the process of accumulation - the
ceaseless economic growth without which capitalism cannot
survive
- the end of the nation-state had to become the
permanent expansion of power. The problem, Arendt argues,
is that neither competition nor expansion, despite liberal
claims, are self-regulating principles. Hence, as the
founding principles for the imperialist state, their
limitless nature clashed with and began to undermine the
stable rule of law grounded in consent in favor of the
permanent process of power accumulation as an end in it-
self. Fueled by economic necessity, the principle of per-
petual motion became the paradoxical foundation of the
polity.
In this context history comes to appear as an endless
necessary process and man a mere "phantom of a force." 16
Arendt brilliantly argues that Hobbes, through "sheer
force of imagination," outlines the main tracts of this
new man.
"He foresaw.
. .that he would be flattered atbeing called a power-thirsty animal, al-
though actually society would force him to
surrender all his natural forces, his virtue
and his vices, and would make him the poor
meek little fellow.
. .who, far from striving
against power, submits to any existing
government and does not stir even when his
best friend falls an innocent victim to an
incomprehensible coup d'etat." 17
The deepest definition of the bourgeois class, Arendt
argues, is not that of an owning class. Rather, anyone
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could belong to this class who was willin, *g to conceive of
AA^^-^rocess of perpetual growth of wealth, what in
fact then happened was the automatic nature of this pro-
cess actually ESEM political act . on
_ an actiQn ^
the public arena had become compelled by the demands of
expansion. « the same time this process of expansion un-
dermined all individual safety and stability insofar as
property became not the quintessence of one's stable and
particular social locatedness, but itself a never ending
process of property (read capital, expansion. The point
here is that bourgeois political philosophy not only con-
ceives of individuals as essentially private persons, but
that the bourgeois polity actually creates private persons
-
in a negative sense. That is, under conditions in which
each person is perpetually deprived of a stable private
locus in the world privacy becomes not the stronghold of
autonomy and self-determination as bourgeois ideology
would have it, but rather an inner condition, a state of
mind without outward effect. The result is conformism and
docility of entirely privatized people which occurs within
the overwhelming movement of history defined as the end-
less process of power accumulation.
Here we begin to see the extent to which Arendt
believes the very capacity for individuality and for free-
dom are dependent upon stable structures both in the sense
of private place in the world, and in the sense of politi-
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cal structure within which human relatedness can occur
individuality is underlined along with the capacity for
political action insofar as the bourgeois polity destroys
both the basis of co„„ unifying bonds through which hu-
man beings are positively related in political community,
and insofar as it destroys the materiality of private
space, reducing the private as a dimension of the human
condition to an inner state.
Historically under these conditions, which meant dis-
integration for the nation if not for the state, Arendt
argues that racism became a substitute for the common
identity that had once been forged by shared past, lan-
guage, territory and principles of a relatively
homogeneous population. As a distinctive phenomenon, the
ideology of racism which claimed to have the key to his-
tory cut across all national boundaries and denied the
principle underlying the national organization of peoples:
"the solidarity and equality of all guaranteed by the idea
of Mankind.
"
18
Simultaneously "Europe's best" became imperialist ad-
ministrators, bureaucrats. Excited by the adventures ex-
pansionism offered, these men went abroad to civilize the
savages. Sharing no common world with those over whom
they ruled by decree, they quickly came to serve the force
of history - expansionism. They became ruthless, non-
descript agents of history.
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These experiences of imperialist polities laid the
9r°Und"°rk t0r t0t»"terie„i8m
. Amidst
. fundamental
despair of ail human responsibility which accompanle(J ^
^integration of both public and prlvate^^ ^
came to be understood as a mere function in a grander
SChe"e
°
f "dory's necessary laws, understood either as
those governing the struggle of the races or of the
classes. Instead of a being whose very nature should
guarantee certain inalienable rights; instead of a being
who deliberately acts on the basis of commonly established
human principies and who accepts responsibility for those
acts, man becomes a plaything of abstract laws and forces.
With the experience of massive numbers of stateless people
after the first World War, the inability of the Rights of
Man or of any natural guarantees to secure human dignity
became evident. Arendt argues that what totalitarian ex-
periences revealed was the total inadequacy of "nature- to
secure rights, and to found a pol it ica 1
-legal order. And
she suggests that we must realize that our most fundamen-
tal right is a right to have rights which is the same
thing as having a right to live in an organized political
community, in a specific pjUitically secured piace in the
world where speech is relevant and deeds effective. There
is nothing equal about us by nature. Equality, she
arques, is produced throuqh political organization, and as
such is more "artificial" than "natural." The spatial
266
tension to hu»a„ existence must be
"artificially.,
secured.
C The Human Condi -hi on
in The Human Condition, Arendt <s analysis of the
process-character of the modern age is deepened. As j
have suggested above, her basic critigue of imperialism is
that it creates entirely private persons who, as such, are
deprived of the worldly spaces for, and experience of,
freedom and initiative. This identification of modernity
with private being receives critical reassessment in The
Human Condition. Arendt develops the
-non privative
traits of privacy" and associates the modern age with the
advent of the social realm and socialized man, develop-
ments destructive of both worldly public spaces and of
private life. Importantly then, in this work, Arendt more
fully elaborates the attributes of both public and private
dimensions of existence and suggests the kinds of tensions
which must be sustained between them too in order that hu-
man life both attain excellence and distinction and avoid
the condition of being "dead while alive" - a phrase which
is perhaps the most succinct statement of her judgment of
"the social."
Central to the argument of this book is her claim
that the modern age is best understood as an age, not of
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self-alienation as Marx argued, but of world alienation,
in this context, her use of the term world is meant broad-
ly to refer to that life which concerns us not as singular
beings, but as beings in the plural; that is, as beings
whose sense of reality is fundamentally dependent upon the
presence of others and on our ability to for, a commonly
shared existence through our capacities for speech and
deed. The modern age as a whole, she argues, can be un-
derstood as a series of events and developments which un-
dermine the possibility of forming a stable, durable
structure within which a truly human world can develop.
Set off by three essentially premodern events - the
Reformation and the massive expropriation and accumulation
of social wealth that followed, the discovery of America,
and the invention of the telescope, the modern age com-
mences with three different sources of world alienation,
all of which contribute to a turning away from the essen-
tial condition under which human life was given us in
Arendt's view
- plurality. The Reformation unleashed a
ferocious but only apparently world-concerned activity.
In fact the concern that predominated was with the self's
welfare and salvation, the world being only the external
instrument. For its part, the discovery of America began
a dramatic process of abolishing distance and spatiality
so that we now are faced with living literally as mankind.
As such, we are alienated substantially from the immediacy
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of our earthly and our worldly surroundings. And finally,
the invention of the telescope Arendt argues had the
twofold effect of alienating "man" from trust in the
senses and of establishing as the locus for securing true
knowledge about the world a point utterly outside of our
earthly condition
- the Archimedean point. Knowledge has
come to depend on our capacity to survey which requires
that we "disentangle" ourselves from everything near.
What ties these three disparate events together is that
they remove us from engagement with our immediate condi-
tion both with respect to the earth and to the world, an
engagement which, in Arendt 's view, is the precondition
for developing a concern with cultivating a specifically
human sense of reality. Neither our essential purposes
nor our ability to know are, in the modern age, thought to
rely upon a commonly shared world, upon the presence of
others
.
In a complicated examination of what Arendt considers
to be the fundamental activities of the active as con-
trasted with the contemplative life, she traces the marks
of this world alienation in modern philosophy and modern
political theory while being careful to note that they are
set off by a series of actual historical events. She
thereby weaves together the story in philosophy, science
and world events of the originating factors and forces
whose endpoint is a form of domination of humans by laws
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of inexorable process which, be they laws of nature or of
history, crush the essentially human capacity for
spontaneity, initiative, freedom. For purposes of my own
narrative I will discuss Arendt , s notion Qf ^ ^
well as the labor philosophies of Locke and Marx, on the
one hand, and the introspective subjectivism of modern
Philosophy beginning with Cartesian doubt, on the other.
Probably the single most important theoretical devel-
opment in The_jiumail^^ is Arendt , s conception of
"the social." it forms the center of her critique of the
modern age as she proceeds to consider and critique it
from the standpoint of its ability to appreciate
plurality, the condition of political life. it is from
this point of view that Arendt considers all three of the
activities of the ylta_actiya - labor, work and action,
not because she wants to assert the absolute primacy of
political action, as some have argued, 19 but rather be-
cause of the experiences of totalitarianism. The lesson
she draws from these experiences is that neither the dis-
tinctive virtues and gifts peculiar to both private and
public life, and hence the richness of lived experience,
nor our sense of reality itself can be kept in being
without a healthy political culture, without a healthy
concern for the world. The conditions of both necessity
and freedom in the modern age have become indistinct, even
unreal qua experience precisely because of a lack of con-
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cern with worldliness. And this lack of concern ^ Qf
course precisely the character she attributes to "the so-
cial.
"
The problem and nature of the social realm cannot be
understood save against the background of the other two
primary spatial delineations Arendt makes - the public
realm and the private. The private corresponds to that
specific material location where the individual can live
free from the bright light of the eyes of others, free for
love and intimacy, and for the quiet wanderings of the
mind, but also freed from the demands of the public life
for the pressing, even tyrannical demands of the body, and
for the reproduction of life. Here intimacy and necessity
can be attended to by being respectively protected and
limited. The public, by contrast, corresponds to that
commonly established space provided for citizens to speak
and act together qua humans; to appear not as beings
caught in the same cycle of life's needs, but as beings
with distinctive qualities. These two realms exist in
enormous tension, and must do so, in Arendt's view, in or-
der that the dimensions and virtues of each be kept in
being. Concerned as she is with the demise of political
life in the modern age, her effort is spent largely in de-
veloping the distinctive qualities of the political. Yet
we ignore the critical tension she wishes to sustain be-
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tween them, and hence the vital • *.6 Vl and intrinsic importance
of each, at our peril.
The obscurity of the private and the searing light of
the public, Arendt suggests, are the two dimensions of ex-
istence which require each other. In darkness a meander_
ing purposeless thought process, the body's repetitious
demands, the strange and relentless pressure of wants and
desires, the incomprehensible violence of bodily existence
-
it is as if all these preserve the raw experiential
resources, bottomless in their mysterious givenness, for
human freedom understood as spontaneity, uniqueness and
distinction. m contrast to the exposure of the public,
the private realm is a release into a kind of purposeless-
ness of mind and repetitiousness of body in which one
feels bliss and exuberance in the sheer fertility of
things. its essence is "absence of form. "20 Both the
mental wanderings and the subjection to inexorable bodily
processes provide a kind of respite in darkness that
refreshes and restores the resources of each individual.
What then is the nature of Arendt's public realm that
it sucks out of us so forcefully these resources? The
public realm is that place where we appear to others
through speech and deed; where we make the obscurity of
our private thoughts, desires and wants fit to appear be-
fore others. The fact that what appears will be seen and
heard by others makes excellence the peculiar demand and
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capability of the public realm
. There ^ ^
nake thing, appear worthy of memory, for the public realm
through its very publicity alone is the arena „here^
can hope to save southing from the endless destruction of
mortal life. The peouliar concerns Qf ^ ^
then are permanence, Mortality, and excellence. No one
can reside in it long, however, Arendt says, for the kind
of responsibility it demands - to strive for a kind of ex-
cellence which preserves and even strengthens human
Plurality
- cannot be sustained. The essence of the pub-
lic realm is form, and the demand it makes on the self is
that the self make deliberate choice of how it wishes to
appear to others; that it give specific shape to its inner
processes, its inner chaos. implicit here is the promise
to remain, within bounds, consistent with oneself; that
is, to endure, which is to say to have character, and not
to be subject to every inner urge or every doubting
thought
.
2
1
Hence what we see on this reading is that the public
and private realms, the one for saving distinctly human
excellence, the other for endless reproduction, destruc-
tion and obscurity, exist in critical mutually interdepen-
dent relation. As private beings we need the public to
have the reality of our individuality brought into being,
confirmed. As public beings we need private life to re-
store and renew our resources for spontaneity and initia-
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tive. With the modern age
, Arendt argues
, both private
and public spheres were destroyed and with the, the
preconditions for human freedom In their place^ ^
social real,. Let me now turn to her conception of this
specifically modern dimension of existence, its origin,
development and nature.
Arendt conceives of the social as a hybrid sphere
where we are neither public nor private selves, but where
what had heretofore been the concern of individuals as
private persons
- namely the reproduction and continuation
of life, became the dominant concern of individuals in
their public capacity as citi Zens. And it is this devel-
opment which unleashes forces which undermine the
durability and stability of the human artifice. She
writes,
"The social realm, where the life processhas established its own public domain? haslet loose an unnatural growth, so to speakof the natural." 22 dK '
The publicity of the public realm, then, which Arendt
argues is what makes it possible for us to save that which
we esteem and cherish, that which we find most beautiful
and excellent from the "natural ruin of time" 23 has, in
the modern age, weirdly, raised the perpetual life process
of birth, decay and death itself to the level of that
which we find most worthy of permanence. "Life as the
highest good" becomes the fundamental principle of modern
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society. With this unnatural unleashing of the natural
into the public limelight the fundamental nature of the
life process remains unchanged - namely its force,
urgency, its relentless consumption and its formlessness.
Beginning historically with the bourgeoisie's effort to
make the public realm protect their private accumulation
of property, the public realm soon became a function of
what Arendt wants to argue are essentially private con-
cerns, m making these concerns become the focus of pub-
lic life, the predominant standpoint of the social becomes
the species. That is, to draw out the distinction laid
out at the outset of this chapter, the standpoint of the
social becomes mere life in contrast to the life in which
we become "born again" by taking on the responsibilities
of molding and shaping a particular form of life. Con-
sequently the public realm was destroyed as a sphere which
itself could shape, limit, and give form to a common life,
understood as more than the sum total of individual
desires and wants. So, too, the rise of the social realm
destroyed the private realm insofar as the concerns in-
trinsic to it were the only concerns which remained com-
mon. It is on the ruins of the public and private spheres
then that the social is built.
It is interesting to note that although Arendt uses
spatial language to refer to the social, her argument that
it actually undermines worldly durability and stability
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implies that, strictly speaking, the
-realB- of the social
has no spatial ity; no real spatial dimensionality. Its
real dimension is temporal and that itself reduced, essen-
tially, to the future. Rather than specific achievements,
it is progress and development, rapid forward movements
which form the dominating metaphors of the modern age.
The phenomenon of progressing process perpetually un-
dermines and dissolves all spatial delineations and sub-
stantialities
- both in thought, Arendt argues, and in the
material world.
Hence, when she turns to modern political thought,
she argues that in the face of the enormous increase of
wealth and property which marks the modern age and the
theoretical prospect of substantial if not total libera-
tion from necessity, modern political theorists con-
ceptualized this growth as a natural process, rooting the
accumulation process in the body. it is this wish to
portray the process of accumulation as in the nature of
things, and the concomitant rejection of worldly concerns
which ties theorists of capitalism and socialism together;
this which forms the deepest continuities of the modern
age. Hence while there are obvious differences between
Locke and Smith, on the one hand, and Marx, on the other,
Arendt attends largely to their affinities as moderns.
And while her harshest and most sustained polemic is with
Marx, this is because in her view Marx carries the logic
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of the modern age to its farthest extreme, and not because
he stands on some path qualitatively different fro, the
theorists of liberal capitalism. Neither theorists of
capitalism nor of socialism are concerned with what Arendt
calls "the worldly character" of a produced thing - its
function, location and length of stay in the world. 24
in taking up a critique of the modern labor theories,
Arendt argues that we understand the modern age most deep-
ly if we see that its essence lies not in the emancipation
of laborers, though to be sure this was a world historic
event, but rather that its essence lies in the emancipa-
tion of the laboring activity itself. m the effort to
account for the enormous upsurge in productive capacity,
all three labor theorists Arendt discusses elevate the ac-
tivity of laboring to the highest rank - Locke finding in
it the source of all property, Smith the source of all
wealth, and Marx, the very process through which the
humanity of man comes into being. Important to Arendt 's
analysis of this emancipation of the laboring activity is
that despite variation in their specific interests and
purposes, all three labor theorists put labor at the cen-
ter of human life because it alone as an experience among
the three activities of the vita activa approximates the
endless seemingly automatically progressing nature of the
productive growth that marks the modern age. Both labor
and the growth of the modern age seemed natural, beyond,
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as Arendt puts it, "willful decision or humanly meaningful
purposes.-.25 As naturally and compellingly necessary as
labor has appeared to all ages, in the modern age the pur-
suit of ever-growing abundance itself appeared natural.
It was Marx who, Arendt argues, made the relation be-
tween labor's productivity and natural abundance explicit,
and in so doing was most true to phenomenal reality. Con-
ceiving of labor and begetting as two modes of the same
life process, Marx rightly conceptualized labor as "man's
metabolism with nature»26 in which/ ^ ^ endless
cyclical processes of production and consumption in na-
ture, man too, through his own effort, produced a surplus.
This modern discovery of man's ability to produce a sur-
plus promised for the first time to fulfill the age-old
dream of the poor for wealth and abundance, and happiness
for the greatest number. Yet it was the mistaken identi-
fication of this dream with the kind of freedom from
necessity the few alone had wrested from life by enslaving
the many that lay at the heart of Marx's errors, in
Arendt 's view.
Marx turned his effort almost exclusively to the task
of increasing the productive forces of society. in so
doing labor became, in his view, the humanizing activity,
and the two moments of the life process - production and
consumption - became the central foci of social organiza-
tion. The life process itself became the very essence of
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a life shared in common. The tragic irony of this, in
Arendt's view, is that laboring, of the three activities
of the UiUflto, is the most private, the least common
experience, ensconced as it is in the relentless
repetitious needs of the body. The perpetual producing-
consuming processes of anima^abor^ can be made the
common end, but when raised to the highest common purpose,
the devouring, limitless nature of these processes un-
dermines the very permanence of the objective world which
Arendt considers to be a precondition for freedom itself,
^ima^aborans, in the unworldly "realm" of the social,
has no world-building capacity. Arendt calls Marx's
socialized man "worldless specimens of the species
mankind. 1,27
The contention underlying Arendt's thought in this
context is that without a world of stable things which
transcend individual mortality, hence a world in which hu-
man relatedness gains stability, the specific capacity of
'
humans to distinguish themselves through word and deed and
thus to build a distinctive common world is impossible.
The central capacities for distinctive speech and action
themselves are eroded and undermined in the society of
animal laborans
.
No less isolated and private for having
made the life process the common end, the preconditions
for the appearance of freedom are destroyed. And while it
may be true that we can produce and consume in particular
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ways, ana^Ub^ has llttle abUity to chaiienge ^
privacy of the llf. process itself as ^ dominant ^
our common lives a c
'
AS SUCh modern "man" has lost the spe-
cifically human abilities to ii mHS 0 ll it
'
shaPe and judge, which
-
to say to make our appearance explicitly; to be culture
building.
Furthermore, Arendt argues, this is true even should
labor be drastically reduced or even eliminated as in
Marx's fully socialized, fully naturalized beings. In
this state Marx envisions Western culture having finally
arrived at the state where all would be free for the Kind
of self and mutual cultural blossoming only the few have
heretofore enjoyed. The problem, Arendt suggests, is that
it is dubious to assume that anisUaborans, freed from
labor, would be capable of these kinds of humanizing ac-
tivities. While Arendt thinks it is characteristic of hu-
mans that we wish to make our appearance explicitly, to
deliberately choose no*, to appear, it is not a necessary
condition of life for our species. Instead, it is some-
thing that must be tended and cultivated, and for which
space, in the literal and metaphorical sense, must be pro-
vided. It is precisely this to which Marx, in Arendt's
view, was wholly inattentive. She fears that Marx's dream
of a cessation of all alienation between man and man as
well as between man and nature is not a dream of freedom
but a nightmarish en-slavement; nightmarish not because it
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is, as an experience, more cruel than the human institu-
tion of slavery (it is not,, but because in the worldless
and herd-like existence of man as the
-consummated oneness
with nature- we really could reach a state where our
ability to distinguish between freedom and necessity
(slavery) had been extinguished as an active capacity.
Arendt singles out Marx because his is the most pure
expression of the modern age. Vet she sees in our society
of jobholders overwhelming evidence of the inability to
recognize futility despite her view that man has an
-in-
nate repugnance- to it. The most obvious and predominat-
ing evidence is the fact that ours is now a "waste econo-
my" whose very existence is predicated upon the ability to
destroy the use value of things in favor of their consump-
tive value. All things are of value insofar as they can
quickly be made to disappear. The modern age has no true
spatial dimension. Without spatiality the temporal dimen-
sion of existence is also severely limited; neither the
present nor the past can stay in being.
In this light it seems apt to characterize Arendt's
critigue of the modern age, and especially of Marx, as a
Hegelian riposte. The human condition as a condition es-
sentially in space and time, as an embodied condition,
demands a perpetual experience of what, in the most gener-
al of terms, we would call alienation: the necessity to
encounter the thing-character of the world; an encounter
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which is perpetually in part affirmation of self in con-
tinuity but also confrontation with the recalcitrant qual
ity of the world, with the fact that a "consummated one-
ness" is probably not even possible - and certainly not,
in Arendt 's view, desirable.
There is both a moral-aesthetic underpinning to
Arendt's thinking here as well as a warning. While it is
conceivable that a society of jobholders such as our own
could continue to exist, the quality of life, its specifi
cally human dimension, would be and is being extinguished
To lead a truly human life is neither to be wholly freed
from necessity nor to be entirely absorbed in its endless
ly repetitious productive-consumptive processes. it is
rather to sustain the often terrible tension between the
activities and perspectives peculiar to the three ac-
tivities of the vita activa - labor, work and action.
Without sustaining the tensions, Arendt implicitly argues
we are unable to reach the heights of human excellence
conceived by her in aesthetic terms. And precisely these
heights have something to do with being morally good on
earth
,
28 for they are tied to our capacity to think and
act, not as single beings, in the image of God, but as hu
man beings in the condition of plurality and a common
world. And insofar as this is true (a line of argument I
will develop in far greater detail in the following chap-
ter) Arendt warns that modern life in which the worldless
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aspirations, abilities and standpoint of 3J1ifflai_lab2£ans
predominate win be incapable of „ specificaUy^ ^
celience, that is, one in which the abilities of humans
for speech and deed flourish.
When Arendt turns explicitly to capture the essential
predicaments of modern philosophy she finds that the spe-
cifically modern loss of worldly sensibility has clearly
left its mark upon it as well. it is both the recal-
citrant thing-quality of the world and the condition of
Plurality which modern subjectivism has also eschewed in
its search for the true and the real. Hence the biologi-
cal processes which form the real for anima^aborans are,
she argues, analogous to the processes of the mind which
affirm the real in modern philosophy. The central modern
metaphor carries the essence of modern thought as well.
It was, Arendt insists, a worldly event, the inven-
tion of the telescope, which launched modern thought as
such. With this invention the reliability and adequacy of
the human senses to reveal reality and truth ended, for
somethinq so fundamental as our ability to know from our
sense data the movement of the sun in relation to the
earth was irreparably damaqed. Arendt tracks the twofold
character of the modern response to this occurrence - the
triumph of the modern man of knowledqe - the scientist, on
the one hand, and the despair of the modern lover of phi-
losophy, on the other.
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The optimism and hone of t-ho m^n p r he modern scientist stems
trom the realization of the age-old dream of Archimedes Qf
reaching a point so far outside the conditions on earth
that one could observe earth lv ii f„ ,y life from a truly universal
standpoint and hence, by implication, "see all." A11 of
the tremendous innovations and discoveries, the increases
in human knowledge and human power have been possible,
Arendt argues, because of this new-found ability to extri-
cate our perspective from the chains of our earthly condi-
tion, vet that which fueled these innovations cannot be
comprehended without investigating the other modern senti-
ment par excellance
- doubt, and the related drive for
certainty born with it.
Modern philosophy registered the "shock" of Galileo's
discovery with acute accuracy. Specifically, the loss of
confidence in the world as something real which the human
sense could be relied upon to reveal. That is, the loss
of the self-evidence of things made the age-old starting
point for philosophy
- speechless wonder at that "which is
as it is" a virtual impossibility. Beginning with Des-
cartes, doubt rather than wonder becomes the specifically
modern impulse to philosophical reflection. The nature
and end of the activity itself not surprisingly changes
too. Instead of the activity in which "what is" is con-
templated, philosophy becomes preoccupied with epistemol-
ogy and the problem of certainty. The assault on the ade-
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quacy of human sense perception for knowing reality aid
not reveal a simple distinction between mere appearance
and true Being, a distinction long lived within philoso-
phy, but rather unleashed the suspicion that Being itself
was an
-active deluder" of the human effort to know, a
devil and not just an eternal order of things largely kept
from human comprehension.
in the face of this fear that the essence of things
was delusion, modern philosophy (which in this sense we
would say comes to an end with Nietzsche's effort to em-
brace this deluding evasive force) begins in earnest the
search for certainty, which should be understood as a
search for stability, at times for comfort and for home in
some sense. Beginning with Descartes modern philosophy
turns for its affirmation of reality to the inner pro
cesses of the mind, of consciousness. Cooito er„n
The critical part of what occurs in this move is that con-
sciousness first dissolves all objective reality into sub-
jective states of mind making the imaginary object of
thought equivalent in terms of its realness to the sensed
object. The sensed object, considered in introspection,
undergoes a process in which it loses its worldly other-
ness and is made over entirely anew as an "object of con-
sciousness." This preparatory process it was thought
would assure certainty, for it is the solitary mind as
maker itself which makes the object something fit to be
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Known. Arendt suggests that here, too, the mind seeks to
occupy an Archaean point, a point so distant from the
sensuaily Known and so distant from the worldly condition
of Plurality that a universality of perspective can be at-
tained. For philosophical thinking, as for scientific
thinking, it is mathematics, which with modern algebra has
"succeeded in freeing itself from the shackles of
spatiality,..29 which becQmes ^ ^ ^
and reasoning. Knowing becomes as with Hobbes (who
remains unparalleled in Arendt's estimation in his im-
aginative genius at capturing the modern age) "reckoning
with consequences."
As a universal being, living in a system "with no
fixed center" and free to occupy whatever vantage point he
chooses, "man" has become a terrestrial being only in the
sense that this is a condition of being alive, and no
longer a terrestrial being by essence or nature. Similar-
ly, while we are sensuous beings whose most distinctive
condition is that of plurality, this need have no real im-
pact upon what we know. in both cases these limitations
can be overcome by assuming a universal standpoint. The
trouble with this response to the unreliability of the
senses to reveal Being is that our sense of reality, our
"perceptual faith" as Arendt, following Merleau-Ponty
,
calls it "depends on the objects also appearing as such to
others and being acknowledged by them." 30 The trouble, to
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put it another way, is that reality, the "that there is »
-
only brought into being and confirmed by pth^. The
loss we suffer is not only of our sense of certainty of
the real in terms of a reassuring identity
(a„ irony
given Descartes' aim, but the ability to encounter
-that
which we are not" which is the other dimension of the real
and for which identity through others' confirmation is the
precondition. Instead of reality as an experience of
identity and difference, science encounters only the read-
ings of instruments the human mind itself has designed,
and philosophers encounter only logical patterns of the
human mind. m both cases human life is trapped within
the logic and patterns of the human mind in a manner
analogous to the way animalJLaborans is trapped within the
logic of the twofold processes of life - production and
consumption. What is lost in all cases is what Arendt,
along with ancient philosophy, calls the capacity for con-
templating truth and Being, and what we might call that
capacity for revealing and finding meaning within the con-
ditions in which life was given us; what Arendt herself
calls the capacity "to think what we are doing.
»
3 1
In some sense, then, it does not stretch or distort
Arendt to suggest that not only in an actual totalitarian
state are human beings, in their homeless and rootless,
isolated state stabilized within an inexorable process or
movement, but that the modern age itself has prepared hu-
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~n beings in the political, sociax and phUosophical
dimensions of their lives for much ^ ^ (un .
purpose. What is lost is the ability to encounter (read
think and judge and experience) the new, the eventuality
of the world, the unpredictable, and to shape such experi-
ences into humanly coherent occurrences, the possibility
of which depends upon worldly relatedness, upon the exis-
tence of a "we... The essence Qf Ufe . s ^
(which is just as "mere» when it entails unleashing of the
new without reflection, but being born again so that we
are capable of taxing our bearings in the world - which is
not a question of an individual becoming self-conscious,
but of feeling the full impact of our utter dependence
upon others for our "unequivocal sense of reality^ and
our ability to be fully alive .
D. On Revolution
On Revolution is Arendt's most sustained examination
of modern political experiments in which this common tak-
ing our bearings or what she calls in "The Crisis in Cul-
ture, "taking aim" is pursued in a hopeful, constructive
manner. Of concern in this context is her highly con-
troversial discussion of the relationship between the so-
cial question and the possibility of founding a stable
political structure within which culture can flourish.
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Most commentators of On^evolution have focussed
critically on Arendt's analysis of the destructive impact
on political foundation of the effort based on compassion
and pity to solve the social question. m so doing, they
focus on her critique of the Rousseauean romantic revolu-
tionary tradition as exemplified in this work by the
French Revolution. what has gone under-analyzed is her
contrasting critique of the liberal revolutionary tradi-
tion's lack of compassion which she argues made the Amer-
ican revolutionaries incapable of fully grasping the
novelty of their experience as exemplified in "a certain
weightlessness" which characterizes the political thought
they produced. 33 I will conclude this chapter with an ex-
amination of both the French passion without reason' and
the American Reason without passion,' for together they
illuminate Arendt's complicated reflections on the rela-
tionship between politics and the urgent, compelling na-
ture of our psychological life which she calls, "the pro-
cess of moods in our souls." 34 This discussion will
therefore form the final link in my analysis of the modern
age in this chapter. It is central to my analysis to
demonstrate that the hope Arendt wishes to articulate lies
not in a strict bi-furcation between necessity and free-
dom, the social question and politics, the passionate
heart and the reasoning mind, but in a lived tension whose
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nature I will gesture towards here, but articulate more
fully in the following chapter.
Throughout On_Revolution
, Arendt makes the case for a
conceptual and experiential distinction between liberty
and freedom, the former being the liberation from tyranny
and oppression and finding expression in civil rights, the
later being the constitution of a space for a public life
of debate, persuasion and common action finding expression
in rule by law in a republican form of government. Her
general argument is that only the American and not the
French Revolution was successful in the latter task,
though it, too, failed to fully constitute the necessary
space for a real political way of life. The extremity of
immiseration in the Old World in contradistinction to
freedom from real want in the New was in Arendt 's view the
single most significant difference accounting for the
respective courses of revolution in France and America.
Let me turn first to the French and then to the American
Revolution.
Arendt argues that in the first phase of the French
Revolution the aim was liberation from tyranny and oppres-
sion and the constitution of freedom in a republican form
of government based on consent. But once liberation from
tyranny was achieved for all it became clear that freedom
would be only for the few, the few who were the purported
representatives of the people. These few could hardly be
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legitimate representatives however, distinguished as they
were from the immiserated masses by social status. Unable
to establish a constitutional form of government under
these circumstances, the Girondins were overcome by the
Jacobins who, Arendt argues, recognized that a great "ef-
fort of solidarization-35 was necessary Qnoe ^
tie of tyranny could no longer serve as the binding agent
for the nation. Furthermore, the impoverished needed yet
further liberation before there could be a real constitu-
tion of freedom. This time round Arendt argues though,
they needed to be liberated from necessity - or so it was
conceived by Robespierre.
With the Jacobins this great "effort at solidariza-
tion" was made by the rich towards the poor by making com-
passion the highest virtue. Compassion, following and
relying on Rousseau, as the ability to suffer with those
who suffer, is something that seemed to bespeak a natural
passionate bond between men. Selflessness hence became
the highest art, and reason, the nemesis of passion, be-
came synonymous with selfishness. Reason, as it manifests
itself through debate and dialogue and calculation, ap-
peared to interfere with the natural feeling of union
available to humans as co-suffering beings. Ironically,
in Arendt 's view, the so-called "natural goodness" of the
miserable became not only the foundation of virtue but of
the body politic itself. The cohesiveness of the body
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com-
politic was to be born out of the single will to have
passion for suffering. Hence in the effort to liberate
the nation from the "yoke of necessity" one had to have a
purity of identification with the immiserated; one had to
subject one's own will to that of the immiserated masses
so that the nation could become a single force. French
political life became preoccupied with a tyrannical scru-
tiny of the chastity of the heart, and the result was the
reign of terror in which those whose compassion appeared
to be mere pretense, those whose motives were deemed im-
pure, were exposed and destroyed as traitors to the na-
tion.
What went wrong, in Arendt's view, in this effort at
solidarization was letting the feeling for suffering
humanity, the anguish felt by the heart, overcome the ef-
fort at establishing spaces for public freedom. The
French Revolution was overrun by the unconditional demand
to liberate humanity from necessity, a demand which had
its roots in the limitless sentiment of pity which, she
argues, is the degraded form compassion must take when it
leaves the privacy of the inner life and the realm of pri-
vate relations, and is made the foundation for political
life. The center of Arendt's arguments revolves around a
distinction between the passion of compassion and the
sentiment of pity. There is, in my view, a clear debt to
Nietzsche in her account though it is developed from an
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explicit concern with the political world and hence fruit-
fully builds out from Nietzsche's own analysis. 36 x will
now turn to her critique.
Arendt argues that Rousseau - understood to be the
revolutionaries' guide in these matters - probably devel-
oped a feeling for the suffering of others, not by suffer-
ing with them, but out of indignation at the indifference
to suffering on the part of the rich. Rather than preoc-
cupying himself with the actual suffering, she argues,
Rousseau became fascinated by the vicissitudes of the
heart. In the grips of this enchantment with "the sweet
delight of intimacy, "37 Rousseau did not feel compassion,
a passion which as such remains bound to particulars, but
rather became taken up by the sentiment to which compas-
sion corresponds
- pity. The distinction Arendt makes is
critical for she argues that as a passion, compassion is a
suffering-with which binds us to the world of particu-
larities, to time and place, specific people and rela-
tionships. As a passion it has no capacity, like reason,
to generalize. By contrast, the emotion of pity is a gen-
eralized feeling for the suffering of all which, however,
does not, like compassion, entail being "stricken in the
3 8flesh." Yet as a sentiment and hence general, it cannot
comprehend a multitude "whose majesty," Arendt writes,
"resides in its very plurality." 39 it is this that makes
pity politically so pernicious, in Arendt's view. Senti-
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-nts are boundless, unarrested by particular considera-te; they inherently lack the capacity to distinguish
deliberate, decide. As the foundation Qf
cal action, this boundless sentient created what Arendt
calls that
"emotion-laden insensitivity to reality," both
to reality in the general sense and to the reality of per-
sons in particular. 40 Specifically referring to
Robespierre but implying it is CQJmQn ^ revolutionaries
since Robespierre, she writes,
hoid
h
ra^
S^e CapacitY to establish andn fast to rapports with persons in theirsingularity; the ocean of suffering around
?i U ht latGr 9eared to receive and respond
erationf
dr°Wned a11 sP^ific consid-
o
m f ' the considerations of friendshipn less than considerations of statecraftand principle." 41 "atecr i
With this Arendt reaches the highpoint of her criti-
que of the danger of a politics based on the boundless
sentiment of pity. The pity-inspired selflessness which
the Jacobins held as the highest virtue was, politically
speaking, evil precisely because it could know no bound-
aries, was incapable of accepting, let alone establishing,
limitations. And at the heart of this inability was its
inherent tendency to depersonalize and generalize all suf-
ferers so that one could be "moved" by a whole class or
people, moved by a single elemental force which gathered
power from its reduction of the multitude to a single
point of outrage.
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Arendt looks at this spectacle and is appalled at the
lack of space for thought as it can occur in politics,
that is, as deliberation from which can follow free and
purposeful action Thi<; iri n^ *
.
in is Kind of aenprai i ?ori ^ „ ^y e zed and sentimen-
tal outrage is wholly unequipped to create enduring
political institutions designed for freedom Ml positive
laws must, in the face of the outrage at the misery of the
many, appear as callous and invidious insensitivity and
must fall before the just terror of the good.
It is in her effort to face up to the danger of such
a politics of the heart that Arendt 's work gets both fas-
cinating and troubling. she is frank about the difficulty
of distinguishing in any set of historical circumstances
between the "mere desire for liberation, to be free from
oppression," and "the desire for freedom as the political
way of life.-.42 And she argues ^ ^ ^ precond ._
tion for the latter. She is equally clear that there was
great man-made suffering, suffering which she says it was
Marx's genius to find a political term for - exploitation.
Hitherto she argues this kind of violence by man against
man has been accepted as necessity itself and she clearly
thinks that the distinction Marx makes is a conceptual and
political breakthrough. Yet her praise of Marx's
originality notwithstanding, it is her view that this kind
of violence is indeed the most "original and legitimate-
source of rulership. Her ground for this claim is the in-
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sistence that to the extent that "we find ourselves as
organic bodies" we are subject to
-necessary and ir-
resistible processes" which cannot and must not be wholly
reduced to political terms. "3
It is this insistence on the difficult distinction
between necessity imposed upon us as embodied beings, on
the one hand, and man-made violence which makes it pos-
sible for some to be, though temporarily and conditional-
ly, freed from necessity, on the other, which fundamental-
ly sets Arendt off from modern political thought in gener-
al and marxist-socialist political thought in particular.
It is a distinction in her view which must be made because
of the unconditionally of the inner life. „odern in his
failure to identify the dangers of the heart in politics,
Marx's mistake, in Arendt <s view, was to reduce all com-
pelling necessity to exploitation. In so doing he entire-
ly destroyed the distinction she thought it so important
to maintain, and thus he ignored the fact that embedded in
the human condition itself are grounds for legitimate man-
made compulsion, for injustice, which we cannot entirely
alter. The desire to do so is rooted in an other-worldly
conception of things; a desire to escape the conditions of
earthly existence. This is not to say that this is not
injustice, and Arendt calls it thusly. It is rather to
say that this is an injustice that in some form must be,
though that form may and should be fought over. What must
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not be the aim and content of politics is putting an end
to necessity itself; of dreaming that all necessity can be
reduced to man-made violence. Once this is done, as she
argues it is for the first time with Marx, it is easy, es-
pecially under the sway of Hegelian theoretics, to simply
reverse the relationship and argue that this man-made
violence is really caused by necessity itself. And this
is just what the later "scientific" Marx did in arguing
for necessary (and violent) economic laws of history. m
this move the distinction between man-made violence and
necessity disappears altogether and the early political
dimension Marx gave to exploitation is subsumed under eco-
nomically necessary laws. The aim of revolution becomes
neither liberation from man-made violence nor the founda-
tion of freedom, but abundance.
The Jacobins were the first in the modern revolution-
ary tradition to fall victim to a pity-based unconditional
demand to be freed from necessity altogether, and hence to
fail to maintain the, in Arendt's view, critical distinc-
tion between necessity and man-made violence. The emo-
tions of the heart, part of the inner life's relentless
processes whose essence is absence of form, cannot sustain
such a distinction, and for this reason we find Arendt
arguing that compassion is "politically irrelevant," and
that there are "disastrous results [when] emotions are
displayed in public and become a factor in political af-
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fairs...44 But as we shau ^ . n ^ exam . nat . on Qf h^
analysis of the African Revolution, this does not Mean
that the heart and compassion are of no import in politi-
cal affairs whatsoever.
The main argument Arendt makes about the American
Revolution is that unlike the conditions of misery in
which the French Revolution took place, the American revo-
lutionaries did not have to contend with mass immisera-
tion. Poverty there was, but it was not abject. This is
the salient difference and accounts for the success Arendt
accords the American revolutionaries. Because the New
World really did realize, though imperfectly, the dream of
abundance, necessity (and hence neither compassion nor
pity) never pressed itself upon the revolutionary agenda.
Consequently the American revolutionaries remained com-
mitted to "the foundation of freedom," and to "the estab-
lishment of lasting institutions," remaining undistracted
by the effort to "re-order society." 45
This is the main line. There is, however, an inter-
esting, apparently contradictory secondary story line, a
sort of counterpoint to the main theme that comes in the
form of a reminder. We must recall, she notes, that this
argument notwithstanding, such abject misery did indeed
exist in the form of black labor and black slavery. There
were approximately 4 00,000 black slaves as compared to the
1,850,000 whites in mid 18th century America. 46 Yet she
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points out that this did not inspire either compassion or
solidarity in Americans. Hence what the relative
prosperity in America and this indifference to slavery
meant was that those in the American revolution were never
tempted by what she calls (in an echo of Nietzsche) "the
test of compassion. "47 Consequently they remained, Arendt
argues, realists with strong common sense, a realism how-
ever bought with indifference. The price paid, though
less than that paid by those who were successfully tempted
to make compassion the ground of their revolutionary ef-
fort at founding a new political order, was tragic just
the same.
The general outline of her argument is that the fail-
ure to be tried by this "test of compassion," by "passion
in its noblest form" meant that, their own experience and
not infrequent expression of the passion for public life
notwithstanding, the American revolutionaries were unable
to break out of the confines of their inherited liberal
intellectual tradition to see the need both to more fully
conceptualize their passion for public freedom, and to in-
stitutionalize it by giving constitutional recognition to
those quintessential spaces for public freedom - the local
town meetings. The American founders remained bound by
the liberal enlightenment equation of thought with reason,
and of reason with rationality, a rationality which was to
rule over passion understood in terms merely of desire.
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Although this reduction of passion to desire belied the
depth of their own experience of public freed™, Arendt
suggests that precisely because they had no profound expe-
rience with compassion for the iterated, they were un-
able to forge new conceptual ground.
And here we arrive at what at first glance appears to
be a curious contradiction in Arendt's discussion of the
relationship between compassion and politics and the so-
cial question. On the one hand, the French revolu-
tionaries were subjected to the test of compassion and
failed miserably; their effort to found a stable political
order was overwhelmed by pity for the impoverished. The
Americans, by contrast, lacked all experience with compas-
sion and consequently failed to save the "treasure" of
their experiences
- the spaces where citizens could find
public happiness and engage their "passion for distinc-
tion." The force of Arendt's argument is that had the
Americans had to wrestle with the test of compassion they
could have come to understand at a deep level the in-
justice of abject want and of mere poverty, what Arendt
calls, "the crippling consequences of obscurity." 48 About
those in darkness John Adams, in an exemplary but rare ex-
pression of such understanding wrote, "...he is in as much
obscurity as he would be in a garret or a cellar. He is
not disapproved, censured, or reproached; he is only not
seen..." 49 Had the founders felt, not indifference but
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compassion towards the poQr ^ ensiaved< ^^have developed a feeling of solidarity with them which
would nave made their particular political predicants,
or their "curse" as Arendt puts it, painfully, even pas-
sionately clear. Such a feeling of solidarity would have
reminded the founders themselves of that passion for dis-
tinction which was the source of their own happiness dur-
ing the course of the revolution and the founding of the
republic. it might even have riveted their sensibilities
enough to their own experiences so as to move the, towards
a break with their enlightenment view of the role of
government as the rule of reason over passion. Arendt
writes,
nob?^,
P
?n
Si°n ^ neVer tempted them in its
easv tn *V0mpaSSi0n ' the* found it
^
o think ° f Pass ion in terms of desire
Ha 1 aniSUr°m 11 any connotation of itsoriginal meaning, which is... to suffer andto endure. This lack of experience givis"1
n
r
f
t e°r
f
1f' even if they are sound, anair o lightheadedness, a certain weight-lessness, which may well put into jeopardytheir durability. For, humanly speaking, itis endurance which enables man to createdurability and continuity." 50
The social question did have a critical impact upon
the American founders not, she argues, in the form of
necessity but in the form of the "fatal passion for sudden
riches." 51 Never was there nor is there yet, Arendt
argues, a clear-cut resolution in favor of freedom or
prosperity. 52 Had the founders had compassion for the
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poor and been moved by this compassion to a feeling of
solidarity with the*, they would have been capable, not of
reducing the multitude to a single entity as happened in
the French effort at solidarization, nor of forgetting the
predicaments of the poor. Rather, they would have been
capable of comprehending the multitude conceptually, that
is, of comprehending rich and poor alike and of establish-
ing a community of interest between them. m so doing,
their gaze would have been riveted to the peculiar in-'
justice of obscurity, and they would have more clearly
seen the source of their own happiness, and tried both to
conceptually grasp it as well as to provide an institu-
tional home for its appearance. Both achievements would
have brought this experience more fully into being, given
it standing, reality and hence endurance. In so endowing
this political way of life and its passion for distinction
with reality they would have offered an alternative to the
passion for riches which, Arendt argues, flooded the Amer-
ican polity in successive waves as the European poor
crossed the Atlantic. The tragedy of the American Revolu-
tion was that the founders came close to saving the repub-
lic from elevating life to the highest good and from em-
bracing the passion for "conspicuous consumption" which
has largely come to replace the passion to excel in public
life in Arendt 's view. 53 Very nearly did the American
revolutionaries overcome the specifically "modern
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sensiMlity whose distinguishing characteristic is that
it "is not touched by obscurity .
"
5 4
What we find here in these accounts of the French and
American revolutions is what appears to be a contradic-
tion, on the one hand, an absolute rejection of the un-
compromising "inner processes of the soul" when it comes
to the task of giving form and shape to political life;
and on the other, an argument that it was precisely the
absence of such inner stirrings which had serious negative
consequences for political life. The problem she wrestles
with is the need for compassion in order to have
solidarity with the "oppressed and exploited," on the one
hand, but the political perniciousness of compassion if it
becomes the foundation of politics - taking the form of
Pity, on the other. she says compassion is politically
irrelevant because it destroys the distance between per-
sons, m the intensity of identification with another's
suffering the compassionate person loses the capacity for
argumentative speech, for talk about shared interests.
The compassionate cannot stand the suffering of others and
hence if they are moved to act, eschew persuasion and ne-
gotiation in favor of violence. From this Arendt con-
cludes that the heart needs to be hidden in darkness. Yet
this darkness must not be a void. The human heart must
beat
- which is another way of saying be torn and ravaged
by the world. The accomodation she makes I think is that
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the heart must be that which «oves us to formulate princi-
ples upon which to act, principles such as solidarity, hut
it xtself Must not become the basis upon which we act
The heart should "arouse" our sensibilities but not move
us to action. (In this sense I think Leon Botstein is
quite right when he suggests that, "Arendt's implicit
psychology (psychology is consistently absent from her
considerations in a formal sense) is more akin to Rous-
seau's (despite her distrust of compassion as a political
virtue) than to Locke's." 55
)
Both the darknesses of the inner life and the light
of the public world must exist in careful tension, both
protected from each other but not utterly dirempt. m
this sense we must see that instead of a compassionate
sense for the injustice of social and economic in-
equalities as the basis for public action, our public life
ought to be based on principles and the fight against the
injustice of obscurity. Yet it must be noted that while
Arendt rises against the modern insensitivity to this in-
justice it is not for utter exposure that she argues. if
it is true that it is only politics which concerns itself
with plurality as such, it is also true that we require an
active inner life, in Arendt's view, in order to be
capable of encompassing the reality of others; of "think-
ing in the place of another" which is the essence of
political judgment. It is in the tension between light
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and dark
,
appearance and disappearance, process and static
for. that a specifically hu,an reality can occur and a
specific for, of life develop over and against the pos-
sibility of sheer happenings, sheer processes of Ufe To
argue this we raust .ore closely exanine the theatrical
metaphors which reign in Arendt's political theory, the
ontological foundations of her wort, and the specific
aesthetic sensibility she would cultivate. This I will do
in chapter six.
305
ENDNOTES
1Hannah Arendt, on Revolntinn /m^o-.
Penguin Book^
,T^fffj^S^ . Mlddlesex ' England:
2
"What is Authority," page 94.
3
SS~l#tls!= Sat
ters Arendt 's critique of "modernity" is
tE? ^ribreaks do- ^to bo?h earS and worlS'aUena-
preSise" isXt v^V^' 8 " largely—gued "
?h?« ««h t should be at home in the world Tot is end he argues she counsels acceptance and a 1,
closrL^teb^^-^ ^G hUman co^tion? ^ndTcomes
c ex I**?
t0 Heidegge^s Gelassenheit, and
oL S h!^ a "humanism of confinement .» (page 164)
thf iLJ?
misses
'
ln tense and strained argumente real meaning of the essential tensions within thehuman condition Arendt repeatedly suggests are a
Sntive'to
0
^
0
'^ fUllY hUman ' »ad he bee* more at-
«rm^«% hG W°Uld haVe Seen that Arendt clearlyargues for a great deal of necessary alienation as partof the yery "stuff" of giving shape to a political-
! hl f?; T° ^Uate this With Gelassenheit and toattribute to her a kind of nostalgic desire for "home"does her a real disservice.
4Hannah Arendt, The Human CnnHiHon, (Chicago: The Univer-sity of Chicago Press, 1958), page 69.
5The Human Condi ti on
r
page 188.
6See "On Humanity in Dark Times, Thoughts on Lessing " inMen in Dark Times, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
1955), pages 6 and 20. '
7
"Thoughts on Lessing," page 20.
306
8
"Thoughts on Lessing," page 6.
11
in he^verfnL^^v^3^ "ith Leah Bradshaw's argument
of human endeavor and achievement and subordinate*the contemplative life to the active 1 i f«T
c rdlnate
and 102), and that furthermore? beginning'^hlr* ^report on Eichmann, this changed and Arendt shifted fm,
04?
PSSeyiB fc?Cti?" t0 PrimaCy °" "ought "fpage
from her r £*h£Y,\ 8hlf fc ln What Arendt examines
states when =L 2 ^ iater Work ' but Bradshaw over-
rti?ff
she tries to argue one or the other was at
Rather Arendt
th0
?
ght bY Arendt to be "PrimlryT"
"*
against, f n 38 to assert the importance -inst the philosophical tradition - of arti™ <-
assertion!^ ^^"^
° f thi"k1^ °" ^ basfs^this
12The Origins of To-halitari ani g™
,
page 447>
13The Origins of Tnt-
a
litari.ni gffl| page 465 .
14The Origins of TotaUtarj^sm
) Preface, page xxx.
15The Origins of Totalitari ani sm
,
page 466.
16The Origins of Tntalitari anim , page 219.
17The Origins of Totalitari ani rtti
r
page 146.
18The Origins of Totalitar i an i sm
r
page 161.
19See George Kateb's Hannah Arendt. Poli tics Consni^n^
Evil, especially the chapter "The Theory of PoliticalAction," in which the imbalance in his reading of
Arendt's glorification of political action as opposed toher "scorn" and "distaste" for unworldly activities withthe exception of thinking, scientific knowing and con-
templation is most evident.
20Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind: Thinking and Win -
307
ing, (New York: Harcourt RMnQ t40. U ' Brace Jovanovich, 1978), page
Thinking, pages 36-37.
22The Human Conditio, page 47>
23The Human Condi tioh, page 55.
24The Human Cbn^ition., page 94.
2 5The Human Condit-ion, page 106>
26The Human Condition, page 98.
2
7
the Human CondiHnn, page 118>
The Human Condition
,
page 2 65.
30Thinking
f page 46.
1The Human Condii-inr., page 5>
320n Revolution
,
page 96.
330n Revolntinn, page 95.
340n Revolution
,
page 97.
350n Revolution
,
page 74.
36It is not unimportant to note that while there is thisconceptual debt and continuity, Arendt considers thediscovery of pity as a sentiment to be an expUcity mod-
critW if'? n0t aPPear to Bhare
P
Nieizsch^slqU® °£ Christianity on the grounds that it rests on
of JeSuJ
r
^f
nl
? "J
th
?
lGaSt hGr readin
^
of the ^ings s' life is far less ambiguous than Nietzsche's.
3 7On Revolution
,
page 90.
380n Revolution
,
page 89.
3 9On Revolution
,
page 93.
400n Revolution
,
page 90.
410n Revolution .
308
42Pn_Revolution, page 33.
430n Revolution
f page 114
<
^1^^ «* P^ < New <*— Press
450n Revolution, pages 92 and 69.
470n Revolution
,
page 95.
480n Revolution
,
page 69.
On Revolution, page 69.
50On Revolution
,
page 95.
5
1
On Revolution, page 139.
520n Revolution
,
page 137.
530n Revolution
,
page 70.
J ^0n Revolution
.
55
!rno
Ha
3
n
a978n
d
3; 5
°PPOSing Vie"S " " artisan Regigw
309
CHAPTER VI
"THE PASSION FOR SEEING" 1
A. Introducfinn
in this chapter I will deVelop the complicated and in-
teresting sensibility for the aesthetic dimension of exis-
tence which lies at the center of Arendt's thought. The
marks of this sensibility must be traced if we are to ful-
ly probe the ethical relevance of her thought for our
time. This is, surprisingly, not an argument commonly
made among scholars of Arendt, and a review of secondary
literature reveals that they either ignore the aesthetic
dimension of Arendt's work, leave it vastly un-
derdeveloped, or misunderstand it. 2 Leah Bradshaw, for
example, in her very thoughtful work on Arendt, argues
that, "the aesthetic dimension of life is rarely mentioned
[by Arendt].'-3 In the earliest book.length £tudy Qf
Arendt's thought, Margaret Canovan mentions the aesthetic
dimension of life only in the final chapter amidst a dis-
cussion of the importance of Kant's Critique of t,,^
for Arendt's concept of the political and of thought it-
self. 4 But her discussion is brief and wholly un-
derdeveloped. In a later article, Canovan does more deep-
ly explore these initial reflections on the relationship
between aesthetics and politics by arguing that Arendt's
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best understood oy ..making explicit an anaiogy
politics and high culture wh . ch is ^^^^ ^ w^t_
ings...5 Althoug„ this approaoh , s ^ ^s^
fits, the relationship is far more intimate a one than
that of analogy
- as I shall demonstrate.
By contrast, Bhikkhu Parekh immediately sets out in
his Preface the claim that, "Arendt is almost alone in the
history o, political philosophy to view politics as an
aesthetic activitv" uhiVh k~ t x.y w c he later defines as "[making]
the world a beautiful place. -6 Yet ^
Philosophical depth in the body of the book and only cur-
sory notice. m a .ore recent study, shiraz Dossa makes a
bold and interesting argument at the outset which places
an aesthetic orientation at the center of Arendt's work.
He argues that Arendt's political theory "is to an unusual
degree literary in many of its substantive concerns, "7 and
that in fact she "makes no distinction between the
literary and the political. "8 He defines the literary as
above all concerned with the act of discovering this world
and its meaning, and situates the identity between the
literary and the political "on the plane of attitudes and
dispositions. "9 Yet while this argument illuminates
Arendt's conception of the public realm and political ac-
tion at a general level, Dossa finds he must "strip" pub-
lic citizenship of its "theatrical dressing" to arrive at
the "substantial core" of Arendt's conception of the pub-
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lie realm as he fPnHc . ^n e ds off the charge that Arendt's
theatrical conception of politic, has fallen prey to
aesthetic, and hence to amorality.
„ence, despite ini-
tially making aesthetics central to his interpretion
Dossa, in a disappointing
,ove, largely empties Arendt's
thought of its aesthetic foundation, and in so doing
deprives his readers of much ofr the power and potential
relevance of the work itself.
Those scholars of Arendt who see the central ity of
the aesthetic dimension to Arendt's work but misunderstand
it primarily „iss the novelty of the relationship she
draws between aesthetics and politics. This occurs some-
times amidst an effort to defend her work, more often
amidst an effort to dismiss it. Thus, for example, Lionel
Abel, in "The Aesthetics of Evil," argues that Arendt's
judgments both of the Jewish councils and of Eichmann are
aesthetic and hence neither moral nor political." m his
response to Abel, Daniel Bell sustains the clear-cut
separation between politics and aesthetics Abel makes, and
argues it is Arendt's adherence to a single standard of
universal order which gives her a tone of coldness and
distance, a tone Bell thinks Abel mistakes for aesthetic
judgment since both justice and aesthetics "derive from a
singular preoccupation and are also separate from morality
and also have a formal quality. «" m a tendentious arti-
cle, Martin Jay also sustains the separation, arguing that
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ion
ons
Arenas
"aestheticization of politics," by which ne means
the disjuncture she makes between political and "any ra-
tional, utilitarian, historical and social foundations,"
makes her greatest affinity to the political exis-
tentialists of the pre-war years, especially the deci-
sionists. m this context, he goes on to suggest that
Arendt succumbed to the dangers and charms of fascism."
What these three thinkers have in common is the convict
that aesthetics and politics are two different dimensi
of existence which, as such, should be strictly kept
apart. However, it is this conviction against which
Arendt 's work so uncomfortably chafes, and which we must
substantially relinquish if we are to adequately explore
and appreciate her work, and in some cases even correctly
identify her concerns in the first place.
The dangers here are too well known to merit great
articulation, yet their general outline should be devel-
oped. In our post-metaphysical age when neither the
Divine, nature, nor tradition can provide the "fixed means
of support" by which we orient ourselves morally in the
world, the dangers reside chiefly in the possibility that
a politics founded and oriented aesthetically, that is, a
politics devoted to great and beautiful action, would be
sorely incapable of placing ethical limits on action. If
creating and saving x the deed' becomes everything, all
things must be sacrificed to the end of aesthetic ex-
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oellence and aesthetic pleasure. And if
, in the
Nietzschean tradition, this pieasure is pieasure in one's
own strength or power, the danger is that politics and
justice too will beco,e a function of the win, and thus
have only subjectivist foundations. Justice, as a func-
tion of the will becomes equivalent tQ the exoeUence pe _
-liar to the strong. The historical experience of course
which demands that we reckon with such fears was the as-
cendant standard of the blond-haired, blue-eyed Teutonic
Aryan of the Nazi period to whose superior beauty and ex-
cellence all others were supposed to be sacrificed.
Martin Jay is not alone in suggesting parallels be-
tween Arendt's work and fascist political thought. m
Politics, conscience, Evil
,
George Kateb cannot come to a
resolution about the parallels. He identifies them as a
common anti-utilitarianism, a reliance on mutual pledging
(which he comes close to equating with oath taking)
, and
the aim of interrupting the automatism of all processes by
asserting the unnatural or artificial against the natural
or every day." Despite his lack Qf resolution< Katefa
clearly does not believe that Arendt in the main success-
fully places sufficient moral limits on political ac-
tion. 14 And his objections to Arendt's work insofar as
her conception of action is at best amoral and probably
immoral, 15 is closely bound with her aestheticism. He
lays the blame for the inadequacy of moral limits at the
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door of what he oalls> „the existential supremacyn
gives to pontic! action. By this he refers to her view
that poiitica! action is unique in its capacity to in-
nate ana render coherent the self and the human condition
The ultimate value of action, then, lies in
its ability to redeem and justify existence, m this
respect action is intimately connected to art and hence to
an aesthetic sensibility, for, as Kateb points out, the
redemptive nature of action can only be p^festgd through
art by being artistically rendered. In this transfigured
state it can be saved from time's indifference. So far so
good. However, as we explore further, it becomes clear
that Kateb 's reading of Arendt's aestheticism is
guietistic, and that he therefore underemphasizes the ac-
tive, culture-shaping, reflective dimension of her politi-
cal theory. He characterizes Arendt's basic orientation
to the human condition as a composite feeling: first a
(Greek) shocked wonder at that which is, a feeling which
must be
-dwelt in,"" and second/ an(J mQre ^.^^ ^
he calls her "doctrine of thereness as beauty. "18 The
latter feeling he equates with acceptance and gratitude
for the beauty of the world, but he suggests hers is a
"non-aesthetic sense of beauty" by which he means that the
world we find ourselves in, if not itself beautiful,
should evoke in us those feelings beauty arouses - the
predominant one being gratitude. On his reading what
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gives action
"existential supremacy," thus
, ^ ^^ity to reconcile us, to provoice our acceptance and to make
us feel at home, a state Kateb thinks Arendt conceives of
as lacking in alienation.
The problem with this reading is that not only does
xt not make sense of the central place of natality and in-
itiative in Arendt's thought, but it cannot ma*e sense of
statoMents such as the following which Arendt placed in
the Preface to the first edition of Th^rigins^f
Total itarianigm-
denSeheI?f i0^ in Sh°rt ' means the unprece-
of realty l^t l^t UP to ^_resLSSg
Sin"? 9 ^a ever it may beTT^^^f
in this statement of her intentions, which remain constant
throughout Arendt's work, we find an effort to register
with wondering shock the impact of the new, and to resist
where resistance is called for. This is far from the ac-
ceptance Kateb argues Arendt counsels, and it suggests
that he sets up an obscuring dichotomy in her thought be-
tween a dominant action for action's sake in which the ex-
istential supremacy of action lies in aesthetic recon-
ciliation and acceptance, and a lesser voice of action for
justice' sake in which we actively orient ourselves ethi-
cally.
Mikael Denneny is virtually alone among scholars of
Arendt in suggesting the ways Arendt's work positively re-
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lates ethics and aesthetics
. ^ ,^ ^
gestive article he argues that Arendt makes an effort to
reintegrate and reestablish relations between those two
fields within philosophy where human values are at stake -
ethics and aesthetics 20 t«1CS
"
In the modern age these two
fields became "suddenly.
. .two seMraf0 » *y...-c par te and major fields of
Philosophical inquiry,-.21 with relatively abysmal results
Denneny suggests that if we look back upon Arendt's last
imaginative work on political judgment, and then to her
earliest writing, "her last unwritten work now appears as
the natural unfolding of the discoveries she made in her
investigation of totalitarianism. "22 The importance of
this comment in the context of this work is that if Den-
neny is right, from Arendt's earliest to her latest works,
we can discern a constant preoccupation with questions of
justice in the form of how to ethically limit action. And
this is a discernment I suggest, with Denneny, only pos-
sible if we locate at the center of Arendt's work her fun-
damental concern for the political relevance of the
aesthetic dimension of existence.
My approach to Arendt's work, then, is informed by
this claim to a unity of purpose from beginning to end,
and is thus synthetic in nature. 23 There is a bedrock of
continuity in Arendt's political-ethical-aesthetic con-
cerns. From her claim that in the totalitarian system, in
which all men have become equally superfluous, we must
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recognize radical evil -24 *.n K«, to her articulation of "the
right to have rights"25 which correspQnds ^ ^^ ^
a community „illing to guarantee any ^^.^
to her argument in EictaaJm_in^sAleffl , that the m_
precedented crime of genocide was
-an attack upon human
diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic of the
"human status" without which the very words "mankind" or
"humanity" would be devoid of meaning; "27 to her celebrg _
tion of the republican form of government as that form
most suited to her ethical framework since it is most
capable of celebrating human plurality and freedom; to her
final and unfinished preoccupation with judging which she
argued was "one of the most important activities in which
this sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass, "28 what
we find is a continuous concern with what we traditionally
call ethical questions. And these questions find their
supporting ground in her ontological and aesthetic reflec-
tions which it is my aim in this chapter to elaborate.
Before turning directly to Arendt's ontological and
aesthetic reflections, however, we should take note of her
interpretation of Nietzsche's proclamation regarding the
end of traditional metaphysics. While Nietzsche
proclaimed, "God is Dead," Arendt restated our situation
as being, "the traditional thought of God is
dead, "(emphasis mine) 29 By this she meant that we no
longer are able to sustain belief in the existence of an
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other-worldly realm of Truth ui and Harmony in such a way
that it can be political^ meaningful. she wrote,
wnolor s^? j °ined the ranks of thoseWHO fo ome time now have been attemotina
W?th llTHl naPhySiCS ' and Phi^so^y
g
thlm 2i if categories, as we have knowne from their beginning in Greece untiltoday. such dismantling is possible olil on
is broken
P
and
n
^
h
r thr^d ° f ^aditLn
renew it »38
that Sha11 not be able to
Ours is a position at once new and a return to a be-
ginning which Arendt captures by culling the e^^exience
behind the central story of beginnings in the West, "we
know only "male and female created he them" - that is,
from the beginning this plurality poses an enormous prob-
lem. "31 Today
, as once befor^ ^ stand ^ ^
Plural. And this of course means not only that the prob-
lem of ultimates is a problem for philosophers, as it has
always been, but for us all. it has become a political
problem which means that questions of authority and of
limits to human action have perhaps become the central
difficulties.
It is from this utterly unstable situation forced
upon us, in Arendt 's view, by modern events that she takes
her bearings. That is, this condition of naked plurality
becomes for Arendt the beginning for all ethical reflec-
tion. What is of very much importance to note here is
that despite the end of faith in a metaphysical order,
despite our return to the state of being "newborns," as
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Nietzsche put it, it is not with nothing we are left. We
are not "groundless." Arendt does not use this metaphor
which by now rises so naturally to the postmodern lips,
instead she uses the metaphor, "thinking without a
banister;" in German, "Denken ohne Gelaender." she ex-
plains it thusly,
"That is, as you go up and down the stairsyou can always hold on to the banister so
^V°U t°n,t fal1 dOWn ' But we h^e lostthe banister. That is the way I tell it to
do
S
"32* this is indeed what I try to
Far from groundless, she is suggesting that what we indeed
do have is the ground. And from the beginning, Arendt ac-
cepts this ground, banisterless though it be, as the
starting point for reestablishing bearings, for she
argues, "plurality is the law of the earth." 33
B. Ontology of Display
"In this world which we enter, appearing
from a nowhere, and from which we disappearinto a nowhere, Being and Appearing coin-
cide ... Nothing and nobody exists in the
world whose very being does not presuppose a
spectator
... Not Man but men inhabit this
planet. Plurality is the law of the
earth.
"
34
In these few lines which constitute the essence of
the first paragraph of the opening chapter of Thinking
,
the ethical-aesthetic texture of what I will call Arendt 's
ontology of display are laid forth. Arendt 's basic ap-
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preach to the nature of reality is phenonenal, and „e
should take note at the outset that the central metaphor
wh.ch carries the weight of her phenonenological concep-
tion of "what is,
» is that of the theater
. Like the
reality created on the stage, things and creatures of the
world are appearing in nature such that what appears is
"Meant to be" perceived
- seen, heard, touched, tasted and
smelled
-
by sentient creatures. Furthermore, without
this perceptivity, without sentient
"spectators,., nothing
is. Hence, plurality is the "law of the earth" in the
sense that for anything to be at all, the basic unit of
Plurality: actor-spectator or thing-sentient creature is
presupposed. Plurality guarantees and brings into being
"what is."
As creatures who both themselves appear and who per-
ceive others, who are both in this sense objects and sub-
jects, all sentient beings are "fit for" this world in
which Being and Appearing coincide. Critical to this
sense in which things are fit for the world is Arendt's
argument that we cannot make sense of the enormous rich-
ness of what is presented to the senses in functional
terms alone, as, for example, the need of the organism for
self-preservation or reproduction. When it comes to ap-
pearance there is a "sheer functional superfluity" in what
is displayed. 35 Experience intuitively confirms such
claims even at the most simple level of life as when we
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cast our eye along the edge of the sea liOH-i^ i- un ght ng upon the
almost fluorescent orange of the starfish clinging to dark
quickly pass over its pale purple sister, drawn towards
the delicate translucence of the sea anenome's emerald
fingers, and still on to marvel at the blood-red urchin's
Prickly spines, what can such colors be for, we wonder
Arendt suggests we not seek for an answer to this question
alone, or even primarily, in a functional direction. To
do so is to reduce the richness of "what is" in the manner
of a Philistine whose hallmark is, as she puts it in an-
other work, "an inability to think and to judge a thing
apart from its function or utility. "36 The surface prQfu_
sion of the world must be understood at a fundamental
level in terms of display.
We find a more active sense to this display quality
of the sentient world in higher animals, reaching its
climax in humans. In these higher forms of life, Arendt
argues, we can speak of what she calls the "urge to self-
display. "37 Here Arendt follQWS fche fascinating work Qf
Swiss biologist and zoologist Adolf Portmann in suggesting
that there is a spontaneous impulse to show or exhibit the
self, a response to "the overwhelming effect of being
shown. "38 she writeS( "whatever can see want* to be seen
whatever can hear wants to he heard, whatever can touch
presents itself to he touched . "39 Here toQ Arendt/s
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theatrical metaphors carry her meaning. Just as tne ac.
tor, on stage before the eyes of all feels the thrill of
being seen, and responds spontaneously to it by excelling
so too higher forms of life are possessed by an urge to
self-display
- understood not as the expression of some
inner authenticity, but as the urge to make its p^^
felt; to be recognized and acknowledged "as an individu-
al." 40 Here Arendt tries to articulate what she calls,
"the expressiveness of an appearance" which is of a dif-
ferent order from the common sense notion that when we
express something, it is something inner that is "pressed
out." This urge to display and self-display, which is the
very essence of things in an appearing world, by contrast,
expresses itself, it makes an effort to shine forth, to
excel in its individuality before others. Thus, inasmuch
as things appear, they "demand recognition and praise." 41
It is in this sense too that we should understand
Arendt 's claim that plurality is the law of the earth.
That is, sentient creatures, according to their com-
plexity, possess an active response to being perceived -
in the form of an impulse to distinguish themselves. Thus
"what is," is constantly contributing to and bringing
forth the wild spectacular quality of the world.
Here then, to summarize, we find an ontology of dis-
play which suggests that "reality" is something born out
of a highly charged mutual sensuous provocation between
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actors and spectators in ti. All Uvmg creatures are in this
respect linked together in a continuous though developfflen-
tally differentiated whole. Arendt uses the language o f
"impulse,.,
-urge,..
..spontaneity" to underline the
mysterious
..given" guality to this conception of the na-
ture of
-what is,. „he„ we speak of ^ ^^
of a universe alive with yearning to sense and be sensed,
of a universe which perpetually gives birth to its own
plurality and profusion.
Vet there is discontinuity between the natural and
the human as well, for "purely" natural things "e.anate"
this profusion; "they (have) no choice but to show
whatever properties a living being possesses. "42 Against
this backdrop of euanation humans prepare and n,ake this
profusion "fit for" thp wor-ine rld of appearance. m humans,
the urge to self-display is manifest in the effort "to
present ourselves in word and deed and thus indicate how
we wish to appear. "43 m this way humans bring forth the
plurality of the earth in a unique way, and it is this
which marks the radical discontinuity of the human species
with the rest of the natural world. I think we conceive
of this relation best as a continuity out of which dis-
continuity arises, as a "difference in identity," to use a
phrase Arendt coins with reference to the plurality in-
herent in the thinking ego.
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This ability to ErSSSDt ourselves is of courseArenas way of saying nutans alone have the ability to befree. In her political theory she calls it natality: the
capacity, as those with a beginning, to ourselves begin
act, initiate. yet
, we should be quick ^ ^ ^^does not »ean that humans create themselves. Arendt does
not share Hegelian-Marxist historicism. And the roots of
her dissent from this camp lie both in her insistence on
"the sheer thereness of beina " 4 4 ^ • t .u g, and in the fact of
Plurality itself. By this latter ! mean that because we
exist in the plural in an appearing world, the anlv mode
through which things can be acknowledged is in the way
they seem. Here again, the metaphor of the theatrical
stage carries her meaning. That which appears, in its
sheer thereness, is common to all, yet it is observed by
spectators, each of whom occupies a slightly different
"seat." It-seems-to-me, dokei^noi, as the fundamental
mode of appearance, Arendt argues, means that everything
which appears, whether it chooses or not, will acquire a
kind of "disguise" which inevitably thwarts our ability to
control the effect of our self-presentation on others, as
well as our ability to know others in any definitive
sense. There is a recalcitrant quality to our experience
of the world in which plurality reigns. This recal-
citrance suggests that in our natural urge to deliberately
present ourselves as distinct beings through word and
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— . we nust depend upon ^ perceptivity Qf ^
this means is that Arendt , s conception Qf effQrt ^
self-presentation (which she calls Hglory„
_
works,, is not a unidirectional,
megalomaniacal urge to be
admired by others. Kather, while clearly an urge ^ ^
acknowledged and a hope of being praised thi.y id a, s urge at the
center of the being of "man" is i„, n its very essence
"world open and communicative." (That this urge might ^
come distorted is beyond douht, and a healthy public cul-
ture and public sphere are Arendt's answers to such a pos-
sibiUty.) As ^ reference for the acfcor ^ a ^
always a specific audience, so our efforts at self-
presentation too always "dIav" <-„ .y pl y to a specific community.
intrinsic to our effort at self-presentation is a
deliberate responding to and moving out towards the plural
world of others in order that they perceive and hence hold
the reality of our individuality in being. Thus the very
quality and the character of our individuality emerges in
the interstices of the human world and is perpetually
evading transparent knowledge and control. m her politi-
cal theory this becomes the idea that we are non-sovereign
beings, and the essence of political action in this regard
is unpredictability.
The specific reality of human plurality hence is very
fragile, dependent as it is upon others willing and able
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to accept the recalcitrance ana unpredictability that we
-ch are. mtrinsic to the ability for such acceptance isthe existence of a world shared in common which offers ^
humans a "space of remembrance" < 5 and a ^
permanence amidst the evanescence of appearing and dis .
appearing in a phenomenal world. This world shared in
common consists both in an objective-in-between (the
materiality of nature and the durable goods o, the human
wcrld, whose durability wears down only very slowly
transcending individual use and thus providing humans with
tangible worldly interests, and the subjective-in-between
(words and deeds of "men") which in the form of stories
concepts, ideas, cultural norms, etc., constitute the in-
tangible web of human relatedness. 46
Arendt calls this common world artificial and un-
natural insofar as it is the product of deliberate acts
which, to be done, require that we win a certain freedom
from ever-recurring cycles of the life process. Hence, we
have the paradoxical idea that for humans to take our
place as earthly beings on this planet whose natural law
is plurality, we must build a common, relatively durable
human world in which our plurality can be explicitly made
manifest. This requires that we simultaneously thwart, to
a certain extent, the compelling dimension of that same
earth's nature, the dimension we must now briefly elabo-
rate.
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What Arendt calls
"necessity. is the other aspect Qfher ontological reflections which i have untn no„ held ^
abeyance in the effort both to highl ight the aesthetic
texture o, Arendt's ontology, and to unfold ^
of the case she makes for the ontoloaical nature of
Plurality. However,
"necessity," which subjects us all,
is equally important to Arendt's conception of "what is."
Fro* this angle, being is conceived of as a relentless
cycle of compelling, multipliers needs bounded on one
side by appearing (birth,
, and on the other by disappear-
ing (death,. Here, the world is one of intense functional
necessity in which natural beings are driven by survival
itself; in which the very beat of life wells out of the
crush to survive and not out of the incitements of dis-
play. Nature, on this account, as the life process,
presses inexorably on all living things, its mode compul-
sion and often violence. it is independent of will and
neither progresses nor regresses. It has no temporality;
it is the realm of "being-forever , ""7 endlessly turning,
ever recurring in its relentless fertility. Here, in some
basic sense, everything is the same insofar as all things
are coerced by a profusion of incoherent and conflicting
drives and needs in the service of the life process.
Arendt's ontological reflections revolve, thus,
around the paradoxical tension that "what is" is something
born of the driving coercive cycles of the life process,
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ana something overflowing with sensuous profusiQn ^
diversity which perpetually brings ltseif
that is, brings itsel£ intQ be . ng As x ^ t
'
brin9 lnt
°
teing the
°* ***n Plurality therefore
we must sustain a tension with the reality o f
..nature.-. J
tension which in ArpnHf'e +-v.e dt s theory appears as that between
the life process and the sDecifira iiv kp c lly human world, between
freedom and necessity. And this tension musfc be
if we are to achieve the first moment of ail ethical dis-
oernment: that is, simply being present to „what ^ ^
in its profusion and its compulsion. This means not
colonizing and not erasing alienation, but rather getting
to know and bringing into being the full shape, feel,
scent and texture of things.
Arendt
'. heightened focus on this moment arises out
of the experiences of totalitarian terror in which the
public sphere was wholly eclipsed, and an eerie sense of
irreality and non-being pervaded and 'structured' experi-
ence. It was this which led her to focus on the cen-
tral ity of both witnessing spectators (in her ontology of
display) and factuality (in her reflections on necessity)
as the two key dimensions of the real. Yet, as I shall
argue towards the close of this chapter, there is a very
important second ethical moment which consists in speaking
to one's present and claiming it as one's own. Both mo-
ments are central to what Arendt means by humanizing the
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world. In what follows 1 wUl aesthet . c
SenSibUitY
°
f tragiC
— * thin, Arendt suggests is
the sine aua non for such discernment - a sensibility
which is i„piicit in Arendt's ontology of display.
C. Tragic Pleasure: The First Moment
The central and rather large linkage between Arendt's
ontology of display and the aesthetic dimension is that
the very mode of appearing in a universe alive with an
urge to exhibit, a universe yearning to be sensed and ack-
nowledged, is aesthetic provocation. By excelling, humans
and other higher animals seek to provoke recognition and
praise of the very reality of their individuality. They
rely upon the recognition of others for full confirmation
of their being. This provocation is the manner in which
all living creatures, some more passively, make their ap-
pearance. Arendt writes,
"...whatever has a shape at all and is seencannot help being either beautiful, uqlv orsomething inbetween.
"
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Arendt here seems to imply that living creatures can-
not help but find things in their appearance aesthetically
pleasing or displeasing. Thus an aesthetic response is
natural, almost impulsive, and it is necessary in order
that the distinct and specific reality of things emerge.
Yet Arendt also suggests that humans constantly fall short
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of the kind of aesthetic sensibility necessary for the
Plurality inherent in the world to unfold. For this rea-
son, this aesthetic sensihinty
- as a finding pieasure in
the astivity of being provoked by^^ _
»ust he cultivated. It is this sensihiiity Arendt refers
to as "tragic pleasure," and it is characterized by the
willingness to accept and feel gladness in the recal-
citrant and plural quality of the world. This tragic
Pleasure is very close to the notion of gratitude Kateb
argues is Arendt's basic feeling towards the human condi-
tion, and which, therefore leads to a kind of ethical im-
mobility on her part. Vet, as we shall see, it is only
the first moment of Arendt's aestheticism, and cannot be
understood without the second, more actively shaping mo-
merit.
in the effort to elaborate this tragic pleasure as
well as to tease out the ethical underpinnings of Arendt's
reflections on it, I would like to turn to her analysis of
thinking which Arendt, like Nietzsche, conceives aestheti-
cally, though in importantly different ways. in the ac-
tivity of thinking and those who think, Arendt finds the
most pure expression of the tragic pleasure upon which the
rich plurality of the world depends. Instead of a
Nietzschean artistic fictioning which remains a largely
self-contained and self-referential activity, thinking for
Arendt, is the revelation of plurality through dialogue -
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with oneself to c=n*.« , .be sure, but dialogue which points out-
wards to the world of others.
^ BilLiif^thg^, Arendt ts driyen ^ invest ._
gate her suspicion that our ability to thin, is connected
to our ability to distinguish evil fro» good
. It is m-
what makes us think? Not only does she answer that it is
this basic and overarching aesthetic pleasure in praising
and not praising the sheer profusion of "what is-- that
makes us think, but she also suggests that this pleasure
is directly related to our capacity for moral discernment
as well.
Although Arendt relies on the
-representative func-
tion- of Socrates' life for a description of the activity
of thinking itself, she rejects Socrates' answer that it
is a desirous love of lovable things (beauty, wisdom, jus-
tice) which makes us think. Arendt begins her own effort
to answer the question by suggesting that in the thinking
activity itself life has deposited its fundamental plural
beat.
"Nothing perhaps indicates more stronglythat man exists essentially in the pluralthan that his solitude actualizes his merelybeing conscious of himself ... into a dualityduring the thinking activity itself." 49
Thinking is of the world in that it is the activity
in which we think about the world, in which we realize
ourselves as "question-asking" beings by splitting into
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two and carrying on a silent dialogue with ourselves It
is this ability to spiit into two, this
-inherent duality"
which Arendt argues
..points to the infinite piurality
which is the iaw of the earth.-- This two-in-one points
to the law of the earth because what thinking does is »ao-
tualize differenr-o » a^.4>-s,, 4. •irerence, activating consciousness which
without the thinking activity, can only think
and not^ it. Thinking thus unl^^ difference; it
releases or reveals the plurality of ^t^. And it does
so, as clearly both Plato and Socrates also reali zed, in a
dangerous way. Thinking, Arendt writes,
"inevitably has a
destructive, undermining effect" insofar as it "unfreezes"
what was settled and solid. 51 Things begin tQ ^^
pery when we talk about their meaning, nothing stays put
anymore, everything begins to move.""
However, what is in this context perplexing about
thinking is that though it "accompanies life" and is an
ever-present ability of everyone, it is not necessary to
us. we can go through the life process quite adequately
without it. The profuse and plural beat can be frozen
into singularity. And indeed this is the case much of the
time for many. What is it then which makes some think and
others not?
Arendt approaches an answer by describing the think-
ing activity itself through the example of Socrates. The
preconditions for thinking are solitude or absence from
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the world of appearances, ana the ability to remain on
gooa terms with ., our friend „ ^ ^ ^
who awaits us, we familiarly oall conscience
, .
Arendt suggests, who is not always present to us but only
"hen
"
WS *° h°- 53 And as we learn fro* the
socratic daimon, it never tells us what to do but only
what not to do if „e wish to maintain our dialogue with
him. Hence, though thinking, as this friendship with our-
selves which opens up difference, is always a possibility
we need not go home; we need not return to reflective
dialogue in the course of which
-things get slippery."
And what makes some do so is, Arendt suggests, the
pleasure in being "fully alive."
"Thinking accompanies life and is itself thede-materialized quintessence of being alive-and since life is a process, its quintes-sence can only lie in the actual Sinkingprocess and not in any solid result or
ifaufie n
h°U
^S - A Ufe without thinkings quit possible; it then fails to developits essence
- it is not merely meaningless-it is not fully alive." 54
i ,
importantly, over and against the platonic conception
of thinking as love of lovable or perfect things, and the
"two-world theory" which follows therefrom, Arendt places
thinking squarely in the world, despite its undeniable
characteristic of being "out of order." Thinking, Arendt
argues, is something we may do continuously throughout our
lives; it accompanies life. It is out of order in the
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sense that it is an invisible activity concerned with in-
visible things in a world of appearances. But it does not
point to a world of true Being, nor it is it activated by
love of such things. This is one of the Metaphysical fal-
lacies, indeed, thinking's perpetual
"non-results- defy
the possibility that such a world exists. And this other-
worldly dream imagines and hopes for a day when thinking
would no longer be necessary. This, in Arendt's view
would be akin to death. it is not love of perfect things,
then, but pleasure in the sheer activity of
-actualizing
difference" which draws some "home" and others not.
Arendt notes the curious emptiness of such an ac-
tivity from the standpoint of the actor. m itself it
achieves nothing; it is as endless or pointless as the
cyclical life process itself. And it is this empty im-
practical quality that is at the heart of the charges of
formalism and immorality Arendt's critics levy at her.
And, to be sure, there is a great degree of formalism in
this notion of tragic pleasure which drives a profitless
thinking activity. Vet there is a very important connec-
tion which Arendt pursues between this activity and our
ability to distinguish right from wrong. She suggests
that without a pleasure in the sheer profusion of things,
without a pleasure in plurality and difference, we cannot
even begin the elementary movement away from the blunt
presence of things, a movement which is the precondition
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for our ability to thin* not what something i,, but about
it. And this ability, of course, is a precondition for
any specifically moral-ethical refaction which concerns
the good or bad nature of things, as well as the very con-
tent of such categories themselves.
Arendt gives a very interesting example which clearly
illustrates the relation between ethics and aesthetics as
she comments on the profitlessness of thinking from the
standpoint of the actor. In discussing the way that
reflective thinking unfreezes meanings into their multi-
tude, she comments,
Itf^l*™^3 ' this kind of Pondering
in ih^10n d°eS n0t Pr°duce definitions andthat sense is entirely without results
^ou!e"
S
mTah?
dy P°nd^d the ^ingnouse ig t make his own look better." 55
We should, I think, read this "look" in a deep sense.
Reflective thinking, by unleashing the plurality of the
world, lays the foundation for a kind of heightened care
for our world that is ethical and aesthetic in nature.
The aesthetic sensibility of tragic pleasure that drives
us to think, which allows us to see, activates our concern
for "what is": that it be good, that it be beautiful, that
it be worthy
- though, and this is critical, this
sensibility itself is not born of a love of lovable
things
.
To underline this last point: it should be clear that
the sensibility which undergirds this elementary ability
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to^ away from the sheer thergness q£ ^ ^ ^
Pleasure in the earths profusion
, is not merely ^^
Pleases in an immediate, gratifying sort Qf^ ^ ^
it pleasure in harmony as oneness. Rather, lt is a
Pleasure in the sublime splendor of the world; that is i„
the splendor of a world a iways potentiaily on the verge of
berng overwhelm by the dangerous and unpredictable, the
challenging end different, and perhaps even the ugly and
horrific. it is the experience of this kind of "tragic-
pleasure which Arendt refers to as the
-home" to which
those who think are spelled to return again and again.
Like the actor in Arendt's political theory, the thinking
spectator too must take sometimes terrible risks; be will-
ing to see "what is." The reward is an
-intensified
awareness of reality."
While some have interpreted Arendt's conception of
this home as one of "harmony and unity"56 it is narmonious
only insofar as the two friends to the dialogue share a
commitment to remaining on speaking terms so that they can
"actualize difference." The distinction Arendt makes as
she discusses the political relevance of friendship in
"Thoughts on Lessing" between fraternity and friendship in
this context is illustrative. Fraternity is what we seek
when we seek warmth, safety. To this end we draw near to
others, avoid disputes. We reach for a kind of stillness,
singularity, for surcease of conflict which, in times of
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political persecution. may be fundamental fcQ ^
of our sense o f identity. By contrast, friendship con-
sists of a passionate openness to the world, a cogent
to sharing it with others such that what each Mee»s true"
can both link and separate us
_ ostabUBhing ^
tances between men which together comprise the world "57
Disputation thus is critical, the relation laced not with
sentimentalism, but with sobriety and coolness. 58 Insofar
as there is harmony, it consists in that shared passion
Lessing called "gladness" for the fundamental relativity
and plurality of the human world, and for the dispute in-
herent in dialogue which keeps plurality in being.
It is with this sense of harmony in mind that Arendt
affirmatively quotes yosal Rogat's characterization of the
offense to which our century gave birth:
"...a great crime offends nature, so that
^il
V
v^l»?
rth
°
rir °Ut f°r ve"^nce; that
tlttZ *J 3 natural harmony which onlylbu
^
lon can restore; that a wronged col-
™n?«h ll
°"eS 3 dUty
Rl0 the m°«l °rder topunis the criminal." 59
This is no image of "that which is" as a single melodious
line, but as a full-part harmony which reaches its depths
through tensions in which musical transgression and accord
follow one upon the other - now searingly painful, now
tender, now sounding both tones. The pagan spirituality
which fills Arendt's pages is praise for the painful mul-
tiplicity of the natural world and the plurality of the
human world. There is much of Nietzsche's spirit here.
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see
c
" we turn now to a discussron of the other pole ofArenas ontological refactions - necessity, we win
Arendt exemplifying this first moment of the aestheti
sensibility of tragic pleasure.
1 • The Human Conrm-i^n
"We walk with alien feet- we see „;. h
eyes; we recognize and greet people Si^""alien memory; we live from alre^'abor!"^"
Arendt's reflections on necessity are the most trou-
bling and least understood aspect of Th^uMax^onditlsn.
The prevailing reading by scholars of Arendt is that as
ceaseless compulsion, necessity must be donated so that
we can lead a fully human life in which we are freed for a
life of speech and action. Like Aristotle, to whom Arendt
is much indebted in this text, the ontological status of
necessity, it is argued, is far lower than the life of
speech and action. The apparent insensitivity Arendt ex-
hibits towards the life of anijsa^aborans
, her failure to
find much specifically human and thus exalted about it,
and her concomitant celebration of politics as something
having apparently little to do with life's necessary and
compelling dimensions, are at the heart of the moral ob-
jections to Arendt's work and the charges of aestheticism,
formalism and amorality many levy at her conception of the
political. I think Arendt's understanding of this dimen-
sion of the human condition is far more complex. In what
follows I will illuminate this more complex reading of
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necessity as well as the aesthetic sensibility Arendt ex-hibits in her reflection, on it. , will also shQw ^
ethical dimension of this sensibility which is intimately
tied to our capacity to see the real ir, <-cn ln its compelling
dimension as necessity.
If we loox closely at this text, with eyes sensitized
by the foregoing discussion of Arendt >s ontology of dis-
play where we find that difference arising out of identity
characterizes her understanding of the relation between
non-human nature and the specifically human world, what we
find is a concerted effort on her part to search not only
f°r what is specifically human, but to argue that for a
tnlta human life, all dimensions of the human condition
must exist in great, but fruitful tension. Arendt tries
to see and value the human condition in its "naked
Plurality." And her arguments for a fully human life are
fundamentally put in term^ nfjr u x ns o a full sensibility for "what
is, » for the real
.
What this naked plurality means in terms of the need
humans have to orient and make ourselves fit for ap-
pearance in a post-metaphysical world, a world without a
fixed center is that, with Einstein, we must deny that "at
any definite present instant all matter is simultaneously
real. "61 This general re i ativity of all things, including
the dimensions of the human condition, means that it is
the specific quality of the real to be evasively multi-
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dimensional in a world without banisters t«"d . in such a world
we need a theatrical agixity, an ability to looK at the
"OCld fr°B mUltiPle ^andpoints if „e are to keep its ^
reality in being. And further< as Me lgarn ^^
Pleasure not only in the harmony but also in the disaccord
which exists between dimensions of human existence as they
reveal themselves to us from varying standpoints, our
sense of reality will be heightened. We will be more ful-
ly present to the world.
Thus, if Arendt can be said to have a method in The
H^an^dlt^, it is to inhabit what Shiraz Dossa has
aptly enough called the "sensibilities-62 which goyern ^
three activities most fundamental to human life: labor,
work and action. Arendt herself sometimes referred to'
these sensibilities as "mentalities," and she personified
them in the actor, h^mo_^aber, and anima^abprans
. m so
doing she gives her readers something akin to flesh and
blood so that we may deeply inhabit their respective
orientations to the world. it is critical to note, since
it is the source of much misunderstanding of this text,
that these figures do not represent whole persons or
classes of persons, but are competing, conflicting and in-
terdependent sensibilities or standpoints within the self
towards the world in general. This of course is not to
say that one sensibility may not dominate a particular
historical period or a particular class of persons. In
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was
fact the balance of these sens ibilities in our tlme
the impetus which led Arendt to write the boo, at all
(in this context her work on the Greeks must be read
heuristically and not somehow as Arendt <s literal
VieWS.) 63 Yet AronHf6 dt s aim m inhabiting variously and
somewhat irradically these personified sensibilities is
not only to rectify the imbalance she diagnoses peculiar
to our time in which the aims and outlook of animal
l^orans have come to dominate. It is also to cultivate
in her readers that "tragic pleasure" in the inevitable
impingement, encroachments and tensions within the human
condition itself. To achieve this difficult pleasure ^
to have the ability to be confronted ever anew with the
need to orient ourselves explicitly with respect to what
is, i.e. to distinguish, to discern, to think, the capac-
ity for which, as we have seen, is what Arendt means by
the phrase "to be fully alive." 64
Hence, although in The Human mnrt< Arendt is
clearly concerned as a (deep) "occasional" thinker with
reinvigorating the capacity to act in speech and deed in
public life because, as the most free activities, they em-
body the specifically human ability to manifest plurality
gua uniqueness, she does not do so at the expense of the
devaluation of every other activity. Even in a book where
she explicitly says she is not attempting "an exhaustive
analysis of the vita activa," but is engaging in a more
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limited effort- »+-<~ito determine... their political sig-
nificance" (emphasis mine> 65 u= ^), „e flnd lmportant positive
evaluations of the activities m •nviti on their own terms, and as-
sessments of the meaning and necessity of the tensions
that exist between them. Even in this
.political" book
where her primary intent is to consider the yit^ti^
from the standpoint of the poiitical actor, there is a vi-
sion of what it means to be fully human which, as I have
suggested above, is achieved, in Arendt's view, not by
being wholly freed from necessity for the life of speech
and action, but rather by sustaining the reality or impact
of the conditions under which life was given, and hence
too, the enormous tensions existing between them and the
activities and sensibilities fundamental to them.
If we look at the realm of necessity, the home of
animal laborans
,
we see that while it is clearly in con-
flict with the specifically human life of speech and ac-
tion, the relationship is not a simple one of domination
and subordination. To be fully human we must be, to some
extent, subject to necessity's compulsion, feel its im-
pact. And further, not to be so subject is to risk the
very plurality celebrated in speech and action. There is
a multidimensionality to Arendt's conception of necessity
as there is to each of the conditions she elaborates - a
multidimensionality we must grasp if we are to see the
ethical impulse which drives her work in this regard.
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The
<* th^iteajl_cand^ ls straightforward
enoUgh
. Arendt alternatively cQnsiders iabor( wQrk
actxon. those activities most fundamental to human life
because they eaoh correspond to one of its basic condi-
tions: labor to life itself, „ork to worldliness> an<J _
tion to plurality. Labor and life with which we are here
concerned fall into the realm of necessity which is
shorthand for the most elemental life process in which hu-
-ns 33!3^ nifflal_lab2Eans engage in an eternally necessary
and repetitious cycle of production, consumption and
procreation. m the realm of necessity the human condi-
tion of life is reproduced. Here, life's fertility is
endlessly born with a force unmatched by other activities
in the human condition.
Necessity stands, then, for the force of the life
process which compels all living creatures insofar as they
are creatures of the earth. Words of caution, what
Arendt is trying to establish with this category is not
that the laboring activities driven by the life process do
not come to acquire different historical-social meanings.
In fact, she is careful to say that all human activities
have the quality of freedom and initiative to some extent.
Hence, for example, reproductive life is not a wholly
coercive thing; it bears the marks of our uniqueness -
both in the sense of cultural-historical and individual
distinctness. And this of course could be traced and ana-
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lyzea, th°Ugh
"» *~ **
-
so. Arenas primary point
,however, is that we must distinguish between the three ac-
uities of the yi^ti^ insofar as each partakes ^ a
neater or lesser degree o f freedom with the category of
necessity she delineates those activities in which the
force of life makes its impact most felt through its pri-
ory modes of pain and suffering. It is of all activities
HUt free. With the term necessity then, Arendt insists
that we acknowledge that despite the tremendous variations
in cultural meanings given to the activities driven by
necessity, and despite the tremendous achievements of h^
faber in reducing the experience of pain and suffering
these activities cause us, there remains an irreducible
compelling dimension which we ignore at our peril.
This compelling dimension, this force of life is
viewed differently by the three figures in the vita afi-
tiva. To the sensibility of the actor the toilsomeness of
life is something to get free from for a life in the world
of human affairs where speech and action are at stake, it
is in this context alone that Arendt says we must be
"freed from" necessity and the immediacy of its demands.
Of the actor a certain sense of alienation is reguired.
From the point of view of homo faber too, the impact
of life must be kept at bay. Indeed this is largely the
aim of work: to build a more permanent artifice within
which the world of human affairs can exist and attain rel-
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ative durability vis a vis the relentless appearing and
disappearing that characterizes the life process. To this
end hpinp__f^£ develops an instrumental sensibility
towards nature and the real, of necessity, what ho^
laber sees is not some confining force to be freed from,
but "the almost worthless things" out of which to build a
world to house human affairs. 66
By contrast, from the point of view of animal
iaborans, thoroughly ensconced in the cyclical rhythms of
life's demands, nature appears as the "great provider of
all "good things" which belong equally to all her chil-
dren *" 67 Animal Iaborans, alone among the
"sensibilities," experiences what Arendt calls, "the sheer
bliss of being alive,
"
6 * a kind of elemental happiness
which alone comes from the "prescribed cycle of painful
exhaustion and pleasurable regeneration.
"
6 9 she writes,
"The reward of toil and trouble lies in na-ture's fertility, in the quiet confidencethat he who in "toil and trouble" has donehis part, remains a part of nature in thefuture of his children and his children's
children.
"
/u
On this reading the picture which emerges is of com-
peting and conflicting sensibilities or orientations
towards necessity and the life process. Necessity itself
is a multiplicitous experience for humans which I think
Arendt, in this book, forcefully is suggesting it must be
in order that we are able to achieve a full sense of "what
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is." Each orientation towards the compelling dimension of
be perpetual experiences of each human being in greater or
lesser proportion. And this is fundamentally an ethical
claim on Arendt's part insofar as to be ethical is to be
responsible to the plurality of the earth. Let me now
turn to Arendt's argument about what dimensions of the
real we risk if we collapse the tension between the life
of the actor and that of animal_laborans by taking an
entirely dominating attitude towards the human condition
of life in favor of the political life of glorious speech
and deed
- as her critics charge she does.
To begin with, it is from intimate engagement with
the eternal, compelling cycles of the life process that a
very fundamental sense of belonging to the earth is born,
a feeling Arendt urges, which is a critical part of our
sense of reality. it offers us an elemental sense of
identity with the earth and all its creatures. There is
an element of mystery in this sense of belonging insofar
as it is a belonging to a continuum of life which reaches
back into a "nowhere" and affirms the strange solidity of
what has been "given as a free gift." Arendt's reasons
for locating the activities of the life process in the
private, non-political realm lie largely in the effort to
protect this sense of belonging and the strange sense of
reality it gives us. For in the profuse thereness of
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life's fertile process, a„a despite its compelling^
-ion, lt offers respite from the oonfines and directives
of the human-centered world. Arendt uses metaphors such
as depth, darkness, dark background and darker ground to
capture the sense of unknowing and of spatial ity. This
sensibility is like a reservoir in the hu»an soul in which
the very beginnings of a feeling of renewed possibility
and hope stir.
The second thing which emerges from Arendt
'
s ap-
preciation of necessity has to do with a different, per-
haps more basic sense of reality, namely, the sense of
being alive. That is, the relentless compulsion of the
life process is that without which the human sense of
vitality would be eliminated. it is this loss Arendt
finds in the lament of Plinius quoted above. it is to the
sense of compulsion and unfreedom which the life force
gives us that our very capacity for initiative is tied.
And to illustrate her point she argues that what we find
in very wealthy communities is an extraordinary degree of
apathy (a furious norm-identified behavior notwithstand-
ing)
.
What is critical here, and it is a point Arendt
makes again and again, is that without the impact of na-
ture's compulsion bearing down upon us to some degree, we
have no way of distinguishing between a state of freedom
and one of enslavement. This is of utmost importance be-
cause the tremendous technological innovations of the mod-
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em age seem to change the very nature of necessity it-
self. Each one seems to represent a door to freedom. But
Arendt warns that so iong as we iive on the earth, h^£^ ability to drastically reduce modes of pain
and suffering do not do away with the spelling guality
°f the life process, hut rather only serve to hide it from
our senses. What we lose are the hearings hy which we are
able to distinguish between freed™ and necessity. This
»ay threaten our sense for alt^it^ itself, "that curious
quality... possessed by everything that is, "71 a sense
without which human plurality and thought itself could not
occur. What is at stake, Arendt suggests, is the ability,
as she puts it, "to encounter that which we are not.-"
And this must be understood in terms of those natural
earthly conditions under which life has been given, but
also in social terms.
The aesthetic sensibility Arendt attempts to
cultivate in TJ^m^Coj^^ is a fundamental pleasure
and even wonder at the alteritas of all things. m this
text it takes the form of an appreciation for the outlook
and contribution of each of the three activities of the
vita activa and a kind of pleasure in their mutual
hostilities and tensions insofar as they reveal the full
multidimensionality of human existence on earth. Together
they provide us with the bearings by which we must orient
ourselves in a world of appearances.
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^ ethical impulse behind Arendt , s^ ^ ^
re?ard 13 t0
°UltiVate that
-sibility without which the
Plurality of the real cannot be revealed
, be it ^
pulsion of necessity or )-h= „ <=«y the profusion of display. To be
ethically responsible i = i-„ k„V oi s to be responsible for "(declar-
ing) the presence of that which is present.-"
I have argued that the elemental moment of this
tragic pleasure lies in the ability to "actualize dif-
ference" thereby revealing the multidimensional^ of the
real, and that thus there is an elemental ethical dimen-
sion to this aesthetic sensibility. And I have argued
that a certain cultivation of pleasure in being aestheti-
cally provoked by the multidimensional^ of the real is
essential to starting the thinking activity in the first
Place and is that which draws us "home." yet what I have
done thus far is articulate only the most fundamental re-
lationship between thinking, aesthetics and ethics. There
is a certain moral weightlessness in an aesthetic
sensibility alive to multidimensional^ and difference in
general. No matter how adept we are at "actualizing dif-
ference," at "declaring the presence of that which is
present," we must also "declare a bond between (ourselves)
and that which is present to (ourselves) . »?« Humans, as
Arendt puts it, unlike other creatures, must manifest
their plurality by making their appearance explicitly , it
is in this context that Arendt suggests that it is think-
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ing which activates judgment. Thinking presses us to par-
ticipate in a process of shaping and forming.
^^^^^^
Aesthetic discernment is the fundamental mode by
which we orient ourselves in a multifaceted and profuse
appearing world, and it is this discernment without which
the singular and critical quality of worldly durability
would not arise. in the effort to elaborate the ethical
dimension to such durability, I will turn briefly to what
I consider to be the other end of the ethical ballast of
The Human Condition
: Chapter 23, "The Permanence of the
World and the Work of Art," and then to Arendt's reading
of Kafka's parable, "HE."
In this chapter, Arendt elaborates the crucial link
between the quality of permanence, and that which shines
forth in the shape of all things making them either beau-
tiful or ugly. it is the specific power of what we find
beautiful that it draws us to it - not for its usefulness
nor for its consumptive value - but insofar as it trans-
cends both these necessary dimensions of human life in
which things are consumed and immediately disappear, on
the one hand, and in which they are used and more slowly
wear out, on the other. It is this quality of trans-
cendence, superseding the temporal destruction of both
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tangible and inta„gible things
, which^ ^
for humans to Know and help give fonn to ^
shape ana quality of the world they together inhabit. The
quality of transcendence in things is fundamental to our
capacity to orient ourselves with respect to "what is,.. as
well as to give birth to our own uniqueness.
This is so because of the crucial relation between
beauty and durability. When we make an aesthetic Judg-
ment, we give praise or withhold it, signalling, i„ the
case of praise, that we are provoked by the excellence of
a thing such that we wish it to endure that we may remain
in proximity to its power to transcend the mere
functionality and otherwise finite quality of our lives.
The power of what provokes us, then, forms the focal point
around which a meaningful form of life might develop,
through which bonds of mutuality and shared understandings
can form. The transcendence inherent in our sense of
beauty is the essence, Arendt suggests, of the very quali-
ty of durability; durability itself being of primary
political and ethical value insofar as we must have some
measure of permanence if we are going to be able to estab-
lish the kinds of relations through which human plurality
can be manifest
. But what is the nature of this ex-
cellence, what is it that moves us? And what is its
status? Is it universal and transcendent? contingent and
contextual?
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Along with Plato, Arendt identifies ^ ^
"that which shines forth most,"" and thus &
certain immortality, she is even, one might argue, ciose
to sharing Plato's view that- w.at the beautiful is thus divine
Yet she diverges abruptly and critically from Plato's
sense that the quality in things that shines forth and
nakes then, beautiful is their approbation to a perfect
cental image
- the ideal - which resides in a realm of
perfection and Being-forever. Although for Arendt it is
also a thing's approximation to a mental image that makes
it beautiful, this image is born, it is not timeless. It
is born out of "the objective standards of the world"™ by
which she means the public world which we share in common.
Thus, the mental image, as bound to a particular public
world, a particular pel is-culture is subject to much
change. The judgment, that is beautiful, is not universal
as Plato thought, but rather, contingent and contextual -
peculiar to a particular culture.
However, despite this contextuality and the sig-
nificant possibility for various "contents" to aesthetic
judgments that it implies, we also find Arendt arguing
that beauty is coercive, 77 that as a "quality of rela-
tion" 78 between beholder and what appears, beauty is not
disputable. To make aesthetic judgments is to choose be-
tween quality, not to choose quality itself.
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The confusion here lies in the fact that Arendt
argues, on the one hand, that there is a universai
predicant to which alX of us, as thinKing beings, nUst
summon a response. m the works nf <-h~un o those who successfully
do, the drama of the predicament shines forth, speaking to
all who share it, and thus the work endures. Durability
and excellence and the coerciveness of beauty are in this
sense intimately linked. Yet, on the other hand, for any
individual or people to make their presence explicitly,
they must avoid such an indiscriminate love of beauty
which Arendt calls aestheticism and barbaric, 79 and devel-
op an active love of beauty through which they can estab-
lish their own contextually specific way of discriminat-
ing, and hence build a specific and unique form of life.
I would like to turn now to Arendt 's discussion of Kafka's
parable in order to elaborate both the nature of the ex-
cellence which makes a thing endure, and the dimensions of
our universal predicament which, however, must be "solved"
contextually.
This parable occurs twice in Arendt's work, once in
the Preface to Between Past and £utU£e, and once again in
Thinking. it goes as follows:
He has two antagonists: the first presseshim from behind, from the origin. The sec-
ond blocks the road ahead. He gives battle
to both. To be sure, the first supports humin his fight with the second, for he wants
to push him forward, and in the same way the
second supports him in his fight with the
354
first, since he driven hi™ k-> i
only theoretically so For *
BUt it: is
the two antagonists Sno S 13 °nlyhimself as well ^ k there, but he
intentions? His dream "Vh^
1
^
kn°WS his
time in an unguLdermomenr^and5,?^ SOBe
require a night darker
and .this would
?Iaht
Pir
^°Ver MS "EaSi.S i^tnelr*10"fig with each other. 8 ° ir
Arendt interprets Kafka's parable as a rendering of
the thinking activity. It is the presence of man as "the
beginning of a beginning"" „hich actualizes and gal _
vanizes the past and the future, breaking up the otherwise
peacefui and indifferent flow of eternity. The actualiza-
tion occurs in the for™ of a battle in which the past
presses man towards the future, and the future presses hi*
back into the past. It is thus the thinker who gathers
both the past and the future into his presence as he at-
tempts to make "a stand," to defend his own presence.
Thinking occurs on a battlefield in which "the fighter"
gathers what was and what is not yet in order to win for
himself a present, to create a gap between past and fu-
ture.
In Kafka's parable, however, this present appears in
the form of a dream of jumping out of the fighting line
into a region above, where he can be umpire over past and
future. Here Kafka repeats the dream of Western
metaphysics in which the region of thought is a "timeless,
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spaceless, suprasensuous realm. "82 Arendt rejects ^
dream, and amends the parable to teach us that thinking is
an activity which, though "out of order" in an appearing
world, is nonetheless of the world. The battleground it-
self, where we actualize the past and the future, offers,
Arendt suggests, a space to which we can retire in order'
to take stock of and survey the field of forces, or, as
she puts it, to "properly see and survey what [is] most
[our] own. "83 In ^ ^ fighting Qf
the thinker makes a small space in which judging, as the
effort to find meaning in one's own past and one's own fu-
ture, can take its place.
Arendt suggests that this activity of thinking which
creates the gap can never be taught but only indicated.
The gap, thus, must be beaten anew by each generation, and
even by each individual. it is a universal predicament.
And the difficulty of such a task is such that more often
than not, the thinker will be unable to find the space
that leads out of the fighting line. More likely, he will
"die of exhaustion." Indeed, Kafka's metaphor for our
home on earth is that of the battlefield, a metaphor with
which Arendt certainly felt affinity at least insofar as
we are thinking beings. As such, our home is strewn with
many wasted bodies. Yet the one's who survive, whose
works endure through the centuries, achieve such relative
permanence, Arendt suggests, precisely because they are
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able to find that diagonal
estabiish a present
for ihsmslxa&l that ,.timeless time ^ whioh ^ a^^
to create timeless works with „hich to transcend their _
finiteness .
"
84
critical to the durability of their achievement is
that they accept the past and the future as aimed at them,
as their past, and their future a . fh. ^i. j-ucu , s t e forces against
which they must throw their weiaht ,nH ^gn , a d out of which they
*ust fashion a life. The key here to Arendt's effort to
answer why some works, some people's present, gnd^ is
precisely their courage and their excellence in fashioning
a response to the dilemmas to which they themselves, as
beginnings, give birth. insofar as they, i„ thought and
works, are able to retain the freshness of their predica-
ments as they survey the
-enormous ever-changing time-
space which is most their own, "85 what they g
.
ye to ^ ^
the thrill of experiencing the beat of life as they insert
themselves into the forces of past and future and tread a
"track of non-time," a present.
It is this beat which moves us, which draws us to
them, for it "indicates" to us what we ourselves must also
do; it indicates the nature of the battle we must engage.
It is also the pathos of this beat which we find beauti-
ful, and which, therefore gives the work its enduring
guality. I would like to give an example of this found in
Arendt's own reflections on Plato's work.
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The sheer quantity of references to Plato in Arendt's
work suggests she has "chosen his company among men, "86
that she remains gripped and moved and even spoken to by
Plato. And yet, in Arendt's view, it is Plato , s substit{1_
tion of making for acting in his effort to avoid "the
moral irresponsibility inherent in a plurality of
agents,-.87 „hich becQmes .^
.^ ^ ^ ^
dition of political thought. As such, his is not only an
argument against democracy, but against the essentials of
politics itself insofar as it seeks to destroy the public
realm where plurality is actualized among humans. Hence
Plato's thought is pitted against the ethical center of
Arendt's entire intellectual effort, and would seem to be
her most serious opponent, her greatest nemesis. And yet
what we find is not mortal enmity, but dialogue and
friendship, why, despite an obvious repugnance for
Plato's impact on political thought and political life,
does Arendt admire and befriend him? Why, despite an ob-
vious moral repugnance, does she find his work beautiful?
We find the answer amidst Arendt's effort to explain
the durability of this part of Plato's work. She suggests
that it is Plato's unique combination of depth and beauty
and the "authentic perplexities" to which he attempts to
summon a response which give his work longevity. Here
Arendt suggests that the beauty with which Plato's summons
is response to a very difficult problem - the unpredict-h
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on -
able, anonyms and irreversible character of all acti
calls attention to itself as something to be reckoned
with. The sheer excellence of the response is seething
with which we can never be wholly finished
, for it ±g ^
that our effort to
-resurrect" the perplexity „ith which
Plato wrestled will be amply rewarded insofar as it sheds
light on enduring problems. The quality of beauty to
which we respond has less to do with the content, with
Plato's solution, than with a certain heroic response to
painful dilemmas endemic to the human condition. Arendt
is moved by what she, with Machiavelli, calls the virtu
displayed by Plato.
It^TZT
iS
^
e resP°nse, summoned up by manto the world, or rather to the constellationof fortuna in which the world opens uppresented offers itself to him, to^his
This kind of admiration of another's virtu is of a formal
sort
-
it is a response to the quality of courage and
heroism and beauty in their effort to establish their own
present.
And yet Arendt distinguishes herself from Plato.
While affirming the beauty and hence enduring quality of
his thought, she rejects the content of his response. All
thinking egos, insofar as they judge, are "enclosed, as it
were, by the forces of past and future, and thus protected
against the void; [they] remain bound to and [are] rooted
in the present." 89 As such, while they share with all
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ti.es the general nature of the problem of establishing a
Present that will endure, they nevertheless are, as begin-
nings, in utterly novel situations. Hence, therefore, the
specific content of their response must be contingent.
Plato, though a friend, does not remain authoritative
for Arendt for reasons rooted in the nature of the virtu
she believes her present demands of her. she writes,
"...I do not believe in a world, be it apast world or a future world, in which man's
lorlk oTlPP6d f°r withd—ing frem ?ne
S
w d f appearances, could or should everbe comfortably at home." 90
And this belief, as Arendt makes amply clear in many pas-
sages, emerges out of the political experiences of the
20th century. These experiences call us to establish our
own present. Durability can no longer be won with
Platonic virtu
- in any of its many historical manifesta-
tions. Ethical life cannot rely on the authority of
transcendental standards. Despite the ethically rela-
tivist tone to this argument, however, Arendt suggests we
are once again, after 2000 years, in a position to ap-
preciate a world whose law is plurality. This is the pos-
sibility our present invites us to embrace. it is clearly
not without its dangers, not the least of which is the
"loss of security" which accompanies the loss of tradition
in a most general level, a tradiiton which she argues was
established through the amalgamation of the Platonic no-
tion of transcending standards with the Roman concept of
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authority derived from a political fn,founding in a far dis-
tant past in the body of the Christian church. This tra-
dition, Arendt suggests, secure though it made life ln
many respects, paved over the gap between past and future;
that is, made it unnecessary for an k,^y r il but Professional
thinkers to think, with Nietzsche, Arendt embraces the
loss entailed in our situation, though
.ore constructive-
ly. It is not, she suggests, Utopian, though it may be
difficult, to expect all citizens to engage in that spe-
cial form of thinking called judging despite the absence
of universal standards upon which to rely. Arendt's claim
is that we can make the world a place fit for human
habitation, and her hope is that a certain kind of
authority and hence durability is possible while we em-
brace the plurality of the world. In._chapter seven, I
will develop this authority and the kind of approach to
guestions of justice towards which it points.
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CHAPTER VII
"AN OBEDIENCE IN WHICH WE RETAIN OUR FREEDOM"
A. Introduction Authori ty
To say that we are going to develop Arendt's concep-
tion of authority requires a proviso. Namely, Arendt her-
self was not entirely sure that authority was possible un-
der contemporary conditions. And she most certainly did
not believe that we could recover or restore the specific
form of authority which had reigned in the West until the
modern age. What we find in her most concentrated set of
reflections on the subject in "What is Authority," is an
exploration whose modest aims are to delineate the politi-
cal experiences from which this form of authority sprang,
and to explore the nature of the public-political world
constituted by it. 1 Arendt hopes to identify the elemen-
tal political problems to which authority in the West as
we know it corresponds, an accomplishment which she
thought would more clearly outline the nature of our own
predicament. This she defines as a crisis in authority
consisting not only in the fact that "authority has
vanished from the modern world," but also in the fact that
"practically as well as theoretically we are in no posi-
tion to know what authority is." 2
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tron in which authority seems tQ ^ a ^ ^
to the later one „hich suggests authority nay ^
see tor, still be possible
, points tQ equivooat . on on
Arendt's part as to whether the effort to establish that
minimuffl of durability and stabUity wh . ch an poutioai
orders require, must, in our time, be so different as to
bear no resemblance to the family of phenomena we call
authority. The equivocation on her part we must take at
face value; her primary voice is interrogative. Vet she
makes some very suggestive moves whose inertia I win fol.
low and take off from in this chapter.
in the Preface to the essays that make up Between
Past and Future, Arendt says that our problem is not how
to find surrogates which can do the job of covering over
the gap in which we find ourselves now that the "thread of
tradition" has been broken. The break is absolute. We
cannot re-fill the gap. Rather, we must settle down in
it, learn, as she says, "how to move in it. "3 (emphasis
mine) By this of course she means to be able to think
without guideposts, to make our way without a
predetermined course. Yet this does not mean that every-
thing is relative, that we have no basis for distinguish-
ing between good and bad, that we can appeal to nothing in
our judgments. Arendt clearly acknowledges that at this
juncture this certainly seems to be the sorry state of af-
fairs. The loss of authority, she writes,
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"...is tantamount to the loss of the around-work of the world, which indeed since^hen
^L??gUn^° Shift ' to ch™<3* ^d transformitself with ever-increasing rapidity fromone shape to another, as though we wereliving and struggling with a Protean univer-se where everything at any moment can becomealmost anything else." 4
Yet if we follow the course of her reflections, uncover
her hopes and notice how and where she constructs, we see
that Arendt says at the outset that while we have lost
that which for millennia gave permanence and stability to
human affairs, this loss need not, as she puts is, "entail
the loss of our capacity to build, preserve and care for a
world that can survive us and be fit for humans." 5 while
the kind of virtually unshakable groundwork upon which the
historical form of authority dominant in the West stood is
no longer a possibility, we are not doomed to a Protean
universe of rapidly changing shapes. Such a thing as a
common world, renewable, with a specific shape and a
certain durability is indeed not an impossibility, in
Arendt 's view. As such, as I will suggest, a kind of
authority can develop. By pursuing Arendt 's efforts to
approach the problem of such authority, we will also begin
to elaborate the nature of her approach to questions of
justice which is, as I have suggested, aesthetic in na-
ture.
1
• Authority and the Pre-Modern World
Conceptually Arendt distinguishes authority both from
power and from violence. While it demands obedience, the
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mode by which it does so has nothing to do with coercion
of any kind. yet authority is also distinct fro, persua-
sion by argumentation and the equality that it implies,
in contrast to persuasion, authority implies hierarchy,
although, paradoxically, it is a hierarchy which, in obey-
ing, allows us to retain our freedom. 6 Tnis hierarchy
which demands obedience and commands unquestioning
respect, yet allows us to retain our freedom is what
Arendt calls authority. What makes us obey authority is
neither superior power, fear of violence, superior force
of argument, or the coercive nature of truth. its mode is
neither irrationality nor rationality. what then?
To recover the meaning and mode of this odd concept
which has been the key to lasting political orders, Arendt
turns first to the Romans where it originated, and then to
its later manifestation in the Roman Catholic Church. Let
me retrace her steps briefly.
Authority, or auctoritas, has its origins in Roman
political experience. It comes from the verb augere,
meaning to augment, or add to. Politically it meant that
those who had authority were so endowed by virtue of the
fact that they augmented or breathed fresh life into the
original accomplishment of those who founded the city of
Rome. Above all other conceivable achievements in Rome
was the glory, the unrepeatable enormity of the original
acts that lay the foundations for their body politic. It
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was this glory which gave tQ the liv . ng the . r ^^^^
insofar as they were there to safeguard and renew the
spirit of that original foundation. The glory of this be-
ginning was passed down through tradition, and it was
sacred or religious in the sense that it was with the
foundation of the city that the gods were given a home.
It was the sacred and stabilizing cornerstone of the body
politic.
This political experience of a glorious foundation in
a far distant past, thus, was the central origin of the
Roman conception of authority. Yet, because in in-
tellectual matters they themselves made Greek philosophy
and theory authoritative, the Romans came to understand
their own unique political experience and this form of
authority which sprang from it, in Greek terms. This, in
Arendt's estimation, proved to be a real loss for reasons
rooted in Greek political experience. Namely, the Greeks
lacked a dramatic founding event, and thus in the effort
to give the very necessary stability and permanence to
their own body politic, they turned (and Arendt considers
only Plato's and Aristotle's solution) to experiences out-
side of the realm of human affairs: Plato to fabrication
and Aristotle to the domestic relation between young and
old. In their efforts to find something that would com-
mand obedience in the realm of human affairs but would not
entail violence, they turned to relationships whose es-
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sence was rule of the inferior fay ^
of the Roman-originating oonception Qf ,.authorifcy^ „
the Greek philosophers
.ovea very decisively in the direc-
tion of
-authority over," by conceptualizing it as a for™
of rule. Piato's solution, particularly influential in
the development of that historical form of authority with
which „e are concerned, was, Arendt argues, to convert the
true essences which the philosopher contemplated in
solitude into measures in the service of rule. These the
Philosopher could use upon returning to the world of the
many. insofar as they originated outside of and trans-
cended the world of human affairs, they could become reli-
able measures by which to compel obedience. Their trans-
cendence could make them authoritative.
Historically, both Roman political experiences and
Greek philosophy were
-amalgamated,- that is, combined and
absorbed, into a unique formation in the Roman Catholic
Church. Here, Arendt suggests, the Roman awe at a
miraculous beginning
- this time the birth of Christ - be-
came the foundational event for the authority of the
Church, and the Roman political experience was given new
garb. The apostles became the authoritative voices which
told of the event and their testimony was passed through
the ages by way of tradition. Thus Christianity became a
true religion in the sense that those who came after were
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"tied back" to the foundational event through the
authoritative voice carried by tradition.
However, although this Christian foundational event
was both mundane and transcendent like the Roman political
one, the Roman event was the product of mortal initiatives
which gave a home on earth to the transcendent, while the
Christian one was an act of a transcendent God which gave
a better home on earth to man than they could ever, of
their own initiative, have achieved. In addition, Plato's
political and philosophic teachings had, by the 5th
century A.D. when the Church assumed authority over
secular affairs, become part of Christian doctrine. Thus
the authority with which Christian bishops, prelates,
priests, etc. spoke had, as Plato's philosopher-kings were
to have had, the force of transcendent measurements and
rules
.
This amalgamation of Roman and Greek experiences in
the Roman Church, in Arendt's view, had greater authority
and more far-reaching consequences than any efforts at es-
tablishing authority heretofore. She writes,
"General and transcendent standards under
which the particular and immanent could be
subsumed were now required for any political
order, moral rules for all interhuman behav-
ior, and rational measurements for the guid-
ance of all individual judgment." 7
There is a very Nietzschean feeling in Arendt's writ-
ing in this context, for we find straightforward awe and
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admiration for the sheer magnitude of both the Roman but
even .ore the Christian establishment of authority, an ad-
miration that comes irregardless of the moral content of
either achievement . 8 The enormous stability and
permanence as well as beauty brought into the world
through the centuries of Christianity are inspiring accom-
plishments. There is also a fair bit of Nietzschean irony
as Arendt surveys the damage or tragedy of this amalgama-
tion, though she delicately forgoes Nietzsche's ex-
travagant hyperbole. what Nietzsche and Arendt share is
at once a pathos for the form of authority and the kind of
durability this fusion of Roman, Greek and Christian ele-
ments produced, but also a pathos for the terrible new
freedom the modern age made possible.
Arendt, therefore, like Nietzsche, is not nostalgic
for restoration. As she argues, with its authoritative
standards, measures and rules, Roman tradition in Chris-
tian garb paved over, for the many, the gap between past
and future. This without doubt gave to the Christian
world a stability which, politically, is of great worth.
Yet such an ordering of the present, such protection from
the more radical confrontation between past and future
with which we are today confronted, was paid for by mental
inactivity of a certain kind. That is, the ordinary indi-
vidual, as a newcomer, was introduced into a world in
which well-marked paths guided her through the past and
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indicated the nature of the future, making her present a
thing less of radical struggle and .ore of an effort to
carry on the past as it indicated the future. Life was
the effort to discover oneself in a largely predetermined
temporal stream. As wrenching and difficult a task as
this might have been for the moral life of the individual,
politically it signalled the end of freedom. For it re-
quired a kind of thinking inimical to that required by the
free citizen. That is, it required that effort be made to
subsume every particular, the very event-quality of the
world, under a universal principle or commandment. This,
as we shall see, is precisely what we are not able to do
in attempting to orient ourselves in the political world
through the exercise of political judgment. Freedom, in
Arendt's view, came to a close at the end of antiquity and
only with the modern age was reborn. in the Middle Ages,
as she poetically puts it, "the public realm lived from
borrowed 1 ight .
"
9
So long as the Christian world remained in tact, this
kind of lassitude of mind produced through the lack of
practice of moving in the gap between past and future was
not terribly problematic. Yet it was precisely this which
was to prove so utterly disastrous, in Arendt's view, as
the Roman trinity of religion, tradition and authority be-
came increasingly attenuated in the modern age and finally
utterly extinguished with political events in the 20th
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century. Again Arendt
, ^ ^ ^ ^^
nostalgically. Yet neither is her embrace of our condi-
tion naive or particularly optimistic, though it is not
emptied of hope. To be set adrift historically is not
only politically dangerous, but existentially unbearable
in its most extreme form. Arendt implies that we can no
longer count on either the Greek or Roman contributions to
authority as we have known it. The power of transcendent
standards is politically at its lowest ebb, and the Roman
trinity of a single authoritative beginning, tradition to
pass down such a glorious singular event, and a religion
to tie us back to it, is equally out of reach in the 20th
century, if we are to be capable of some kind of authority
by which stability, durability and a certain shape can be
rendered to human affairs, we must be capable of augment-
ing, but augmenting what? And in what way? And how, when
the thread of tradition has been severed, to save any
deed, any event - be it mundane or transcendent - by which
to anchor the present, from the ravages of time? when
Arendt looked at modern revolutions it was precisely these
questions she had in mind.
2
-
Authority and Modern Revolutions
Before proceeding we would do well to take stock of
Arendt 's findings thus far. When we look at authority as
it was constituted in the West, but even more specifical-
ly, at the Roman contribution to it (since Arendt found
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the Roman insights and experiences most illuminating)
, we
see that the political experiences from which it sprang
were those of political foundation; that the nature of the
public-political world constituted by it was conservative,
consisting as it did of tying the potential novelty of the
present "back to" the founding acts and virtues of the
maipres; and that the elemental political problem to which
authority corresponds is what Arendt called "the abyss of
freedom": the inevitable sense that the new is il-
legitimate, without standing, and therefore in need of
some kind of justification. in all of these senses,
clearly, authority was a primary concern for the men of
the modern revolutions.
Arendt suggests that insofar as the revolutionaries
aimed at founding new political bodies at just the histor-
ical moment that the Roman trinity of religion, authority
and tradition had become severely attenuated, modern revo-
lutions appear as "giant attempts to repair these founda-
tions, to renew the broken thread of tradition, and to re-
store, through founding new political bodies, what for so
many centuries had endowed the affairs of men with some
measure of dignity and greatness." 10 Ironically, then,
these "modern" revolutions look like tragic and grand ef-
forts at restoration - not only of the Roman pathos for
foundation, but also of the Platonic-Christian grounding
of the political realm in that of the transcendent. They
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appear grand because they rekinriioH ^ »^i K ndled the Roman pathos;
tragic because their appeal to various Kinds of transcen-
dent and absolute sanctions (self-evident truths, the
Supreme Being, the nation) could secure neither the revo-
lutionary effort to found a new body politic nor the more
conservative effort to restore the Roman trinity and its
stabilizing force. "Authority," Arendt writes, "as we
once knew it.
. .has nowhere been re-established. "U
As a distinctive phenomenon, modern revolutions com-
bine what Arendt calls a "pathos for novelty" with the
idea of freedom. The men of revolution experienced the
human faculty to begin something new at the same time that
they themselves sought to liberate themselves from the old
order. Hence it was their "eagerness to liberate and to
build a new house where freedom can dwell"" which was un-
precedented and specifically modern about modern revolu-
tions. Through their own initiative they could liberate
themselves and constitute a new order. The problem for
them, however, was that they were confronted "directly and
inevitably with the problem of beginning, "13 namely, with
the mark of arbitrariness which the appearance of new
things always bears. in each act of freedom this abyss
appears because beginnings are events which do not fit
causally into the temporal stream, they appear bizarre,
arbitrary, and without reason. They seem urgently to
stand in need of justification, legitimation, explanation.
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More specifically, the revolutionaries were faced
with the problem of having to create laws and institutions
which together would stand as a solid supporting structure
for a new form of political life that would sustain suc-
ceeding generations. How could what they themselves, mere
mortals, created command the kind of reverence and respect
without which the onslaught of the free initiatives of
citizens to come could not be housed? And more immediate-
ly for them, to what could they appeal in order to make
their initial constitution-making
"stand?" m both the
French and the American revolutions we find, ironically
enough, appeals to the very transcendent realm from which
they were trying to free the world of human affairs.
Hence Robespierre's cult of the Supreme Being, Adams'
"great legislator of the Universe," and Jefferson's appeal
in the Declaration of Independence, to "the laws of nature
and nature's God." 14
Such appeals, Arendt suggests, were wholly inadequate
under modern conditions, and the farce of the cult of the
Supreme Being who was not even able to "inspire the
proclamation of a general amnesty, to show a minimum of
clemency," 15 was clear evidence of the "utter loss of
relevance" of religious beliefs in the political realm,
and, we might add, of transcendent standards more gener-
ally as well.
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Vet despite the perception, handed down to the revo-
lutionaries by tradition itselff that Qniy ^
solute and transcendent standards could establish the
authority of their acts, the African revolutionary and
pre-revolutionary experiences, combined with a deep
engagement with the Roman founding together set the stage
for the emergence, alone in America, of a form of
authority utterly different from that established and
passed down by tradition in the West. it is to this de-
velopment in America that Arendt looks with most hopeful
eyes for a conception and form of authority appropriate
for our age.
Although, as I suggested above, the American founders
too made appeal to transcendent religious otherworldly
sanctions, Arendt suggests that the authentic location of
the authority which legitimized and gave stability to
their foundational acts is to be found elsewhere. While
they were still bound to the Hebrew-Christian understand-
ing of law as commandment which, as such, reguires ab-
solute obedience and hence needs the awesome enforcement
powers only a transcendent source of authority can pos-
sess, there is another tradition. This tradition was
buried not only by the amalgamation of the Roman experi-
ence of foundation with Greek political philosophy in the
Christian Church, but also by the fact that the Romans
themselves were never able to conceptually articulate
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their unique way of constituting political authority, de-
pendent as they came to be on Greek conceptualizations and
intellectual life
.
It is th^ tradition which sheds light
on the distinctive nature of African political experience
-
pre- and post- revolution, and thus best helps us to
comprehend the relative success of the African effort to
establish the permanence and durability of a novu^ordo
saeclorui.
In this tradition, beginning with the Romans,
revitalized by Montesquieu and again in Arendt's own
works, law is understood as that which establishes an "in-
timate connection" (original meaning of Latin lex)
,
or,
"rapports" (Montesquieu) between two discrete entities'
which circumstances bring together." When we understand
laWS 33 ^^M^ rather than as comi^nding
obedience
,
we acknowledge that, by definition, laws are
relative, and that therefore, no divine sanction is needed
to establish their authority. indeed, for the Romans, as
I have suggested, it was the acts of the founders who were
themselves mortals, albeit gifted, which gave a home on
earth to the gods. m Roman political experience this
meant that what those who came after venerated in the
maiores
,
the founders, was their very ability to forge re-
lations and establish specific connections between former-
ly unrelated peoples, and hence to create something new in
the way of human association. It was this initial act
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through „hich the city of Rome was brought into being ^became and remained the Qf ^ ^^
Republic but also for the
.-augmentations" to the city
through the expansions of the Empire.
It was to this Roman experience of foundation that
the men of revolution turned, guided, not by any tradi-
tion, but by their own political experiences. And it was
the American revolutionaries who were to benefit most ful-
ly from the Roman precedent. The American people brought
to the task of foundation pre-existing organized political
bodies from the colonial period so that, unlike the
French, when the break with the old order came, they were
not "thrown back into a state of nature." This meant that
not only had they already had the enormous experience of
coming together to generate, through consent and delibera-
tion, power among themselves, but that this power was
clearly, in this pre-colonial period, separated con-
ceptually and actually from the authority which granted
its legitimacy. This authority lay, of course, with the
Royal charters and ultimately with the English King him-
self, m their own pre-revolutionary experience then, the
origin of power was decidedly different from the source of
authority. When the American revolutionaries sought to
constitute authority and embody it institutionally, they
already had experience to orient them and make them more
attentive to this same general conceptual and institu-
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tional distinction in the Ro.a„ model to which they
turned. The French, less fortunate, tried to deify "the
people," locating both power and authority in their "Gen-
eral „iii... subject to the pass . ons ^ viss . ss . tudes of
an unorganized nation, authority and hence stability could
not be brought into being.
institutionally this distinction between power and
authority found its expression in the creation of an inde-
pendent Judiciary whose lack of power combined with the
permanence of office, Arendt argues, is the sign that it
is and was meant to be the seat of authority for the new
secular order, with its judgments the judiciary branch of
government perpetually breathes new life into the founding
rapports of the American polity. As Woodrow Wilson put
it, the Supreme Court is "a kind of Constitutional Assemb-
ly in continuous session." 17 Now, the curious and all-
important point Arendt seeks to make about both this seat
of authority and the Constitution is that what actually is
authoritative about them is beginning itself. m a series
of conjectures I will call her "one is tempted to con-
cludes," she tentatively formulates her very unigue con-
tribution to the possibility of authority in the modern
world.
Arendt hears both the substantive and the verbal
meaning in the term constitution, and it is this verbal
tone with which she suggests the document spoke to the
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spirit of the American people. The Constitution became
immediately and has remained authoritative because it is a
living embodiment of the achievement of the founding acts
themselves. Despite the founders own sense that they were
"merely revolving back to an earlier period, the "blind
worship" of the Constitution which, Arendt suggests, seems
to have begun almost immediately after it was created,
points to the fact that what really held the American pub-
lic in thrall was the experience - politically - of a new
beginning brought about by the acts, not of gods or demi-
gods, but of mere mortals. it was perhaps the political
genius, or perhaps the "great good fortune" of the Amer-
ican republic
- Arendt seems uncertain - that Americans
had, as she put it, "the extraordinary capacity to look
upon yesterday with the eyes of centuries to come." 19 And
this political genius, if such it was, points to a kind of
authority which Arendt argues is entirely different from
that resting on appeals to a transcendent source, 20 but
also from that resting on a single set of grand acts whose
magnitude can never again be approximated.
If political genius it was, what exactly would this
mean? In part it means, without doubt, capturing "the
Roman spirit" and finding the "absolute" with which revo-
lutionaries so desperately sought to establish the
authority of their beginnings not in the transmundane, but
precisely in their own mundane acts themselves. The
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Romans' genius was to divinize bir+v,. +-th; to find in beginning
itself the very absolute they needed to establish the
authority and hence durability of their founding efforts.
Yet the Romans so divinized the founding of their city
that no acts in the future could ever attain the greatness
of those initial ones. Hence what Arendt means by the
political genius of the American people was their ability
to honor and revere acts in their own present with the
kind of intensity the Roman spirit reserved alone for the
original founding acts. The political genius of the Amer-
ican people was to find greatness in the novel, the new
the present and be able to "save' it.
This genius of the American people seems all the more
interesting if we consider, further, that not only did the
Romans divinize the founding acts to the detriment of the
novelty of what was to come after, but they also
enshrouded these "absolute" beginnings in legends. These
legends located the Roman political beginning itself in an
earlier history, thus covering and softening the impact of
the arbitrariness, the abyss-quality inherent in all be-
ginnings, in other words, Roman veneration for the an-
cestors and their heroic foundational deeds was a venera-
tion advantaged and augmented by an ever-receding point of
beginning. And Roman authority rested upon every new act,
every act in the present being understood as but a re-
affirmation of and addition to the original and never
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.ves
repeatable heroism of the founders whose acts themsel,
lay enshrouded in an elusive past. The present could only
augment, never equal or surpass the founding glory. The
public-political world constituted by Roman authority, and
the ethos to which it gave rise was fundamentally conser-
vative. And this too, we ouaht t-r, >hh u
,
gn o add, though Arendt does
not, aside from providing tremendous stability, was an in-
genious justification for expansionism during the period
of the Empire. That is, if greatness was a one-time deal,
the best we can do is to expand upon it; "to found Rome
anew.
"
Although it is clearly the case that the United
States' own expansionism has often occurred under the ban-
ner of "making the world safe for democracy, " a banner
that has gained what legitimacy it has enjoyed, without
doubt, from the founders' greatness and a kind of Roman-
like veneration of an interpretation of these acts,
Arendt 's interpretation of the kind of authority to which
those events and acts could give rise, her interpretation
of their true spirit, is rather different.
The American revolution clearly is, for Arendt, an
authoritative beginning, one she thought could help us, in
a post-metaphysical age, reconceptualize what "grounds" we
need to legitimize or authorize our political acts and our
common world. These grounds were not transcendent (the
appeal to self-evident standards notwithstanding), nor did
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she think the American revolutionaries could obtain the
kind of aura of the Roman maiores. The American Revolu-
tion is exemplary for Arendt insofar as it "founds a new
Rome," as she metaphorically puts it. That is, it is thi
event more than any other in modern history which affirms
the possibility of initium or freedom and the ontological
condition of natality to which it corresponds. Moreover,
this is a kind of initium which itself rests on and gives
rise to a form of authority which affirms and attempts to
augment practices which make possible such initium itself
The American revolution stands as an authoritative
event for our time because what it suggests is that what
legitimizes beginnings, what addresses the apparent ar-
bitrariness inherent in all beginnings, is the principle
which every new beginning carries within itself. That is
as Arendt puts it,
"The way the beginner starts whatever he in-tends to do lays down the law of action for
those who have joined him in order to
partake in the enterprise and to bring aboutits accomplishment.
"
21 (emphasis mine)
What proves to be authoritative in beginnings is the way
action is begun. This principle which every unigue begin
ning carries within itself corresponds to the particu-
larities of the acts and the rapports which they estab-
lish. Hence this understanding of authority arises
directly out of the particularities of the present, out o
the manner in which it is brought into appearance.
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The "law of action" laid down by the "way" the
founders started what was to become a specific national
hxstory for a new United states was inspired from the
Principles of mutual promise and common deliberation. it
is these principles too which Arendt hopes might yet prove
authoritative in the general sense of the term in a n^
°^g_saeclprum: command our unquestioning respect and
obedience without compromising our freedom, neither coerce
nor persuade through argumentation, but rather inspire and
speak to us so that freedom is augmented.
It is not a terribly new thought of course that what
might give legitimacy and hence bear authority in our time
are these two principles. This is almost axiomatic, even
platitudinous, and some version of it can be found in all
liberal theorizing. Yet there is an accented difference
between mutual promise and mutual consent, on the one
hand, and common deliberation and common good, on the
other. And this accent is all-important, for it speaks to
a world such as ours whose reality, without traditional
authority, without religion or tradition, is in perpetual
need of re-affirmation and re-constitution. it is indeed
Protean without our intervention, requiring our responsi-
bility if it is to stay in being as a specific shape.
Both the notions of consent and of the common good obscure
this dynamic reality-constituting nature of political
life: consent insofar as it presupposes a world already
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whole to which „e consent or do not; como„ good insofar
as it suggests the pre-existence of an entity rather than
a sensibility constantly being shaped and shaping.
Both promise and deliberation, as authoritative prin-
ciples in the sense that they augment initium, paradoxi-
cally evoke and speak to a world in greater motion and in-
stability than the notion of consent and coM„„ good
. „
these were the principles which coincided with the only
successful political foundation in the modern world, if
they are in some way authoritative and thus stabilizing,
how can we elaborate this authoritative element which
seems so frail in the face of the Protean modern world?
How exactly does it augment initium? What relations are
laid down towards this end? it would perhaps be helpful
to turn to Arendt's reflections on education briefly in
the effort to pursue these relations in which we can read
a form of authority that augments not a set of heroic
deeds in a long-distant past which always remain in sub-
stance authoritative, but rather augments the ontological
condition of natality and the corresponding capacity for
initium, for beginning itself.
3
-
Authority and Education
In her essay "The Crisis in Education," Arendt says
both that the essence of education is always conservative,
and that the essence of education is natality. 22 Sepa-
rated by eighteen pages, these contradictory statements
389
might lead one to believe Arendt was confused. She was
not. Rather, she was dealing with a paradox she thought
the modern world had to face. Namely, that in order to
build a common world around its "pathos for novelty," an
element of conservatism was essential. she wrote,
-'.Exact-
ly for the sake of what is new and revolutionary in every
child, education must be conservative." 23
The essence of what Arendt meant by conservative is
that the purpose of education is to teach a child about
the world "as it is," no matter how painful, perplexing or
disutopic it may appear to the adult who must teach. it
is the task of the educator to take responsibility for
preserving the "old world" both for itself and for the
newcomers. The authority in the voice of the educator
says, "This is our world, "24 and thereby introduces the
newcomer into the already existing world in which each new
person must takes his place and make his way.
The exceptional degree of world alienation as well as
the reigning modern notion of an ever-progressing rather
than a backward bending historical stream makes this con-
servative attitude of the educator exceedingly difficult
to conceive of and grasp today. Arendt compares our dif-
ficulty with approaching the question of how to educate
with the Roman's ease with this conservative task, living
as they did in a culture whose defining ethos was conser-
vative. And, compounding the problem for us is precisely
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the modern
-pathos £or novelty ... „ ig ^ specificaiiy
-dern pathos which gives the purpQse Qf ^ ^
modern world that tinge of paradox of „hich ! spoke above
Thus Arendt suggests that while the ethos of the educator
»ust be conservative, she embraces this conserving tas* «
^ to best assure the renewal of the co«o„ world that can
only co»e about through the perpetual insertion of unigue
newcomers with the absolute novelty of their own begin-
nings in tact.
The authority of the educator derives from a love for
the world such that she knows that only by teaching what
it means to be engaged in and with the world, by carefully
introducing the newcomer to the common world, is there any
chance for renewal which saves what is good and roots out
what is bad thereby making "the world right anew." it is
finally the knowledge of this paradox that gives the
educator her specific authority in the modern age. She
says, "That renewal be possible, this is our world."
Finally, thus, in the broadest sense of the term (which
for Arendt is in some sense also its most precise sense)
the educator's aim is political she takes her bearings
from the most central requirement of the world of human
affairs
- that there be a common world in which the
plurality characteristic of the human condition can
flourish. And this means too, of course, that the very
content of a common world is in perpetual contestation.
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This contestation even significantly contributes to its
distinctively modern shape.
From these reflections on education it appears that
central to authority appropriate to our time is a conserv-
ing, conservative sensibility which, however, is in the
service of allowing the newcomers to be new, that they may
refresh by saving and adding to an old world.
It remains for us to move from the specific realm of
education to the political realm itself and there to fur-
ther develop this notion of authority towards which Arendt
gestures. m her development of the concept and activity
of judgment this task will be most rewarded, for it is
this mental faculty which she thought was central to our
ability to
-build, preserve and care for a world that can
survive us and be fit for humans. "26
_j: shall proceed both
conceptually and by example, for I think that by using
some of Arendt 's own judgments we can more deeply compre-
hend the kind of authority she thought we, in the
twentieth century, could command.
B. Judging
Arendt 's reflections on judgment received her
sustained effort only in her final years, and what was to
be her major piece of writing on the subject, the proposed
third book of The Life of the Mind remained wholly un-
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quote from Goethe found in her typewrlter >t ^^ ^
her death. They read as follows
Konnt ich Magie von meinein Pfad entfernen
(Could I but clear my path at every turnina
Serffbut'M
1 utterly unlearning-" 9w re I but Man, with Nature for mv frameThe name of human would be worth the claim. , 27
We have on the authority of lecture notes kept by
Mikael Denneny what Cato's words meant to Arendt in this
context. instead of the Hegelian tradition in which world
history (success, is the final arbiter of the significance
of all events, Arendt sides with Cato in suggesting that
it is (or should be) the judgment of living spectators
which renders events significant, giving them a •home- in
human affairs. It is the "quality of their attention-^
which establishes an event as worthy of historical memory.
And this quality of attention is of greater worth than the
attention which success or sheer power can arrest.
Yet this claim immediately raises the question
regarding the origins as well as the status of the quality
of the spectator's attention. It is in the direction of
this question that I think the second quote from Goethe's
Faust tends, for with it Arendt suggests that if we were
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to be able fully to take in the disenchantment of the
world which indeed U our condition, if we were able to
stand nakedly before it, seeing and alone (ein Mann), then
it would be clear how utterly important, how necessary it
is that we turn to one another in the effort to humanize
ourselves (ein Mensch zu sein) by making the world a place
fit for humans (Menschen)
. This, to complete the circle
and return to Cato, we can do only if we cease a fruitless
and even dangerous search for authority among the gods,
(which, in its modern form has been the God of success,
and thus of process in its various guises)
, and look in-
stead to one another for orientation and sense of place.
The ontological arrogance that may sound forth in this
formulation will, I think, be stilled through the effort
in what follows to articulate Arendt's conception of judg-
ment with particular attention to the nature of the
authoritative element implicit in it. it was with the
urgent sense that philosophically we have lost the gods as
the providers of rules and standards by which we formerly
judged particulars, that Arendt turned to the faculty of
judgment as that orienting capability which might help us
to develop some kind of stability and authority adequate
to our post-metaphysical condition. Practically it was
the shock of witnessing Eichmanns' utter inability to
judge particulars unless he could find a rule that could
encompass them which turned Arendt's attention in the
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erection of judgment; the wofds he^ ^ ^ ^
neral
- the cliche of funeral oratory -
. prime example Qf
the disturbingly ridiculous and pathetically haunting tale
of this inability to register and respond to the event-
texture and hence plurality of the world.
It may perhaps be important to distinguish my inter-
pretation of Arendt's conception of judgment from that of
her most significant student on the question to date -
Ronald Biener. m his interpretive essay which ac-
companies Arendt's lecture^^ant^PoU^
Ehv, Biener argues that there are really two distinct con-
ceptions of judgment in Arendt's work, an early and a
later one.« m the early one judging is understood as an
intrinsic part of political life. it is the activity
through which, as political actors, we come to share a
common world since it requires of us the ability to in-
habit and "think in" the place of others. m the later
conception the essentially political and non solitary
sense of judging is left behind. Judging appears as an
activity in which a "solitary contemplator" 30 looks back
on the world in quiet and makes the judgments alone
through which reconciliation to the unpredictability of
events with which our condition of freedom confronts us is
possible. Thus Arendt moves, Biener argues, from consid-
ering judging as "simply a capacity of political beings,"
to believing it serves the "ontological function" of an-
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choring us in a world without intrinsio mean ing insofar as
it is judgment which saves fro» ti.e's destruction what is
fit to be saved. 31
Biener argues that what accounts for these discrepant
conceptions is Arendt's uncertainty regarding the relation
of judgment to the vi^ a^a, on the one^ and ^
Yita contemp^ativa, on the other. This uncertainty, in
turn, is at least partly rooted in a too rigid distinction
between mental and worldly activities. Arendt increasing-
ly, in his view, comes to see judgment as a mental facul-
ty, and as she does so its obvious ties to the political
world which she developed in her earlier conception pro-
duce a tension within the concept itself. This tension,
he argues, Arendt finally resolves in favor of the later
conception at the cost of the richness of the earlier
32one
If we approach the tensions which indeed do exist in
Arendt's conception of judgment from the question of
authority rather than from the tensions between mental and
worldly activities, something different emerges. The ten-
sions in Arendt's reflections on judgment appear not to
stem from a too rigid distinction on Arendt's part between
the vita activa and the vita contemplativa - if we under-
stand this as Biener does to mean the distinction between
solitary reflection and sheer activity with others. Rath-
er, they appear to stem from the very real differences in
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the um of impartiallty possible; on the ^ hand>
the poUtical actors judgment, and, on the other, for
judgments made by those whose position is in one way or
another outside the political realm (among whom Arendt
eludes the philosopher, the scientist, the artist, the
historian, the judge, fact-finder, witness, and
reporter.)" It is important to note, however, that those
outside the political realm per se, are very much, in
Arendt's view, part of a public realm. in this light,
there are differences of degree in the extent to which the
political actor and, for example, the reporter are "bound
to" a particular political community, and also differences
between the respective communities to which they are bound
-
a point I will develop in what is to come. Thus the
tensions between the actor's judgments and the spectator's
judgments are rooted in their respective public loyalties
or public locations, and not in a difference in mental as
opposed to worldly life. Furthermore, the tensions be-
tween these respective "locations" are not "resolved" in
Arendt's thought, nor can they or should they ever be, in
Arendt's view. They perpetually produce important and
fruitful conflict within selves and between ways of life.
Thus the kind of withdrawal from the immediacy of the
world into the interior space of the mind is demanded as
much of the political actor as it is, for example, of the
reporter. And the spectator, like the actor is fundamen-
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tally a social creature. Ahom- t-v,~b ut the actor Arendt, in some
of her latest formulations, writes,« faDrica?or.. Sw!?nou?rthir
o
d
?so?atea
Ul
f
tY k™ °* ^"vSiS 1^
not'even^e perceived?^^" that he would
And about the spectator,
"Spectators exist only in the Dlurai -rv,
spectator is not involved in the act' %
tators
a
^5 inV°1Ved Wlth fel"°« -P^'
The distinction between the spectator and the actor does
not, therefore, parallel that between a solitary mental
activity and a whirlwind worldly activity.
Let me turn to Arendt's reflections on judgment
directly in order to lay the groundwork for this argument,
proceeding first to an elaboration of the elements of
Arendt's conception of judgment, and second, to the effort
to draw out the tensions alluded to above amidst an elabo-
ration of the authoritative element residing in and common
to all judgments.
1
-
Arendt 's Kantian Conception of Judgment
Arendt turns to Kant and his CritiouP. nf Judgment as
the only philosopher to be explicitly concerned with the
problem of judgment and its political nature. Kant makes
a distinction between reflective and teleological judg-
ments. Reflective judgments are judgments in which, in
distinction to teleological judgments, a universal cannot
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be found under which to subsume the particular in ques-
tion. Hence Kant's reflective judgment is political in
nature insofar as it is concerned with particulars qaa
particulars, and not with them insofar as they can be
safely shepherded under the skirts of universal rules.
Thus, as a mental faculty, reflective judgment tries to
encompass its object in all its distinction and unique-
ness, and is therefore suited to the political realm where
the freedom of combining together initiates singular, un-
repeatable events.
To develop this mental capacity suited to particu-
lars, Kant turns to aesthetic taste, and Arendt approving-
ly follows. At first glance this seems to confine judg-
ment to the most idiosyncratic and subjective modes of
relating to particulars since of all the five senses taste
(and smell) is the most private and inward. Taste is that
sense most attuned to what is unique about its object, and
this uniqueness as well as my feeling of pleasure or dis-
pleasure hits me directly and overwhelmingly. Taste hence
seems immune to discussion, disputes, even communicability
at all, and thus singularly unsuited for the political
realm, not to speak of its suitability for helping us
reflect on the problem of authority, why, then, does
taste become for Kant "the vehicle for judgment?" 36
In judgment, Kant argues, there are two distinct op-
erations: that of imagination and that of reflection. In
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the operation of Pagination what „e Co is close out the
outside world and re-present to ourselves in our inner
world an object we have sensed in that outside world. The
operation of Pagination shuts out the objectivity of the
world and maxes sensing an inner and Mediate experience
as it is with the sense of taste. Furthermore, when we
represent or re-sense an object, we also immediately feel
Pleasure or displeasure upon sensing it. i„ this respect
judgment is similar to taste an(J hence^
Kant's purposes well. yet judgment must also be un-
derstood as growing out of taste, for the immediacy of
this pleasure or displeasure we feel in judging is subject
to yet another operation - that of reflection. Here we
judge whether or not the pleasure or displeasure experi-
enced in our immediate response itself pleases or dis-
pleases us.
The effect of these twofold operations of judgment is
to remove us from the scene of action to an interior space
from whence, though blind to the scene itself, we can
represent it for our spectatorship. Here we establish a
"proper distance" 37 between ourselves and our object; we
fend off the immediacy of its affect and we simultaneously
compress the manifold of what is given to the senses so
that, for the first time, we can get a picture of the
whole and our object's place in it. 38 The operations of
judgment establish, through this blind-seeing , the condi-
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tions for impartiality from which alone ju(Jgments ^ ^
»ade
-
be they concerning the beauty or the goodness or
the fairness of a thing.
The question presses, by what standards do we then
judge whether we are pleased by our pleasures and dis-
pleasures? While we have thus far set the ssmitism for
impartial judging, how in fact do we actually gain im-
partiality of judgment with respect to something as appar-
ently idiosyncratic as pleasures and displeasures? The
standard, Kant says, for impartial judgment is com-
municability, and our common or public sense guides us in
this matter. In this sense too the essentially political
nature of judging is apparent. The very possibility of
judging, as a distinct way of thinking, depends upon a
community of others within which it can occur. Arendt
writes,
"You see that impartiality is obtained bytaking the viewpoints of others into ac-
count; impartiality is not the result ofsome higher standpoint that would then ac-tually settle the dispute by being
altogether above the melee." 39
As Kant describes this manner of obtaining impartiality
what he describes is the formation of a kind of public,
hence orienting sense acquired only in the "melee."
One obtains impartiality in one's judgment by train-
ing one's imagination "to go visiting." 40 That is, to
leave the specific details that characterize our private
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selves, to liberate ourselves from the*, and to try to
think about the object we wish to judge from ^ stand_
points of others - „hich Arendt def ines as ^^
where they stand, the conditions they are subject to,
which always differs from one individual to the next, from
one class or group as compared to another. ""1 Kant refers
to the result of this visiting as "eine erweiterte
Denkungsart,..42 an enlarged way Qf ^.^ ^ ^
what it is, fundamentally requires others whose particu-
larity we seek, not to absorb into our own, but to under-
stand and encompass as part of the stuff of our world.
Thus the very quality of our judgments depends upon our
ability to "visit" others, what we are doing in some
sense by enlarging our thinking in this way is taking the
pulse of our world.
Let us say we have had an immediate sensation of,
say, displeasure at some event. Our next move is to
travel through our community, inhabiting the standpoints
of others, registering their sensations to a twofold end:
first, to ensure that the judgments we make about this
feeling of displeasure are the best we can make by asking,
what do my peers say? What does it look like from over
there? And second, to learn better how to persuade others
that ours is indeed the best judgment about this particu-
lar event, once we ourselves have become convinced. This
process has helped us to strip our response of its wholly
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subjective conditions, to allow us to put it in a form in
which it is communicable to others; that is, so that it
recalls others to some dimensions of our shared public
sense or taste. And „e ourselves have clearly moved from
a position of considering ourselves as the whole world, to
considering ourselves as members of a community. „e have
developed a sense of our own being as intersubjective.«
And appeals on the basis of this intersubj activity help to
further constitute and shape this public sense itself.
It is important to note that judging is not an ex-
ercise in empathy, for we are not trying to feel and think
what others do, but rather to see what we would feel and
think in their position. We must always follow the maxim
of Selbstdenken: think for oneself. it is as
Selbstdenkern that we put ourselves in the place of every-
one else.
If, then, communicability is the standard by which we
reflect on our immediate sense of pleasure or displeasure
in something in order to form a judgment, it is a very un-
usual standard insofar as it requires of us the fashioning
and shaping of our own voice into a view or judgment that
does not entirely lose its particularity yet simultaneous-
ly presents itself as an example of the public sense.
Fundamental to the communication implicit in our judgments
is thus that others should share them because they speak
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of, to and about our world Thn«= t,« 4-—t ia. us we try in our judgments
"to woo" others to share the/our world.
It is not, we must note, some simple rationally for-
mulated relationship to the world to which we attempt to
woo others. And herein lies Arendt's anti-modernism. The
appeal, as Ernst Vollrath has put it, is not "epistemic"
but "phenomenal. "44 We are forever and involuntarily
responding perceptively to the world whose in-betweenness
or objectivity relates us to one another. it provokes and
stimulates feelings and emotions which range from the ex-
tremely pleasurable to the extremely displeasurable
. And
it is these feelings and emotions which we wish to commu-
nicate to others, woo others to share, but which must be-
come transfigured through this process of enlarged think-
ing in order to be communicable, which is to say in order
to reveal a common world. There is something akin in this
to the kind of process an artist must undergo in the ef-
fort to make communicable through a medium the ineffable
feeling the world provokes in her. And Kant even suggests
this making communicable is the essence of genius. 45 The
point in our context is that for Arendt, this is what we
do, albeit on a more directly collective or intersubjec-
tive level, when we make judgments. We give form and
shape to our feelings in the form of a public sensibility
which is the essence of "who" we are - and this involves,
to be sure, reasoning and rationality but more fully what
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Arendt calls our "soul apparatus . "46 Hence, when we make
judgments we are concerned about how our world will look,
sound, feel, what should be in it, and what it is to which
we, as a we, belong. When we judge, Arendt says, we "per-
sonalize" the world by shaping how it is to look and who
is to belong in it. And this is the case whether we are
philosophers or reporters or political actors.
2
-
The Authoritative Element in Judgmpnt^
"If the past and present are treated asparts of the future - that is, changed backinto their former state of potentiality -
the political realm is deprived not only ofits main stabilizing force but of the start-ing point from which to change, to begin
something new. What then begins is [a] con-
stant shifting and shuffling in utter
sterility.
.
.
"
47
Here in her essay, "Truth and Politics," we find as
we did in her reflections on education that Arendt seeks
to establish a necessary relationship between a kind of
faithfulness to factual reality both in its past and its
present tenses, on the one hand, and the possibility that
what is new might make its appearance in the world, on the
other. Without sustaining this relationship we have end-
less shifting, sterility, what I have, in earlier chapters
referred to as formlessness.
The "blind-seeing" which comes about through the
spectator pulling back from appearances in their immediacy
is a precondition for this faithfulness to "what is as it
is" whether one is a political actor, a philosopher, an
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artist or a reporter. For what we do in this state is
send ourselves to the places of others, places from which
we encounter not only the recalcitrance of a world funda-
fienfeaiirybepotHeoptuahliit^atoia^ifiypluBatitj afsopinions
counter the tissue of factuality which so depends upon our
mutual testimony and common memory, and which forms our
common heritage and common world itself. What Arendt
finds, then, in the activity of judging is that although
what the one who judges must do in the end is persuade ,
or, as Kant so nicely put it "woo" the consent of others,
there is an authoritative element in all judgments. That
which has the ability to command our obedience and still
allow us to retain our freedom in a judgment is precisely
evidence that the judge has engaged in this "enlarged way
of thinking" and thus has taken account of and responsi-
bility for our common world in its twofold giveness of
plurality of opinions and factuality. It still remains,
to be sure, for us to be persuaded by the content of the
judgment, but its authority manifests itself in that to
such a judgment we unquestionably and obediently lend our
ear, give it careful and attentive hearing. Its authority
lies not in compulsion, but like the Roman senate, in
guidance, advise-giving . And the guidance it gives is
that it will not let us be finished with, disregard "what
is as it is," and even more precisely, what is as it is
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insofar as we share the world. What is authoritative in
judgments gives them claim to be a more permanent part of
the contested terrain of the public world insofar as they
exemplify responsibility to plurality and to factuality.
in this sense there is in every judge, or every judge
whose judgment can command authority, a truthteller. That
is, one who by nature is in perpetual tension with the
political actor. if politics is about changing our world
or setting it right anew, 48 there are and must clearly be
limits to it. m the reflections Arendt develops in
"Truth and Politics" which arose out of her experiences
both in reporting on Adolf Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem
and in the encounters with the often bitter criticism her
reporting/judging in that book evoked, she notes that the
greatness of the political realm notwithstanding, it must
be limited, bounded. 49 And what limits and bounds it is,
of course, truth. of truth, Arendt writes,
"Conceptually, we may call truth what we
cannot change; metaphorically, it is the
ground on which we stand and the sky that
stretches above us." 50
While truth in this specific sense, taking account of
"what is," "going visiting" is part of the authoritative
element in judgments, it is inconceivable in an age char-
acterized by a "pathos of novelty" that a stolid commit-
ment to the given could command the kind of hearing that
could give stability and shape to a common world, form the
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horizon which draws us all in. And indeed just as the es-
sence of the educator's authority is to protect the old
from the new and the new from the old, so too the
authority in judgments is, finally, the concept of renewal
which requires that the factual, plural web of the world
be protected, remembered, saved that the newcomer might
establish his own relationship - insofar as the temporal
forces which enclose his being are unique, and insofar as
he himself is a unique newcomer - to the common world.
And this is true, more generally, for any individual's ca-
pacity for initiating new actions. m order that some-
thing new might appear, the old, the given must itself be
secured, remembered, kept in being.
If, as Arendt suggests in what I have called her
ontology of display, reality itself is perpetually born
and reborn out of highly charged mutual sensuous provoca-
tion between actors and spectators, between what appears
and those to whom it appears, the authority as well as the
excellence specific to judgments lies in the extent to
which the plurality inherent in the world in which the
judgment is made is encompassed. Such excellence provokes
our unquestioninq respect and our obedience - understood
as an obedience to enqaqe with the judqment on the order
of friendship: equality. That is, an obedience in which
we retain our freedom by submittinq our ear to the voice
of this judqe. We submit because we see that this judqe
408
takes pains to do no "injury to reality." And this Means
no injury to its plurality and to the condition of
natality which is so central to its essence for us. It is
precisely doing injury to reality that separates bad from
good judgments.
At this point we will do well to remind ourselves
that judgments have what Arendt calls "exemplary
validity." That is, they claim to be examples in which
others will recognize the public sense or taste that binds
them together and which arises out of their common world.
This is of significance because it implies that they are
never absolute, but always contestable and relative, if by
relative we mean that because plurality is the law of the
earth, we must re-think our judgments ever again on the
basis of worldly events and others' opinions. We lay
down, establish relations in our judgments which may not
be apt in a changed world or a world of newcomers. We
promise to be accountable to what is, and what may come,
and we do so on the basis of a certain erweiterte Denkung-
sart which, in its explicitly political form, is delibera-
tion with others. And in so doing, we contribute to the
shape and quality of our world with our judgments. in
this context judgments' validity are exemplary in another
way as well - namely insofar as they also present them-
selves as examples which people can use to help think
about the new; that is, insofar as they are examples in
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not what to conclude (standards or rules by which every-
thing else is to be measured)
, but how to judge, how "to
take account of" the world. m the modern world such ex-
emplary validity is suited to the kind of authority pos-
sible in our time which cannot be absolute, yet is neither
utterly relative.
To summarize, the essence of a judgment which has
powerful exemplary validity and authority lies in its
ability to speak to the world out of which it arises by
remaining "true to" its plurality and factuality? and that
it do so with a self-conscious sense of making it possible
for those who come after the moment of judgment themselves
to judge, to act, to initiate and hence to renew the com-
mon world. in what follows I would like to elaborate this
notion of authority through a critical look at two judg-
ments Arendt herself made.
3 • Arendt 's Own Judcrments
The two examples of Arendt 's own judgments I want to
explore concern the quality and nature of Jewish political
thinking and political acting. The first has to do with
her reflections on the socialist Zionists and the kibbut-
zim. These judgments were made during the 1940 's while
Arendt 's writing and action were still of an explicitly
political nature regarding the fate of the Jewish people
and the formation of a state in Palestine. In other
words, Arendt 's impartiality is, in this case, acquired
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"inside the political realm " 5 1 cjh- 4di
' Sne is explicitly and
self-consciously speaKing to a particular political com-
munity in an effort to persuade. The second example has
to do with the Jewish response to Arendt's report on Eich-
mann's trial and those careful concerns expressed by Ger-
shom scholem in a letter to Arendt to which she responded.
Both letters were published at Scholem's request. These
judgments Arendt made in the early i 9 60's in the capacity,
this time, of a self-conscious reporter whose im-
partiality, as she conceived it, is "inherent in the posi-
tion of the outsider. "52 My purpose in both cases is to
explore the nature of the authority of Arendt's voice in
each of these judgments and to suggest, in contradistinc-
tion to Biener, that the tensions in her conception of
judgment lie in the relative insider-outsider status and
not in a mental as opposed to a practical life or capac-
ity.
Arendt's assessment of the socialist Zionists and the
kibbutzim is at once highly critical and full of admira-
tion. As an outgrowth of the non-nationalist trends in
Jewish tradition in general, and more specifically of
Eastern European socialism, the collective settlements
were successful in Arendt's view in creating on a small
scale "a new type of man and a new social elite" who held
new values and established new practices based on a pas-
sion for justice. 53 Here, in the kibbutzim, Arendt sees
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an example of a new way of living which presented a viable
alternative to the
-competitive and acquisitive" world-
estranged modern society., m her assessment, interesting-
ly, Arendt applauds the successful and unique combination
of manual labor, a new form of ownership, and high cul-
ture. 54 And it is th6 lQss Qf th . s soc . ai exper . ment
which, in 1948, Arendt wrote would be "the severest of
blows to the hopes of all those, Jewish and non-Jewish who
have never made their peace with present-day society and
its standards. 55
Despite this enormous praise of the ability of these
non-nationalist Zionists to develop novel responses to the
challenges of ant isemitism and the specifics of life in
Palestine, responses that were in Arendt 's estimation of
"permanent human and political value," 56 she is neverthe-
less highly critical of the absence of political judgment
on the part of the Zionists; that is, of their virtually
exclusive focus on their own social experiment, and their
abstention from politics. Even their own understanding of
the nature of their work was devoid of political
sensibility, driven as it was by the notion that necessity
and not at least some measure of freedom drives all ac-
tion. More to the point, however, is the fact that these
social experimenters were content to fully absorb them-
selves in the immediacy of their work, leaving the ques-
tions of the native population and the issue of state
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formation to others. The world held in common, as they
understood it, simply did not include the native popula-
tion nor, for that matter did it require that they enter-
tain larger questions of political community which their
very presence in Palestine begged.
The consequences of this neglect have been, Arendt
argues, that this moral "vanguard of the Jewish people" 57
has itself ended up supporting the very ugly nationalist
and chauvinist policies their ideals should disown. And
this has not only soiled the glory of their experiments
since any successes they have had have been won at the ex-
pense of others, but it has also fundamentally threatened
the survivability of the new social man and the new values
themselves in the sense that the support they give to neo-
fascist policies itself makes a mockery of their work and
destroys the very humanity they've tried to make possible.
Obviously since 1948, we would have to add, it has also
threatened the survivability in the more literal sense as
well, i.e. that the state of Israel itself may not sur-
vive.
At the root of Arendt 's characterization of their
failure to think politically and to exercise good politi-
cal judgment are then both strategic and moral claims.
And they are ineliminably intertwined in an argument about
what it means to be able to think and act in a world that
in one way or another we share in common - apart from
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whether we desire to do so or not. The kibbut2iin came to
Palestine to realize their new social ideals as if to a
barren land; as if, Arendt says
, tQ the^ ^^
in addition, armed with a revolutionary tradition which
shared the modern sense of world estrangement insofar as
it self-consciously eschewed explicitly political think-
ing. At the same time, this Jewish non-nationalist
vanguard were part of a larger Zionist movement whose
leadership was preoccupied with the Jews as "the people
without a country [who] needed a country without a
people. "58 Hence those ^ ^
Palestine also acted as if the native population simply
had no reality. Importantly, for both Zionist groups,
this was all the more possible since the Jewish economic
miracle in Palestine was built wholly from international
charity and was entirely de-linked from, independent of,
the economic lives of the native population. This void of
"objective" relations made it even more possible to ignore
the realities of life vis a vis the native Arabs in
Palestine. And with this, Arendt, in the mid-1940's, be-
fore the state of Israel was a fait accompli, sees some-
thing terrifyingly familiar - a refusal to face up to
events, facts, the given; a way of thinking and acting
that tries to restructure factuality itself.
It is in this light that we must situate the politi-
cal judgments about Zionism and the kibbutzim Arendt made
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just prior to the formation of the nation-state of Israel
when it still seeded (remotely) possible that a non-
nationalist state might instead be formed. As an active
Zionist at the time, Arendt embodies what she herself
called "the hallmark of true patriotism and true devotion
to one's people": "intense discontent . "59 For what this
intense discontent produces politically is * intense dis-
comfort' through an insistence on seeing the factuality of
the given. Politically speaking the authoritative element
in Arendt's judgments (which indeed from our vantage point
today seems undeniable - save to most Israeli Jews them-
selves) is precisely this insistence on seeing "what is,"
on encompassing as best we are able the discomfort and
discontent and pain which the unruliness and multi-
dimensionality of the world we share in common provokes in
us. And this argument is all the more powerful if we see
that the "injury done to reality" if we do not do this is
an injury done to the possibility of upholding a world not
only with a solid and even new vision of justice (e.g. the
kibbutzim)
,
but one capable of renewing its own morality
through the initiatives of others. And this is not pos-
sible, this space cannot be held open if one of the pri-
mary necessities of political life is to radically
restructure factuality itself. The true patriot's
"seeing," which is essentially moral and essentially
political in the very broadest of terms, is all we have to
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rely on today for a sense of limits as well as for our
ability to shape with relative permanence a world for our-
selves, with respect to morality and politics Arendt
writes,
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It is the gift of the "true patriot" that she attains
a kind of impartiality with which she then mediates be-
tween the power to change "what is" which is intrinsic to
political action, and the factual, given texture of the
world which we must accept if we are to contain the
political realm and learn acceptance and reconciliation to
the nature of our world which both precedes and will ex-
ceed us. in an essay she wrote long after these reflec-
tions on the socialist Zionists, "Crisis in Culture,"
Arendt identifies a particular attitude, a cultura animi
(a culture of the soul) which we must develop in order to
mediate the, in her view, necessary and fruitful tensions
between politics and factual ity. The authority of such an
attitude rests on impartiality, in this case on its will-
ingness to accept the factual conditions within which
one's own people's fate is tied. And these are, generally
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stated, the extent of the world which one must share com-
monly with others, as well as its elemental plural quali-
ty.
In this case Arendt's political judgments are made
self-consciously as a Jew and a patriot, and their
authority rests on her ability to accept and extend the
boundaries of the political world within which she must
think
- beyond the actual political-cultural community
whose fate is her central concern. The "representative
thinking" she engages in encompasses the reality of the
common world of the two peoples in Palestine rather than
the respective fictional and hoped for common world which,
she argues, both Jews and Arabs in Palestine constructed.
Her judgment in this case exemplifies the relation between
durability and renewal, on the one hand, and the
authoritative (moral) element in political judgments, on
the other. As such, her criticisms of both people's fail-
ure to think politically is fair and harsh, yet her tone
is hopeful and measured.
By contrast, if we consider Arendt's judgments of
Jewish action under Nazi occupation we find, amidst a
similar call not to deny factuality, a different tone, and
a certain attenuation of the authority of her judgments.
Let me elaborate by reflecting on the issue as it is
framed in the exchange of letters which passed between
417
Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt following the publica-
tion of Eichmann in Jemsaioi.
Scholem's criticisms center around the matter of "how
to approach the scene of that tragedy" in which one third
of "our people" were destroyed. 61 He finds Arendt's ap-
proach painfully inappropriate: flippant, heartless, with
frequent overtones of malice towards those Jews involved.
Because he regards her as "a daughter of our people, "62
this tone is especially troubling to Scholem. in Arendt,
he finds none of the traditional "love of the Jewish
people" which, in his view, ought to be a natural disposi-
tion of all Jews. Furthermore, beyond Arendt's tone,
Scholem finds her specific judgments against the Jews un-
balanced, and challenges her presumption to pass such
definitive judgments - for example on the Judenraete -
when she "was not there. "63 He also does not believe that
their generation can possibly attain the necessary objec-
tivity with which to judge what occurred.
Arendt's response is direct and uncompromising, in
her view it is imperative that we judge the arguments with
which the Jewish functionaries justified to themselves and
to others their cooperation with the Nazis in the final
solution. Without such an investigation of what was done
and how it was justified, followed by our own judgment of
the justifying arguments, the past will remain out of our
reach, haunting and mysterious, and we will learn nothing.
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un-
Judgment is the route to reconciliation based not on
resignation to a fate that can neither be changed nor
derstood, but on understanding that helps orient us
towards the future as well as establish our present.
This response exemplifies much of the authoritative
power of Arendt's thought. m her refusal to abdicate
trying to take responsibility for "what is- by declaring a
bond through judgment between herself and this past, she
calls those to whom she speaks to face the tragedy of what
occurred in such a way that renewal and renewed action may
be possible. The difference in terms of the authority of
their respective views is I think best seen by Scholem's
recognition that he must answer the Israeli youth's in-
evitable and persistent questioning about why so many Jews
"allow(ed) themselves to be slaughtered,
»
64 and his simul-
taneous abdication when it comes to judging those very
events. The abdication comes in the form of a plea that
it is too early to judge fairly and objectively. One
suspects Arendt is right that this abdication is not unre-
lated to his feeling of love for the Jewish people. And
the authority of her own effort lies in the courage to
judge what occurred in order, by understanding the
specifics of this situation, to free the youth from the
weight of that past for their own political life, as well
as to free those who themselves experienced totalitarian
conditions - to the extent that this is possible.
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Yet the tremendous controversy as well as the quality
of the controversy, that erupted over her report on Eich-
mann's trial, which has yet to settle, points to attenua-
tion in the authority of her judgments. Arendt herself,
unheedful of Scholem's deep concern about the tone of her
judgments of the Jewish functionaries, chalks up the con-
troversy entirely to the "campaign of misrepresentation-
carried out by the Jewish "establishment" in Israel. 65
Clearly this was in part true as Arendt herself docu-
ments.^ yet, did the manner with which she chose to
report on the Jewish functionaries, that is, her tone, not
perhaps have itself something to do with both the in-
tensity of the controversy and the attenuation of her
authority
- understood here as her ability to command the
ear of her readers, but also her ability to stimulate
renewal through understanding? Even so sensitive a
thinker as Gershom Scholem had a terrible time looking
past her tone to the substance of her judgments.
Arendt defends her tone, rejecting Scholem's notion
that Jews should love their own people. She suggests that
the proper attitude ought to be Selbstdenken - independent
thinking. Love, she says should not be felt for something
that is "part and parcel of myself." 67 For such things we
can and ought to feel gratitude; only for that which we
are not, can and ought we feel love. Love is an outer
directed passion which links us through intimate and un-
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transparent ties to others. while we may grant this to
Arendt (and I think we should) ,68 she seems, in the role
of reporter she adopted for the trial of Eichmann, to have
tried so to locate herself outside this particular world
that she fails to inhabit the Jewish community's points of
view with the same kind of understanding and clearsighted-
ness she shows towards the Nazis themselves. And one
wonders whether this is not an overreaction to her own
givenness as a Jew and her sense of the tremendous dis-
cipline in thinking required for her to be, in this event,
impartial. Arendt herself admits to Scholem that she
feels with more grief wrongs done to her own people than
those done to others. But such emotional partisanship has
no business seeing the light of day in Arendt's view,
though it may indeed be the thing which drives us most
deeply.
It is indeed true that at least in one of her essays,
Arendt provides conceptual support for the extremity of
the outsider's tone reflected in her report on Eichmann.
In "Truth and Politics," Arendt characterizes the status
of the truthteller, reporter, etc. as the one who is out-
side the political realm, alone . 69 And yet here, in this
essay which arose out of the controversy over Eichmann in
Jerusalem, she oversimplifies what, in other works she
does not; namely, what the truthteller must do in order to
make her voice heard, in order to get those she would be
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heard by to lend her their ears. Another way to put this
is that though outside the political realm in the sense
that she speaks not to persuade but to illuminate and
therefore is not beholden to specific communities in her
present, she nevertheless speaks into a particular public.
In this light the truthteller must sustain a tension
(which, Arendt writes, all of us do all the time70 ) be-
tween an outsider-truthteller status, and an insider-
political actor status. The differences between these two
is shaped by the difference in who the political actor and
who the truthteller go "to visit." That is, the community
of the political actor is the political one; that of the
truthteller the political community and a community of
historical witnesses and friends whose action and judg-
ments serve as examples and orienting touchstones. The
world they share and consider to be common is in each case
slightly different.
It is the ability to sustain this tension between the
insider and the outsider which is what makes, finally, the
voice of the truthteller authoritative, for she has com-
mand over how to take account of and thus how to communi-
cate with others so that they will lend their ears. And
this means of course that the nature of her outsidership
is relative, not absolute. Insofar as she tries to commu-
nicate what she "deems true" she does so because she has
an (aesthetic) interest in how the world looks. And in-
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sofar as she is not a god, her sense of how the world
should look has grown out of the world into which she was
born, and thus it is with this world she must communicate.
Therefore, she too, like the political actor who judges,
must mediate between politics (understood here as the art
of the possible) and factuality. The truthteller, like
the political judge must develop the mediating attitude
the Romans referred to as cultura an inn
Thus the idea that what distinguishes the truthteller
from the political actor is that the former is alone, the
latter inter homines is misleading, and in her most
sustained writings on judgment, Life of thP. Mi nr. and her
written Kant lectures Arendt herself suggests as much by
arguing that the spectator, the judge is neither solitary
nor self-sufficient, 71 and that judging is "inherently so-
cial." The attenuation of Arendt 's own authority then
in this context is due not to the content of her judgment,
but indeed, as Scholem intimates, to her tone which comes
from too great a severance of her thinking from one cru-
cial part of the public world with which she is concerned.
Even Gershom Scholem, her friend, cannot really deal (and
I do not mean agree) with what Arendt had to say. The
"hard bed" Nietzsche advises us to offer our friends is,
in the form here offered, unbearable. (And this form is
also, I might add, Nietzsche's own undoing.) And again,
one suspects Arendt 's tone is a result of losing the
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necessary tension the ciUtura_animi must sustain between
the outsider-truthteller and the insider-political actor,
in this respect she fails, not to love the Jews as Scholem
suggests, but to speak and think with them; to carefully
inhabit their standpoints.
As Arendt suggests in her most insightful moments,
the tension between "truth" and politics, outsidership and
insidership must be sustained because it is precisely
authority which is at stake. Had Arendt 's tone been less
ironic, less harsh, and instead reflected through thinking
"with" others the enormity of the circumstances, and yet
not have changed the substance of her judgments, the
authority she could have commanded would have been far
greater. For in the words of one of "the daughters," "her
people" would have found exemplified the awesome effort to
take responsibility for "our" world, they would have found
Arendt exhibiting that "tragic pleasure" which takes, in
this case, a deeply woeful pleasure in seeing "what is,"
in illuminating, that the way may be held open for change,
for the new, for initium.
C. Approaching the Question of Justice
If now we stand back from the particularities of
Arendt 's own judgments and try to summarize the new kind
of authority in the West towards which her work as a whole
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points it looks something l ike the following. Under post-
metaphysical conditions authority obtains in the world in
practices and judgments which make possible initium itself
and hence which "obey" the law of the earth which is
plurality. what we in our time augment is our earthly
condition of plurality and our practices of initium or
freedom which this condition makes possible. And we do
this fundamentally through judging. Just as ancient
Greece had its figure of the tragic hero, and the Chris-
tian West its figure of the sinner in whom the questioning
after meaning was historically housed as a question yet
within a specific ethical horizon, so Arendt puts forth
the figure of the judge. And the question which drives
the judge is, of course, who are we? Judging is a simul-
taneous posing this question and qiving shape to an ans-
wer. It entails, as we have seen, the twofold responsi-
bility of accounting for our world whose essence is
plurality, and taking a relationship to it. it mediates
between what is and was (the old) , and what could be (the
new)
.
It maintains a difficult and often painful tension
between the necessity to see things as they are and as we
wish them to be, not allowing either to prevail. To judge
is to take our bearings from "what is as it is" without
bowing down before the given; it is a complex of preserva-
tion and renewal which brings about the new itself. It is
that activity which alone, today, can sustain our polities
as living entities.
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There is a beauty distinctive to the figure of the
judge which when exemplified is what provokes us ^ lend
our ear in obedient listening, to give audience to the
judgment. And it lies precisely in its ability to en-
compass or evoke the plurality, the complexity and even
ambiguities of "what is" while shaping a specific response
to it. And this we do not only through the specific words
we use, but also in our tone. it is Lessing's tragic
Pleasure by which we are provoked in a good judgment. And
it is this aesthetic sensibility which allows us to find
ourselves with or in another. it is this aesthetic
sensibility which, finally, guides the activity of judging
and grants authority to those judgment's which exemplify
it. By taking responsibility, being responsive to the
plurality of the world in which we must move and orient
ourselves, our judgments sustain an openness while laying
forth a very definite sense of the shape of the "we." And
this is as true for judgments of political actors as it is
for those of truthtellers and philosophers, though the
temptation in the former is towards too great a
partisanship, and in the latter too great an autonomy.
However, the nature of the authority of their respective
judgments is the same, and it is co-terminous with its
form-giving force; that is, with its ability to give shape
to a specific form of life through the durability of its
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provocations, a form nf 1 i r~ i. •r o l lfe which becomes bounded by a
specific ethical horizon.
in "The crisis in Culture," Arendt suggests that in
his articulation of this enlarged way of thinking Kant has
discovered (though he himself did not recognize his dis-
covery) a different way of thinking upon which an ethics
might be grounded. Occidental ethics and logic have been
based on the idea of being in agreement with oneself and
the corollary logical axiom of non-contradiction. This is
an ethics which starts and remains with the individual in
the singular. Arendt, through Kant, moves towards an
ethics that depends upon people in the plural and gains
its validity from the movement between individuals and the
public sensibilities to which together they give shape,
and over which there is a perpetual struggle of mutual
persuasion. The question remains regarding exactly how
validity is established, what the authoritative element in
judgments really is and the kind of stability it can
render to human affairs.
For Arendt that ethical horizon is shaped by the ac-
tivity of sharing-the-world-with-others which is precisely
what she understands judging to be. And yet she abjures
when it comes to specifying this horizon further. And
this is as it must be given Arendt 's ontology with
plurality at its center. In her view, the greatest evil
is failure to attempt, through judging, to orient our-
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selves in a comoh world; failure to be provoked by the
sensuous profusion to take our own distinctive rela-
tionship to the given, thereby taking present" our unigue
being. That there are better or worse orientations is
contingent, must arise out of the particularities of the
Political world fro, which they come. In a lecture course
called "Basic Moral Propositions ,
- Arendt argued that the
greatest evil facing us today is not choosing between good
and bad company, but not choosing at all. The ethical
horizon which can guide us is not a horizon of specific
good, but rather it is the delineation of an activity to
save us from a passivity Arendt called "the banality of
evil." she wrote,
l
X
^lhe laSt analYsis "- our decisions aboutright and wrong will depend upon our choiceof company, with whom we wish to spend our
throuah ?h?nW
iS COmPany t in turn] is choseng t inking m examples, in examples ofpersons dead or alive, and in examples ofincidents, past or present. m the unlikelycase that someone should come and tell usthat he would prefer Bluebeard for company,
and hence as his example, all we could do
would be to make sure that he would never
come near us. But the likelihood that some
one would come and tell us that he does not
mind and that any company will be good
enough for him is, I fear, by far, greater.Morally and even politically speaking, thisindifference, though common enough, is thegreatest danger. And in the same direction,
only a bit less dangerous, does this other
very common modern phenomenon lie, the
widespread tendency to refuse to judge at
all. Out of the unwillingness or inability
to choose one's examples and one's company,
and out of the unwillingness or inability to
relate to others through judgment, arise the
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Clearly the ethical horizon of given communities
takes more distinctive shape as it becomes populated by
exemplary figures whose power tQ provoke^ ^ ^ ^
munity to lend their ears has great durability. Yet,
though Arendt herself actively courts us to be provoked
and thus remember those she wishes to have form orienting
touchstones for at least the Western world, (this is the
—nee of MeJ1_in_Dark^s)
, this shape is always in
formation and something that cannot be formulated in ad-
vance
-
it relates to the world which is punctuated by the
departure of the very old and the arrival of the very new.
Hence the figure of the judge both celebrates this
plurality and courageously tries to orient himself towards
the particularities of the world into which he was born
and will leave behind. He tries to augment, to add to the
possibility of political freedom itself which is the same
thing as to allow the new, the miraculous to happen.
The essential fact about our situation in the 20th
century which remained the perpetual touchstone for
Arendt 's thought was what she referred to alternatively as
being in a gap between past and future, and as being con-
fronted with or being in an abyss: the abyss of freedom.
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It is the figure of the judge who, in Arendt's view, could
"move" in such a gap, who could, to recall Barry Lopez
again, "cultivate the wild" of this abyss in the twofold
sense of this ambiguous phrase: making a specifically
humanly shaped world within which what is new, unprece-
dented might appear and be given reality. it is in this
figure of the judging spectator that the questioning after
meaning in this abyss occurs, is housed; a questioning
which asks who are we, in the midst of an embrace of the
particular, the new, which perpetually "threatens" to re-
constitute, destroy, undo the we and that who. in the
tension of space for such questioning which must stay as
close as possible to "what is," to particularities, lies
the authority of this figure and the durability of her
judgments.
It is in this figure of the judging spectator and the
activity of judging that Arendt finds a deep expression of
joy at the elemental experience of living together. From
this, the authority available to us can spring, as I have
suggested, but it is also the touchstone for Arendt 's ap-
proach to the question of justice. In her notes for her
1964 lecture course on Kant's political philosophy at the
University of Chicago, Arendt wrote about judgment,
"We deal with a form of being together
[shared judgments, community of taste] where
no one rules and no one obeys. Where people
persuade each other... This is not to deny
that interest and power and rule... are very
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And, at the end of "Truth and Politics," Arendt answers
this question in the affirmative by suggesting that there
are indeed two orders of experience which determine the
substance of politics: a lower order where politics is "no
more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests,
where nothing (counts) but pleasure and profit,
partisanship, and the lust for dominion," and a higher or-
der (which she refers to as the actual content of
politics, which she conceives as, "the joy and gratifica-
tion that arise out of being in company with our peers,
out of acting together and appearing in public, out of in-
serting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus
acquiring and sustaining our present identity and begin-
ning something entirely new." 75
It is out of this cluster of concerns of the higher
order that Arendt 's approach to justice arises. The first
order of concern when it comes to thinking about justice
for Arendt is always the question of how best to augment
that form of being together "where no one rules and no one
obeys" or, to put it differently, where we find "an
obedience in which men retain their freedom." The first
order justice concern is with what keeps us together as a
vital, living entity. In this context the first right, as
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" Stla^in£_a£_T2taUtarian^, is a "right
to polity,- the first order question, what augments that
"political.. li£e
. Questions Qf sQciai justice; distribu_
tive justice correspond to that lower order of the sub-
stance of politics. They concern power and interest, but
combat them in favor of some distributive notion of fair-
ness. It is not that Arendt wished to argue such ques-
tions are not a part of politics (though in some formula-
tions it would seem difficult to think otherwise)
. it is
rather that these in our time have become dominant, first
order questions, when this happens the deepest most fun-
damental meaning/purpose of political life becomes at-
tenuated and eclipsed, and we court nihilism.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
"There [Sophocles] also let us know what
mils, the space of men's free deeds and
splenlou?!^'
WMCh C°Uld ^ ^h
in drawing this work now to a close it remains to more
directly contrast Nietzsche and Arendt's respective con-
tributions to the problems of authority and justice in a
post-metaphysical age. This I will do in part by way of
summary, in part by way of reaching out to the broader
philosophical and political terrain of these issues.
I have tried in my reading of Nietzsche not so much
to refute the perhaps dominant interpretation of his
aesthetic reflections as to offer a reading that is in
some way more necessary for us to encounter today, neces-
sary in the sense that it moves us in a constructive
direction vis a vis the problems of ethical action in a
post-metaphysical age. As exemplary of the dominant read-
ing we might instructively look at Terry Eagleton's recent
analysis in The Ideology of the A^h^^, a reading that
is not so much unconvincing or irrelevant as one-sided
and, given the neglect in Nietzsche scholarship of that
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which is now less relevant ^ *-v,i to the problems of ethical lifem a post-metaphysicaln age. m The^deoioqv of the
Aesthetic, Nietzsche's self h^iself-declaration that he is the
"most modern of mod™ is in effect to mean that
Nietzsche has realized through Eggieton caiis h^
"aesthetic of autonomous sel f -reali 2ation..3 the total
destruction of the moral, religious and
structure" which kept the "productive energies" of the
bourgeoisie at least partly in check. This destruction
Nretzsche carries out in thought is not, Eagleton notes,
done to be sure in the interests of the bourgeoisie for
when Nietzsche has obvious disdain, but on behalf of those
strong-willed creatures who are able to live aesthetical-
ly. That is, who are able to creatively thrive on an
amoral will to power that celebrates power as an end in
itself. 4 Thus the truth Qf Niet2sche , s self.declarationj
on this reading, is that he is the hyperboli 2 ation of the
reckless, experimental
"energies" of the bourgeois class.
And since Nietzsche has absolutely no interest in trans-
forming the "base," Eagleton argues we cannot turn to
Nietzsche's aesthetic as a model or principle of social
consensus. Rather, this aesthetic of autonomous self-
realization undermines all law, all habit and all social
custom upon which order might be based.
Eagleton is, after this reading, pressed impatiently
to ask what could possibly be so morally positive and en-
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riching about this pointless, self-generating, amoral will
to power. 5 what
, to put ^ ^
ly. could be so morally positive about what would amount
politically to an unstable, ever-in-flux tyranny of the
strong? a kind of culture dedicated to anti-culture?
Readings such as Eagleton's are not only plausible
but instructive, warning as they do of the political and
moral dangers of the solipsistic and radically individu-
alistic moments of modernity as found in Nietzsche. What
such readings however fail to explore is Nietzsche's more
important insights into the possibilities for ethical and
by extension political life in an age without the solid
foundations of Truth, Reason or God. it is reflections
along these lines which Nietzsche opens up and which are
necessary for us today. in this regard, I have tried to
offer another way of interpreting Nietzsche's boast of
being "the most modern of moderns," an interpretation
which distinguishes him from all possible contenders - in-
cluding Hobbes, Marx and even Machiavelli. Namely, not
only does Nietzsche reject metaphysical foundations,
metaphysical "faiths" (as does Machiavelli and, arguably,
Hobbes) in a full-fledged and self-conscious claim to be
true to the intellectual honesty which he suggests has
historically given coherency to something we can refer to
as Western civilization, but he also, indeed, partially
answers Eagleton's question regarding the morally positive
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cs a
new.
and enriching possibil i t- i ~oy ties of an aesthetic of autonomous
self-realization. This he does in a^^
Eagleton's interpretation and rather explores an aestheti
of Vieldeutigkeit or multiplicity which in some sense i
hyperbolization of modernity's fascination with the
It is this latter project which involves Nietzsche persis-
tently with questions regarding the social conditions for
an ethical life in which a new post-metaphysical multi-
plicity of things could flourish, (it is here, with regard
to a kind of freedom as multiplicity of being, that he
vies with the vision Marx articulates in I^e_Economic^nd
Philosophic Manuscripts.
)
As I have suggested, the parameters of Nietzsche's
exploration of the social conditions for such an ethical
life are far too narrow, confined as they are to the na-
ture of interactions between individual persons, on the
one hand, and between figures of authority and those they
would influence, on the other. still, the line of reflec-
tion he initiates calls us to some original thoughts about
the nature of the quality of relations between persons in
which individual distinctiveness and uniqueness - hence
the plurality of the human world - can best flourish. The
ethos of the exemplar which emerges from Zarathustra be-
gins to explore the ethical idea that for the uniqueness
of each individual to emerge, a presumptuous and as-
similating pity (which rests on a kind of epistemological
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and metaphysical arrogance) must be ^ ^ ^ ^^
of a new wariness which honors and transfigures by beauti-
fying the gulf which now, in a post-metaphysical age, di-
vides us fro, one another. Yet Nietzsche pushes beyond
this idea one crucial step further in suggesting that the
very strength, beauty and authority that any individual
might today exhibit fundamentally grows out of the ability
not simply to keep the abyss near, but in_so_doing to
receive the blunt force of others' differences - be they
ugly, mediocre or radiant. m order, finally then, our-
selves to beautify and hence justify our world in its
tragic and terribly beautiful proportions by making of
ourselves inspiring examples, we must receive the world's
otherness, allow it to provoke us. it must cut into us,
that we learn from it as we strive to make of ourselves
examples to it. To be able to give, we must be capable of
receiving. A pitying ethos impedes both. Insofar as
Nietzsche moves towards articulating "principles of con-
sensus" in Eagleton's sense, they revolve around the ques-
tion of how best to create and preserve the strength and
uniqueness of each person. Hence Nietzsche is concerned
not merely with keeping the gap open, but in forming a
constructive ethical life around it, one which takes deep
and tragic pleasure in the terrible multiplicity of the
world and beautifies it by example.
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Nretzsche is "the most modern o £ moderns" in the dou-ble sense then that he embodies perhaps th^ two ethioal
dictions of an era: an endless mastering will to power -
the ethics of the strong which Eagleton and others criti-
cally elaborate, on the one hand, and a different ethic of
the strong which depends precisely upon nat mastering and
assimilating but rather on honoring and engendering the
distance between persons in order that plurality might
flourish. it is this Nietzsche with whom we can begin to
think a conception of authority adequate to a post-
metaphysical age no longer able to ground social order in
Truth, God or Reason. We need to learn from both
Nietzsche's in order to discern the contours of our age
including the way we are moving beyond it. But we have
gotten almost exclusively the first Nietzsche.
If Nietzsche begins this elaboration of an under-
standing of authority that values mutual self-formation in
the effort to allow otherness and the new to flourish, and
if he explores (albeit narrowly) the social relations be-
tween persons which most encourage this, the question
which drives the exemplar, though it leads in a social
direction is still far too solipsistic. Nietzsche is a
political thinker in the wide sense, concerned throughout
his work with a common ethical horizon for a culture
beyond nihilism. Nevertheless he is able to move out of
late modernity's solipsism only partially - for the ethi-
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cal question in his work remains at best "who am I" (and
at worst, "who shall I create myself to be"), even as this
1 feels the ground of its very being only when receiving,
with gratitude, the distinctiveness of others. That is,
even though this is an I in a post-metaphysical sense: de-
pendent for its identity as well as its difference on en-
counter with strong and different others. The problem is
that such solipsism keeps Nietzsche, as I suggested in the
Interlude, from more greatly appreciating and giving more
texture and dimensionality to the constructive formation
of a "we." Nietzsche's selves are artistic actors . They
have not fully felt the reality of their we-ness; they are
too theatrical, too changing.
It is, as I have suggested, in Arendt's work that we
find the thinker who inherits and moves beyond Nietzsche's
exemplary ethos. The question which drives Arendt is a
question of citizens who are at once actors and spec-
tators: "who are we?" And her work on authority and on
justice revolves around keeping this question alive by ex-
ploring the conditions which must be constituted for the
tension-filled presences of both the old and the new, the
established and the revolutionary in any culture. Her
concern about the lack of metaphysical foundation in the
2 0th century takes her not to an aesthetic of multiplicity
but to one of initium, of beginning in the twofold sense
of something new and something which establishes or con-
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stitutes a framework for saving that worthy of being
saved. In Arendt, then, we find the unusual and highly
delicate work of a thinker who embraces the post-
metaphysical condition in its politically post-
foundational sense, but who does so through the perpetual
concern with and exploration of constituting political re-
lations which provide the necessary stability of a world
within which and against which a new beginning can emerge.
Arendt persistently argues something that most others
writing roughly about the same problems utterly fail to
comprehend: namely, to establish political-ethical rela-
tions in which natality or initium can breathe, that is,
in order to celebrate the new, there must be an "old"
venerated and solid enough, an old world with enough
identity to provide the new with the contrast necessary
for its emergence. For Arendt, the old, the world as we
find it when we come into it, is worthy of as much atten-
tion and care (a judging care which decides what is fit to
be saved) as the newborn. It is in the tension between
the two where Arendt locates "life" - the living moments
of culture. And both the aesthetic and ethical dimensions
of her work are elaborated precisely here in the tension,
as I have argued.
This "locus" of Arendt 's thought also accounts for
why she has vexed both conservative and liberal thinkers.
It also distinguishes her work from post-structuralists
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such as Lyotard as well as from Eagleton's Nietzsche as
she neither courts change-frenzied paralogism, nor amoral
self-realization for their own sake. The urge to
celebrate movement or a sort of ever-abundant quantity of
difference is foreign to her thought. indeed it is
politically and ethically that which haunts her most about
our age. yet in her search for stabilizing principles
with which to ground authority and provide see degree of
stasis, Arendt also refuses to place faith in natural
rights, Reason, or Truth - all of which she argued events
in the 2 0th century has rendered political impotent. in-
stead, what Arendt courts is a political version of
Nietzsche's friend and the exemplary ethos he embodies.
Through the figure of the judge and the activity of judg-
ing Arendt describes the difficult process of ethical
orientation in a post-metaphysical world, one that bears
responsibility both to the world as it is, but also to a
world she would like to help bring into being, it is in
living in the tension between these two responsibilities
that Arendt's judge embodies the care for the strangerli-
ness or cleft which Nietzsche argues has come to define
existence in our times. It is this strangerliness which
the judge, in making good judgments, transfigures and
makes beautiful, provoking others to find her judgments
authoritative in the sense that in the effort to ethically
orient herself in a world without solidity, the judge does
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"no injury to reality." That is
, sne makes
to inhabit the standpoints of others, to, in Nietzsche's
words, let others "cut into" herself. This process too,
like that of the friendship Nietzsche describes, shuns the
arrogance and assimilating tendencies of pity. The judge
is not out to assume others' sensibilities and reactions
to the world, but rather to inhabit their positions in the
effort to experience their life with her own eyes. Here
too then, the judge honors that cleft which divides us and
makes us different; she honors that quality of alteritas.
Yet she is not so dominated by it that she cannot presume
a we
- albeit a we never settled, always suspended amidst
and given breathe within the tragic beauty of a plural
world; a we in whose life we take tragic pleasure.
What we find in Arendt/ then, is a powerful argument
that what ought to be authoritative for us, what ought to
provide "principles of social consensus" to use, again,
Eagleton's phrase, is a form of judging-orienting which
embodies attentiveness to the conditions for a we in con-
stant "self-challenge. For it is the life force of such
challenging which forges the "splendour" of "free deeds
and living words" which can make life justified, in
Arendt's view. Arendt finds it morally positive to enrich
plurality - not for the sake of profusion in itself, but
for the sake of freedom which she understands as essen-
tially made possible by the existence of a culture secure
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enough to receive, and save those unique deeds and words
worthy of being saved. This understanding, as I have
argued in chapter five, arises out of an ontology which
Place at the heart of human being the urge to sense and be
sensed, the urge to be both display and spectator. it is
pleasure in this perpetual aesthetic and sensuous mutual
provocation which makes our freedom take a fundamentally
political form, in Arendt's view.
The abyss between Nietzsche and Arendt in this regard
is large and all-important. As I have argue, Nietzsche
moves in this direction, particularly in Zarathustra
. Yet
his reliance on the will as the creative source of his
artist-actor self turns him in a less political, more
psychological direction in which the ego, beset always by
forces of disintegration and formlessness, must forge its
own character and style. 6 in Zarathustra
r
Nietzsche has
critical insights into the fundamentally social dimensions
of this task, but his reliance on the will constantly un-
dermines the insights in this work, as in his others, in
favor of Eagleton's Nietzsche who indeed preaches an
aesthetic of autonomous self-realization. This leads
Nietzsche perpetually away from an analysis of the condi-
tions for the kind of aesthetic justification of the world
for which he writes.
Nietzsche is then a necessary thinker for us in the
twofold sense of being very dangerous and of initiating a
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line of reflection we need to further today; a line I
think Arendt pursues with most vision and insight. it is
post-structuralist thinkers' neglect of this line of
thinking which makes the,, on the whole, so unpolitical,
so unsuited for the constructive tasks of political
thought
- including elaborating different conceptions of
authority and other foundations for justice in a post-
metaphysical age. This is likewise true for readers of
Nietzsche who see primarily his danger, a group which in-
cludes most in the marxist-socialist tradition, as well as
students of Leo Strauss who read Nietzsche as the great
herald of nihilism, but also as a thinker who embodies it.
To intimate the political and cultural significance
of this Nietzschean-Arendtian line of thinking on
authority and justice, and the parallel sterility and
danger of those who fail to engage it, it may, in closing,
be illuminating to situate this work within the con-
temporary debate within the academic community over the
status of the canon in Western intellectual life, for this
debate touches quite centrally upon the question of
authority in our culture, but also upon multiple questions
of justice.
The debate over undergraduate education at American
universities was touched off by the appearance in 1987 of
Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind
r
and given
added life with the very recent appearance of Dinesh
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D'Souza's Illibera^ducation.V Both Bloom and
are standard bearers for the traditional curriculum, and
see themselves as writing to defend the principles of lib-
eral education against the assault made upon them, in
their view, by deconstruction, postmodernism, and post-
structuralism which, for short hand I will call here the
new criticism. This new world view teaches, according to
D'Souza, that Western values are inherently oppressive,
that political transformation is the chief purpose of edu-
cation, that all standards are arbitrary, that there is no
objectivity, and that justice is simply the will of the
stronger party. 8 Tne political effect, as Allan Bloom
succinctly put it, is that the new criticism "prepare [s]
the soul for devotion to the emergent. "9 The historicist
impulses which dominate the new criticism have relativized
all claims to truth and knowledge leaving, they suggest,
the student few intellectual resources with which to chal-
lenge or gain perspective on the issues and views which
dominate our historical present. The real problem of the
new criticism thus is not the various approaches to
literary tests per se, but the kind of politics and the
ideology it "serves" which D'Souza summarizes as "the vic-
tim's revolution." 10 Here the aim is, as Yale professor
Geoffrey Hartman put it, "the restoration of voice to
unite classes of people," 11 or, as Michel Foucault has put
it, the unearthing of "subjugated knowledges." Once all
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standards are relativized and the traditional norms of
scholarship are de-legitimized, the "instinct for ac-
tivism" is set free and the university loses its autonomy
from the political currents of the day, becoming a
battleground for particular interests and claims instead
of that arena in which truth and knowledge can be pursued
for their own sake. Warning against the possibility of
"indignant political fanaticism," D'Souza concludes, "the
rejection of authority can sometimes result, paradoxical-
ly, in an embrace of authoritarianism." 12
The authority they wish to restore is that various
and rich body of texts which, as proof of their quality,
have survived the test of time, retaining the power to
speak to the "permanent questions" of mankind, 13 and thus
perpetually to inform human life with their truths. These
texts (and for Bloom particularly those of the ancient
Greeks) must be read for the sake of finding out whether
they are true, viz. we should read Aristotle's
Nichomachean Ethics not to find out what people of his
time thought of morality, but rather to learn his teaching
of what a good man is. 14 No life, Bloom argues, can
remain in studies which are not driven by the claim that
they are pursuing "the important truth." 15 Not only,
thus, do works in the canon teach us about the importance
of the questioning after truth, the good, etc., and of the
capacity of intellectual life and culture committed to
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them to place critical tension on the present, but there
is important truth in these texts which we must recover.
That is, not only are they methodologically exemplary, but
they are substantively enduring as well. it is only with
the conviction that there are enduring truths that we pur-
sue that we can retain what for Bloom and D'Souza are the
ethically and politically essential grounds from which to
make claims that one thing is superior to another, i.e.
that we can have an ethical life. The problem today is
that no one is willing to claim that one thing is superior
to another in the sense of expressing or being exemplary
of permanent questions and problems of mankind.
On the face of it Arendt seems an unlikely critic and
rather more of an ally of Bloom and D'Souza. No friend of
the absolute relativizing of historicist claims, Arendt
argues for the moral centrality of judging. She is also a
true lover of the classics in the Western canon, finding
in them those works most worthy of our enduring attention
- a position nearly all of her own works exemplify in the
extreme. Furthermore, Arendt was a persistent critic of
ideological politics, and spoke out against politicizing
the university in this sense. She too believed the uni-
versity should serve "intellectual detachment and dis-
interested search for truth." 16 (She did think the uni-
versity should be politicized in the sense that it was a
public thing "owned" collectively by the community it com-
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posed, and thus she supported a student strike at one uni-
versity taken in solidarity with "their university" as she
put it, when they learned that university service employ-
ees were being paid less than minimum wage. She also
gladly supported demands that students be given time off
during elections to engage as citizens. But she shared
Bloom and D'Souza's fear of the other forms of politiciza-
tion of the university.) m addition, Arendt was very
critical of a politics based on pity or compassion, as I
have argued, and would therefore seem to be hostile to the
"victim's revolution" that D'Souza argues underlies the
world view of the new criticism and the accompanying as-
sault on the canon. And her own criticisms in the late
60 's of curriculum changes demanded by Negro students -
she called Swahili a 19th century kind of no-language, and
African literature a non-existent subject17 - appear to
support such a reading and such an alignment.
Indeed, there are great general affinities between
D'Souza and Bloom's apprehensions about the present, on
the one hand, and Arendt 's own concerns, on the other.
This is particularly the case with respect to preserving
the university as a place where souls are not prepared for
"devotion to the emergent," but rather for a lively criti-
cal capacity of mind. Yet the differences between them
are decisive, and I will try to show that the effect of
the conservative response of thinkers such as Bloom and
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D'Souza is to close out the emergence of a genuine pres-
ent, to make it possible to beat that path of non-time in
the heart of time which is the task of every new thinking
generation, as Arendt argued. Arendt would have found
Bloom and D'Souza's response to important concerns reac-
tive insofar as they fail to let the present breathe its
own breaths. And this, I will suggest, has everything to
do with their conception of authority, a conception ill-
suited to our times, and which also radically differentia-
ted the approach to question of justice her aesthetic con-
ceptions of politics suggest from that of Bloom and
D'Souza.
There is, then, an abyss between them when we look
both at their respective analyses of how we got to the
current educational state we are in, and of their respec-
tive responses
- i.e. what should be done. Bloom has a
stubbornly intellectualist
,
anti-materialist explanation
for the current assault on the canon: it is due to the im-
portation of nihilistic, relativizing ideas from Germany.
And his response, to be blunt, (and I'm afraid bluntness
is appropriate because the depth of his analysis is able
to support little else), 18 is to argue that we must quit
thinking certain things - most importantly that there is
no nature and no truth, and quit reading texts in certain
ways, that is, with our own concerns and agendas in the
forefront. Let me take an example to illustrate each of
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Bloom's arguments regarding how we should respond to the
threat of relativism and nihilism which indeed is, at
least in some way, part of our current condition.
First, there is the argument that we should quit
thinking certain things - namely that there is no truth
and no nature. This is a persistent argument, and the ex-
ample from his work I would like to explore concerns his
reflections on feminine "nature." Bloom argues that there
is a feminine and a masculine nature, moored teleological-
ly in the procreative needs of the species. Modesty be-
came (and should remain) the central virtue of the femi-
nine nature "because it govern[ed] the powerful desire
that relate[d] men to women, provide[d] a gratification in
harmony with the procreation and rearing of children, the
risk and responsibility of which falls naturally - that
is, biologically - on women." 19 it is this female modesty
which distinguishes the sexes not only in the sexual act,
but in "the whole of life." 20 And it is the scourge of
feminism which has substantially attenuated this modesty,
assaulting nature and the natural order of things, so much
so that sexual difference loses all its richness as does
the sexual act, and the permanent problems surrounding
sexual identity which have heretofore been expressed in
great literature now no longer speak to the reality of the
young. Whatever problems they have in their sexual rela-
tionships can no longer be traced back to "any moral am-
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biguity in man , s sexual nature _„ 21 Hence ^
naturalizing sexual identity and realize its natural
origin. The former is centra] t-ri «-v,„l o the agenda of feminism
and its academic arm, women's studies, and accounts
therefore for what Bloom characterizes as their assault on
the canon.
There are many, many reasons to question Bloom's
teleological moorings for feminine and masculine nature
and sexual desire. To take one of the most distressing
examples from recent history to demonstrate the enormous
Plasticity of sexual desire, we can turn to testimony
Arendt herself cites in Th^ains_ofJomitarian^ of
a once very ordinary German citizen become SS who was in-
terviewed at a concentration camp during the war by David
Rousset
.
"Usually I keep on hitting till I ejaculate
I 2
W
i
fe and three children in Breslau.I used to be perfectly normal. That's whatthey've made of me. Now when they give me apass out of here, I don't go home. I don'tdare look my wife in the face." 22
This should give us reason to pause in assuming humans
possess a set sexual nature, for this example suggests we
must at least include in our understanding of sexual
desire a socio-political dimension.
Furthermore, though it is obviously plausible to
argue that procreation fell naturally (biologically) on
women, it is not egually plausible to argue as Bloom does
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that childrearing fell naturally on women. Here again it
xs much more plausible to argue ^^ ^^
factors had a great deal to do with the historically so
persistent role of ween as childrearers - as so .any
socialist feminists have argued. 23
in addition, the technological developments which
have occurred as a consequence of modern science really
demand we question the entire category of nature when it
comes to human identity. That is, even birth control, but
more pointedly, new reproductive technologies of which
some are now available and others only foreseeable - such
as test tube fertilization followed by ex utero incuba-
tion, to the even more outlandish possibility that a fer-
tilized egg be placed in a male "womb" and there be
brought to term... such possibilities make the very notion
of natural sex identity problematic, unsustainable as we
know them, and they push as to question what Bloom does
not
- the importance of sex to identity itself. Why
should it be so central? We are now faced with a choice
never before available. it is this reality we must en-
counter, a difficult encounter which Bloom's theorizing
refuses. This Nietzschean-Arendtian line of thinking does
not.
The failure of Bloom's effort to make nature our
authority when it comes to sexual identity or gender,
then, is manifold. What is of importance in this context
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is to point out something Arendt very forcefully and
honestly faced; namely that, at the very least, our latest
experiences, (e.g. totalitarian conditions), and our new
technological capacities (e.g. the new reproductive tech-
nologies) have made the notion of a human nature which we
can definitively grasp, an intellectual and moral im-
possibility . 24 These very reai events ^ ^ ^
many others, have made such a nature a moral impossibility
because they have so radically severed us from the past
that we no longer have any reliable guideposts to it.
Hence we are faced morally without the authority of past
experience and past reflection, and the moral task of
thought is, as I have suggested, to think and judge
without it. it is not thus the emergence and predominance
of mere ideas which is the problem, as Bloom suggests.
The world and the life of the mind, the visible and the
invisible, have a much deeper and more intractable rela-
tionship than Bloom is willing to consider. It is worldly
events which have attenuated the reliability and
plausibility of the "old views," worldly events which make
attempts such as Bloom's to rely on them irrelevant at
best and reactionary at worst.
To face up to this situation is to take a moral posi-
tion for Arendt insofar as, in a world which is now "free"
from metaphysical groundings (whether it chooses to be or
no)
,
we have a new possibility of really building a shared
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W°rld
°" ^ baSiS °f * C—ration o f plurality and
a world whose ..splendour „ can reany shQw
_ Tq ^
otherwise is to reject the specific ^.^^ ^ free_dom our world offers Th= t-rt . e time for the idea of a fixed
nature is passed; we must face our condition. To do
otherwise is to court a kind of authoritarianism.
This leads to the second dimension of Bloom's
response to our condition
- namely his argument concerning
how to read texts in the canon. „is arguments about what
how they should be read is, from an Arendtian point of
view, equally unfreeing and morally problematic insofar as
their effect too is to forbid the present to bring itself
into being; to beat its track of non-time in time. In a
significant passage Bloom, reflecting on the problem
"ithin the academy of the lack of unity regarding what
constitutes the core of a liberal education, writes,
one^haf;^? "4* Seri°US s°mtion is thene that is almost universally reiected- t-ho
lioera°}
d
•
B°°ltS aPP"»<** in'which'aberal education means reading certain gen-
ina
rec°9n
i
zed cl^sic texts, lust_rela-
J-nq them
,
letting them dictate what theQuestions are and the method of approachingthem
- not forcing them into categories wemake up, not treating them as historicalproducts, but trying to read them ac
authors wnshed them to he roa H (emghailj—
mine)
Here the sterility and really moral irresponsibility - if
this means anything like "thinking what we are doing" -
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shines forth. While there are very good reasons to read
classic texts imminently in the general way Bloom suggests
-
not the least of which is to pursue the question of gen-
eral and permanent problems of facing humanity - this can-
not, given the enormously changed material, intellectual
and spiritual worlds we live in, be the sole approach.
For instance, to take the question, again, of women - our
"nature" and our "place" in the socio-political order.
Were we to rely on reading, for example, Aristotle or
Augustine or Hegel, all three would uphold an order of
things in which women's nature was essentially passive and
most fulfilled in the domestic sphere. So would they wish
to be read. How illuminating is this for us today in a
world where the very notion of gender is increasingly
challenged not only politically but by the very material
conditions of our lives? it is thoroughly instructive, I
would suggest, as a chastening, questioning posture, yet
surely there are additional questions we must press upon
these authors, questions which the very uniqueness of our
age demands we think. Where is the space for these set of
questions in Bloom and D'Souza's liberal education?
It is, it seems to me, the mixture of approaches to
the texts in the canon which constitute the best work
being done in, for example, feminist scholarship. That
is, work which both seeks to conserve and to problematize
the rich thought in the canon, enlivening and re-
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enlivening the works themselves as well as the issues of
our day through mutual encounter. 26 while Bloom and
D'Souza fear in the new criticism a rejection of authority
which results in a relativization of all value, a collapse
of standards, and an accompanying authoritarianism per-
petuated by the strong, they themselves turn for help to
the authority of truth and nature which, I have suggested,
at the very least recent events render implausible and un-
fit for helping us think fully about the moral and politi-
cal dilemmas of a post-metaphysical age. Theirs is a
nostalgic and politically authoritarian turn itself, wish-
ing rather than to think in the present, to stifle its
emergence. Hence the strictures on having the canon "dic-
tate" to us our questions and method of reading these
texts
.
The position on the debate over the canon which
Arendt's work suggests is neither clearly with the hyper
historicism of the new criticism nor with the conservative
reaction. She partakes of both concerns and both methods
in an approach uniquely Arendtian, and one which is highly
instructive and really quite moral in the midst of what
has become a very polemical, acrimonious and often
unilluminating environment. Arendt neither relies on now
implausible authorities nor does she eschew the notion of
authority and standards altogether. The greatest evil
today in Arendt's view, as I have suggested, is neither
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not believing in truth or nature (the conservative view)
nor believing in such things (the view of the new criti-
cism)
.
Rather it is failure to orient oneself with
respect to what is, failure to judge. she fears not
tolerance, and not intolerance, but indifference. And her
vehemence against ideological politics is due not to its
destruction or disregard for truth, but due precisely to
it anti-political nature in the sense that it seeks to
reduce the plurality of ideas, perspectives and interests
inherent in the human world. And here her thought should
chasten those within the new criticism camp who are so
ready to politicize the university in the sense of making
it unreflectively amenable to demands by those who have
historically been excluded from it. There is a danger of
an authoritarianism of the left to be sure.
A position on the debate over the canon informed by
Arendt 's work would take its bearings from that something
Arendt called "humanness," by which she meant not a mere
tolerance for diversity but a more active sensibility - a
gladness in and an openness to the world of others - that
aesthetic sensibility called tragic pleasure. A political
sensibility in the deepest sense of the word, this human-
ness endeavors to make the rich and plural world an object
of discourse, to talk about the world with others in the
effort to bring forth a world to which "we" distinctly
belong. This requires that we "commend truth unto the
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gods," and accept that in a human world, truth has no
Place save truth which has been humanized; that is, save
that which takes as its primary bearings the fundamental
relativity of the interhuman world, 28 and says not "this
is truth" (e.g. the truth of feminine nature), but rather,
"this is what I deem truth. "2* ^ Qnly^ ^
ing would it be essential to judge and speak the truth as
one sees it, but also it would be necessary to exhibit
that "vigilant partiality" to which Arendt referred, to
exhibit that lack of objectivity which is nevertheless not
the same as subjectivity because its partiality favors not
the self, but the world insofar as it is constituted by
the multiple voices of those who judge and speak the truth
as they see it. it is these voices which together create
the nearness and the all-important distances without which
there could be no specifically human world. Such
partiality would be ever-vigilant against the dominance of
a single Truth and hence be partial to the ambiguities,
subtleties and paradoxes in all questions and judgments
concerning the world.
More specifically, an Arendtian approach to the
debate would embody a responsibility to the canon as "the
world" that has been handed down to us, as that body of
texts which have been the central intellectual, philosoph-
ical cornerstones of Western civilization. As such, the
responsibility entails that of introducing newcomers, the
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young to this, "our" world. Hence this instruction must
figure centrally in a liberal education. However, and
this is decisive, the essence of education is not merely
conservation, but natality too. And this means that not
only must we attempt to conserve and sustain a common
world, but that this very world is perpetually suspended
in and even sustained by contestation. We must strive for
a conserving sensibility in the service of the new. And
this is all the more critical if Arendt is right, and I
think she is, that in our post-metaphysical age we have
lost the threads which tied the present to the past such
that the very stability and tangibility of our common
world has become fleeting and evanescent; the instruction
and meaning it holds for us now unbound by age-old pres-
criptions which heretofore "dictated" to the newcomer the
nature of the "treasures" it succored.
We cannot then but bring our current questions,
urgencies and predicaments to our approaches to the canon
- which is not necessarily the same as historicizing all
claims and approaches to it, though it does mean allowing
it into the relativity characteristic of all human things
and ceasing to approach it in an almost metaphysical fash-
ion. Arendt 's own way of approaching the canon in The
Life of the Mind is exemplary in this regard. Here,
driven by the question whether the habit of thinking may
not condition humans against doing evil, a question which
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emerged from her observations of and report on Eichmann
and his trial, Arendt turns to the canon of the "great
thinkers." Her problem is that each of these thinkers is
caught within what she calls "the metaphysical fal-
lacies...30 That ^ on ^ bas . s Qf ^ think^
ence each drew conclusions about the world which are no
longer plausible (e.g. belief in a less real sensory and a
more real and eternal suprasensory world)
. Despite the
implausibility however of the various systems and doc-
trines of the great thinkers, Arendt argues they are not
arbitrary. it is not, she suggests, the g^iestions which
they pursue which have become meaningless to us, but the
way they were framed and answered which has lost relevance
and plausibility. 31 what she therefore attempts to do is
to reframe these age-old questions by moving them out of
their metaphysical, philosophical and theological dimen-
sions and into their phenomenological dimensions - more
plausible and suitable to us today.
It is the fundamental continuity of experience, of
being thinking beings which makes the thought of the great
thinkers to whom Arendt turns not arbitrary and such rich
sources for her phenomenological explorations. Yet to let
their specific formulations and interpretations of that
shared experience "dictate" their meanings would be to
still the relevance of their work to the living world of
the present. Arendt 's conserving sensibility, her sense
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that the philosophical canon has treasure which must be
saved, is a sensibility in the service of the new. And it
is the freshness with which she approaches the canon which
"saves" it and gives her own voice its authority.
What then of the other dimension of this debate over
higher education today - the struggle over the curricula
in the form of the creation of new fields of study such as
women's studies, Afro-American studies as well as other
ethnically centered fields which Bloom and D'Souza cen-
trally implicate in the anti-Western bent of academic
study as well as in its politicization and relativization?
in this struggle questions of justice are paramount. How
would this Nietzschean-Arendtian line of thinking approach
this dimension of the debate?
To begin with, the concerns critics such as Bloom and
D'Souza express over these new fields and the changes in
the curricula for which those who promote them agitate
largely revolve around the fear that these changes are
turning universities into sites for rectifying socio-
historical injustices rather than sites for developing and
civilizing young people into our culture. This they do by
destroying the possibility of a body of "unifying thought"
which can form the "general curricula." 32 Without such a
body of thought civilized persons with a solid sense of
identity and culture cannot emerge. Further adding to the
problem, these new fields teach, in their view, disdain
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for (dominant) Western culture and seek radical social
change which favors those historically oppressed and vic-
timized by this same culture: women, blacks, hispanics,
homosexuals, third world peoples, etc. While they some-
what begrudgingly recognize the legitimacy of struggles to
change these dimensions of Western culture, what those who
engage in them aim for is far too radical and unrelenting
in their critique and rejection of Western culture. Fur-
thermore, they have so politicized the university as to
make it impossible for anyone to object to this "victim's
revolution" on grounds of academic standards of any kind.
D'Souza puts it this way,
"It is a revolution in behalf of minority
victims. its mission is to put an end tobigoted attitudes that permit perceived so-
cial injustices to continue, to rectify past
and present inequities, and to advance theinterests of the previously disenfranchised
- unobjectionable aims to be sure. But be-
cause the revolutionaries view xenophobia,
sexism, racism and other prejudices to be
endemic and culturally sanctioned, their
project seeks a fundamental restructuring of
American society. It involves basic changes
in the way economic rewards are distributed,
and in the way cultural and political
privilege is exercised ... The changes are not
always indefensible, seldom if ever, though,
are they subjected to any criticism. Since
the motives and objectives of the activists
seem beyond reproach, there never seems to
be any need to account for the means they
employ. "^^
What we seem to be witnessing, then, is a classic
case of a politics of pity in which the views and inter-
ests of the weak who have now become the "stronger party"
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coalesce in a politics which borders on righteous terror.
All standards and objectivity are sacrificed to this pro-
cess of rectification; anything which aims at less than
this just cause is delegitimized - including the pursuit
of the permanent guestions of mankind and of truth itself.
Both Nietzsche and Arendt, it appears, would join in
D'Souza and Bloom's revulsion at such a state of affairs.
There is, I think a measure of truth in Bloom and
D'Souza's characterization of this as a victim's revolu-
tion prone to excess, though the lack of measure in their
own voices, their hyper-focus on the more extreme formula-
tions and their concomitant failure to examine the really
important scholarly contributions which have been made by
"members" of this revolution vitiates the critical
authority of their views. Furthermore, however adequately
they point to dangers, the remedy they offer - a reversion
to traditional standards and traditional curricula by
which to develop and civilize our youth - fails wholly to
provide an adequate response in the twofold sense of being
adequate to enqaging the concerns which drive those they
oppose (and such engagement need not imply agreement, but
rather consideration that results in "speaking to"), and
of being adequate to the ethical conditions of a post-
metaphysical world.
In this regard, the project of civilizing and devel-
oping our youth must encompass not so much directly a
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fight against social and economic injustice, as embody an
ethic which places plurality at its center. it is with
respect to this demand that the work of Nietzsche and
Arendt is instructive as it points to an orientation out-
side the current polarization over the curriculum in high-
er education. Here the impulse is neither for unchanging
standards of excellence which qualify one work and not an-
other, nor for standards formulated solely on the basis of
how inclusive they are at addressing gender, race and
class issues. The orientation which is suggested by a
Nietzschean-Arendtian aesthetic approach to questions of
justice is, rather, one which orients itself by the in-
justice of obscurity and by the sense of gladness at the
plurality and relativity of human affairs such that the
aim is for a cacophony of voices who perpetually pose and
counterpose the broadly political question, who are we?
In so doing we let others cut into ourselves with all the
power of their strangerliness, to paraphrase Nietzsche.
Standards for judging the acceptability and excellence of
a particular voice, a particular work must, given the rel-
ativity of human affairs, be the outcome of public strug-
gle, but one informed by a cultural animi who feels great
joy in the ceaseless challenge of bringing into being the
novelty of a present which mediates between both the past
and what is to come. it is in this challenge that the
life of a culture, the very thing which keeps it is being
as such, abides.
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